Putin has defined his special military operation to conquer Ukraine as a war for Russian survival against Nazis, NATO, and Satan himself. And Putin has made an effort to show he is finally taking charge of the war from his weak and inept commanders who have been blamed for Russia's faltering invasion. That's a lot of pressure on a partially trained, poorly led, and inadequately trained mass of new recruits.
Russia certainly plans to win this war:
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on December 13 that indicators such as Russian mobilization efforts, the announcement of conscription, and the movement of heavy weaponry suggest that Russia may be preparing for a large-scale offensive in January and February 2023.
Russian efforts to portray Putin as taking charge of the Russian war effort is risky for Putin. Rather than being a master strategist playing Russia's bad hand with great skill as so many in the past wrongly portrayed Putin, Putin seems like he is bluffing and trying to draw to an inside straight.
Will Ukraine strike south first to cut off Russian-occupied Crimea along the Sea of Azov (and perhaps taking a bigger shot at the Kerch Strait bridge)? And try to break the morale of Russia's ground forces to preempt a Russian offensive?
Or will Ukraine wait and let Russia get its new army bogged down in a new offensive? That would prevent Russia from using the new army to counter the Ukrainian southern counteroffensive. But it risks requiring Ukraine to commit reserves earmarked for the southern counteroffensive to holding off the Russian offensive. That might cripple the capacity of a southern counteroffensive to reach its objectives. Just getting a salient that doesn't cut Russian lines of supply could be counter-productive. Delaying a southern counteroffensive to first blunt a Russian offensive also risks granting time to Putin to reconstitute his forces if the threat of a new offensive with new forces is a bluff.
Russia's threat to reopen the northern front is unclear, according to ISW. And the timing if it is planned is unclear. Winter? Spring? And what would the purpose be? Conquest? Diverting Ukraine from the real renewed Russian offensive? I lean to the latter. I've mentioned that plugging new forces into existing lines of attack based on established supply lines would be easier than establishing a new one across a broader northern front.
Could this choice depend on whether Belarus can be pushed into joining the war? Lukashenko may fear his own people and possibly his lower ranking troops too much to listen to Putin's persuasion to join the war. But what if Putin stopped trying to persuade Lukashenko and went right to the "You might die from your people if you join the war; but I will absolutely kill you if you don't join me" stage?
I have no idea.
ISW wants the West to help Ukraine maintain its battlefield momentum; help regain the territory that Russia could exploit to renew its offensive deeper into Ukraine; weaken Russia's core military capabilities with more effective sanctions and improved Ukrainian capabilities; and prevent Russia from gaining propaganda advantages that weaken Western resolve.
I'm hoping Ukraine can conduct an offensive this winter more decisive militarily than they've managed thus far.
UPDATE: Ukraine made a drone attack on a Russian air base deep inside Russia. Russia said it shot down the drone over the airfield. [It apparently looks more like a strike that hit.]
UPDATE (Tuesday): Russia and Ukraine seem to be trading blows on the Kharkov-Luhansk front. Is Ukraine on the cusp of a breakthrough?
NOTE: ISW coverage continues here.
