The Winter War of 2022 Seeks Victory Through Air Power

 

Each side has hopes that it can yet win on the ground. Russia with masses of new men from a reservist mobilization; and Ukraine with improved offensive tactics exploiting ground drones being tested on the battlefield. Yet each side seemingly puts greater hope on Victory Through Air Power as each wages strategic bombing campaigns with long-range drones and missiles. This winter we will see if the latter route to victory can work for either side. And in the spring and summer of 2027, we may see the ground efforts should the air campaigns fail to produce decisive results.

Head on over to Substack for the essay. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

Winter War of 2022 Ponders Life After War

 

How will Russia and Ukraine react to peace? Will it be peace or a ceasefire to reload? And will both Russia and Ukraine follow the same war or peace path? Putin (and many Russians) only saw Ukraine as the priority target that would provide the most bang for the buck. It is a large country that if captured pushes Russia’s borders far west and secures the northern shores of the Black Sea. Ukraine appeared to Putin to be ripe for plucking, eager to display their Inner Russian nature for Holy Mother Russia’s loving embrace back into the family of Slavic peoples. But after cold reality has battered Russian delusions, could Russia look elsewhere for easier targets for now?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Gets Wildly Divergent Potential Timelines

 

Is Russia going super big on a Plan 2027 to create an even larger bulldozer to plow their way to victory? I think that plan would have worked in February 2022. I don’t know if Russia’s arsenal, soldiers, or people can stand that kind of effort now given their casualties and equipment losses over the last 4-1/2 years. And just what is Ukraine up to? I mean other than their aerial drone barrage on Russia. Or is that just my hopes getting way ahead of actual capabilities?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Goes Big or Goes Home?

 

Will Russia finally grind down Ukraine’s civilian morale from the air and pound their way through Ukraine’s ground forces with a bigger sledgehammer after mobilizing reservists and throwing in accumulated equipment? Or will Russia face its own 1944 Battle of the Bulge offensive failure that expends its last reserves? Or a 1943 Kursk offensive failure that leaves Russia without significant reserves to counter-attack? Or even a Karbala V bloody failure that collapses Russian troop morale for holding occupied territory?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Misses a Chance

 

It is false compassion to reduce the rate of your losses by refusing to energetically conduct a counteroffensive and suffer a higher casualty rate if you forfeit a chance to end a war quickly only to condemn your troops and civilians to a lower rate of casualties for years on end. Did Ukraine miss its chance to exploit Russian weakness in the first half of 2026?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Reflects That But For the Grace of God Go I

 

Russia’s insistence that it must restore the Soviet empire that it lost in 1991 even as Russia’s ground forces bleed out trying to “return” Ukraine to Mother Russia’s loving embrace isn’t exactly a recruiting ad for the empire. Other former republics of the Soviet Union know that Russia has territorial ambitions yet lacks the power to enforce that. Other ex-Soviet states may decide they need to act during this gap between ambitions and power before the gap closes on them.

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Seeks Victory Through Air Power

 

Can Ukraine wage offensive ground war? Is Putin willing to risk internal division to wage offensive ground war by mobilizing more troops? If the answers are “no”, do both sides believe bombarding the enemy homelands is the only affordable path to victory? I just don’t think the war’s outcome can be decided without ground forces getting the decisive votes.

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Resumes Its Usual Programming

 

Russia weathered the storm of Ukraine’s ground counter-attacks and Russia has picked up its pace of gaining ground. The Russian casualties are still heavy. And Ukraine still counter-attacks. But the break in the pattern in Ukraine’s favor beginning early this year did not expand into something bigger for Ukraine. Will armored vehicles return to close combat as each side adapts to massed drones? Will new North Korean troops provide the punch to set tanks loose past Ukraine’s defensive belts?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Hopes Quagmire is the Path to Victory

 

Russia’s war is dragging on with heavy casualties and damage to Russia’s economy. Putin seems to be edging toward mobilization of civilian reserves to compensate for insufficient recruiting evident this year. Ukraine may be winning right now, but it is nowhere near a decisive edge. And Ukraine is suffering tremendously. Will Putin be able to add to the pressure with mobilization and finally break Ukraine on the ground? Or will mobilization break Russia’s home front in its core European region and make internal unrest far more dangerous for Putin than Ukraine is?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Ponders Insurrection

 

Putin insists the war must go on until Ukraine is defeated. He may mobilize civilian reservists to make a bigger effort to finally win. Perhaps the war will go on. But could Putin’s fate be the measure of what the main front in the war is about?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Faces a Performance Review

 

Is Ukraine’s internal drama over military leadership not really about satisfying public dissatisfaction of how the war is going? Despite recent successes, the war nears 4-1/2 years with no end in sight to the sacrifices in lives, resources, and lives derailed to cope with the war. Of course people are getting restless notwithstanding the gratitude for not being conquered by Russia. But what if the public drama obscures the preparations to exploit Ukraine’s recent small but noticeable gains in the ground war that get much less attention than the flashy aerial drone campaigns that could enable expansion of the ground gains in potentially decisive fashion?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to publish this series there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Ponders Its Life Choices

 

I must conclude that Russia’s ground forces have essentially collapsed for all practical purposes in an offensive role. When they have proven for three months that they are no longer the relentless steam roller constantly—if slowly—advancing into Ukraine despite losses, refusing to accept that is willful blindness. And their defensive abilities are suspect. Russian ground forces could recover, of course, given time and resources. Is Ukraine capable of exploiting this time of military troubles plaguing the Russian ground forces?

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to put the essay there. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Looks to Belarus

 

Is Belarus Putin’s last card to play in his invasion of Ukraine? The potential for success seems low and the potential for disasters of different varieties seems rather high.  

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to put the essay there from now on. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Followed My Script (Is it Enough?)

 

Twelve years ago my basic advice to the Ukrainians should the Russian full invade was to preserve their army, send body bags back to Russia, and strike Sevastopol, the base Russia started the war in 2014 to secure by taking over Crimea. 

Head on over to Substack for the essay. I decided to put the essay there from now on. But you can always get the link here on TDR.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Wonders if Putin--Or Russia--Survives

Russia has growing problems rising from its failed war to conquer Ukraine. Logistics are the least of them.

 

The war goes on. Russia's offensive seems to have contracted to the effort to take the Ukrainian city of Kostyantynivka. This isn't Stalin's Red Army anymore. In the strategic air war, Ukraine focuses on military logistics and is affecting the Russians from the front to the Russian defense industrial base and fuel production/export.

I've read and seen more reports that Ukraine is succeeding in cutting off Crimea from supplies. I refrain from concluding this will truly isolate the Russians--as opposed to adding to Russian logistics difficulties--given what I read about American interdiction in the Korean War against railroad lines. Apparently, the North Koreans/Chinese only needed 5% of capacity to keep enough supplies flowing to their troops.* Still, I can see a politically devastating (for Putin) image of Russian civilians heading east across the Kerch Strait Bridge and becoming refugees to escape the impact of Russia prioritizing their security forces for the supplies that make it by road, rail, sea, and air.

And while that reality means Ukraine has at least survived due to its sacrifices, Russia stepped on multiple rakes:

Russia is currently entering a new Time of Troubles, similar to the fifteen years of chaos in Russia 500 years ago. The current version is similar in that the major supporters of Vladimir Puttin and the war in Ukraine have started backing away from the war. Public opinion is increasingly against the war and hostile to allowing their sons and brothers to be recruited into the army to die uselessly. Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s assistants, advisors and staff are hiding or downplaying what is actually happening with the economy plus, in the Ukraine war, the growing Ukrainian victories and the plummeting morale of Russian soldiers.

I've certainly wondered about that outcome as the price Russia might pay.

Will the collapse of the Russian army be the trigger? Or an effect of disorder at home? Or will the clusterf**k be so densely packed that it is hard to tell cause from effect? 

Is this the first act of the Time of Troubles?

The Russian military command is reportedly withdrawing forces from the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast as Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian supply lines in occupied Ukraine is rendering defenses in the area increasingly untenable.

I'll be watching this long-quiet part of the front. Will exposure at the front and growing supply problems lead to more withdrawals?

The Russian military command reportedly prohibited military cargo traffic along Russia’s main highway connecting mainland Russia to Crimea due to Ukrainian strikes. 

And I wonder if it gets much, much worse for Russia. 

So far Putin retains enough popular support for him if not for Russia's deteriorating conditions and loss of life. But "if only the tsar knew!" won't protect Putin for long. 

Is it too late for Putin to save himself and perhaps Russia itself with a radical move that recognizes the true threat to Russia? Because if Russia enters a Time of Troubles, China will pounce.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

*That figure is my memory of it. Might be different. But the effect of whatever percentage I read was that not much capacity was needed, making our interdiction effort difficult. Have things changed? Is Ukraine more than 95% effective?

The Winter War of 2022 Stands at a Fork in the Road

The Winter War of 2022 seems to hang in the balance of which way the battlefield advantage could flow. Will either side be able to tip things their way to end this period of battlefield uncertainty?

Ukraine is training its troops better. And some Ukrainian corps have gotten much better at combined arms warfare:

[A] number of Ukrainian units began to better integrate infantry, uncrewed systems, artillery, and armor. On the frontlines, they were able to create periods of dominance over the Russians that allowed the rotation of troops and even offensive gains. These combined arms tactics helped Ukrainian forces make advances in Kupyansk in the fall of 2025 and in Huliaipole in the spring of 2026. More important, the Ukrainians maintained a favorable casualty exchange ratio, losing fewer soldiers than the Russians, even when they were on the offensive.

Enough to push the Russians back in some places. Can that be scaled up if more corps (really, what we'd call "divisions") improve? And Ukraine is hampering Russian logistics more effectively to hamper the ability of the Russians to attack or even mass forces on the front. ISW describes this, too:

Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) is disrupting Russian logistics across the theater, from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Crimea.

On the other side, Russia can't replace its losses. And despite masses of troops in the theater, the troops at the pointy end of the suicidal meat assaults are thinning out as troops thicken in the rear (back to the first article):

Pay as the primary motive for service has also created an accumulation of personnel in Russian units who are eager to avoid combat. 

If the front breaks, those men are primed to run, no? This adds to the Potemkin vibe I have gotten from the Russians since last year:

I have strong doubts that Russia is managing to increase the raw numbers of its troops fighting inside Ukraine to continue its grinding offensive as long as it takes. Does Putin have a Potemkin Invasion Force? Would he even know he only has that?

Indeed, even in 2024 I began to have doubts about Russian troop strength claims, as one link shows.

And of all the reasons I gave to explain why Russia might not have an attack force in Ukraine that Putin thinks is there, it didn't even occur to me that masses of soldiers might have essentially gone AWOL in the rear areas without leaving service. But corruption seems to have done that. 

That's a brittle army that counts on being on the strategic offensive so Ukraine can't seriously exploit the brittleness. Could Ukraine deepen Russia's logistics problem, train more corps and concentrate them, and then exploit the thinner Russian front line with an offensive toward a Crimea garrison weakened by logistics difficulties and lack of combat power?

This ground war is seriously getting weird. Yet it is no declaration of Ukrainian victory. Perhaps the Russians restore their capabilities to attack. Or the Ukrainians may prove to be unable to do the things they need to mount a proper counteroffensive while Russia experiences weakness at the front.

Hell, what if China looks at the situation and decides Russia can be coerced to turn over Far East territory or grant economic and legal concessions within Russian territory for Chinese businesses in exchange for weapons or even the right to recruit in China's Xinjiang province for more cannon fodder?

That's fanciful. But is it impossible? Might Russia be that desperate? Might China be that ruthless? Anything seems possible in a war  that remains ... different. 

As I asked, when the war ends what empire ends, too?

UPDATE (Tuesday): Well that's interesting:

The Russian military command is reportedly withdrawing forces from the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast as Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian supply lines in occupied Ukraine is rendering defenses in the area increasingly untenable.

First drip of water in the Russian frontline dike? If Ukraine can do that along the eastern bank of the Dnipro River on the Kherson front, it could get really interesting.

UPDATE (Saturday): I heard doubts that Russia is withdrawing from the Kinburn Spit. But the person seems to confuse the larger Kinburn Peninsula that leads to the extreme tip--the spit. So I'm not rejecting the initial report.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Seeks the Holy Grail of Battle-Hardened Soldiers

Is Russia gearing up for a summer offensive? Or is what we see what they've got? I keep hearing that the Russian ground forces are now combat experienced. But I see an exhausted ground force.

The war goes on.

Russia's ground war has faltered:

Russian forces are performing poorly on the battlefield and failing to make operationally significant advances in their ongoing spring-summer 2026 campaign, as Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack and comprehensively strike Russian mid–range targets and deep in the Russian rear.

 Russian war supporters wonder why Russia hits symbolic targets in their air war:

Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the May 24 strikes as expensive but not militarily useful and that the Oreshnik strike against Bila Tserkva did not have a clear militarily significant target. Milbloggers further criticized the strikes as expensive and as not contributing to the Russian war effort, while Russian forces are under-resourced and unable to advance on the frontline. 

The appearance of success with missile strikes may now rely on aerial attacks in the absence of a ground war that provides that. You can only pretend to have taken a town from the Ukrainians so many times before people start to notice.

Recall that there were those who claimed the U.S. Army was "broken" by its campaign in Iraq after it suffered perhaps a thousand KIA per year there. I thought that was ridiculous:

Our Army is stressed. And we need to take actions to counter and eventually relieve that stress. So far, we seem to be doing that successfully. Don't confuse this, as Korb seems to do, with the other problem of being unbalanced--so focused on counter-insurgency that we are slighting conventional warfighting skills. But once Iraq deployments slow after victory, the problems of both stress and balance will be resolved. And we will retain the combat experienced troops for a generation.

Yet Russia with deaths in over four years of combat (nearly 500,000 according to Britain's GCHQ director) a couple orders of magnitude greater than America's 4,500 deaths in Iraq over about 6-1/2 years of combat missions is combat-hardened with hard-won experience against Ukraine? What survivors will make Russian ground forces better in the next war?

Call me skeptical about seeing bloodied and battered Russian ground force elements and thinking "none shall pass" that awesome array of experienced combat power!

Still, Russia's ground forces have power in the positional war of attrition they are optimized to fight now. Fighting that sort of war against Russia would not be ideal. As long as their troops are willing to die in large numbers, of course. Are we just seeing a pause in Russia's advance? Or has Russia lost the ability to attack. If the latter, can Ukraine exploit it before Russian ground forces can recover? 

Ukraine has a six-month window in which to seize the battlefield initiative from Russia and strengthen its hand for peace talks, a senior commander told Reuters, predicting a “turning point” was imminent after more than four years of war. 

Can Russian ground forces recover? Will a much-discussed Russian mobilization make or break the troops in the field?

UPDATE (Monday): The war is shifting. Will a ceasefire by the result?

The mood among Ukrainian commanders, however, has changed. Russian attacks are putting less pressure on their units than they did in previous years. Although drone strikes and shelling remain constant, Russian combat performance is waning. In Kyiv, there is a growing optimism that Ukraine can fight Russia to a cease-fire.

Ukraine’s mood shift is not the result of a radical transformation of how the war is being fought but rather stems from a subtle turn in several trends that together point to a major change in the war’s trajectory. 

Indeed. I did say in March that things seemed ... different ... this year. 

Would Russia use a ceasefire to rearm to continue its bizarre war against Ukraine and NATO beyond it?

Or to pivot to face China's power and potential threat to Russia's Far East and Central Asia influence? 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2025 Sees Continuity During Change

Observers, including myself, see changes in the Winter War of 2022 that seem to indicate a change in fortunes. But few, including myself, are willing to say the tide has turned. Are we at a turning point like the one that took place in the Iran-Iraq War when Iran lost the ability to pound Iraq? Yet nobody could believe that was happening after that feature of the war had lasted so long?

 

The war goes on. We can see and track the frontline and map the targets of bombing raids. But can we see what is behind that image of clarity about a "transparent" battlefield. War itself is cloaked in fog. Hence "the fog of war." But I see faint outlines through the fog. Are they real or my imagination? 

As I wrote back in March about my impression about the war:

I've often said I try not to let my hopes guide my analysis. It is difficult. But there is an opposite problem. When the situation has been mostly the same for years, it is easy to assume current trends will continue.  ...

Maybe. But things seem ... different ... now.  

This year, Russia continues to attack but they aren't doing the Hulk smash! routine like it used to. Indeed, Ukraine has glimmers of success:

Ukrainian forces appear to be regaining the tactical initiative in different sectors of the frontline in Ukraine. 

But just tactical initiative. No big deal in the strategic picture, right? It isn't really that different.

I recall that the Iran-Iraq War settled into a pattern of Iraq sitting on the defensive and Iran sending masses of men (and boys) to their deaths to overwhelm the Iraqi defenders. Nobody could see a way out from that basic fact even as each side sought salvation by attacking the other side's oil revenue (the Tanker War) and civilians (various Wars of the Cities). And when things seemed ... different ... after Iran in January 1987 launched yet another "final offensive" called Karbala V that attempted to take Basra in southern Iraq, nobody explained what was happening as the end of the pattern:

Perhaps 20,000 Iranians died in the battle. Iraq's casualties were about half of Iran's. Iraq's performance is notable in that Iraq withstood and won the kind of brutal bloodletting that supposedly only Iran could endure. Observers at the time saw only that Iran had launched yet another in a seemingly endless series of big offensives. They speculated about how many more of these attacks Iraq could endure. Actually, Iran broke at Karbala Five. It would be many months before observers began to wonder what was wrong with Iran when no further attacks were begun, yet it was true that the "Islamic Revolution bled to death in Karbala V."

People kept waiting for Iran to use its anger at failing to revive yet more Islamist-fueled offensives. But Iran could not. It would not be fully revealed until Iraq launched a big offensive to push the Iranians out of their major accomplishment of taking the Fao Peninsula in 1986:

While Iran continued to insist that ultimately it would be infantry who would decide the war, Iran had already let the usual season pass without launching a major offensive. This failure began to raise questions about what Iran was doing. One answer came in April 1988 when, after fewer than two days of fighting, Iraq recaptured the Fao peninsula with Operation Ramadan. Iraqi regular troops and Republican Guard forces backed by 2,000 tanks and 600 heavy guns plowed south and struck from the Gulf with a supporting amphibious assault. The Iranians were overwhelmed and showed no spirit of resistance. While it is true that the Iraqis outnumbered the Iranians by 8 to 1 odds, the contrast is amazing between April 1988 and February 1986, when Iranians fought hammer and tong for every square inch of worthless swamp on that peninsula. The day that Iranian infantry could not exact a heavy price for the terrain on which they stood was the day that Iran lost the war. April 18, 1988 was that day.

Has Russia truly faltered? Are we refusing to believe the evidence of our lying eyes?

Consider that Russia and China signed "a joint declaration on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations." I have to ask, is this simply a rote repeat of an old theme? Or a sign that Russia has internally admitted it cannot restore Russia's greatness on the battlefield and so must partner with China? Is this a sign that Russia will end their invasion of Ukraine?

And I wonder if this round of flinging nuclear poo and beating their atomic chest is to project military strength before ending the invasion: 

Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine’s allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses.

Could Russia be trying to shape public perceptions to make it seem as if ending the invasion of Ukraine without conquering Ukraine is irrelevant to Russia's national security because of Russia's nuclear might?  

If these are big picture signs supporting the faltering Russian offensive capability theory, can Ukraine do what Iraq did to attack and expose the eclipse of Russia's offensive capability?

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s army settled in to a defensive struggle from fortified lines against Iran. Its army evolved to survive in that environment. Iraq found it needed a mobile army to go on offense. So it built that army.

Ukraine has in fact been attacking and slowly gaining ground at both ends of the southern front for the last several months. Analysts have noted that for the first time in a long time Ukraine has gained more ground than Russia has. And Russia is losing so many troops that it can't replace battlefield losses. Are we in a post-Karbala V period of this war?

Will we see an April 1988 event that finally exposes the Russian threat as hollowed out? 

For years I've considered a Ukrainian offensive to Crimea to be the most logical front to seriously harm Russia. Ukrainian military actions could be shaping the battlefield for such an effort.

Was this a test of capabilities away from the southern front?

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized counterattack in the Borova direction, possibly penetrating up to five kilometers into the Russian defenses. 

Or maybe this is still 1985 and Russia has a lot more offensive life left in them that Putin--overriding some recognition that all is not well--wants to use:

Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to resolve the war on his terms, including fully seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end of 2026. 

Maybe I am hoping fluctuations in the pattern are a turning point when in fact they are mere fluctuations in a continuing pattern of Ukraine hanging on as Russia throws body blows on the ground.

How much longer does this "lull" in Russian offensive gains have to go on to suggest things really are different? 

How are Ukraine and Russia judging their offensive and defensive options? 

I can't know. All I can say is that I know things do change--sometimes radically--after we get used to predicting tomorrow will be the same as yesterday. I hope somebody on our side can see deeper into Russia's conditions to tell if things are really ... different. And I hope that Ukraine has been building forces to exploit that turning point if it is taking place.

Perhaps the Russians see the turning point more clearly than we can despite our assessment that the Kremlin is blind to battlefield realities. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

The Winter War of 2022 Gives Its Failure a Wonderful New Set of Clothes

What is the Russian government preparing for during this fifth year of the three-week special military operation? Does the Russian government believe it is safer to turn the disinformation dial to 11 and risk a fight against its own people rather than continue to fight NATO-backed Ukraine?

I almost don't care if this is real:

A top-level Kremlin policy document discussing post-war political planning and how to neutralize potential ultranationalist discontent has been leaked to the Russian investigative site Dossier Center. Entitled “Images of Victory,” the paper gives a rare insight into the inner workings of Russia’s political machine. Crucially, it shows that while the Kremlin remains officially indifferent to peace talks, behind the scenes apparatchiks are working hard on selling an inevitable stalemate to the Russian people by dressing it up as a species of victory. The document was leaked before President Trump’s announcement today of a three-day ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.

While the source of the leaked document is unknown, its tone and content seem entirely plausible and its authenticity has not been challenged by the Kremlin even though Dossier is funded by exiled London-based oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Significantly, the paper warns that continuing the war carries serious dangers for Russia’s economy and society. But in practical terms the policy paper’s focus is how to construct a post-war narrative of why the war was worth it, as well as how to systematically dismantle all potential areas of dissent, first and foremost from a constituency it describes as “armchair patriots.”

The Sad parade to commemorate the victory over Nazi Germany in 1945 reminds Russians that Russia has been fighting small Ukraine for more time than it took to defeat actual Nazis. And with far less to show for it. 

Indeed, it may tarnish the Great Patriotic War by raising the possibility that the only reason the USSR won in 1945 was the extensive Allied support for Soviet industry and military power. With Western power helping Ukraine instead, Russia has floundered. Perhaps not a coincidence, eh?

Just publicly raising the issue of declaring victory and ending the war bolsters those inside Russia who can plainly see the tsar has no victory. That may cause dissent to rise to opposition. And the document could be real given the apparent shift in fortunes to Ukraine (which even before this shift has blunted and slowed Russia's invasion for over five years). It would explain Putin's possible fear of demobilizing his military after the war--whenever and however that happens. 

At the very least, the signs of Russia wobbling in its determination to win at all costs seem to be rising. But until the signs really accelerate, the war goes on. Ukraine seems to have gained edges in both the strategic air war and the ground war. Will that trend reverse, continue, or accelerate?

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: I found the picture on the web with no attribution. I carry forth that lack of information. 

The Winter War of 2022 Fears Peace

Perhaps Putin can survive a peace deal with Ukraine that doesn't represent a diplomatic form of conquest. But he cannot survive demobilization after the war. Then things get interesting in a heavy pucker factor sort of way.

The war goes on. Ukraine continues to counter-attack to claw back land; and Ukraine expands its aerial attack capabilities to match Russia's aerial bombardment scale. Well, hello:

Air traffic at 13 airports in southern Russia has been suspended after drones struck a building at a local air navigation center in Rostov-on-Don, the Russian transport ministry said. 

I can't help but think that America responded to Russian aid to Iran with increased targeting data for Ukraine. I have no proof. Just a suspicion that Trump is a FAFO kind of president, and Putin decided to FA. Russia seemingly ponders mobilization to provide bodies for his war. Perhaps Putin's invasion force isn't the juggernaut Russia portrays.

Putin fears demobilization:

Today, Russia faces what can be called a demobilization dilemma. The war in Ukraine is not about Ukrainian territory. The war is being waged as a response to Russia’s domestic fragility, declining legitimacy and a political system that depends on mobilization, fear and external confrontation to maintain control.

This is plausible. But technically, a ceasefire (I won't be so bold to call it "peace") with Ukraine doesn't have to mean demobilization if demobilization means a new Time of Troubles for Russia. Putin may be preparing to win a civil war, but that doesn't mean he wants a civil war.

And then there is this odd development (tip to Instapundit):

Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested the war in Ukraine was drawing to a close — just hours after he vowed to triumph at Moscow’s puniest Victory Day parade in years.

“I think that the matter is coming to an end,” Putin told reporters inside the Kremlin Saturday about the four-year-long war.

Putin said the United States — which he referred to as a “partner” and “friend” during his remarks, alongside the likes of China and India — was eager to help broker a deal.

Huh.

What happens if Putin agrees to a ceasefire without demobilizing? Maybe he decides that Stalin was a coward for not taking advantage of his massive army in central Europe in 1945 to immediately wage war on his Western allies to win the whole thing. Stalin didn't have nukes, Putin may think. I do. Regardless of the truth.

But the tattered mob Putin commands is not the 1945 victorious Red Army that marched across Europe to raze Berlin in less time than Russia has spent still trying to capture all of Donetsk province. As the initial article notes:

Unlike Western professional militaries, Russia’s forces are disproportionately composed of prisoners, ethnic minorities and contract soldiers recruited through exploitative arrangements. 

Perhaps that go big or go home course of action is still too risky for Putin.

Or maybe Putin ends the war without demobilizing and without deciding to wage another war as Iraq did in 1988 because hostile Iran remained across the border. But by 1990, Saddam decided to use his expensive army to solve his financial problems by taking over Kuwait in a lightning attack. Believing nobody would stop him, he found out that he was very wrong. Desert Shield and Desert Storm followed in 1990 and 1991 (but at least the Coalition reduced Saddam's military to a more affordable level--suicide by cop?). And after a pause, the predictable--but not to Saddam who expected a mere drive-by shooting--2003 war finished Saddam off.

Maybe that's not a good plan for Putin given that Russia is already financially struggling. 

Or perhaps Putin decides that a more muscular subtle attack should be his post-Winter War of 2022 military option while his mobilized army stands guard. Break NATO in the Baltic states, which Putin seems to be threatening (even if he has to AstroTurf supporters), with a Kargil-style invasion of heavily armed "little green men." Then dare NATO to go to war against his bridgehead. Putin could break NATO in several ways with such a strategy if NATO isn't prepared, as I discussed in this Army magazine article.

Sure there is risk. But the West may be unwilling to admit Russia has invaded. And at least it is deniable. If things go really bad, Putin can abandon the irregular troops and deny all responsibility. Will NATO then invade Russia while it has nukes? Not likely. And Putin may think something must be tried if history is to append the honorific "the Great" to his name.

So maybe. Unless a tall open window veto from other Russians is wielded. Or even if Putin just gets too nervous from Western disinformation to walk by windows.

Ukraine faces a similar problem with demobilization. Do it and Russia could pounce. Fail to do it and Ukraine will go broke eventually and not be able to afford a large active army. Will Europe really be as generous with financial support when the war is over? Even if Ukraine gets reparations in one form or another, will Ukraine spend it not on reconstruction but on keeping their army in the field ready for renewed invasion? If so, eventually Ukraine will run out of that source of cash. Going broke follows as does demobilization.

Ukraine and Russia--if Putin or whoever succeeds him does not choose another war as the post-war path--both could use a post-war deal that limits both NATO and Russian forces within striking distance of the ceasefire line.

And if that agreement cements in place a Russian "flip" against China so Russia can focus on holding its Far East from Chinese recapture, so much the better. Is that what Putin expects from the United States, his partner and friend?

But until then, the war goes on. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Photo from Getty via that "disinformation" link.