The Third War of the British Succession

In 1968, the British announced that they would withdraw their forces from "east of Suez." The British had long been the stabilizing outside power in the Gulf region but could no longer afford the imperial mission. Stability was still needed after 1971, but the United States, still damaged by the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union's apparent growing strength, was in no position to fill the vacuum. The question of who would succeed Britain in the role of stabilizer was not answered with any certainty for three decades, but may now finally be known. With American-led occupation of Iraq pending, we may see the end of the period of instability that has developed since the British withdrew from the Gulf region. America will succeed Britain. Reluctantly, but with the growing belief that there is no alternative, America is going east of Suez to stay.

During the 1970s, America attempted to fill the vacuum left after British withdrawal by proxy—arming the Shah's Iran to the teeth. As the 1970s closed, an Islamic revolution brought Khomeini to power and sent Iran into chaos and anti-Americanism. The United States announced it would create a Rapid Deployment Force to be able to deter invaders of the region, but that force was merely a notion. With Britain gone and America's proxy dead, there was no stabilizer to enforce the status quo.

Into that vacuum entered Iraq. Eager to end the humiliation of Iran bending Iraq to Tehran's will, Iraq in 1980 initiated the First War of the British Succession. Iraq aimed to humble Iran and seize its Khuzestan oil province leading to domination of the Gulf, the Arab world, and the larger non-aligned movement in the Third World. Yet America backed Iraq with great reluctance, starting with a "tilt" in 1982, viewing Iran as the greater evil and so tried to give Iraq enough assistance to avoid losing. America intervened in the latter part of the war directly, effectively escorting Iraqi-bound traffic to and from Kuwait to protect them from Iranian attacks. From behind this shield, the Iraqis struck Iranian tankers. The war that Iraq initiated against Iran did not end until 1988. By the end of that period, when Iranian battlefield resistance unexpectedly collapsed, Iraq was a power with which to be reckoned.

During that war, with an objectionable state, Iraq, fighting our former client, Iran, America sought to build up Saudi Arabia as our new bulwark of stability. Modern American arms flowed to Riyadh, which ultimately proved to be nothing but expensive status symbols for the Saudis. Our Rapid Deployment Force began to flesh out and our Army began to look beyond the Cold War confrontation lines at the DMZ in Korea and Fulda Gap in Germany.

The Second War of the British Succession began in 1990 with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. American-led forces, freed from the Cold War battle line in Europe, drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait in an overwhelming display of American military prowess that decimated the Iraqi military in only 100 hours of ground offensive. Yet the time it took us to deploy our military to the Gulf was a sobering reminder of the difficulty of policing the region from a distance, where our only speedy response could be nuclear. Our Rapid Deployment Force had not become rapid enough. Although we hoped Saddam's defeat would lead to his downfall, he managed to fight off his enemies and survive. Over the next dozen years, Saddam thwarted inspections to eliminate his weapons of mass destruction and tightened his grip on power with ever more brutal methods. His quest for glory had been checked but as long as he lived, he could hope he would get his chance to lead Iraqis to their rightful place in history, as he saw it. Although we had hoped to smash Saddam and reverse his invasion of Kuwait, we found we were unable to return our presence to the status quo ante. We were dragged into the Gulf to watch Saddam and prepared to rush troops to the new front should Saddam role south again. There was no end in sight to our military presence, which tried to bring stability to a region with despots who channeled local anger about their homegrown dictators against America. We were in the worst of both worlds. We were unable to withdraw yet unwilling to force real change that would lessen anti-Americanism.

Saddam's brutality, ambition, and lust for nuclear weapons have led the United States to finally believe that enough was enough. September 11 demonstrated how much Islamists hate us and reminded us of the price we might pay should Saddam gain the world's most horrible weapons.

The Third War of the British Succession will begin soon. Perhaps, I believe, by the 14th or 15th of February. Perhaps a little later. But the invasion is coming. After destroying Saddam's war machine, we will settle in to root out the banned weapons programs and eliminate the apparatus of terror that governs Iraq today. We will be entrenched in Central Asia, with forces there and in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We will be present in NATO Turkey and in the Gulf states. We will have a presence in Egypt and Eritrea. Israel will remain an ally and we will of course, temporarily occupy Iraq. Only in Saudi Arabia will we likely reduce our footprint to a level that will end that irritant to Islamists. With our influence established in a ring around the Gulf and in Iraq, we will have the job of creating stability where none has existed for more than three decades. Success is not guaranteed. I don't know if it is even likely. But continuing on with the old status quo is unacceptable. We must try to change the region for the better instead of managing its explosive neuroses.

Mostly, I hope that this Third War of the British Succession will be the last. If the Iranians rise up on their own to depose the thugreocracy that misrules them, we may have hope that this terrible period will end.

Casualties of War

From UPI. I am relieved that our casualties are so few that we yet list each by name. Each death is a tragedy, so I do not mean to minimize our losses; but I hope we never reach the point where we just list a number for the week.

U.S. military deaths in war on terrorism

From the International Desk
Published 2/5/2003 10:41 PM
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WASHINGTON, Feb. 5 (UPI) -- List of U.S. military personnel killed in Operation Enduring Freedom (as of Feb. 5, 2003):
Andrews, Evander Earl; Air Force master sergeant; 36; Solon, Maine; Oct. 10, 2001; heavy equipment accident.
Edmunds, John J; Army specialist; 20; Cheyenne, Wyo.; Oct. 19, 2001; helicopter crash.
Stonesifer, Kristofor T.; Army private first class; 28; Missoula, Mont.; Oct. 19, 2001; helicopter crash.
Davis, Bryant L.; Navy fireman apprentice; 20; Chicago; Nov. 7, 2001; fell overboard USS Kitty Hawk.
Johnson, Benjamin; Navy electronics technician 3rd class; 21; Rochester, N.Y.; Nov. 18, 2001; Lost at sea, Persian Gulf.
Parker, Vincent; Navy engineman 1st class; 38; Preston, Miss.; Nov. 18, 2001; lost at sea, Persian Gulf.
Maria, Giovanny; Army private; 19; New York; Nov. 29, 2001; non-hostile gunshot wound in Uzbekistan.
Jakes, Michael J. Jr.; Navy electricians mate fireman; 20; Brooklyn, N.Y.; Dec. 4, 2001; on-board ship accident.
Davis, Jefferson Donald; Army Special Forces master sergeant; 39; Watauga, Tenn.; 39; Dec. 5, 2001; friendly fire incident.
Petithory, Daniel Henry; Army Special Forces sergeant first class; 32; Cheshire, Mass.; 32; Dec. 5, 2001; friendly fire incident.
Prosser, Brian Cody; Army Special Forces staff sergeant; 28; Frazier Park, Calif.; 28; Dec. 5, 2001; friendly fire incident.
Chapman, Nathan Ross; Army Special Forces sergeant 1st class; 31; San Antonio; Jan. 4, 2002; enemy fire.
Bancroft, Matthew W.; Marine captain; 29; Shasta, Calif.; Jan. 9, 2002; plane crash.
Bertrand, Bryan P.; Marine lance corporal; 23; Coos, Ore.; Jan. 9, 2002; plane crash.
Bryson, Stephen L; Marine gunnery sergeant; 35; Montgomery, Ala.; Jan. 9, 2002; plane crash.
Germosen, Scott N.; Marine staff sergeant; 37; Queens, N.Y.; Jan. 9, 2002; plane crash.
Hays, Nathan P.; Marine sergeant; 21; Lincoln, Wash.; Jan. 9, 2002; plane crash.
McCollum, Daniel G.; Marine captain; 29; Richland, S.C.; Jan. 9, 2002; plane crash.
Winters, Jeannette L.; Marine sergeant; 25; De Page, Ill.; Jan. 9, 2002; plane crash.
Cohee, Walker F. III; Marine staff sergeant; 26; Wicomico, Md.; Jan. 20, 2002; helicopter crash.
Morgan, Dwight J.; Marine sergeant; 24; Mendocino, Calif.; Jan. 20, 2002; helicopter crash.
Disney, Jason A.; Army specialist; 21; Fallon, Nev.; Feb. 13, 2002; equipment accident.
Allison, Thomas F.; Army specialist; 22; Tacoma, Wash.; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
Dorrity, James P.; Army staff sergeant; 37; Goldsboro, N.C.; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
Egnor, Jody L.; Army chief warrant officer 2nd class; 32; Liberty Township, Ohio; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
Feistner, Curtis D.; Army major; 34; White Bear Lake, Minn.; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
Forshee, Jeremy D.; Army sergeant; 25; Pisgah, Alab.; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
Frith, Kerry W.; Army staff sergeant; 37; Jamesville, Nev.; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
McDaniel, William L.; Air Force master sergeant; 36; Fort Jefferson, Ohio; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
Owens, Bartt D.; Army captain; 30; Franklin, Ohio; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
Ridout, Juan M.; Air Force staff sergeant; Maple Tree, Wash.; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
Rushforth, Bruce A. Jr.; Army staff sergeant; 35; New Bedford, Mass.; Feb. 21, 2002; Philippines helicopter crash.
Carter, Curtis A.; Army specialist; 25; Lafayette, La.; Feb. 27, 2002; non-hostile gunshot wound in Kuwait.
Harriman, Stanley L.; Army chief warrant officer; 35; Wade, N.C.; March 2, 2002; enemy fire.
Anderson, Marc A.; Army specialist; 30; Brandon, Fla.; March 4, 2002; enemy fire.
Chapman, John A.; Air Force technical sergeant; 36; Waco, Texas; March 4, 2002; enemy fire.
Commons, Matthew A.; Army private first class; 21; Boulder City, Nev.; March 4, 2002; enemy fire.
Crose, Bradley S.; Army sergeant; 27; Orange Park, Fla.; March 4, 2002; enemy fire.
Cunningham, Jason, D.; Air Force senior airman; 26; Camarillo, Calif.; March 4, 2002; enemy fire.
Roberts, Neil C.; Navy aviation boatswain's mate-handling petty officer first class; 32; Woodland, Calif.; March 4, 2002; enemy fire.
Svitak, Philip J.; Army sergeant; 31; Joplin, Mo.; March 4, 2002; enemy fire.
Bourgeois, Matthew J.; Navy chief petty officer; 35; Tallahassee, Fla.; March 27, 2002; stepped on land mine.
Craig, Brian T.; Army staff sergeant; 27; Houston; April 15, 2002; explosives clearing operation accident.
Galewski, Justin J.; Army staff sergeant; 28; Olathe, Kan.; April 15, 2002; explosives clearing operation accident.
Maugans, Jamie O.; Army sergeant; 27; Wichita, Kan.; April 15, 2002; explosives clearing operation accident.
Romero, Daniel A.; Army sergeant 1st class; 30; Longmont, Colo.; April 15, 2002; explosives clearing operation accident.
Vance, Gene Arden; Army sergeant; 38; Morgantown, W.Va.; May 19, 2002, enemy fire.
Corlew, Sean M.; Air Force technical sergeant; 37; Thousand Oaks, Calif.; June 12, 2002; plane crash.
Shero, Anissa A.; Air Force staff sergeant; 31; Grafton, W.Va.; June 12, 2002; plane crash.
Tycz; Peter P. II; Army sergeant 1st class; 32; Tonawanda, N.Y.; June 12, 2002; plane crash.
Speer, Christopher James; Army sergeant 1st class; 28; Albuquerque, N.M.; Aug. 7, 2002; enemy fire.
Jackson, Mark Wayne; Army sergeant 1st class; 40; Glennie, Mich.; Oct. 2, 2002; explosion in Philippines.
Checo, Steven; Army sergeant; 22; New York; Dec. 20, 2002; enemy fire.
Frampton, Gregory M.; Army sergeant; 37; California; Jan. 30, 2003; helicopter crash.
Gibbons, Thomas J.; Army chief warrant officer; 31; Maryland; Jan. 30, 2003; helicopter crash.
Kisling, Daniel L. Jr.; Army staff sergeant; 31; Neosho, Mo.; Jan. 30, 2003; helicopter crash.
O'Steen, Mark S.; Army chief warrant officer; 43; Alabama; Jan. 30, 2003; helicopter crash.

Copyright © 2001-2003 United Press International

Timeline

The 101st Airborne Division has been ordered to deploy. I earlier read it would take a month to move the division overseas. Are we really going to wait a month or more? The Turkish decision to vote on February 18 on letting Americans into Turkey seems to back this as does the rumor that we want to wait until after Moslem pilgrims return from Saudi Arabia.

I keep approaching this from the point that it is better to go sooner than later. I know we can't go until the supplies and troops are in place, but I also think we have alerted far more than we need in order to make it look like a long pipeline stretching back to America has to flow completely to the Gulf before we go to war. We will go before all those troops are there.

To assume that we can go while pilgrims are still in Mecca is not too unreasonable. The Saudis tolerated throngs of Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War and did not hesitate to suppress riots with much bloodshed. For Turkey, we could be feinting a great deal and plan to fly in the 10th Mountain Division directly into those airbases we are setting up in Kurdish regions. After Turkey agrees to troops, we could flow troops in for occupation duty. Based on these objections alone, we could go soon after February 14th. But the 101st is a major problem for me. I've assumed we want this division for crossing the Euphrates and for its ability to jump long distances to outflank enemies. Going sooner would require us to leave the 101st behind. Could be, I suppose. I'd be surprised. But then, so too would the Iraqis.

On to Baghdad.

Unreal

I thought I heard the French envoy at the UN say something really stupid, but I thought I must have heard him wrong. I didn't want to write it earlier since it was so ridiculous. But later I read he really did assert that the Iraqis should pass a law banning the development of weapons of mass destruction.

I have to wonder, are the French really that idiotic and fixated on their legal fetishism? Or are they so hateful that they would look us in the eye and suggest we should protect our people by trusting a scrap of paper from a rubber stamp parliament?

Or maybe they are just hopped up on cheap table wine and truffles.

Whatever. Today really was France's last chance to act like an ally. They've passed secrets to the Serbs and now they are a human shield for the Iraqis. At best they are a competitor right now, and we'd better start acting accordingly.

But the Sophisticated Know This Just Is Not Possible

It is not possible for secular Iraq to cooperate with Islamic fanatic al Qaeda, right? It is just silly to think two such opposite organizations could join forces and cooperate. I mean the very idea!

Apparently, it is not so far fetched. And the presentation by Secretary Powell bolstered both the case for this connection and the case regarding weapons of mass destruction. He devastated the idea that even more inspections can work to disarm Iraq. Now, the skeptics will begin weighing the denials of Saddam that he supports terrorism and that he pursues nuclear and other prohibited weapons against the evidence that has been public knowledge for a decade or more and the evidence Powell presented today.

The usual suspects will not be persuaded. They are not persuadable. We should now stop giving a damn what they think. We should rest at ease knowing we went far further than anybody else would in justifying before the world our intention to use our military to defend ourselves.

Oh my God, our friends the French are on. The esteemed French representative stated that Powell's presentation bolsters the case for further inspections! Tough that they are, they want expanded inspections. Richard Perle is right, France is no longer an ally (shoot, the case can be made that this has been true since 1799; only we haven't realized it through saving their butts through two world wars and the Cold War--notwithstanding the fear in Moscow of the vaunted Force de Frappe) If that SOB talks about a moral approach to Iraq as if France of all countries possesses that wisdom, I will truly throw a fit.

I swear, we should just close our embassy in Paris. They pine for the EU super state, so let's just move those diplomats to Brussels. I was going to resist, but I can't: damn those cheese-eating surrender monkeys.

But business before pleasure, as they say. Iraq is in further material breach of the UN resolutions requiring Iraqi disarmament. We need nothing further from the United Nations.

Stealth fighters are reportedly moving. Our planes are lifting ground forces at a rapid pace. Carriers and Marines are converging.

On to Baghdad.

And then, out of Paris.

Quite the Dilemma

An interesting article on Ivory Coast. The French had quite the choice: defend the sitting Marxist president who won election under dubious conditions; or support the rebels. They tried to split the difference based on their superior understanding of their crown jewel of west African ex-colonies and are getting burned. According to the article, "Philippe Moreau Defarges of the French Institute for International Relations, said, 'What is difficult is, we thought we understood this country. But we have discovered we do not understand this country.'" Neither side, apparently, appreciates the sophisticated nuances of French foreign policy. I hope they get their citizens out in one piece and don't get dragged into the middle of this fight.

I'm not by nature a cruel man, after all.

Oh, and apparently, our transport planes are surging.

Why We Should Fight Iraq: Part Two

So, it should be established the Saddam Hussein's Iraq is a horror show of torture and sheer terror domestically. His regime is aggressive with a record of attacking neighbors and targeting civilians. He has supported terror and instability (I know I failed to mention some specifics like killing dissidents overseas and his attempt to pollute the air and Gulf with burning/gushing oil, but these are just more details of his support of terror). Saddam has also been in single-minded pursuit of nuclear weapons; and has done whatever he has had to do to keep his stocks of germs and poison gas as well as means to deliver them.

His place on the Axis of Evil is secure. Even if Saddam ended all his weapons of mass destruction programs, he would not be demoted to the broader Pantheon of Evil that includes lesser threats who did not quite make the cut. By any measure, the demise of Saddam's regime should be an event to celebrate.

Of course, elevation to the Axis platform means he is a threat to us. And he is. With nukes, his ability to harm us expands exponentially. With every terrorist attack, coup attempt, destabilization, or invasion that he carries out, we will have to decide whether we wish to risk being on the receiving end of a nuclear weapon as the price of responding. Saddam, who has challenged us repeatedly despite our overwhelming conventional and nuclear superiority, clearly believes he can strike us without prompting nuclear retaliation if he keeps his actions under a certain threshold. Nukes in his possession raise that threshold. He could seize Kuwait again, enduring the casualties needed to overwhelm our tripwire force in Kuwait before we can respond (this is pre-2003, of course; and if we do not invade, post-2003). He could try again for Khuzestan in Iran, hoping the lack of Islamic fervor in Iran will this time lead the Iranians to figure losing a province is ok if the cost of retaking it is losing Tehran. He might foment a coup in the United Arab Emirates, or Bahrain, or Oman, or Qatar, or even Saudi Arabia and wangle an immediate "invitation" to defend the country. He might even go after the big prize of Saudi Arabia with conventional invasion if (and he will, because sanctions will weaken even further) he can rebuild his offensive arm. The Saudi military was weak in 1990. It is a joke today despite the money lavished on fancy hardware. Saddam could try to take down Jordan, hoping to use Jordan as a base to attack Israel and until he does so, rally the "street" to his pan-Arab banner. The large number of Palestinians in Jordan might welcome him. Their cheering of SCUDs flying over Jordan on the way to Israel in 1991 is not exactly comforting. Saddam could finally gain Baathist dominance over his Syrian Baath Party competitors and form an alliance with Damascus as the junior partner. Given Saddam's record of aggression, these are not far-fetched scenarios. And while we might tolerate such a madman in the middle of sub-Sahara Africa, one in the middle of the planet's energy storehouse is not something we can shrug off. Yes, of course, he would sell it to us. But at what price? Will our economies, upon which our well being rests, survive? And what will he use his income for? If you don't know, it is pointless to say.

One of the scarier possibilities is that Saddam could embark on a serious campaign of terror against the West, both in the Gulf and in Europe. The goal would be to drive us out of the Gulf, weaken European resolve even further and pry them away from America by showing them the price of siding with us, and raise his prestige to lead the Arab and wider Moslem worlds. He could do this even without resorting to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. His possession of these would shield him from an effective American response. Would we invade Iraq over even hundreds of deaths over a year, scattered in the West? If we wanted to, who would risk 100,000 dead to avenge a hundred? We would certainly not nuke Iraq. Again, we'd place 100,000 or more at risk. And if we decided to launch cruise missiles, would Saddam care? He would ride it out, with anything valuable buried even deeper underground; and parade real or claimed civilian casualties to enrage the "street" while showing our inability to confront him effectively. Then of course, for sheer madman-level thuggery, he could elevate his spite from assassination attempts and environmental terrorism to real nuclear terrorism. Could he plant a false trail to blame somebody else? Shoot, he might steal somebody else's nuke and use it. Even if we suspected Saddam was behind it, how would we justify a nuclear response when the world won't even admit that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction today? If such a day ever arrives and we fail to respond in kind, deterrence is dead as a defense for us; and we will have declared open season on Americans everywhere.

Such an incitement to haters in the Islamic world is a real threat to us. Our inaction could lead to a clash of civilizations because the Islamists will conclude we are unable to resist. Europe is nearly at that stage already. Although a post-nuclear strike clash of civilizations is certainly not a sure thing, it is the logical--if extreme--conclusion of a trend line that starts with Saddam's mere survival. Has anyone noted that Saddam has for years relied increasingly on Islamic rhetoric to bolster his legitimacy? Has anyone noticed that after Bali, purported al Qaeda statements swore loyalty to Saddam? Even the French are worried that pro-Iraq cells are ready to strike in Europe when we invade? We too prepare to face fanatics who will delight in the death of even our children should we invade Iraq. The Islamists have chosen Saddam as their champion after the defeat and/or dismemberment of bin Laden. Saddam's survival is proof to them of their eventual victory. Destroying Saddam will destroy another champion and far from encouraging terror, will dull the appeal of terrorism to the Islamists and wannabee 9-11 types. It is one thing to die believing you will win in the end; it is another to die with defeat certain. America will build no memorials to terrorists to make their deaths seem heroic.

I suppose if you never thought that Iraq's conquest of Kuwait in 1990 was worth fighting to reverse, no possibility that Saddam will invade or take over another state in the future will convince you that we are right to invade now. What I could write to change your mind about that is beyond me. If you think we can deter Saddam from any adventures by threatening to nuke him and don't believe that instead we would be deterred, what more can I say? You are either far more ruthless than I am in your willingness to lob nukes at mere suspicion or hopelessly naïve. If you think the moral reason for removing a thug like Saddam is insufficient to go to war, who is evil enough? The bottom line is that threats to America take many forms and it has been a long time since we have been threatened with physical invasion and conquest. If that is your only standard for believing war is justified, that won't happen in our lifetimes.

Saddam is a threat to us and our allies, even those who would bury their heads in the sand and refuse to look. Failure to deal with Saddam while we can is a grave error. He will certainly deal with us when he is able. The track record of the international community does not give me hope that that day can be more than delayed. And for those still in doubt about his threat to us, would it actually be wrong to end his horrible regime?

On to Baghdad.

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Why We Should Fight Iraq

As we stand on the eve of war, I suppose I should set forth the reasons for war. Until now, it has been (or could be, that is) a full-time job responding to particular arguments against different objections to war. I think the case for war has been made in many ways, but I haven't set them out in one place.

So here goes.

The justification for war against Saddam's Iraq rests on three main pillars: his sheer wretched despotism; his record of aggression; and his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. And then there are the final multiplying factors. One is based on the idea that the bottom line value of all the above parts is greater than merely their sum. The other is the multiple based on the wealth that Saddam has to carry out his risky schemes.

Starting with his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the Iran-Iraq War prompted Iraq's quest for weapons of mass destruction on an urgent basis. Saddam's need to find means to overcome Iranian numerical advantages on the battlefield and their frightening willingness to die led Saddam to pursue any weapon to kill Iranians. They electrified water barriers and in time, used chemical weapons. Saddam's use of poison gas in that war against Iranians and against Kurds is well-known. The Iraqis would boast of killing Iranians like insects and few observers of the war doubted Iraq would have used atomic weapons if Saddam had them. After his defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in violation of agreements he made to end the war, Saddam continued to pursue chemical, biological, and nuclear arms. He has violated restrictions on missiles and has tested drones to spray chemicals or biological weapons. He has thwarted inspections designed to verify his compliance. He has cultivated allies to successfully undermine the sanctions that partially blunt his drive for nukes and bugs. He has repeatedly lied, stating he had ended all programs, only to have defectors reveal previously unknown programs. He has failed to account for known weapons and ingredients for weapons of mass destruction, implausibly arguing that he destroyed them in secret or-at least once recently-claiming that they were all destroyed in our 1998 air attacks! This single-minded devotion to obtaining such weapons is frightening. Or it should be. Worry about the state that wants 1,000 nukes. Fear the state that wants only one.

His record of aggression is impressive. Specifically, his first major act after seizing control of the government was to invade Iran in 1980. It is easy to ignore this given the odious nature of the Islamic regime that took power in Iran and held American hostage for more than 400 days, but Saddam's invasion had nothing to do with defending America or the Arab world from the tender mercies of the Iranian mullahs. Yes, Saddam did worry that Iranian incitement might prompt his own people to revolt, but in the end it was a land grab aimed at capturing oil-rich Iranian Khuzestan; a grab for dominance in the Gulf to replace the Shah's Iran; a grab for leadership in the Arab world, forfeited by Egypt for its peace deal with Israel; and a shot at dominating the nonaligned movement, with a victory paraded at the conference that Baghdad was scheduled to host in 1982. He survived the war yet did not demobilize after the war with Iran was over. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, of course, was a blatant land grab. He carted off the wealth of that state like an old-fashioned bank job. Saddam's willingness to kill civilians is clearly shown both in 1991 when he sent SCUD missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia; but also in the 1980s during the war with Iran when Iraqi missiles and planes bombed civilian areas for the sole purpose of terrorizing civilians. Saddam's proxy war against Iranian-backed militants in Lebanon during the 1980s contributed to the sorry state of that country. In 1993, he tried to assassinate former President Bush. He massed troops on the border of Kuwait in 1994, apparently threatening another invasion. In 1996, we again had subtle indications he would invade. In 1996, he also attacked the Kurds. In 1999, he advised the Serbs on tactics to resist our air campaign. He has harbored terrorists. He has trained terrorists in aircraft hijacking techniques. He has paid suicide bombers' families in Israel. And there are indications that he is aiding al Qaeda remnants to set up a base in Kurdish areas of Iraq. The Iraqis have continued to issue threats against Kuwait, saying they "deserved" Iraq's invasion in 1990.

Saddam's enthusiasm for brutal oppression is horrifying. He has tortured and terrorized his population as demonstrated by Amnesty International in sickening detail. Rape, torture, murder, and fear are the tools he uses to keep his people in line. He has forced parents to send their children to para-military training to indoctrinate the children to die for him. And Saddam, though he has pauperized his own people who were once a bright hope in the Arab world, has not been content to brutalize his own people. Saddam's Iraq is still releasing prisoners from the Iran-Iraq war which ended in 1988 and has not accounted for hundreds of Kuwaitis and others seized in 1990. His brutality as an occupier was apparently so appealing that he had to bring some innocents back to Iraq to continue the horror. Indeed, Saddam may still be holding one of our pilots originally thought killed in the Persian Gulf War. His 1988 campaign against the Kurds after the war with Iran ended was brutal beyond description with mass casualties inflicted on the Kurds to terrorize them into submission. He has pursued weapons of mass destruction at the price of continued sanctions with no thought to the harm he has caused his people. Indeed, their suffering is a blessing to him that he parades to any fool who will listen and believe Saddam. Yet Saddam and his loyal minions suffer not a whit. Palaces Saddam has aplenty while his people suffer.

Tying it all together, and multiplying the effects of his depravity are the combination of all of them. Some say why attack a brutal dictator when there are other dictators, failing to note the extreme nature of Saddam's depravity. Some say why attack a nuclear aspirant when others want or have them, ignoring that Saddam has used whatever he has gotten and without conceding that someone so evil should probably not have such weapons. There really is a difference between the French having nukes and Saddam's Iraq having them. Some say he is no threat to us or our allies-at least not the greatest threat--or that we can contain him, ignoring that he has initiated two wars for glory and oil already, and has tried to exploit any weakness we might show to attack us, his own people, or his neighbors. The critics forget his ambitions for creating an Arab empire under his rule and bringing down the West that stands in the way of his path to personal glory. And those who object on these grounds fail to explain, even if they can find another state arguably worse (and if they do, Saddam's Iraq gives number one a run for the money), why one state can manage to at least place in the trifecta of brutality, aggression, and hunger for the worst weapons that exist. Nor do they account for the great wealth that allows him to pursue his dark visions of glory even in the face of sanctions.

His success in oppression allow him to mobilize available resources for his nuclear ambitions. His acquisition of nuclear weapons would increase his ability to successfully attack or blackmail his neighbors. His success in bullying his region and deterring us from helping our friends would reinforce his brutal rule at home, drying up hope in Iraq that Saddam might be defeated. Truly, Saddam cannot give up any of his evil and hope to live-or hope to build the foundation of a new empire.

The basic answer for why we must destroy Saddam Hussein's regime is that the ambitions of Saddam Hussein to dominate his region, the Arab world, and glorify his reign of terror are too dangerous to let stand. Normally, for some run-of-the-mill dictatorship, this type of megalomania is mildly annoying. But Saddam's Iraq has wealth and an educated slave labor force to make those dreams a concrete threat to us. His ruthlessness and willingness to kill to stay in power are not comforting signs for what he might do if he achieved his dreams. And if anybody thinks that Saddam does not dream of September 11s of his own making but on a scale that is unimaginable to us, they are fooling themselves. Saddam truly is that evil and hoping he is not is a risk that we should not take.

Take the bastard down soon. On to Baghdad.

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First Infantry Division

I forgot to amplify on my point about the headquarters of the 1st ID going to Turkey. This headquarters plus support units could command combat brigades (1 or 2) shipped in to support a Turkish thrust into the Mosul area; while 10th Mountain Division would operate in Kurdish areas.

Wrong

These two professors argue for continued containment of Iraq. Their arguments are simply wrong.

First, they seem to think two invasions by Iraq in a thirty-year rule is unremarkable. Nor is a thirty-year dictatorship itself disturbing, apparently.

They then excuse the Iran invasion by Saddam as a reasonable response to Iranian provocation and threats to Iraq yet fail to give us the same benefit of the doubt as we consider what to do. They also note the war did blunt Iran's regional ambitions. This certainly excuses our reluctant aid to Iraq in the 1980s, but fails to note that the war was also meant to cement Iraq's leadership of the Arab world with Egypt still a pariah; cement its role as paramount power in the Gulf with Iran in chaos; and cement Iraq's leadership of the Third World with Baghdad's hosting of the Nonaligned Movement's conference in Iraq in 1982 only two years away. Iraq also hoped to snatch Iran's oil province of Khuzestan. Iraq had ambitions completely separate from advancing our interest in halting Iran or their worry about regime survival in the face of Khomeini's Islamic appeal. Saddam had clear visions of glory and territory motivating him when he invaded Iran.

The invasion of Kuwait seems to be excused as the reasonable response to a dispute over oil prices and war debts, ignoring that Kuwait loaned Iraq money for the war and that driving down oil prices had been effective in drying up Iranian revenue, which helped Iraq win in the first place. And the authors say that we "signaled" Iraq that the invasion would be fine with us? Our ambassador made some ill-advised comments and Saddam took that as a green light? Did Saddam think our reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the Iran-Iraq War indicated out lack of interest in Kuwait? Did our last minute naval exercise indicate nothing? Did the parade of Arab leaders urging Saddam to back off mean nothing? The words of one minor ambassador convinced Iraq that they could take over? Saddam clearly needed little persuasion from anybody else that he could get away with taking over Kuwait. That seems to undermine their argument for containment.

So in claiming that we never tried to contain Iraq in 1990, and noting that Iraq only invaded Iran because Iran appeared weak, the authors are saying that at the first sign of weakness, Iraq will strike. If an enemy/target ever lets down their guard for a moment, Saddam would attack. Well, that is comforting. Our presence in Saudi Arabia is annoying enough to the Islamists and we are to keep our forces present there to deter Iraq for how long?

And the authors dismiss the threat of Iraq's poison gas and potential nukes and bio weapons. They argue that Iraq's past use of chemicals against their enemies, foreign and domestic, "tells us nothing" about whether they would use them against us. Wow. Past use may not prove they will use them but it sure as heck tells us they are willing to use them if they think they can get away with it and it will help them. Somehow, the notion that he would only use chemicals against those helpless to retaliate in kind is reassuring to the authors. It is not. And the notion is false. Iran used chemical weapons too, although not in the same volume. The professors should note that the Iraqis used chemicals to counter Iran's ground advantage in numbers and fervor. I dare say Saddam feels he needs something to counter our ground superiority.

And Saddam's belief that we are far less able to accept casualties argues that he would accept limited American retaliation in order to kill a lot of Americans. This reasoning also shows that blackmail really could work against us. Also, if the fingerprints of a strike on one of our cities weren't clear, would we really retaliate against Iraq? And if the Iraqis struck our military forces in the area-needed to contain Iraq-how would we retaliate? We would clearly want to strike a military target in response. But what if the Iraqis hugged their cities to make us kill civilians in order to nuke a military target? Would we still do it? I'd rather not place us in the position of needing to slaughter civilians to maintain deterrence. And if we did not strike, who would ever be deterred again? How is wanting to pre-empt such an outcome an inferior strategy?

As for the comparison with North Korea, why does treating two states differently offend them? Even though they quote Rice from some years ago saying Iraq could not blackmail us, that doesn't mean she was right then; and she certainly doesn't think so now. Nor should public statements by the Bush administration that North Korea cannot blackmail us be taken at face value. What would the authors expect us to say? With our humanitarian interests, we are blackmailable. Shoot, we have difficulty even killing too many of the enemy when we fight! Do the authors really think we can't be blackmailed when we care more for Iraq's civilians than Saddam does?

They also belittle the Iraq-al Qaeda connection, bringing up the old argument that a secular regime could not cooperate with an Islamic movement. I guess I only thought America and Saudi Arabia have joined forces for decades. The authors ignore what has gone on and the power of a common enemy-America-to unite our enemies. They also think Iraq would be deterred if they think we might respond should we think Saddam gave bio weapons to terrorists to use against us. Given Saddam's track record in 1990, do the authors really think that he rationally calculates? If he believes his will to win is stronger, he will believe we won't retaliate against an indirect attack. Or he may think he is untraceable-as he might be.

Their arguments that Saddam is farther away from nukes now than in the past may or may not be true. What is undeniable, however, is that Saddam has considered it worthwhile to endure crippling sanctions that make his people suffer to keep the nuclear path going-no matter how slowly. And we can't ignore the breakout option if he can buy or steal nuclear materials. I won't take that chance.

The authors argue that negotiating with North Korea while obliterating Saddam sends the signal that states must get nukes. Reality Alert! They already believe this. And we are only in the early stages of confronting North Korea's nukes. I should think that the proper lesson of "containing" North Korea since at least the 1994 agreement should be that even slowing North Korea down did not stop them from getting nukes.

Their argument that war will be expensive is not an argument. Given that so many against the war decry the lack of "sacrifice" by the American people, you'd think they'd welcome a real cost. What will the cost of a nuclear strike on New York be? Or "just" a chemical or bio strike? Far greater than the cost of 9-11, I dare say.

As for our being isolated. Hogwash. Again, if destroying Saddam is in our national interest, why should we care? No doubt thug regimes the world over who wish us ill will continue to oppose us, but I can live with their opposition. And the world is coming over to us. In fact, we will have plenty of support.

Their final argument that destroying Iraq will divert us from defeating terrorism is so ridiculous that I don't even really feel up to it. But just this shall suffice. Even if it has taken intelligence resources from the terrorism fight, and I doubt it, that "diversion" will end after we nail Baghdad. And if we contain Iraq for decades more, won't we need to commit our intelligence assets to watching Iraq? Now that is a long term diversion, if you ask me. All the more reason to take care of Iraq fast. Our conventional power, which is barely engaged in the war on terror, is hardly being diverted. The authors also bring up the strange notion that victory will encourage our enemies when we can see from the past that victory encourages collaboration with the victors. Pinpricks that do not defeat will encourage enemies. Decimating enemies creates people who have been with us all along. I dare say the lesson to states that support of terrorists can earn you the attention of our conventional forces will have a cleansing effect on terror sponsors the world over.

The authors' faith in our allies' willingness to contain Iraq given their quick exit from containment over the past decade is based on ignoring evidence and counting on wishes. Their faith in our ability to contain Iraq with the evidence of North Korea's willingness to starve millions of their own people to death in order to finance nukes is amazing. Saddam will endure the feeble sanctions to fund nuke work. He will get them if he lives, or if his sons live (another lesson from North Korea), and he will use them. I will draw little comfort if we then kill millions of Iraqis in retaliation.

In the end, only regime change can effectively disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and end Saddam's threat to us. Iraq under Saddam even with no WMD is a threat to us and a continuing death sentence to Iraqis. Even France with nukes is no threat to us or its own people.

On to Baghdad.

Latest Invasion Story

This story indicates that we are assuming victory and planning for the post-war planning before the victory is cemented on the battlefield. One Army heavy division, 3rd Infantry Division, British forces, and a larger Marine Expeditionary Force will attack from Kuwait; while 4th ID leads a force from Turkey to invade from the north. Special forces, Rangers, the 82nd and 101st will have special missions scattering units all around Iraq, seizing strategic targets and capturing airfields. The ground forces will be preceded by perhaps a week of air attacks, the article says.

This doesn't make sense to me.

Why do we have six brigades of heavy equipment in Kuwait? Why would the 82nd Airborne be diverted from covering Afghanistan? What about the Army and Marine equipment stored in Jordan? What about our obvious preparations in Kurdish areas? Why would headquarters elements of 1st ID go to Turkey if 4th ID is going there? Why isn't 10th Mountain mentioned?

The good news is that the Iraqis aren't redeploying their ground troops. I never thought it wise for them to put their regulars in the cities where they would be more likely to defect when in good defensive positions to resist the Republican Guard enforcers and where they would be more vulnerable to pleas from civilians to change sides. More surprising is that even Republican Guards apparently aren't being put in cities. Even these units must not be trusted enough to take a chance. Of course, if Saddam believes invasion is far off, he wouldn't want to put units in the cities until the eve of the offensive to guard against the possibility of revolts and the declaration of 'free zones."

To me, an armored thrust into the north where all the Iraqi army is located does not make sense. Why wade into the middle of the largest grouping of regulars when we want to preserve the army for post-war constabulary duties (after proper vetting and supervision, of course)? A northern front makes sense if we send 10th Mountain into the Kurdish areas to take on the al Qaeda thugs who have taken up residence and to bolster Kurds with special forces and air power for a drive south.

Where I God, 3rd ID would secretly redeploy to the west to strike into western Iraq and spearhead the drive on Baghdad from the west. They'd link up with Marines and Army troops coming out of Jordan and linking up with 101st AB flying directly into Iraqi airfields captured by special forces and Rangers and conventional forces. Perhaps a heavy Army division, a Marine Expeditionary Force, and the British will grab Basra and then drive north. This would seem to place them in harm's way if the Iraqis douse the road north with gas but maybe they can move fast enough. Or maybe the Army will go west of the Euphrates, leaving the Marines and British to feint north and exploit any collapse of the Iraqis.

And I'd prefer to send 4th ID to the Pacific just in case Pyongyang gets weird.

As for the week-long air offensive, I think ground and air will go all at once. Defectors want to see American uniforms before they switch and we need to get the forces moving to avoid chemical strikes. Just sitting in their bases where the Iraqis can easily target them makes no sense. Nor does it make sense if the invasion concept is regime takedown. We need speed to overwhelm them and keep them from enacting a scorched earth policy.

I guess I'm starting to really feel the invasion is quite near as opposed to guessing/projecting when I'd go. No more than a couple weeks at this point.

On to Baghdad.

Carter

Carter doesn't think President Bush has made a case that Iraq is a threat to America. On a day that we lost seven astronauts, I have no tolerance for that idiot Carter's opinion on anything. He had no idea how to defend American interests and protect us when he was president and he has learned nothing in the years since then. I know I am in no mood to rationally deal with his views, but I have no respect for him. Zero. His Nobel Peace Prize was given to him by foreigners who prize his anti-Americanism over everything else and Carter clutches it as his most prized possession. Why he doesn't just renounce his citizenship and make his hatred for America formal is beyond me.

February 2003 Posts Recovered From My Email

I had saved post archives in my email before the old Yahoo!Geocities died. But years ago they seemed to be gibberish. A number were not available on the Internet Archives and I thought they were lost. 

I recently checked my email archive of pre-Blogger posts and they were all legible. So I am restoring the gaps in my archives. Although I had to take a picture of a surviving graph that would not copy and paste directly. For what it's worth. Obviously all of the post permalinks are dead and artifacts of my ersatz-blog format back then. These were what I had formerly categorized as "national security affairs." They complete February 2003 after I stopped transferring individual posts early in the month.

"Infantry" (Posted February 28, 2003)

It is actually difficult to watch pictures of the infantry getting ready for war: marching to the planes, on the firing range, just waiting. I was just a rear-echelon radio operator. My risk even had I been sent to war twelve years ago, was slight. Yet I can still feel a little of what they must go through. Basic training is the building block for all soldiers. No matter where you go from there in your military career, basic training teaches you to march, to fire your M-16, and to use your bayonet. Indeed, shooting and passing the PT test are the only two things you must pass to graduate. Everything else is just an accessory.

So I spent two months with that mindset. Just a PFC marching through the hot Missouri summer, toting a rifle, going to MOPP level 4 time and time again, and shooting. I was never "infantry" for that implies a combat ability in squad and platoon tactics that I never had. At best I was cannon fodder. Yet still, my only use to the Army during that time was pulling a trigger and stopping bullets. It is a tremendously humbling experience.

So with soldiers going off to war to protect me, I feel no joy though I have urged this course these many months. I will cringe every day they fight, knowing that at least at some level, I share responsibility for their fate. Believing that their sacrifice--their deaths and maiming, that is, no sense in euphemisms--will save many more Americans in the long run, will not lessen my guilt. I pray for them. I pray victory will come swiftly and at some "acceptable" cost in their lives.

Yet I do not weaken in my resolve that this is the right thing to do. Guilt that I wished death upon our troops in uniform is not much of a price to pay given what our soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen will suffer. It would be unjust if I felt no guilt.

Rip their hearts out. Kill the enemy with no mercy until they give up unconditionally. As long as they resist they are a threat. I'd rather our commanders come home and have to explain another "highway of death" than explain why we let enemy escape to kill their troops another day. This isn't a game. Fair fighting is bullshit. Just kill them. And then come home to your families, God willing.

"101^st Airborne" (Posted February 28, 2003)

I read yesterday that 101^st AB was about to lift off from the US and today I read that the deployment has been going on for a week. I though equipment by sea wasn't scheduled to arrive in the Gulf until mid-March. Apparently not. It seems we must have equipment there since there is no reason to airlift the soldiers if they have no weapons to pick up. Press reports say we have over 200,000 troops in the area. Lots are Marines and Navy and Air Force, of course, but a lot must be Army. Clearly, the talk about the division going to Turkey was misleading. Talking about the division going into western Iraq from Turkey was silly. I wonder where their equipment is? One ship is transiting Suez but are we sending troops first? Just where is 101^st flying to? Most interesting.

Given UN obstructionism in agreeing to the bleeding obvious-that Iraq is not cooperating-it would be really nice if we hit tonight. After all, the Turkey feint is wearing thin with the Turks not voting until tomorrow and the Iraqis moving a Republican Guard division south from the Mosul area to the Tikrit area.

"Interesting Times" (Posted February 28, 2003)

North Korea starts up their nuclear plant, fires an anti-ship missile, and sends a fighter across the border. The IAEA is surprised at the extent of Iran's nuclear development. Radiological material is missing in Nigeria. Iraq decides to start to destroy illegal missiles tomorrow, which could stretch out their destruction for ten years given the track record of the UN on this matter.

Truly, we live in interesting times.

Iraq is not the last of the simmering problems that have come to a boil this century. It is not pleasant to think that we must confront and possibly fight so many problems, so closely packed together. Even Venezuela, for God's sake, may prove to be involved in terror under the loose cannon Chavez. All these "little" problems could cause deaths up to the tens of thousands in a single shot and cripple our economy. And then there is the looming prospect of China as a world power. Will China be friendly? Hostile? Will China crumble into chaos? And what of our so-called allies such as France, Belgium, and Germany? What of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan? What is Russia doing? And, yes, there is still al Qaeda.

So much to do and yet we delay in dealing with the Iraq problem that is front and center and absorbing our assets and attention. We must clear this problem before it falls into the "too tough" category. So many appear to be; yet we must deal with them.

When this decade began, I wondered what we would call the decade. The Double Noughts seemed too awkward. I debated the Oh-Ks or the Oh-Ohs. The first had that ubiquitous 'K' for thousand to make it hip. And it expressed optimism that I felt. The latter expressed my worries that looming problems could make these interesting times in the worst sense of the Chinese curse.

I guess I've settled on the Oh-Ohs. This is our decade, people. If we are resolute, wise, and lucky, they may yet be ok. We're a long way from that happy condition. And the path to ok goes through Baghdad.

Let's go.

"Whoa" (Posted February 27, 2003)

You know, adding up the stuff on globalsecurity.org, we have 24 line battalions of Marines in Kuwait--armor, infantry, recon, and light armor. That's about 8 brigades. Plus 3 heavy Army brigades and 1 paratrooper brigade. And that doesn't even account for the 70,000 difference between what the Pentagon says we have there and the smaller amount noted by Pike's outfit. That's a pretty good "rolling invasion" if we start tomorrow night.

"After the War" (Posted February 27, 2003)

The President spoke of our pursuit of democracy in the Middle East. Some think this is unrealistic.

Actually, I'm kind of amused when critics of invading Iraq ridicule the idea of democracy in Iraq. They often say it is folly to think we can implant "Jeffersonian democracy" in a region with no history of democracy. Yet I do believe such critics would be horrified if we did implant "Jeffersonian" democracy: voting by white, property-owning, 21-year-old men, in a society that allowed slavery and which had the upper chamber of its Congress selected by state legislators and not by direct vote (and then there is that electoral college thing for president). I'm not really mocking such critics but rather pointing out that democracy in Iraq—or anywhere else for that matter—is a long-term project. We can start with imposing rule of law, with training-wheel democracy under our guidance. Iraq has wealth and education as well as exhaustion from more than two decades of Saddam's murder, depravity, war, and privation to make them eager for an alternative. If they still aren't ready for an alternative, they may doom themselves to another lost generation of opportunity.

Truth be told, however, I'd be happy enough to suppress the tendency of despots in the region to goad their people into hatred of America as a means of deflecting anger at the local regime. A regime in Baghdad that doesn't dip dissidents in acid or rape family members as a lesson to behave would be sufficient. A government that doesn't dream of the day it can slaughter ten thousand of us in one blow would be nice. Yet I do think we can get more than that minimum.

Why is democracy out of reach for Arabs and Iranians? What tradition of democracy was there in Eastern Europe, where democracy is growing? In Latin America outside of Cuba (and Venezuela, for the moment)? In South Korea? In Taiwan? In the Philippines? In Japan? In Germany? In Spain? In Turkey? In India? Critics even now say that the 1945 militaristic, emperor-worshipping, dictatorial, fanatical Japanese are a bad example to hold out in arguing for Iraqi democracy because the Japanese actually had a democratic tradition. Just squint a little and turn your head just so.

Well, I guarantee that if we succeed in Iraq, those scholars will identify some local Babylonian councils of elders meeting along the banks of the Tigris every third high tide, or something, that in hindsight were proto-democratic bodies that provided the seed for full-blown democracy in the 21^st century. I guarantee it.

And as long as I'm dissing the notion that some people are just not capable of democracy; what about the notion that a democratic Iraq could inspire democracy elsewhere in the region? This, the critics say, is just too much like the "discredited" domino theory. What of that theory? After South Vietnam fell to the communists, Cambodia and Laos fell. Mass murder, reeducation camps, and boat people followed. And Burma became the Chinese client, Myanmyar, noted for its brutality. Keegan, the noted military historian, once noted (I heard it on the radio once, I really should see if he put it in print) that he thought our war in Vietnam gave others the time to prepare; and had we not blunted the momentum of communism in the rice paddies of Southeast Asia, other states might have succumbed. Then there of course was that little-noted domino of Hungary opening its borders in 1989, which set the dominos of Eastern Europe tumbling, reaching even to the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later.

So could Iraq spark dominos from Iran to Syria and from Egypt to Saudi Arabia? I hope so. It certainly isn't out of the question given the history of the "discredited" domino theory. With Islamofascism crumbling in Iran, perhaps the region is ripe for the democratic counter-offensive. Shoot, just batting .300 would be pretty good. The ironic thing is, though tipping the domino of Iraq could start a chain reaction for rule of law and democracy in the Islamic world; the Iranian mullahs hoped tipping Iraq the other way, during the Iran Iraq War in the 1980s (the real First Gulf War) would be the first domino to turn the Islamic world into Iranian-inspired and led fanatics. The Iraqis may have held the line long enough to blunt the murderous, Islam-distorting philosophy that today motivates al Qaeda and prepared the region for the day very soon when we reach out our finger and tip the domino the other way. No wonder al Qaeda hates Saddam almost as much as the West.

I hope for democracy in the Moslem world. I'm realistic enough not to try to implant democracy overnight in Iraq; yet optimistic enough to think that there is no such thing as a people "not ready for democracy," as so many critics condescendingly imply. I'm also realistic enough to accept as a success far less in the short run. Iraq as a place where people aren't trying to flee bloody tyranny, where the rulers don't dream of expansionist glory, and where thugs don't find sanctuary to plot our murder in the thousands, is fine by me. Even a democratic Jeffersonian democracy in Iraq, or elsewhere, would be pure cake. We might even do better than that in the long run.

On to Baghdad.

"Shielding Saddam" (Posted February 27, 2003)

Yes, people will protest this characterization, but the Iraqis certainly believe the anti-war protesters, France, Germany, and other assorted human shields are standing up for the brave Saddam as he defies the evil United States.

Uday's television station showed footage of the "peace" rallies in the West for seven hours on four successive days. Every 10 minutes or so a portrait of Hussein would appear. A solemn voice-over read the message: "The world says: Yes to Saddam."

Footage of Chirac and Schroeder was also offered, along with the claim that they were working "tirelessly and heroically" to prevent "an American-Zionist aggression" against Iraq.

Iraqi newspapers and radio and television networks, all controlled by Hussein or his family, refer to the German leader as al-munadhil al-bassel (the brave combatant) because of the stance he has taken against the U.S. and in favor of Iraq. This is an important title in the Iraqi Baathist lexicon, just one degree below the title of al-munadhil al-akbar (the great combatant), used to describe Chirac, the only Western head of state to have met Hussein and to have forged a personal relationship with him in the 1970s.

Most of the protesters, I believe, seriously if mistakenly believe their efforts are promoting peace and will benefit the Iraqis and ourselves. That latter debate will rage regardless of the outcome of the war. I think we will all, excepting the Baathist thugs, benefit from this coming war. But for the first part, there is no doubt that the protesters have increased the chances of war from about 80% to 99%. Talk about blowback.

Such a pity. The protesters are just so darned earnest. War is Hell. And the road to Hell is truly paved with good intentions. Two clichs that work very nicely for this situation.

On to Baghdad.

"Where Is Third Infantry Division?" (Posted February 26, 2003)

You know, having written that I'd have given 3^rd Infantry Division the job of helping set up the numerous brigades of heavy equipment shipped to the Gulf and then shifted the division west, I started to realize (or think I realize) that I haven't seen stories on TV about the division lately. Sure, pictures of Marines landing, but the stories of 3^rd ID that were common when the division arrived in Kuwait seem to be missing. Or am I just not noticing it. Shoot, Saudi Arabia said they'll allow us to use our air control center and to use bases there for air strikes, so letting US troops stage out of Saudi Arabia isn't much more of a step really if it ends the war faster. Or could the main thrust still come out of Jordan? We admit to 2,000 Army troops there manning Patriots and other units for search and rescue. I swear, I wouldn't have deployed precious Patriot units to Jordan if I didn't want to protect a decent-sized American presence there. Could this division be poised to spearhead the drive on Baghdad from the west? Hooah.

Oh, did I hear that our special forces types are inside Iraq making contact with the French Resistance? After having read a story that said the French had an important role in Desert Storm I figured another myth must come back to life, too. The crucial French role? Why, guarding our flank with units of 82^nd Airborne attached to the French unit to make sure it really could fight. Or, perhaps I misunderstood and it was "French roll"—they are damned fine bakers after all. Good at bakin' and surrenderin', yesirree. Excuse the French tirade. I know it is not as if that is a rarity for me, but their continued faith in containment after they undermined it so enthusiastically these last twelve years is just infuriating.

Do we start the invasion this Friday? I'll not start another countdown clock since I've been wrong before, but I shall hold my breath on the drive home that night.

On to Baghdad.

"Delay" (Posted February 25, 2003)

No tiny amount of Iraqi feigned cooperation is insufficient to encourage those who will not believe that Iraq intends to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction no matter how many Iraqis must suffer and die. Blix is encouraged that, after a dozen years of non-cooperation, the Iraqis have shown a small amount over the last few days. My, hope does spring eternal.

Face it, delay for another week, or two, or a month, or until the fall, or indeed until whatever nebulous future timeframe is "enough" for some to conclude that Iraq will not disarm, will only harm us.

Delay in invading Iraq was justified to build more JDAMs; to transport equipment, troops, and supplies to the Gulf; to gain allies; and to wait for better weather. Delay to convince those who oppose us that we are right will only increase our casualties by giving Iraq the time to figure out a way to fight us.

We have enough munitions. We've sent our supplies and equipment, needing only the last soldiers to jump in (and this delay is political not logistical, given what we did in a shorter time in 1990-91). We have allies. The weather will soon start to get worse and then oppressive. Those who have not yet been convinced will not be convinced, and we must stop caring about their opinions. Saddam gains time to kill us the more we delay.

We have introduced our resolution. The SC will discuss it Thursday. Blix is to give yet another report by Saturday. Hopefully that means Friday. The French-German-Russian proposal to extend inspections stands in contrast to our simple statement that Iraq has failed to disarm after many last chances. UNSCR 1441 states that failing to do that means war. So we don't need a clear war authorization this time. And if the UN will not look at the past twelve years and say clearly that Saddam will not disarm as he is required, what more should we do? They are not persuadable. We have done more than enough to convince them and it would be a terrible mistake to wait until after Blix's report (on the 7^th? Christ, I'm always shocked to hear that the last "final" Blix report was not in fact the last one. Like damn clowns pouring out of a VW Bug. Hmm, good imagery for the French and Germans, actually). We should insist on a vote on Friday and then go to war Friday night.

And meanwhile, Dan Rather interviews the Vile One, Saddam himself, who wants to debate Bush. Sure, Saddam has always won debates with his lackeys. Of course, Saddam cabinet debates have usually ended with the anti-Saddam side taking a bullet to the head. But whatever his debating style, it does work, hand that to him. And of course, Saddam says he will not part with his illegal missiles—too inaccurate to have any use other than weapons of mass destruction delivery. But not to worry, Rather had advice from Ramsey Clark to assist him in interviewing Saddam. I'm surprised, actually. I thought Dan already knew the proper way to kiss a dictator's butt.

Two good links, one by Larry Miller on why the anti-war folks, the hard core anyway, will not be persuaded by anything that fighting Iraq is right (indeed, if the aftermath of the Cold War is any indication, those opposed to fighting Saddam will simply start to say, in a few years, that overthrowing Saddam was a bipartisan endeavor by all sides). Another by Richard Cohen, on the reflexive, ideologically driven opposition to war by the anti-war crowd. Cohen is someone with whom I often (ok, usually) disagree. But not always. And he is a writer who rarely crosses the line into outrageous statements even when he is 180 degrees away from me (would that I was that tolerant, truth be told). Although sometimes he does get to me. But who is perfect?

Anyway, on to Baghdad. Before it is too late, for God's sake.

"Invasion Main Effort" (Posted February 24, 2003)

In my ideal world, 3^rd ID would have noisily entered Kuwait, unpacked equipment for two other heavy divisions in Kuwait; and then quietly trundled west to positions across the border from western Iraq. A Marine brigade and Army brigade from Jordan would strike east to join up with 3^rd ID. The paratroopers of 82^nd AB would be airlifted into a forward airhead to join forces with the other stuff. I'd be happier with more heavy stuff further west but maybe we plan to drive north with two heavy divisions, most of the Marines, and some British after capturing Basra. I do worry that this direct route will be mined and gassed but perhaps our special forces have been productively busy. Or maybe we do have more equipment a lot further west than Kuwait.

I just shudder to think we could wait until mid-March to invade. We spend time too freely and could yet pay for this delay.

A little sense of urgency, please; and get on to Baghdad.

"When French Speak" (Posted February 23, 2003)

When one of those haughty C-ESMs speaks, it just about makes me want to offer an alliance of convenience with Iraq to finish off France first. I don't think we need to deal with North Korea, or the Palestinian issue, or bin Laden's rotting corpse, before we deal with Iraq; but I'd think about France first. This guy, Regis DeBray, thinks France has something to teach us?

He starts, "For the current trans-Atlantic crisis to be defused, the White House would do well to steer between those extremes and to treat its European allies as what they are -- citizens of independent states, each with an idiosyncratic history and geography. That approach would spare us many a useless bout of hysteria as the Security Council this week considers Iraq. To each its own geopolitics."

I can only ask, why is DeBray directing this at us? From threatening states that might exclude us from the jurisdiction of ICC to telling countries who state support for us they should just stay quiet, Chirac has ignored the concept of treating European states as independent states. We have gone to the UN for support these long months now, treating nations as states with whom we must reason; and France stabbed Powell in the back, making his advocacy of the UN route look foolish. The French need to make amends for this strain-not us.

DeBray himself fails to treat the Eastern European states as independent states, defending France's obstructionism thus: "Not having any training as a satellite state, unlike the countries of Eastern Europe, France has assumed the right to judge for itself."

Indeed? His cheap shot at states that endured Soviet rule for 45 years is outrageous. France, which kicked NATO out of France while Soviet tanks were poised to conquer all of Europe, should not raise this ugly part of France's history. Those Eastern European states gained their freedom without any help from France. But this is not new. France itself was freed from the Nazis without French help. And let's not go into which country eagerly carried out the gruesome work of their overlords.

Amazingly, he feels fighting will make things worse, and as a Frenchman, well he should I suppose. Just because bin Laden wanted a war with the West does not mean we will give him the war he wants. We reached out and stomped him, during Moslem holy months no less, without giving him the war he wanted. No, DeBray, we won. DeBray states, "Provoking chaos in the name of order, and resentment instead of gratitude, is something to which all empires are accustomed. And thus it is that they coast, from military victory to victory, to their final decline." Not to take too many cheap shots, but how many victories has France coasted to and from? The French may hope we will decline, but our power and influence seem to grow. Do we have limitless power? Hardly. Yet where American troops go, stability follows. And his comment about resentment rather than gratitude seems to be a French problem, not a world problem.

His claim that France (and Europe) has developed wisdom over the years by learning from their bloody history is a joke. Listen to this, "Europe no longer takes its civilization for civilization itself, no doubt because it is better acquainted with foreign cultures, notably Islam. Our suburbs, after all, pray to Allah."

Excuse me, remember that statue that you gave us? Recall the huddled masses clawing for our shores. What other country is such a-yes-melting pot of different nations. You put your immigrants into enclaves where you ignore them and let them bring their ethnic hatreds to France. We make our immigrants Americans. And yet you think so little of your own civilization that you would let it die rather than fight for it. We believe our civilization is worth defending. And we still welcome foreigners here, making Americans of them who in turn see our nation as worthy of defending. Fine, let French civilization die off. Our's will not, not without a fight.

DeBray states, "Europe has learned modesty. A civilization that believes itself capable of making do without other civilizations tends to be headed toward its doom." A nation that jumps up on a stool and shrieks when an English word enters usage is hardly confident. I shall not shoot the "modesty" fish in the barrel he constructs. He follows with a stupid comment about war for oil. Tell me about France's contracts will you, and cease the lazy "blood for oil" chant.

He derides us for still actually seeing evil for what it is and believing we can do good. He thinks France is incapable of both-fine, I agree. His insinuations about some dream of empire that we must have are unworthy of real debate. "Europe," he writes, " no longer possesses that euphoric arrogance." Not "euphoric" arrogance. He is tellingly specific. Yet his determination to defend French obstruction of our intent to defend our people reeks of arrogance. It may be defeatist, appeasing arrogance, but it is arrogance.

He sniffs at us for being a young country while they have gained wisdom from their history. We are still on our first constitution and are the oldest continuous constitutional democracy on the planet. France has had more republics than Die Hard movie sequels (and admit it, DeBray, your compatriots flock to see every damn one of them). One would think they'd learn how to get it right by now.

He is incapable of seeing black and white, right or wrong, friend or enemy. Yet France has made those decisions-they just think Iraq is on the right side. Where is their gray on this issue? Yet I can see how France would not want us to think in terms of friend or enemy. France has not acted like a friend. We poor unsophisticated pre-modern Americans see that as unfriendly.

We may even see it as the actions of an enemy.

He concludes with another slap at our faith, which he derides: "But as to which of the two worlds, the secular or the fundamentalist, is the more archaic, it is surely not the one that Donald Rumsfeld had in mind."
That is funny. I thought the Islamists-including some of those in those French suburbs that DeBray so proudly points out-are the ones who want the fundamentalist world he fears so much. His inability to distinguish between our tolerant faith and the killing faith of bin Laden and his ilk is astounding.

DeBray and his France have nothing to teach me or my country. America still recognizes evil, threats to our people, and the value of fighting to defend what we hold dear.

And we recognize friends.

"Invasion Troops" (Posted February 22, 2003)

So what is the invasion force? Most of the attention is on the digitized 4^th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and 101^st Airborne Division trying to get into Turkey. Their equipment is sailing there and their troops are ready to fly in. Apparently, troops of 1^st Infantry Division (Mechanized) are moving by rail through Europe heading for Turkey. Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) is in Kuwait where it picked up prepositioned equipment. A brigade of 82^nd Airborne Division is there. About four regiments of Marines are in Kuwait or nearby as well. The British have Marines and air mobile troops plus a small amount of heavy stuff. First Cavalry Division (Armored) in Texas, 3^rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (from somewhere in the US, I forget where), and 1^st Armored Division in Germany are also expected. Tenth Mountain is reportedly on the way. American troops are supposed to be in Rumania too, ready to fly in.

We still have 3 brigades worth of heavy equipment in the Gulf. Plus we shipped three more that were originally for 3^rd Infantry. Where is it? Plus there is equipment in Jordan for the Marines and Army. Could we fly in 1^st Armored and 1^st Cavalry troops to link up with pre-positioned stuff? Analysts expect the Army to go in with 2 or 3 heavy divisions, so 3^rd ID, 1^st Cav, and 1^st Armored would represent the high end of the estimate. Why wait for 4^th ID?

As for 101^st AB, we don't need it for deep strikes to establish air heads behind enemy lines. It would be useful for crossing the Euphrates but the 82^nd AB brigade could be lifted by helicopters for that. So too could 173 AB brigade, which I read was alerted. And we also have plenty of Marines plus British marines and air mobile troops. They could spearhead river crossings. Do we really want the 101^st for street fighting? Seems a waste of their specialized capability. Again, Marines, who practice a three-block war concept, where they may fight on one block, keep the peace on another, and provide relief to civilians on another, could spearhead the battles for Basra, Baghdad, and Tikrit, if it comes to that. The British will add infantry. And the British heavy armor on the way could be in the second wave to keep a watch on the Iranians by garrisoning the Basra area.

First Infantry and 10^th Mountain could be the northern front, plus a Turkish corps. The southern front, from Jordan to the Gulf, would have the Marines, British, 3^rd Infantry, 1^st Cavalry, 1^st Armored, and the 82^nd AB brigade. We can quickly airlift troops in for 1^st Cav. And 1^st AD. Are the troops in Rumania 1^st AD troops? Rangers and special forces too, of course, for strategic and special missions.

The occupation army may be formed around the core of 4^th ID, 101^st AB, and 3^rd ACR. They don't need to make it until much later so all the eyes on them may take their eye off the ball.

With Powell off to the North Korean crisis, I imagine diplomacy for Iraq is all just for cover. We go soon. We'd better anyway. Delay is foolish at this point.

"France" (Posted February 22, 2003)

The French are gathering African nations to back their position on Iraq. So we are supposed to believe the French are working this hard to save us from ourselves? The French have staked out their position against us. While they intervene in Ivory Coast this is particularly galling.

It is also unforgivable. We aren't talking agricultural subsidies or banana tariffs here. This is a matter of life and death for us. The very lives of our people are at stake and the French side with our enemy. They insist Iraq be disarmed peacefully even as the Iraqis increase their obstruction. The French argue for this in the light of their past efforts to undermine peaceful disarmament.

Could the French recover our good graces? I suppose. One good change of government and somebody more friendly to us could take charge in France. I don't doubt some French are friendly to us (even if I belittle all of them-I really don't dismiss all French. But their government torques me off so much that it is tough to calmly specify the French government in my rants). But under Chirac, they don't exist.

They must pay for this outrage. No post-war contracts. Formally end the consensus nonsense in NATO. Actively oppose EU expansion. Push our influence in the West African gulf region where we may establish a base and gain oil access. And while we can rename some of our favorites to "Canadian kissing" and "Australian Toast," for God's sake let's stop this talk of renaming French Fries to "Freedom Fries." The French hate McDonalds, remember? They hate the concept anyway, even as they flock to them. Keep calling them French Fries and that will piss off the French more than anything. And we can just eat Italian bread.

Most importantly, go to war soon-before friendly governments in Britain, Spain, Italy, and Australia fall. And do it without a second resolution. Delay to get this approval in the face of French opposition risks losing allies rather than gain them with a UN scrap of paper. At this point, victory will be a post-conflict validation of our war aims. And ending the pretense that France's veto even matters to us will send a strong signal that we will not be tied down by these false friends. We will signal that France's military does not matter. Let the world see them in action in Ivory Coast and ignored in the Gulf. Let the world know (and the French too) that going to war without France is like going hunting without an accordion (not original).

This is a shame, too. Ultimately, we are both western nations with a common heritage of freedom that we should be defending. I hope France remembers who she is and upholds her duty.

I wrote that delay that strings things out until March would really make me worry. Events are spinning away from us. Attack Iraq quickly!

"The War on Terror" (Posted February 21, 2003)

I normally don't just link, but time is short today and these two essays are so good that my comments would dilute them. This one explains why we must fight Iraq now. It demonstrates how we have underestimated Saddam's nuclear timetables repeatedly and how Saddam has a pattern of aggression that is not containable. The second places the Iraq war in a context of the war on terror and slams those who claim that Iraq is a "distraction" from the war on terror.

On the eve of war, I can do no better.

On to Baghdad.

"Northern Front" (Posted February 20, 2003)

So the paper says that our northern front will use 4^th Infantry Division with elements of 1^st ID in support, for a thrust into northern Iraq. Turkey's resistance is calling this into question, the article says. Were I, humble former reservist E-4 phone guy in charge (are you overwhelmed with my strategic background yet?), I would not have a northern front in that form. I still suspect this is a feint to keep the Iraqis looking north and to freeze their troops in the region.

Fourth ID still seems better suited to occupation duty if it is earmarked for the Gulf. Its situational awareness and network will allow it to mass effect to crush resistance even as it fans out on occupation duty. This will also be a great way to test the unit's abilities short of full-blown war. Do we really want to risk the outcome of the war on this new division? Work on bases and ports in Turkey will pay off as a supply line into northern Iraq for allied occupation forces after all, letting us cut reliance on the more volatile Gulf route. Just because we say it is for support of an invasion doesn't make it so.

Also, consider that little is said of where 10^th Mountain Division is going. With its experience in the mountains of Afghanistan, will it just be used for the Battle for Baghdad? I think it essentially is the northern front (British air mobile troops, which I thought could have bolstered this division, apparently are heading to Kuwait), with emphasis on Kurdish regions where al Qaeda-related Islamists have taken refuge. For the Mosul area, Turkish troops will suffice to keep the Iraqis busy. Elements of 1^st Infantry will be able to support the Turks and keep the Turks and Kurds from going at each other, hopefully, after the Iraqi surrender. After all, why wade into the middle of all those Iraqi conscripts when they will likely surrender or stay in their barracks anyway? I still think that we'd have to destroy anything close to our troops just in case.

I guess I just see this negotiating as theater to throw off Saddam.

Invade from an arc starting in the west at the Jordan-Iraq border all the way to Kuwait in the east. Approach Baghdad from the west. And do it fast. I bet allied special forces have routes staked out all the way to the Baghdad outer defenses. We will move very fast when we finally, at long last, blow the whistle.

On to Baghdad.

"The Streets" (Posted February 20, 2003)

Our "street," the hodgepodge of communists, idealists, sixties nostalgia buffs, and Francophiles, who took to the streets across America this last weekend (and who were joined by demonstrators around the world), hoped to sway our President to stop war against Saddam and his Hellish regime. I was not worried that they would succeed, and in fact figured they'd grease the slide to war. (I am worried their numbers will strip away allies, however, making this more costly to us—and the Iraqi people too for that matter) They sought to protect Saddam and he has returned their faith in him by returning to his stonewalling. Check this out:

President Saddam Hussein's government, apparently emboldened by antiwar sentiment at the U.N. Security Council and in worldwide street protests, has not followed through on its promises of increased cooperation with U.N. arms inspectors, according to inspectors in Iraq.…

Newspapers here, which are state-controlled, have pushed a similar line in the wake of the protests, proclaiming that Hussein's government parried U.S. efforts to forge an international coalition to confront Iraq. Babel, a paper run by Hussein's eldest son, Uday, said the United States and Britain face "humiliating international isolation."

"The antiwar demonstrations across the world reflect a new chapter in the global balance of power," the paper said in an editorial earlier this week. "Everyone has noted that a new multipolar world is emerging. Iraq, with its oil, its resistance, its wise leaders and its strategic vision is an important and fundamental actor in this multipolar world."

Iraqi officials, displaying a similar confidence, have shifted their message from "We are complying" to a more insistent call for the lifting of economic sanctions imposed after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

Boy, are the Baathists in for a shock when U.S. troops roll in and take them down.

Meanwhile, on the international front where the Moslem "street" is said to be seething and on the verge of exploding against us should we touch Saddam, solidarity is cracking.

Yes, public opinion there opposes an American-led war against Saddam's regime. And yes, public opinion worries about the impact on the Iraqi people as our military drives him from power. But, "the lack of enthusiasm for Hussein provides a vivid contrast to attitudes in 1991, during the Persian Gulf War, when Arabs in a broad variety of countries shouted support for his defiant stance and hailed him as the one Arab leader willing to raise his banner high and stand up to Israel and the United States."

When we take him down, especially if we do it fast, the disillusionment with Saddam will outweigh the fears of civilian deaths in Iraq. The sight of happy Iraqis will also likely defuse any latent desires to stand up to America over Saddam. (And related to that, if the Moslem world actually does rise up in support of such a brutal thug in preference to us, maybe the clash of civilizations some foresee has actually been going on for some time and our offensive to win it should begin none too soon.) Having said they are unhappy with Saddam and only worried about the people, the sight of happy people celebrating the departure of Saddam and his thugs will leave them free to say, "Well Saddam is gone and if the Iraqis are happy, who are we to say they paid too high a price to get rid of that brutal thug?"

And how will the European street react to the war? If we win, more will say they support the effort. And when the Iraqi archives are opened to show the despicable German and French collusion with Saddam, The Axis of Weasels will lose a lot of influence. Perhaps the Germans will come home. And the French will continue their long slide to Belgium status.

On to Baghdad. Please don't wait for another Blix report. Precious time is slipping away.

"The Doubting Didn't Start on 9-11" (Posted February 18, 2003)

E.J. Dionne thinks Saddam evil but has doubts about this administration's course of action to depose Saddam. He thinks that the Germans and French would have gone along with us if our president had not—what? Here he says:

It's easy to trash the French and the Germans. But the leaders of Germany and France are only following European public opinion. Even if you think that Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder are being opportunistic, you wonder how much the Bush administration created the opportunity they are exploiting by conditioning public opinion against us. Would we be in this fix -- would millions of demonstrators have poured into European streets -- if the Bush administration had not been so publicly indifferent to European views on issues ranging from global warming to the International Criminal Court?

Yes, the old "unilateralist" accusation. The ICC and Kyoto are always the only two issues that adherents to this line raise. Both were dead long before Bush declared them "not with the living." The previous administration failed to submit them for ratification by the Senate because the President knew they were "ex treaties," "swimming with the fishies," and "decidedly not living."

This explanation also requires us to believe that the extended deference to multilateralism that has been practiced by the current administration regarding Iraq is to count for nothing. We pursue NATO agreement to aid Turkey and yet still we are the ones who are unilateralist. We are also to believe that American military actions in Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and even Iraq during the previous administration were all done multilaterally with UN blessings. We must also forget that our allies undermined our efforts to diplomatically deal with Iraq for twelve years. France pulled out of the no-fly zone enforcement, aggressively pushed for sanctions to be eliminated, and pushed for toothless inspections when the Iraqis held the doggy biscuit just out of their reach. And Blair is the poodle? We must also forget that over North Korea, our allies insist we deal with North Korea alone and not bother the international community.Yeah, right, it is our fault.

He also says:

It's hard to escape the feeling that those who always wanted to "finish" the last Gulf war by getting rid of Hussein are using the events of Sept. 11, 2001, as a rationale for doing what they wanted to do on Sept. 10.

Sure, I came to believe that we should finish off Iraq; but never second-guessed the decision that stayed our hand in 1991. Nor did I, prior to 9-11, say we should invade Iraq to carry out that policy. I simply figured that Saddam would do something that would draw us back to finish him off eventually. In 1998, regime change in fact became our official policy. September 11 did change my mind on how I thought Saddam should go. While I felt that the first priority was bin Laden, we did far more than even I hoped we could accomplish. Bin Laden is now a matter for police, spies, and clairvoyants. September 11 showed us the hatred that the likes of Saddam have for us, and with the resources of an oil-rich state to finance his sick hatreds, I conclude he must die and his twisted regime be destroyed. I am unwilling to risk that in the face of what we risk by doing nothing.

Yet Dionne still has doubts. What are we to make of such doubts in the face of Saddam's track record? What on earth would it take to ease his doubts? A Gore presidency?

Mark Steyn has a great piece on the doubters. In the contest between the "peace" protesters and war advocates over who has a better grip on reality, let's just say one side thinks the Tooth Fairy will depose Saddam. (or defend him to the death, depending on who you ask on "the street") Doubting now, when we have seen what this hatred can breed, is unforgivable. Doubting is the default position of the "peace" protesters and the fact that even the horrible evil of Saddam cannot erase those doubts says more about the doubters than anything.

On to Baghdad. Without a doubt.

"The West" (Posted February 17, 2003)

The West, in the form of NATO, will resist our enemies in the east-without the French. NATO will send air defense assets, among other assistance, to help defend Turkey against possible Iraqi retaliation against Turkish civilian targets. Given French history in kicking NATO out of France so long ago (then rejoining the military arm after we won the Cold War), who could be surprised? When danger rears its ugly head, the French are busy again. Inventing yet another cheese, I suppose. No wonder they are up to 300. The West will resist threats from the east without France.

I just finished A Concise History of the Crusades (Thomas Madden). Given all the ranting about how the West is out to destroy the Islamic world with another crusade, I thought I should read up on the age. What is striking is that for such a long period of time, Islam was relentlessly advancing the frontiers of Islam at Europe's expense. The Crusades were really Europe's efforts to resist and take back what had once been in Christianity's domain. Even as Western Europe reached out to discover and colonize the New World, Islam remained a mortal threat to Europe. The current Islamic rant about crusades are really an outrageous attempt to make them seem like the victim in all that history of Islamic conquest. It wasn't until the late 17^th century that Islam stopped being a threat to Christian Europe's existence. The French had the central role in much of the crusading energy, too.

By the end of the 15^th century, the Islamic threat was still very potent and Europe could have been extinguished. Madden wrote, "Everyone knew that the stakes were enormous, for Christendom itself seemed on the brink of extinction. There was widespread frustration that Europeans could not shake themselves from their petty quarrels long enough to defend against the wolf at the door." he noted that the French themselves, under Emperor Charles V, allied with the Ottoman Empire, an alliance that lasted for centuries. But Madden concludes with how Europe ultimately beat the Islamic threat: "In the end, the discovery and exploitation of the New World not only saved western Europe but also propelled it to world hegemony. The Muslim threat was neutralized not by crusades to the East, but by those to the West."

Europe likewise is divided today, with protesters in the streets of European capitals unable to recognize the wolf at the door. France continues its tradition and breaks ranks with the West, to effectively back Iraq. Lastly, the New World, this time the globe-straddling United States, will neutralize the Isamofascist threat to our people. Western Europe, America, and the other states whose existence is an affront to the bin Laden wannabees.

And the next time somebody goes on about our guilt for the Crusades, I think I will truly throw a fit.

On to Baghdad.

"Overcoming Saddam's Strategy" (Posted February 16, 2003)

That Saddam has a strategy to withstand our coming assault is not surprise. But let's not assume they will succeed in implementing it-or that it will work even if fully implemented. Their plan will not survive contact with the enemy. We are a heck of an enemy.

The article notes that Republican Guard units are dispersed away from their fighting positions. These positions are fortified and stocked with supplies. The Iraqis plan to move to these battle positions once we invade.

But I imagine the fighting positions will be destroyed quickly. In addition, the Iraqis will not have much time to get to their battle positions to block us. We will invade as soon as the bombers and cruise missiles go in. And moving armor will be where our air power will really shine. If the Iraqis think they can move freely, they are mistaken.

Special Republican Guards are in Baghdad.

But will they fight? They are the most loyal and that loyalty is bought with material goods. This should not be confused with the oft-mentioned term "elite." When real soldiers come after them, they'll probably kill some civilians out of habit as the bug out.

He will seek to use chemical weapons.

Yes, he will. But I suspect his long-range delivery capability is limited. He may waste them going after defended Kuwait and Israel. Hopefully, Patriot PAC-3 and Arrow are more effective than the early Patriot air defense missile pressed into anti-missile duty in 1991. Our ground troops are likely to be moving too quickly to be easily targeted by shorter range chemical munitions. I expect we will also advance on Baghdad along routes unexpected by Saddam. I don't think we will charge up the Euphrates and Tigris River valleys. We will approach from the west. The chemicals will miss us. Saddam doesn't care how many Iraqis he hits. Related to this is the scary idea that one of Saddam's tactics will be to put his own people in the way to maximize Iraqi civilian casualties. The Iraqis are planning to scorch the south to create a humanitarian disaster that will divert American attention from driving on Baghdad. Some troops are in the south to guard Basra and crossing points over the Euphrates, but other than that, little is forward deployed. He has even apparently planned to strike his own cities after we capture them-what other than spite he plans to accomplish is beyond me.

My hope is that the Iraqi military will finally rebel at the thought that the institution billed as the defender of the nation must become Saddam's executioner. The arrival of American ground troops will give them the opportunity to escape Saddam's fearsome chain of command.

An outer ring of Republican Guard divisions protect the approaches to Baghdad.

They will die if they make it to their battle positions. Our Navy and Air Force will have something to say about that. The Republican Guard did fight in 1991, but we plowed through them without slowing appreciably. I give them credit for fighting in 1991. Keep in mind that they remember what fighting got them in 1991. Even the RG will crack, in part.

As for fighting to the death in Baghdad. Well, it is possible. But I doubt that too many will consider victory imminent when all they hold is Baghdad. A strategy that concedes the entire country outside the city limits of Baghdad and Tikrit is not one to inspire confidence. And I think fear rather than fanatical loyalty motivates most of Saddam's thugs. They will crack. Few will be deluded enough to shoot it out to the bitter end. For those, we'll probably be able to send in Special Forces-enhanced Iraqi defectors to dig the loyalists out.

The closer war gets, the more confidence I have that we will take them down rapidly and decisively. I see few signs that Iraq can effectively counter us. We still need to do an awful lot right to pull this off, but i think we can.

Oh, and I should apologize for slamming the German military. I actually have a lot of respect for them. They provided the lion's share of the front line strength in the Cold War and I do think they are still fine soldiers despite the poor funding that has kept them from modernizing beyond their 1980s excellence. The German government's alliance with the French really torques me off. My judgment was clouded. Sorry.

"Momentum" (Posted February 16, 2003)

The President made an error by not scheduling the invasion right after Powell's presentation at the UN. Further delay to try for another resolution will compound the error. Opponents of war are emboldened by our hesitation and the protests worldwide give governments on the fence or tepidly with us reason to refuse to support us.

As I said, giving our enemy time is a mistake. We will still invade, but we will face more hostility because we did not go when the momentum was with us. Only victory will reverse our lack of support at this point. It was no error to seek UN support--up to a point. We passed that point.

Go! Go! Go!

"Cue the Idiots" (Posted February 16, 2003)

The Iraqis feel safe behind the human shields who marched yesterday in the West and Third World. The whims of mobs who perversely believe Saddam Hussein is uniquely worthy of their efforts is simply amazing. It is a marching, chanting, drumming outrage.

But I am pleased, actually. As in 1991, Saddam's only hope is to surrender enough to make it seem like he is cooperating. If he can stall us for a month or so, we will need to wait until the fall. Otherwise we will risk much higher casualties fighting in the heat of Iraq's summer. (Of course, delaying until the fall might cause more too. Delay means American deaths, either way) By the fall, opponents will say that we must wait until after the presidential election in 2004 before going to war.

So why am I pleased? Because in Saddam's world, mass protests mean one of two things: 1) The regime has organized the protesters; or 2) The regime has not organized the protest and so has lost control and is in danger of falling. Saddam can reasonably believe protests in countries whose governments are anti-war were organized by those governments. For those in America, Britain, Italy, Australia, and others, Saddam can say that those governments will fall if they invade.

Thus, Saddam likely thinks he has given up enough to survive; and believes that a preemptive strike of his own on our massing forces would expose the lie that he has no chemical weapons. He will sit and wait. And then we will strike.

Thank you protesters. Do I think you are anti-American? Domestically, no (except for the various Marxist dinosaurs organizing the protests). Internationally, yes. But their motives are not relevant. Their effect will be to ensure that Saddam sits and takes it. Being useful idiots is a two-edged sword, eh?

We are coming.

"Troop Watch" (Posted February 15, 2003)

Wow. A brigade of the 82^nd Airborne Division is in Kuwait. I didn't think they'd abandon their Afghanistan focus. Plus four regiments of Marines and two Marine armor battalions are in the area and 3^rd Infantry Division is in Kuwait. A couple Military Police brigades and odd combat battalions. Plus lots of armor waiting for troops to fly in. Globalsecurity.org is truly invaluable.

In case anybody isn't clear, we are invading in my name. Rip their hearts out and come home safe, lads and lassies. This will be an important victory in our campaign to keep the bastards away from our cities.

On to Baghdad. My third deadline has passed quietly. If you are still interested, by the end of the month--no need to wait any longer and we really do risk running into an early summer temperature spike if we wait longer. We must be counting on 101^st Airborne as an occupation division. Their trip overseas must be a red herring. Those All American troopers already there can travel by helicopter too, after all.

"Useful Idiots" (Posted February 15, 2003)

Yes, I am talking about the protesters. But not in a bad way. Saddam will be eagerly watching the news and will believe he can get away with his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction despite the massing of American troops on his door step. And because he believes he can outlast even this crisis, Saddam will not order a preemptive chemical strike on our forces and bases in Kuwait. All thanks to the useful idiots who bang drums, hoist their puppets, and chant inane slogans as if they were policy decisions. They grease the slide to war.

And the conceit of the protesters gets me, too, Sure they are useful to us, but they believe that their scruffy performance should change the government's policy? When did we become a mobocracy? Did not the Congress of the United States, the duly elected representatives of the people, vote for war? And we are to now decide policy on which group manages to get the loudest people on the streets? What an interesting "democracy" they have in mind.

They feel great about themselves. They think they are standing up to a dictatorial government. They really have no clue. They are free citizens of a free country and they risk nothing by protesting. It is their right. They are fools, but that, too, is their right.

"So Let's Clarify History, Shall We?" (Posted February 15, 2003)

So this French gentlemen, Justin Vaisse, is a tad upset at our interpretation of history. He thinks France is being treated unfairly for its opposition to war against Iraq.

First, he notes: It's just that I learned in school that France and Britain declared war on Nazi Germany in September 1939, while the United States was enacting isolationist laws, and that America entered the war two years later, only after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor ... I now know what really happened: Franklin D. Roosevelt felt that a country with more than 300 kinds of cheese was worth liberating, and for the love of France he came to our rescue. Joseph Stalin came to the same conclusion, but -- fortunately for us -- he was slower and had to stop in Berlin.

He overlooks the small matter of history that the French relied on containing Germany even in the face of German hostility. The French placed their hopes on inspections to keep the Germans from rearming and thought the League of Nations would keep the Germans at bay. Instead, another country (Russia) helped the Germans avoid the inspections and the League did nothing. Then, when the French did declare war, they stood by while Poland was crushed and while they had an opportunity to attack. Instead they waited for the Germans to gather their forces and let the Germans smash them. Then, when the French fled from Paris and surrendered, the survivors collaborated with the Germans. Excuse us if we didn't rush to save France while Vichy shipped Jews off to German concentration camps. We did try to help the British, but the people who wanted to bury their heads in the sand while danger gathered won the day. Still, we did what we could with military aid and our military covertly to help Britain. In the end, a devastating attack was needed to wake us from our slumber. And he is upset that saving them was also in our interest? Does this eliminate the sacrifice of our soldiers in freeing them? And is he really equating the Russian advance to conquer Europe while we liberated it? His apparent relief that we liberated France and not the Russians is curious given his earlier inability to divine the difference between our use of force and Moscow's. And if he really is glad Russia didn't march through Paris, his strange glossing over of the Cold War when the French kicked us out of France is quite the oversight. (would the Russians have left when invited?) Perhaps the French schools ignored that small period in their eagerness to glorify the accomplishments of De Gaulle. Bad for the ego to note that we ended up winning anyway despite France's retreat from the front lines of the Cold War.

So how does this history bolster France's "do nothing" attitude? This time, we won't ignore an expansionist nutcase. We won't rely on the UN and inspections. We won't wait for our enemy to attack us. Nor will we let isolationists keep us too afraid to act. And we will win. You can win when you fight, although I can understand how French history might not make that clear.

He also skips over that little thing of the American Expeditionary Force heading to France in 1917 to repay our debt of the Revolution. We were more than even by 1918, I dare say.

Yes, France did help us in our Revolution and I am grateful. But the French aid was late in coming and was done to hurt Britain. And note that French help didn't come until we proved we could beat the British alone-which we did decisively at Saratoga in 1777. God help the French if they had needed to prove they could win before we helped them in 1917 and liberated France in 1944. In World War I the French revolted in the trenches and refused to attack. In World War II, well, we know their prowess in that war.

The author's supposed concern for us after they learned their lesson about Algeria and Egypt is contradicted by their adventuring in their former colonies since the 1960s right up through their current failed intervention in Ivory Coast. So what high-minded lesson are they teaching us? It sure isn't that intervention is wrong.

He denies that France has economic interests despite French contracts in oil-for-food deals and their clear interest in post-sanction oil contracts. Yet I bet he thinks we invade for oil. He thinks we calibrate our policy for Texas oil companies. Nor does he admit France's help in arming Iraq with lots of weapons including material for weapons of mass destruction. I bet Iraqi files will be quite interesting. We apparently aren't too worried about such revelations.

He also thinks Afghanistan is no better for our intervention; but what does one expect from a nation that felt Nazi rule was perfectly ok with them. To not admit that Afghanistan is better off now than under the Taliban/al Qaeda regime-if not a placid suburban community-is to be determined to lose. Figures.

He counts on opinion polls that show the world is opposed to us-well if they can side with the brutal likes of Saddam over us, they can just call for the French when they have a hurricane or earthquake that exceeds their capacity to respond. Our people support fighting to end a threat to us and foreign opposition be damned. It may scare off France, whose opinion polls in 1940 were pretty split on resisting the Nazis ("better Hitler than Blum," as the slogan went) but that is hardly surprising. It is not a practice we will emulate.

In the end, he claims that France is opposed to war because of their "fears of civilian casualties, the use of weapons of mass destruction, increasing terrorism or Middle East instability." You know, we fear the same things. And notwithstanding the author's fascinating history lesson, we have decided the French approach of ignoring the problem, counting on paper to protect us (de Villepen really did cheer on the Iraqi law outlawing weapons of mass destruction!), refusing to act, and trusting despots (oh, and say hi to Mugabe while he takes a break from raping Zimbabwe, why don't you). I'd suggest he go back to school, but Lord knows what the French curriculum is teaching today.

On to Baghdad. You just stay at home sampling one of those 300 cheeses you mentioned. And write down what you have learned from your stay in Ivory Coast. We could use a laugh.

"Blix Krieg Stalled?" (Posted February 14, 2003)

I am not worried. Blix spun his report hard to the French but he had to admit that the Iraqis haven't explained what happened to weapons of mass destruction they had. Yet our public will see that the world is being unreasonable in the face of our patient explanation to the Security Council.

Let the toadies applaud the French as they argue that Saddam is to be trusted. We have gone to the UN as a courtesy to that body. If they cannot admit that Saddam's thuggery must be stopped, they are a collective security body for Iraq and not for the forces of peace and justice. The UN will sign its death certificate as a forum for debating all but the most technical security matters. Dare them to veto a resolution and then go without their collective blessing. Their approval was always a luxury--nice to get but we shall invade when ready.

Oh, with the 101^st just leaving and not arriving in theater for a month, could this division be destined for garrison duty and not assault missions? We don't need its deep strike capability to outflank Iraqi defenders after all. Ground forces will advance faster than they can leap frog by chopper. For crossing the Euphrates they would be nice but perhaps the large Marine presence will suffice for this. This airmobile division will be great for an occupation force. Add this to the 4^th Infantry Division, our advanced digital division, which would be a great force to fight dispersed with superb situational awareness, and we'd have a good core for a 75,000-man occupation force. If these divisions are for occupation duty, we can go fairly quickly. If they are assault divisions, we're talking late March (!) for the invasion.

I know the instant analysis says today was bad for us, but we knew the opponents of invasion were not going to be persuaded and our allies will stick with us. And opposition to war in the Security Council keeps the Iraqis from striking first even as we mass troops. Once we have the troops, we will go. And Blix and the Pantheon of Collaboration are in practice just running interference for us in the meantime. Really, do they think they will stop us?

Oh, and given the current electoral system in Iraq, unless the act banning development of weapons of mass destruction is written in blood, I can't be bothered to read it. God save us from fools and the French.

Finally, the Saddam defenders will be out tomorrow. As war gets closer, they will get more careless and forget the rote "Saddam is bad but..." line. They will just focus on their core message of condemning America. Delay in starting the war does have a bright side--the human shields have more time to get to Baghdad. Their loss will help the gene pool.

Our troops are certainly going to BAghdad in my name, that's for damn sure.

On to Baghdad.

"Another Blix Report" (Posted February 14, 2003)

God, just dare that Pantheon of Pansies to vote down a Security Council resolution to declare Iraq in violation of UNSCR 1441. Those dithering idiots will always believe Saddam is, or is about to, cooperate more. And they are right. Iraq's progress toward full cooperation will always be half the distance to the goal line. Listening to the distinguished representatives of the assorted surrender primates who urge the patience of a corpse in the face of Saddam's defiance and the threat he poses to all of us is just sickening.

On to Baghdad. Let the UNSC pound the table with impotent fury as we do what we must to defend our people. The distinguished representatives can bite me.

"Quite the Empire, Eh?" (Posted February 14, 2003)

We are thinking about redeploying our troops away from the DMZ defending Seoul, where they are more hostage than deterrent now. We may even pull troops out if we are not welcome. The article quotes that Rumsfeld said:

In the case of Korea, Rumsfeld said he "would like to see a number of our forces move away from the Seoul area and from near the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone], and be more oriented towards an air hub and a sea hub" in the area. He offered no specifics about where such hubs would be located, whether in South Korea or elsewhere.

But he said the United States would still have to ensure it retained an ability to send reinforcements to South Korea "so there's still a strong deterrent" to aggression by the North. "Possibly with our improved capabilities of moving people," he added, U.S. forces in the region could be reduced.

As I've said before, our troops should be the heart of a counter-attack force or a fire brigade to stop a North Korean breakthrough. It is a mistake to bleed such an excellent division blunting the first wave of a North Korean lunge south. Since we would need to reinforce with a corps to launch a counter-attack, the air and sea hub concept is reasonable. It would also provide a stepping stone for other contingencies in the Far East.

It would also make it easier for us to wield our tremendous missile and air power against North Korea without worrying that 2^nd Infantry Division will be struck in retaliation. I imagine that the North Koreans will be in quite the quandary as they seek to condemn us for doing what they say they want us to do—pull our division back. It will be a nice signal to the Chinese, Russians, and Japanese that they need to step up a little more to restrain North Korea because we will be more free to act.

South Korea, too, may get a dose of reality as it faces up to the fact that its troops alone stand between them and the tender mercies of the Pyongyang Doughboy (the banality of evil is so striking when you look at Kim Jong Il, a man who looks like he should be running a bakery and shooing away kids from his sidewalk—not the imposing evil looking dictator we might cast in a movie at all).

And of course, all the ridiculous talk of our seeking an empire is shown for the paranoid fantasies of others that the claim is. We will not fight to keep our troops where they are. When we are unwanted, we go home.

"British Report" (Posted February 14, 2003)

This from UPI: "Tony Blair's government had egg on its face after issuing a public report on Iraqi intelligence and deception that was in part plagiarized from an article in the highly respected Middle East Review of International Affairs by Ibrahim al-Marashi. But who is using whose research? Tony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington , says that al-Marashi "quotes Sean Boyne and my work and I got most of the data from British intelligence in the first place. Furthermore, the author of the document that Britain copied believes the British report is correct." "

Once again, let's deal with the content as we address Iraq. Let the British government address any issue of plagiarism when the staff members' annual reviews come up.

If I hear anybody say we have to clear this up before we invade, I will retch.

"Screaming Eagles" (Posted February 13, 2003)

The 101^st Airborne Division won't arrive in the Gulf until early March, apparently. This unit would be useful for river crossings, deep assaults, and occupation duties. Either this division is slated for occupation duties or the invasion really isn't taking place until mid-March.

"Interesting" (Posted February 13, 2003)

This article about the ongoing operations and future plans is interesting. Special forces already in Iraq--no shock. And we may send in the ground troops before the air campaign. I earlier speculated that we might be able to do that and this article says we might be able to get away with taking huge chunks of territory with nobody even being aware of it. The article says we could advance south from Turkey and get to the outskirts of Tikrit without being noticed. That I doubt. Even the conscripts of the Iraqi army up there would notice that. Special forces, sure, but conventional forces? No way. Now wouldn't it be interesting, however, if we managed to truck in a division's worth of armor and a nice helicopter refueling point into the deserts of southwest Iraq and start the overt push on Baghdad with a good 2-3 day head start as opposed to starting outside Iraq? Plus, we might be able to secure oil fields in the south before the Iraqis can blow them up.

In a plug for notion that the ground offensive starts no later than the start of the air offensive, the article notes that a prolonged bombing gives the Iraqis time to start a scorched earth policy generally and may stretch out the war when we need to conclude it speedily to avoid giving the "street" time to get mad enough to do something foolish and dangerous.

So will we go in before the air attack? I doubt it. Other than special forces, that is. They have been in Iraq for a while and that is as expected. But rolling big units into Iraq early might really freak our allies. If special forces are on the ground, guarding oil fields, having staked out advance routes, prepared landing strips for aircraft and helicopters, and identified weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, I imagine a simultaneous air and conventional invasion will do just fine. It sure would be daring to sneak the troops in first, though. I'd like to be able to get away with it!

On to Baghdad.

"So What Will Happen When We Invade?" (Posted February 12, 2003)

Good question. I suspect we will move fast. Although we want to minimize casualties, I think the Afghanistan campaign has comforted the Pentagon that they won't be court martialed for suffering casualties. With that knowledge, we will move fast to advance on Baghdad. Speed risks error and ambush but in the long run reduces casualties by dislocating the enemy and causing it to collapse. We can certainly move slowly and win; but we would have to win by attrition, killing everything in our path. Speed also minimizes the risk of chemical attacks on our advancing troops (fixed rear area bases will be a likely target).

Fast moving armor, helicopter-mobile troops, and parachute attacks will cut off Baghdad. They will attack at the same time the air offensive begins. Special forces and air power will go after weapons of mass destruction. Special forces will link up with resistance forces and defectors.

I expect we will avoid the Tigris and Euphrates valley for the advance on Baghdad. It is too wet and too obvious a route. We'd be stuck on the roads for long stretches. I hope we learned a lesson from Market-Garden in World War II that we should not leave light infantry exposed while a heavy relief column tries to bulldoze its way up a predictable route, chained to a road.

Were I God, XVIII Airborne Corps will attack through western Iraq-from Jordan and northern Saudi Arabia?-to strike Baghdad from the west; V Corps will spoof the main attack toward the Euphrates. Marines and British will take Baghdad (CORRECTION: this should read Basra) then head north; Turks will move in from the north to distract the Iraqis; and the American 10^th Mountain will go after the al Qaeda thugs near the Iranian border.

I expect the Iraqi regular army to stay in their barracks, switch sides, or melt away to go home. A very tiny percentage will fight. The Republican Guards are iffy. Some will fight like mad. Some will defect. Some will go home. This will be the main fighting force we have to overcome. I do not make light of their abilities. They may not be "elite" in the Western sense of the word, but they are perfectly adequate soldiers. They have declined since 1991 when they fought and held until destroyed, but they used to be a decent mobile force able to conduct corps-sized offensives. I doubt they can manage even a decent division-sized fight now, but individual brigades will fight until destroyed again. These units and chemical weapons will be the main source of our military casualties from the enemy in the advance on Baghdad. Do not under-estimate them. Nonetheless, they will not stop us from reaching Baghdad very rapidly. The Special Republican Guards are supposed to be the ultra-elite force that will die to the last man around Saddam's bunkers as our forces close in on Baghdad and Tikrit. I doubt it. They are the most loyal because they are the most pampered. It is one thing to be loyal when you only have to beat up on the helpless, but when the regime is coming down around you when real soldiers out to kill you are storming in, you may just want to go home and protect your family from vengeance attacks by your former persecuted citizens. Once the oppressed Iraqis no longer have fear, they will try to use the chaos of the initial Iraqi collapse to mete out revenge on Saddam's thugs. Undoubtedly, some true-believers will hold out. But their final stands will be tactical problems and not war stoppers.

We will probably get cautious once we get to Baghdad rather than try to bounce the city on the run. Once the dust settles from our initial thrust, I bet the city garrison starts to feel real lonely. I don't assume a last ditch defense of Baghdad. It is possible, I concede.

I have no idea what Iraqi intelligence and allied terrorists will be able to do to our civilians once we attack. It is quite possible that Western civilian casualties will exceed our military casualties. Or maybe we haven't been really attacked since 9-11 because we have been effective in rolling up the terror cells.

We will win decisively on the battlefield but I would not assume a cake walk

So do we go this Friday evening? We have 150,000 reservists mobilized. We are airlifting troops in at a rapid rate. Do we really have 150,000 troops ready to invade? If so, where are they? Third Infantry and a Marine Expeditionary Force appear to be the only line combat outfits there. Plus a couple British battalions. I think we have enough equipment for three heavy divisions somewhere out there, including equipment in Jordan for Marines and the Army. Ground force are the key. I think the three carriers in range plus Air Force in theater are enough to start a precision air war. Ground troops are the key to starting and I have no idea if we have sufficient forces to overwhelm the Iraqis. I hope the Iraqis are just as confused.

I want to overwhelm the Iraqis but I also want to strike soon to avoid giving the Iraqis time to prepare. I hope we have both very soon, mostly because I think we can generate overwhelming superiority without waiting for all the units mentioned as alerted reach the Gulf. We shall see.

I am apparently wrong about 1^st Infantry Division. It looks like combat units from the division are deploying (to Turkey?) even though I thought it was too contaminated by peace ops in Kosovo to go to war soon.

"War Soon?" (Posted February 11, 2003)

If the price spike at my local gas station is any indication, war is imminent. There sure seem to be signs of war soon. An airlift surge accompanied by a CRAF call-up. A heightened terror alert level. Marines arrive in the area. Carriers converging. And although analysts say we can start a war with what we have in the Gulf, gathering an overwhelming force could take another month. But I assume that this guess assumes that all of the forces alerted will move. I think we could get another heavy division in place in a week or so plus 10^th Mountain. We have the heavy equipment out there already so we only need to fly in the troops for 5 or 6 more heavy brigades.

I am torn as to what we will do and what we should do. I'd rather smash the Iraqis with overwhelming force rather than dribble in the troops in a rolling invasion. Once we get going, even if it takes longer to assemble a larger invasion force, the faster the invasion will go and the fewer casualties we will endure and inflict too, for that matter-if the shock causes a collapse. Yet I want to get the war started soon to end the possibility that something will happen-some uncertain event shall we say-to derail us. Maybe terrorists will blow up the Capitol Building. Maybe North Korea will invade the south. Maybe an earthquake will devastate San Francisco. Maybe Iraqi scientists will turn the last bolt on a usable biological weapon and a delivery system. I don't know what that something might be, but every day we grant the Iraqis provides another day where something might go wrong.

I hope we have slipped in troops to man the equipment that we have had out there for some time. I hope that somehow-and I know not how-we can go in fairly big on the night of the 14^th. This date appeals to me because we have a three-day weekend of people out of office buildings and schools. Plus, protests are scheduled for the 15^th. It would be fitting if al Qaeda cells woke up on the 15^th, and as they rush off to commit murders, they find protesters standing as human shields in front of our federal buildings everywhere.

On to Baghdad. No countdown. But if the news Friday evening says we are attacking, I won't be shocked. If it doesn't, I will fret until it does. And then, I'll worry new worries.

"Our Uncertain Future" (Posted February 11, 2003)

On the way home tonight, NPR had a report on a CIA official (I didn't catch who) testifying on Iraq. What really got me was the reaction of one of the senators who criticizes American policy. The senator complained that in his testimony, the CIA official used the word "uncertain" X number of times when referring to post-war Iraq.

The very idea that somebody would even be credible saying the future will be Y is astounding. What did this senator expect? Of course the future is uncertain. Of course we don't know what will happen in the future. I was really starting to get annoyed at the very idea. What certainty do I have about my future? I just go day by day, making assumptions and reacting to the daily uncertainties of life. I was really getting into it. On the last leg of my daily 140 mile commuting drive, I angrily noted that I have no certainty that I'll even get home each night! The story ended and I cooled off, driving on.

Then uncertainty hit. Or rather a load of bricks. Out of nowhere, a half dozen bricks started bouncing toward my car. Boom! Boom! Boom! as the bricks bounced under my car. Luckily, none came through my windshield and I didn't run over any either, blowing my tires. Where did they come from? That flat bed truck ahead? But it looks empty. No, here come some more! This time I see them fly off the truck. I brake and slow down. I go over the next salvo, but this time they aren't bouncing as much by the time I reach them. Boom! Thunk! With traffic heavy, I am not getting around the truck any time soon. Luckily, an exit is just ahead so I take it and wind my way home the long way through town. No idiot lights blazed. No new car noises. No dash gauges doing funny things. Both headlights working. By the time I park, I've at least some confidence that my car has sustained no damage. No fluids leaking, apparently. I'll give my Mercury product some credit for plowing through that obstacle. I am home.

No senator, the future cannot be known with any degree of certainty. I can attest to that under oath if you want. You have to know where you're going. And have some confidence that you can cope with the uncertainties of life. You can change your course, if your path looks bad. If you don't when you need to, a ton of bricks could drop on top of you, after all. And some luck sure helps, too. I certainly admit that.

"Errors on Containment" (Posted February 11, 2003)

This opinion piece on the ability to contain Saddam is quite wrong on facts and analysis.

Right off the bat Halperin states that Iraq has never used weapons of mass destruction against a state able to respond with either weapons of mass destruction or overwhelming conventional power. Say again? The 1980-1988 war between Iraq and Iran is completely forgotten. It was precisely because of Iran's conventional superiority, which broke a third of the Iraq army in its campaign to recapture Khuzestan by mid-1982, that led Saddam to douse the Iranians with chemicals. Eventually, the Iranians used chemical weapons too, but Saddam simply increased the volume and types of chemicals and used them with greater skill.

His assertion that we supplied Saddam with the material to make such horrible weapons similarly ignores the First Gulf War between Iran and Iraq. It took the prospect of looming Iraqi defeat at the hands of the fanatical Iranians to get us to "tilt" toward Iraq. Yes, we provided some help. Food, loans, helicopters, and yes, some aid used to make chemical weapons. The main help on that front, however, came from the French and Germans. It is to our shame that we did not prevent Saddam from using gas, but that comes from hindsight. At the time, how much of a chance should we have taken that Iran would win? I suspect Halperin was just fine with dtente, but shouldn't he have railed against American opposition to Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe? After all, we did help them in World War II.

Halperin's statement that Iraq has neither threatened to use weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors nor threatened to invade his neighbors is wrong. The Iraqis have, since 1991, claimed that Kuwait "deserved" the invasion, moved Republican Guard divisions toward Kuwait in 1994; and later, gave more subtle indications that they planned an attack (I think in 1996). I dare say that Iraq has threatened Israel with weapons of mass destruction but I cannot point to specifics. Perhaps, amazingly, in the twelve years since Desert Storm, Saddam has not issued such a threat. Or perhaps Halperin cleverly notes that Israel is not a "neighbor" in the sense of being right next door.

He also misrepresents the sanctions debate early in the Bush administration. Led by those wacky French and Germans who scurried to Baghdad to ink deals, sanctions were collapsing slowly but surely. Powell's plan to "tighten" the sanctions was really just focused surrender. We hoped to convince our backsliding allies that a vigorous review of a more narrow set of imports in exchange for a loosening of the broader restrictions might be better than watching the whole sanctions regime just collapse. To speak of it in terms that suggest our allies were about to go along with a tougher sanctions program to finally bring Saddam to heel is to misrepresent the whole issue in a fairly shameless fashion.

Halperin dismisses the threat of Iraqi use of chemical weapons. After portraying Iraq's past use incorrectly, to dismiss this track record, falsely saying Iraq would not use chemicals since we could retaliate. He says that the CIA thinks Iraq is likely to use chemicals only if we attack them. Strangely, though we know much about Saddam's beastly regime and history of chemical use, threats, and barbarism, Halperin believes using chemicals against us is just beneath him. Yet if Saddam's bugs and chemicals are there only to deter us—and Halperin seems to admit they exist—why would Saddam flatly deny he has any at all? Doesn't deterrence require your potential enemy to know you will use weapons of mass destruction should they attack?

His solution is to tighten sanctions (which we already know leak like a sieve and vanish over time); beef up inspections (which mischaracterize what inspections are supposed to do—verify disarmament, and not search every haystack in Iraq; and ignores the twelve-year history of failure and Iraqi obstruction of inspections); support opposition groups (who, after 1991, will not go up against Saddam's still formidable apparatus of repression without our active help. This is basically a call for fax machines, computers, and office space in London and New York); and create a UN war-crimes tribunal (and who arrests him?)

He fleshes out his solution with even more ridiculous reasons. He would actually support stationing UN-authorized troops on Iraq's border to halt trade and compensate Iraq's neighbors for the loss of trade revenue! Why yes, literally starving the Iraqis will win us friends and admirers. So too, will the stationing of UN troops. If they are locals, they will look the other way, allowing both trade and getting aid to the neighboring state. If they are non-US/British troops, they will look the other way too. Unwilling to stop massacres in Bosnia, will they risk it all for a shipping container of dried dates?

He also says that the inspectors should be backed by air strikes and other military means! So, how long before mosques and nursing homes are the only place Saddam places his weapons of mass destruction? And if they are effective, how long will Saddam allow inspectors to be spotters for air strikes? He already rails against them for being "spies" for God's sake. What do we do if Saddam stops cooperating—again? Or takes them hostage? What on Earth makes Halperin believe Saddam will suddenly become cooperative?

The real flight into loony toon fancy is his call for a war-crimes tribunal to indict Saddam. I sure hope Halperin is the one who gets to slap that subpoena on Saddam. He cites Yugoslavia and Rwanda, ignoring the fact that it took military defeat of the Serbs and Rwandan regime by NATO (read, America) and the Rwandan rebels, respectively, to deliver anybody to any court.

Of course, his support for the opposition is made realistic by his support for aid to "effective opposition groups." As we should have learned from experience from World War II occupied Europe to Afghanistan under Soviet rule, the most "effective" opposition is often the most ruthless and hostile to American values. Who does he see as effective? And won't he just complain that American support discredits them?

Truly, Morton Halperin's solution is built upon errors of fact and failure of analysis. How he got into the Washington Post and not the New York Times is beyond me.

"Deter Iraq?" (Posted February 10, 2003)

Some opponents of war against Iraq at least agree that Iraq is awful and at least a potential threat. These people think Iraq can be deterred from offensive actions by our military might. Who would they invade without prompting our prompt response? Even if Iraq gets nuclear weapons, using them would be suicide, opponents of invasion say. As with their conventional threat against us and our allies, their nuclear threat too will be deterred. The opponents of invasion point to the Cold War as an example of that strategy. Given time, these opponents argue, Saddam may fall or die, and we may achieve our objective without war.

But imagine that course of action. We have confidence in our military superiority and confront them with the threat of a massive invasion that will destroy them should they strike us. We expect this threat will undermine them. This conventional superiority, we believe will cow them and prevent them from interfering with us as we pursue our interests at their expense. Their system is oppressive, and although not enough of their people view us with hope for a better life; in time, our example and our help will help overthrow their regime. Or it will collapse on its own as the people rise up.

Unfortunately, they have nuclear weapons and so we cannot risk a conventional attack even as they dare not attack us. Still, if worse comes to worse and we have a nuclear exchange, our nuclear superiority should let us "win" in the sense that we will survive and they will not. There may be stalemate on the surface but we can work to isolate them from friends. We will have the edge in the United Nations with countries usually voting with us-our power will ensure that. Some loyal allies will vote with them but so what? They can count on a Security Council veto to save them, of course, but the UN is only to harass and weaken them. We can't be sure which way the French will go, but they probably won't try to stand in our way.

So then we have stalemate. This could go on for decades. We think we will win in the end, but what if the correlation of forces doesn't go well? They start to rebuild their conventional military. Their nuclear forces become robust enough to survive a preemptive strike on our part. We probably wouldn't have risked it, but it sure helped that we could if we chose to-but now they know our threat is empty. We are forced to maintain military spending in excess of what our economy should bear and our allies become increasingly unhappy tagging along with us in confronting them. Then they get away with nibbling away at our containment and start to gain allies of their own who actually fear us more than them!

And then, the unthinkable happens. The Berlin Wall falls. And then our entire empire implodes-the Soviet Union is no more.

Yes indeed, the Cold War can teach us something about the ability to deter, contain, and ultimately defeat an enemy without fighting. But who says Iraq gets to take the role of the Soviet Union in this scenario? Just because we got to play the role of America and the West once, doesn't mean we get to in the sequel.

On to Baghdad.

"Our Friends the French" (Posted February 10, 2003)

Given the news of France's leadership in stopping NATO from assisting Turkey and thus attempting to gut yet another institution of collective security, I must insult the French again. The headline says, "French Bashing Rolls Off France's Back."

That's because scales are fairly slippery.

"We Are Better Than Our Enemies" (Posted February 10, 2003)

One would think this is self-evident. Sadly, even our so-called friends have difficulty drawing a sharp distinction between America and Iraq (well, if some polls are to be believed, at least drawing a distinction in our favor).

Yet as Iraqi refusal to disarm stretches out into a thirteenth year and the international community still looks for hopeful signs that Iraq might begin to cooperate just a little more, America is condemned for "rushing to war." We are heckled because we have not exhausted all options short of war. Our critics say war must be a "last resort" yet seem to believe hoping a meteor will take out Saddam is one of the options we should explore before we reach the last option of war.

The opponents of waging war on Saddam then add to their ridiculous charge by asserting we must look to the root cause of the anger of the Islamic world. What have we done ("we" being America) to cause people to hate us so? What policies of ours should we change so they don't want to kill us? (Not that changing our policy to seek out and destroy our enemies is the policy change they have in mind, but I digress.)

Having established that America is rushing to war and that we really did provoke the anger and violence against us, I would at least appreciate our critics applying the same standard to our enemies. Are not our enemies morally bound to explore all other means before killing us as a last resort? Shouldn't Iraq have sought dialog before entering the 1973 war to assist Syria' surprise attack on Israel; or invading Iran; or taking over Kuwait; or trying to assassinate Bush the elder? Shouldn't the Islamists have tried to discuss their feelings before boarding our planes with box cutters and flying them into our buildings? Where is the outrage over there or over here over this failure to consider violence as a last resort?

It can only be that for all the drivel about understanding the rage of Islam, critics of our war admit that we are better than the Islamists and their chanting street behind them. What can we expect of mere wogs, they seem to say? They appear to justify the anger of the Islamic street on their inability to control their anger and stay their violent hands.

I suppose I should be comforted that the critics of fighting Saddam and the Islamists think the West is superior. We can reason this out. We can avoid lashing out in rage. We can question our past. They can only scream and leap (a Kzin reference, not original to me) and we can expect no more.

But shouldn't the critics of American policy take their implied confidence in our moral superiority one step further? Shouldn't they assume that our democratic institutions have duly considered the threats and consequences in contrast to our enemies who act on the whims of the rulers? Shouldn't they assume we have decent motives for taking action unlike the power mad stabs for glory that motivate Saddam and bin Laden and their ilk? Shouldn't they assume that we will seek to insulate civilians from our military actions unlike the enemy which deliberately targets them?

Doesn't our track record in contrast to the enemy's give the critics some confidence that our resort to war is justified?

The unleashing of war certainly will bring an unknown future rapidly into focus. We will have to address the consequences of our actions against Iraq. Yet inaction too brings an unknown future closer, even if it is slower to arrive. Even though the impact of doing nothing takes years, the progress Iran and North Korea have made in acquiring nuclear weapons should tell us that even a slowly evolving future arrives. The destruction of the Twin Towers, damage to the Pentagon, and the thwarted attack that ended in a Pennsylvania field should show us how that future will arrive. Those attacks should open our eyes to the hatred that claws its way to our shores if we let them go about their evil in peace.

The counter-attack against the forces of barbarism in the Islamic world that began in the aisles of a civilian plane over the skies of our nation will take another step forward by smashing Saddam's oil-fed, aggressive gulag. This will not be the last step but it is a necessary step.

The really funny part of this is that we, in contrast to the critics, believe the Islamic world can handle democracy, even if it cannot be imposed overnight. We think they deserve rule of law and don't write them off as lost causes.

I have confidence that we can wage this war consistent with our freedoms and ideals. I trust our motives more than I trust the motives of our enemies.

I have confidence because I know we are better than our enemies.

"Don't Shoot!" (Posted February 9, 2003)

One really has to believe that inspections began about two months ago to have any faith in Iraq's statements today that they will cooperate "more" with the UN. Given they had already promised unconditional cooperation with inspections, I am naturally shocked that it could get any better.

Seriously, President Bush rightly dismissed the Iraqi offer. Inspections should have been over years ago. The Iraqis have had great success stalling until the last moment and then giving in enough so that the French and Russians cried out, "don't shoot, they are cooperating. Let's give them time to demonstrate this new commitment. Let us examine all the facts" And so, twelve years later, we are still waiting for the inspections to work. We still look for facts that can provide the French and Russians with subtle clues as to whether Saddam is cooperating.

Are not the twelve years of obstruction and lost income signs of the importance that Saddam places on getting nuclear weapons? This single-minded focus should be the real measure of the threat, and not some farcical debate over how many Iraqi weapons of mass destruction can fit on the head of a pin. The Iraqis must want them very badly to endure this kind of privation. Do we really want to wait until he can pull the trigger to say the threat is imminent? Really, when his path is so clearly marked, we would have to be fools to watch him approach yet refuse to act now.

The important facts are gathering in the Gulf at a rapid rate. I hope we are gearing up for a February 14 invasion. The quicker the better.

"France" (Posted February 9, 2003)

An interesting aside from National Review Online, which reports that the French have attempted to translate "Cheese-eating surrender monkeys." Even in their own language it sounds awful: "Primates capitulards et toujours en quete de fromages". And, because it is in French, it sounds pretentious too! Actually, this really does sadden me. I received some junk mail yesterday. But part of it included a picture of a painting showing the unveiling of the Statue of Liberty. It is sad to think that at one time the French admired our nation so much that they sent us this glorious monument to our liberty. And we erected it at the entrance to our proudest city. Our soldiers sailed to France in 1917 and 1918 determined to repay the debt we owed from French help in the Revolution. But now the French would screw us at every turn. Even when the city under the gaze of their gift has been wounded by crazed killers. The French would shrug if some terrorists crashed a plane into that statue or destroyed the city that has welcomed so many foreigners to our shore.

And though I am saddened by how far our relations have fallen, I think we should turn the screws on the French for their behavior. An ally would help us. A friend would at least stay neutral. I don't know exactly what you should call France's constant interference. It is not right to call them an ally, and I can no longer say friend. When this is all over, France must pay a price for obstructing us as we seek to defend our people. That is unforgivable. I am not in a forgiving mood.

May the French spend the next generation agonizing over who lost America and why we hate them. It is very nearly to that point.

"What??!!" (Posted February 7, 2003)

The British published a report about Iraqi obstruction and people are upset that the British failed to footnote the report and lifted sections from a published paper?

Sloppy, yes; but people, this is not an academic exercise. This is literally life and death. The only question should be the truth of the report. Questions of plagiarism are a third tier question at this point. Or should be, anyway.

"Sand-Pounding Stupidity" (Posted February 7, 2003)

On the way home tonight from work, I listened to NPR as I usually do. I have a long drive. On one segment, a gentlemen from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was setting forth his wisdom on Iraq.

All I have to say is he is lucky that an endowment funds his work. If he had to justify it, only Sean Penn and Barbra Streisand would fund him.

The man offered that he thought that inspections should go on for another year. That, he thought, should be enough to disarm Iraq. He said that th UN has only been inspecting for sixty days so why the rush?

Sixty Days.

Somehow, the whole history of inspections from 1991 to 1998 when the inspectors were withdrawn over frustration with Iraqi obstruction was forgotten. He actually said we've only been at it for sixty days.

The Carnegie people have impressed me with their stupidy before and they continue to thrill and amaze me.

Dude, get a clue. The Iraqis won't cooperate and won't disarm without the Army and Marines making them. You guys and gals haven't a clue about the real world. The French spout similar stuff but I have some grudging respect that they are simply lying to us in a very dedicated pursuit of a twisted notion of their national interests. The Carnegie people are just blindly trusting, or somehting.

"Oh Good Grief" (Posted February 7, 2003)

Kurtz notes that Paglia thinks the loss of Columbia is an omen not to invade Iraq.

"I have a terrible sense of foreboding, because last weekend a stunning omen occurred in this country. Anyone who thinks symbolically had to be shocked by the explosion of the Columbia shuttle, disintegrating in the air and strewing its parts and human remains over Texas – the president's home state! So many times in antiquity, the emperors of Persia or other proud empires went to the oracles to ask for advice about going to war. Roman generals summoned soothsayers to read the entrails before a battle. If there was ever a sign for a president and his administration to rethink what they're doing, this was it."

Tell you what, we'll compromise: after the invasion we'll read the entrails of Saddam to see if it was a mistake. I guess I'm relieved she doesn't want to throw virgins into volcanoes. Or rely on polls or French approval, or some such superstitious rot.

"Oops" (Posted February 7, 2003)

Ok, Rumsfeld really shouldn't have said German opposition to war with Iraq puts them in the same league as Cuba and Libya. That is unfair. On the other hand, it is infuriating to me that Germans are getting mad about that comment yet seem to have no problem with whatever Saddam says or does. Go figure. We'll see how these principled pacifists who would never think it was worth overthrowing Saddam will act during their protests.

And for the record, a thank you out to the Germans for their assistance in Afghanistan. I honestly haven't written Germany off at all. I'm very disappointed in their attitude, to be sure; and wish they could at least avoid demonizing America as part of their position on Iraq. They are sovereign so have every right to decline to help us, but really, must that include blaming us for the world's ills?