America is a global superpower. Sealift capacity eroded after the Cold War but was supplemented by private sector shipping for the short conventional campaigns and long counterinsurgencies America fought. But that is not enough for an era of great power competition. America is not a super power without that power projection capability.
What are the measures of a superpower? Is it the number and diversity of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems? Is it the size of its Army? Or the number of ships in its fleet? These are necessary, but not sufficient, measures of a nation’s military capabilities.
A unique strategic advantage for the U.S. is its capacity to move large amounts of forces and supplies across oceans and sustain them while engaged in combat, often for years. This is essential for the military’s ability to achieve integrated deterrence, conduct expeditionary and humanitarian operations, and provide reassurance to friends and allies. Should deterrence fail, moving forces to a fight and sustaining their presence is vital. That makes sealift an important measure of U.S. military power.
I've been droning on about this issue. Sealift is still insufficient.
And we'll just gloss over my worries about that whole "integrated deterrence" notion.
But I digress.
Threats to America are not found in the Western Hemisphere--luckily for America. But that luck is only the foundation for projecting power.
And America must project power because the threats are from Eurasia where we need forward defenses to keep the threats from gathering and growing to reach North America.
America's airlift is insufficient. More importantly, American sealift is insufficient:
As we focus on shooters for great power competition, let's not forget the logistics that will allow us to move and sustain the shooters long enough to shoot and win.
We've seen the problems Russia has sustaining combat operations just 100 miles from their rail heads. The problem of moving an expeditionary force abroad and sustaining it through opposition at sea and in the air is far more difficult and expensive. But that is vital to preventing that American expeditionary force from dying far from home. Let alone winning campaigns to sustain Eurasian allies to keep threats far from our shores.
And maybe, just maybe, China learns the wrong lesson from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Maybe the Chinese don't learn that it is too dangerous to invade Taiwan.
Maybe China learns that like Ukraine did, China could destroy the sea-going "trucks" that must sustain any American campaign in the Western Pacific.
Oh, and it gets worse. Aside from carrying and sustaining the Army and Air Force abroad, the Navy lacks the organic ability to project and sustain itself abroad:
One of the overriding themes inherent in this effort is that the U.S. Navy is no longer an expeditionary navy, that it is a forward based navy.[iv] In dealing with the “peace dividend” defense budgets of the 1990’s, the Navy made the discussion to cut many of the ship classes that underpinned expeditionary operations: tenders, repair ships, salvage ships, logistics ships, etc. It was able to do this, in part, by being able to secure the long-term use of forward operating bases in Japan, Spain, Singapore, and other countries around the world, as well as enter into ship husbanding contracts for supplies and repairs in ports around the world. But the Navy never went back and replaced the ship classes it reduced and eliminated in the 90’s, and the ability to use facilities located in other countries is entirely dependent on the sovereign decision-making of host nations.If we lose those forward bases from enemy action or host nation decisions, our Navy is largely pushed back to North America.
Have a super sparkly logistics kind of day.
NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
