How do you deter the deluded or irrational? I'm starting to think that conventional deterrence only works in political science theories.
It is popular to say that America and the West failed to deter Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I have sympathy for that view. But it has limits. Just how much can you deter the irrational and paranoid?
The current war in Ukraine provides a case for security cooperation. Had the United States and NATO invested more heavily in Ukraine before Russia’s February 2022 invasion, they may have deterred Russia from attacking in the first place. In the past several months, the United States has invested approximately $17.6 billion in security assistance for Ukraine. In comparison, it only invested $2.7 billion from 2014 until February. The United States’ concerns about escalation with Russia were pervasive early in the Ukraine crisis, but along with NATO it has since taken much greater risks to help Ukraine survive and to contain Russia. U.S. and NATO leaders are now likely pondering whether it may have been smarter and cheaper to invest earlier to prevent the war than to help Ukraine fight it. [emphasis in original]
Would, as an example, sending $10 billion in security assistance before the invasion have deterred Russia?
One, more aid would have just fueled Russian paranoia. Not that I'm saying Russian paranoia should guide our policy. Insane fears must not have a veto on our policy.
The converse of fueling Russian paranoia is that nothing can actually lower Russian paranoia:
Good grief, if Putin had just kept his mouth shut and his army at home, NATO would have continued to disarm. In a few years of the trend continuing, the fierce warriors of Montenegro could have conquered Germany.
And to add to the evidence, contemplate that Putin has managed to turn Democrats into virulent Russia-haters. We know why, of course. But still, the change is amazing. I bet Putin didn't expect Russia's traditionally useful idiots to stop being useful.
Anyway, stop acting as if Putin is brilliant or a model to follow.
Seriously, Russia watched NATO disarm but still believed it was marching toward Moscow because former Soviet vassal states didn't want Russia to take back what the Soviets lost. If America had provided zero security assistance aid to Ukraine, Russia still would have feared a NATO plot. If NATO had disbanded, Russia would have convinced itself that it was a clever American plot to remove the restraints the alliance placed on American plots to destroy Russia.
There is no geographical advance that would calm Russian paranoia.
So I disregard Russian paranoia as something America must consider when deciding policy because Russian paranoia is an internal issue beyond our control. Describing American policy toward Russia in public should consider Russian paranoia. But not the basic policy. Don't spike the ball in the end zone, is all I'm saying. Or, contain softly but carry a big stick.
Still, the level of Russian paranoia is separate from deterring Russia from attacking Ukraine. In theory, having superior military power--or at least raising the cost of winning to a level too high to bear--is supposed to deter an enemy.
Would Russia have looked at $10 billion in American security assistance prior to Russia's invasion as too much Ukrainian military power to overcome?
I seriously doubt that.
Putin fears NATO is out to get him. We'll ignore the issue of why that is so when Russia should really worry about China taking Russian territory.
And Putin believed he had vastly superior conventional military power to resolve those issues.
But Putin was wrong. He believed Russia's BS.
And it isn't just a Russian problem. America thought Russia would rapidly stomp on Ukraine. How much security assistance would America have needed to pump into Ukraine to satisfy our models and conclude Russia was deterred?
And even worse for our belief we can fine tune policies is that Putin has waged war with heavy losses for nine months now despite a theory--that I believed--that the Russian people would not bear heavy losses, thus putting a brake on Russian aggression.
Thucydides said that fear, honor, and interest are the basic causes of war. Sadly, no disinterested party defines what a country must fear, what sustains or harms its honor, or what its national interests really are.
And even if elements of a country's government or private sector know the accurate answers to those three issues and what the relative military power balance is, will the leaders who decide on war or peace have any chance of knowing those facts?
Still, we can totally figure out nuclear deterrence, right?
Have a super sparkly day.
NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.
