The Russian Cavalry Must Come From the Air

Russia failed to get air superiority over Ukraine. There are many reasons for it. But I think the basic reason is that Russia needs to preserve their air force for more important targets--the Chinese.

Via Instapundit is this post on reasons for why Russia failed to gain air superiority over Ukraine.

The reasons are all valid. But I think Russia could have powered through those obstacles--and endured the aircraft and pilot losses--to use their air power if it was really needed in Ukraine.

And with Ukraine's limited air power, Russia finds that its operational concept of holding off NATO air power defensively is the default situation in Ukraine. As long as both sides' air power is nullified, I think Russia figures it has the firepower advantage over a Western-style army. Remember, at some points Russia was credited with a 15:1 artillery fire volume advantage over Ukraine.

By withholding aircraft from providing routine close air support, Russia preserves their air power in case it really needs it to intervene on the battlefield to blunt a Ukrainian offensive. Or for the next war.

Away from the front lines, Russia has been able to use missiles for strategic missions. The one thing Russia loses by withholding air power is the ability to strike deep throughout Ukraine's military rear areas. Clearly that objective is not important enough to get Russia to risk their aircraft.

More broadly, Russia needs their air power intact as a strategically mobile source of firepower across vast Russia:

What if the Russians really see this new strategy to counter supposed foreign subversion linked to precision weapons as applying to China which poses a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia in their Far East. A Chinese threat only suspended by the 20-year treaty they signed in 2001. Russia is running out of time to be able to defend their territory in the Far East rather than appease play second fiddle to China while the power differential favors China.

In that light, Russian investment in long-range air and missile precision strike capability isn't intended to reach America but is intended to reach Russia's own Far East and neighboring China from European Russia. The fifth column might not be Russian protesters on the streets of Moscow but ethnic Chinese illegally settling in Russian territory in the Far East (and maybe local Russians who'd rather go with China than distant Moscow which siphons off their natural resources) where their empire is truly at risk.

Russia's exercises for their airborne forces could be seen in this light, too.

That last link above is about Russia practicing moving their strategic ground forces reserve across Russia:

With most of Russia's army second tier at best (with the vaunted battalion tactical groups simply the useful parts of their brigades that can be scraped together with working equipment and trained personnel), Russia is relying more on the VDV.

The second tier forces have to be the bulk of the army in any theater. But they will need to be reinforced and stiffened by better quality forces. So the VDV has to be mobile as well as better trained and equipped in order to reinforce any local army under threat (or that is tagged for offensive operations against a small neighbor, of course).

Which I think is largely about quickly reinforcing the Far East.

The airborne forces have been savaged fighting Ukraine. Russia will no doubt prioritize post-war rebuilding on these units. But that will be easier than replacing lost air power, with their expensive machines and ammunition plus crews that take a long time to train.

As long as Putin's war against Ukraine is just a special military operation, the air force will remain uncommitted. And I don't think this really limits Russia's war effort against Ukraine.

UPDATE: Related thoughts on Russia's poor ground forces that are unlikely to be good enough to exploit any effects of its air attacks to win:

The most important point is that airpower, under the best circumstances, cannot take and hold ground. Ground forces must be deployed to do that. Drones can support ground campaigns, as airpower did in WWII and Vietnam, but the gap between intelligence and action makes support for ground attacks more difficult.

And strategic attacks are unlikely to break Ukrainian will to resist.

I still think that air power is not necessary for battlefield victory if you nullify the enemy's air power. Under those circumstances your superior artillery can be the decisive firepower support on the battlefield. That said, I still want air superiority to use air power against enemies.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.