An online journal of commentary, analysis, and dignified rants on national security issues. Other posts on home life, annoying things, and a vast 'other' are clearly marked.
I live and write in Ann Arbor, Michigan. University of Michigan AB and MA from Eastern Michigan University. One term in the Michigan Army National Guard. Former American history instructor and retired nonpartisan research analyst. I write on Blogger and Substack. Various military and private journals have published my occasional articles on military subjects. See "My Published Works" on the TDR web version or under the mobile version drop-down menu for citations and links.
I have finally salvaged my pre-Blogger TDR archives and added them into Blogger. They are almost totally in the form of one giant post for each month. And the formatting strayed from the originals. Sorry.
But historians everywhere can rejoice that this treasure trove of my thoughts is restored to the world.
And for your own safety, don't click on any old Geocities links or any of their similar variations in my posts. Those sites have been taken over by bad and/or dangerous sites. Hover over links first!
Colby argues for a more sensible division of labor. “America,” he
writes, “should laser-focus its military on Asia, reducing its level of
forces and expenditures in Europe.… Meanwhile, Europe should focus on
taking the lead on Ukraine and, more broadly, assuming the primary role
in its own conventional defense.” This division of labor would enable
the United States to rely less on economic warfare against China,
thereby lessening the strain on the Atlantic alliance.
While the China threat is more pressing, Europe has the power to blunt
Russia, as long as America is there in NATO to knit together the
European military forces scattered across the continent.
And Russia's self-immolation in Ukraine buys European
NATO states time to rebuild their military.
As for Iran, with the
Abraham Accords we have the nucleus of a local coalition that Europeans
could increase their support for, without needing to deploy many forces.
That said, I don't think it has been a mistake to send help to Ukraine. America needs a forward defense in Asia and Europe. That proposed division of labor requires Europe to be secure enough for America to further pivot to Asia. That requires the Russian threat to be defeated and not simply assumed away.
In World War II, even after Japan struck America first, America had a Europe-first policy based on the need to defeat the more powerful Nazi threat. But while America focused on deploying and using power in Europe, that didn't mean America ignored the Pacific. America initially even deployed more power in the Pacific to hold the Japanese at bay.
Also, don't forget that America has already withdrawn a lot of military power from Europe and the Atlantic! This reduction was made possible not by additional European military power but by the great reduction of the threat from the Soviet Union--geographically and militarily. No American fleets roam the Mediterranean Sea or guard Atlantic supply lines. Aircraft don't darken the skies of Europe. The Army doesn't possess a multi-corps army to hold back the enemy. You want reduced American power in Europe to focus on Asia?
Done!
The increased American presence in Europe since Russia invaded Ukraine (again) is a pittance compared to the legions that once guarded Europe.
Further, much of the early war decisive weapons America sent--Javelins and Stingers--are older (but obviously still very good) weapons that will eventually be replaced. Sending Ukraine some of that stockpile to defeat an avowed enemy makes sense rather than holding them to eventually scrap. And the war is an alarm to build up our production capacity to cover war ammunition usage and weapons replacement. I just don't see an early war against China need for Javelins and 155mm ammunition. Or Stingers beyond what we've held back from Ukraine.
Pivoting to the main front of Asia requires a secure Europe. And reducing the
Russian threat is key to that. It is an economy-of-force front, but a front that still requires American force. History is rhyming and Putin clearly gets the supporting role.
Adding Sweden and Finland to NATO will anchor the NATO northern flank and provide decisive assets for the Baltic Sea region. Is this one more step to Russian strategic sanity?
Sweden elected a new government in September, and Jonson was sworn in as
the new defense minister about a month later. The previous government
had vowed to raise its defense spending in line with the NATO threshold
by 2028. Jonson said Sweden currently spends about 1.4 percent of its
GDP on defense. However, with the worsening security situation in
Europe, the nation will move that goal up to 2026, he said.
“This is about solidarity with other allies. The Baltic nations are at
about 2 percent. Poland is way over 2 percent, and Germany is on the
track to 2 percent,” he said. All eight parties in the newly formed
Swedish government support meeting the threshold, although half of them
want to keep the original goal of 2028, he noted. “We can find
bipartisan agreement on it,” he added.
Once membership is approved, Sweden will be ready to participate as a full member, he said.
Sweden also has naval power, a modern defense industry, and useful intelligence capabilities focused on Russia.
Sweden's military is a joke, and NATO shouldn't consider Sweden for
membership until Sweden can be a provider rather than a consumer of
military security.
Sweden used to have a potent military to defend their neutrality. No more[.]
Finland, too. Although I hadn't imagined Finland would join. Russia's 2022 invasion alarmed both. But
Russia's extended face plant in Ukraine was a window of opportunity of heightened worry and temporarily reduced Russian military capabilities to
enter NATO too good to ignore. Finland adds modern air power, tanks and artillery, and a longstanding determination to keep the Russians out.
Both have made efforts to work with NATO, since 2014 especially, increasing their ability to quickly fit in as NATO partners.
I do wonder if Russia's decision to demote its Northern Fleet was a reaction to the cost and likely futility of defending the northwestern Russian bases from Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish air power, bolstered by other NATO assets.
And other Russian critical nuclear and conventional military assets are located on the far northern Kola Peninsula need protection. Can Russia contract defenses to that region while extending Arctic SSBN bastions further east?
How do you deter the deluded or irrational? I'm starting to think that conventional deterrence only works in political science theories.
It is popular to say that America and the West failed to deter Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I have sympathy for that view. But it has limits. Just how much can you deter the irrational and paranoid?
The current war in Ukraine provides a case for security cooperation. Had
the United States and NATO invested more heavily in Ukraine before
Russia’s February 2022 invasion, they may have deterred Russia from
attacking in the first place. In the past several months, the United States has invested approximately $17.6 billion in security assistance
for Ukraine. In comparison, it only invested $2.7 billion from 2014
until February. The United States’ concerns about escalation with Russia
were pervasive early in the Ukraine crisis, but along with NATO it has
since taken much greater risks to help Ukraine survive and to contain
Russia. U.S. and NATO leaders are now likely pondering whether
it may have been smarter and cheaper to invest earlier to prevent the
war than to help Ukraine fight it. [emphasis in original]
Would, as an example, sending $10 billion in security assistance before the invasion have deterred Russia?
One, more aid would have just fueled Russian paranoia. Not that I'm saying Russian paranoia should guide our policy. Insane fears must not have a veto on our policy.
Good grief, if Putin had just kept his mouth shut and his army at home,
NATO would have continued to disarm. In a few years of the trend
continuing, the fierce warriors of Montenegro could have conquered Germany.
And to add to the evidence, contemplate that Putin has managed to turn Democrats into virulent Russia-haters. We know why,
of course. But still, the change is amazing. I bet Putin didn't expect
Russia's traditionally useful idiots to stop being useful.
Anyway, stop acting as if Putin is brilliant or a model to follow.
Seriously, Russia watched NATO disarm but still believed it was marching toward Moscow because former Soviet vassal states didn't want Russia to take back what the Soviets lost. If America had provided zero security assistance aid to Ukraine, Russia still would have feared a NATO plot. If NATO had disbanded, Russia would have convinced itself that it was a clever American plot to remove the restraints the alliance placed on American plots to destroy Russia.
So I disregard Russian paranoia as something America must consider when deciding policy because Russian paranoia is an internal issue beyond our control. Describing American policy toward Russia in public should consider Russian paranoia. But not the basic policy. Don't spike the ball in the end zone, is all I'm saying. Or, contain softly but carry a big stick.
Still, the level of Russian paranoia is separate from deterring Russia from attacking Ukraine. In theory, having superior military power--or at least raising the cost of winning to a level too high to bear--is supposed to deter an enemy.
Would Russia have looked at $10 billion in American security assistance prior to Russia's invasion as too much Ukrainian military power to overcome?
And it isn't just a Russian problem. America thought Russia would rapidly stomp on Ukraine. How much security assistance would America have needed to pump into Ukraine to satisfy our models and conclude Russia was deterred?
Thucydides said that fear, honor, and interest are the basic causes of war. Sadly, no disinterested party defines what a country must fear, what sustains or harms its honor, or what its national interests really are.
After America allowed Afghanistan to fall to the Taliban, we need a post-action review to learn lessons. Is a broader critique appropriate? Let's check the "definitions" section.
Clausewitz tells us to measure society’s strength by
whether we achieve victory on the battlefield. Victory entails not just
destroying the enemy’s fighting capability or claiming his territory,
but achieving certain political objectives. American politicians have
shown a willingness to end wars without achieving their objectives. In
other words, they have shown a willingness to lose.
Precedent was set with the 1953 ceasefire in Korea and
upheld when America withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. It remains
unclear whether politicians intended to lose those wars (and others) or
merely accepted that the price of victory had become too high, that
victory was no longer worth the time or effort required....
No one blames the troops for our failures in Korea, Vietnam, or
Afghanistan. Rather, it is “the political leaders who have forgotten
that victory matters,” historian and Clausewitz scholar Donald Stoker
told me recently over the phone. And since the politicians do not
believe that victory matters, our troops have found themselves trapped
in endless wars that lead to defeat or stalemate, a doom loop of poor
planning-leads-to-poor results, where the pursuit of war itself becomes
more important than defeat or victory.
What of these three American defeats that prove our failure to think victory matters?
Korea: we did not start it, and we and the UN-authorized alliance
stopped the North Korean invasion, counter-attacked north, and then
coped with Chinese intervention. Today South Korea is a prosperous and
powerful ally. Victory.
The Korean War judgment depends on when you judge it, no? Fifty years ago we propped up an authoritarian South Korean government with a poor economy. What was our victory, then? Just a marginal one, at best. Now? Clear victory.
Vietnam: We did not start it, and we and our allies eventually defeated
the Viet Cong insurgents, leaving the fight to North Vietnamese regulars
and irregulars infiltrated south to AstroTurf an insurgency. South
Vietnam fell not to insurgents but to a conventional North Vietnamese
invasion after we withdrew and after our Congress cut off support
sufficient to sustain the South Vietnamese military we left South
Vietnam with to hold. Was that really a defeat by our military? I count
that as a military victory.
Further, that narrow military victory judgment that concedes a defeat because we let South Vietnam fall might not even be relevant, depending on whether the Vietnam War was a war in isolation or a campaign in the Cold War. We won the Cold War. Was the duration of the Vietnam campaign enough to win the broader war, with the campaign outcome now clearly irrelevant (to America, although not to South Vietnam)?
The Afghanistan War: We did not start that. Recall 9/11, if you will. We
smashed the Taliban regime and while we have not crushed the Taliban
for a number of reasons, the enemy has not managed to defeat our allies
and Afghanistan is not a sanctuary for terrorists who plot against us.
At worst it is an incomplete victory.
Afghanistan turned into a defeat since I wrote that. But I'll admit that maybe if you consider Afghanistan a campaign in the War on Terror rather than a war in isolation, that in a decade or two our judgment may look different. Maybe we find the campaign was critical to breaking the back of jihadi appeal and recruitment. Maybe we'll find that our two decades in Afghanistan changed its society enough to reject and defeat the Taliban over time--and provide a more enduring victory for our sacrifice there. The passage of time changes perspectives. But for now Afghanistan feels like defeat. And it could become a bigger defeat if jihadis reconstitute inside Afghanistan with the support of the Taliban government.
Iraq is interesting. The author calls it a victory based on our objectives. I'm on board that. I reject the complaint that destroying Saddam gave Iran more influence. Saddam was no bulwark against Iran that we removed. If he was a strong bulwark, Saddam and his minority Sunni Arab government (15-20% of the people) wouldn't have invaded Iran in 1980, in part due to the heavy Iranian influence among Iraq's poor and oppressed Shia Arabs (60%) with the Kurds (20%) opposing the Sunni Arab government on the side. And I'll even concede that the cost of the result makes the war debatable in retrospect. But I don't really question the cost because we cannot know the cost of the alternative of not fighting the war.
And do you call Iraq a campaign in the War on Terror or a discreet war
on Saddam? In 1990-1991 and in 2003, it was a war against Saddam's
threat to the region. After al Qaeda invaded Iraq in 2004 to fight the West
there, the jihadis made it a campaign in the broader war. So it is
probably both. And probably a victory from both angles.
Also, in my post looking broadly at the issue of winning or losing noted earlier, I looked at the record of American wars prior to Korea through the lens that judges our current wars as defeats. With our current eagerness to define our wars as defeats, many of those earlier wars would be called defeats.
Still, this advice from that initial article is sound:
If you’re not trying to win the war, how will you ever get to peace?
Fighting the war becomes an end. There’s a phenomenon where the war
becomes more tactical the longer it goes on, and planners and
decision-makers lose sight of the strategic picture.
Are Russians aware of and sick of the slaughter Putin has inflicted on their men? Is a desperate bid to kill more Ukrainians worth the deaths of so many ill-prepared and reluctant civilians forced to wear a Russian uniform?
Putin is pushing virtually untrained and ill-equipped troops into the line to stop Ukrainian counteroffensives and to maintain an offensive in the Donbas. Putin is bolstering those new levies with veteran survivors of the Kherson front after withdrawing east across the Dnieper River to reduce the need for troops to hold that shorter front behind the river line. Russia is getting a respite during the mud season. As the ground freezes, cross-country movement will be restored until deep winter bitter cold adds new problems to overcome.
Honestly, this level of crisis that Putin is stoking might just provoke enough powerful and ordinary Russians to wonder if Putin himself is the foreign plot to destroy Russia. Could Putin end up hanging from a lamp post by his heels before this is over?
Or at least end his continued rule? Just how long will the Russian cannon fodder show up to do and die?
I only ask because after Ukraine savaged the Russian ground forces and seized the initiative, Ukraine has not been able to inflict a serious military defeat on the Russian occupiers. Sure, Ukraine took back significant amounts of territory in the east near Kharkov and on the Kherson front. But neither counteroffensive broke the Russian army and sent it fleeing back to Russia.
I expected a lot more during the autumn. Which I guess technically has a little more time.
If Ukraine can't take advantage of this moment of advantage to conduct winter offensives, Russia can eventually train and equip enough troops to fill that capabilities gap in Ukraine's favor to some extent. The Russian units won't be great, but they may be adequate. Perhaps enough to hold what Russia still occupies even if not enough to resume an offensive in the spring. And I can't rule that offensive option out.
Maybe Putin's destruction of the Russian army and sacrifice of cannon fodder to hold the line until spring will be his own undoing. But it is risky to count on your enemy defeating itself. But is that all Ukraine can do despite its often impressive performance thus far?
If Ukraine’s allies and partners do not support Ukrainian forces to conduct large-scale decisive counteroffensive operations this winter—as the DNI’s statements might be construed to suggest – then Ukrainians‘ ability to conduct maneuver warfare will be constrained until likely at least after the spring mud season in March 2023.[14] Such a course of action will likely prematurely culminate Ukraine‘s current momentum and grant shattered Russian forces a valuable three-to-four-month reprieve to reconstitute and prepare to fight on a better footing.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that the Russian military seeks an operational pause in winter 2022-2023 to regain the initiative and conduct a counteroffensive in spring 2023[.]
It would be even more worrisome to me if Ukraine cannot continue their counteroffensive over the winter.
Putin, who met in a televised meeting of his Human Rights Council, said
the "special military operation" could go on for a long time, and called
Russia's annexation of part of the territories of Ukraine a major
achievement of the operation.
Are the Russian people really fine with their role as cannon fodder for Putin's sick glory? Maybe string the SOB up by his heels from the nearest lamp post, eh?
Ukrainian forces’ interdiction campaign against Russian military assets and logistics hubs in southern Ukraine has likely degraded Russian forces, their logistics lines, and broader Russian morale.
Killing sick kids. But the Canadians plan to do it so politely. It's almost as if what the state provides ("free" health care) the state can take away. The greater good, eh? Tip to Instapundit.
Four-year college degrees used to be a proxy for being qualified for a job. But the woke have wrecked that relationship. Those who hire are starting to notice. Tip to Instapundit.
Coping: "The Army is going all-in on
pre-basic training courses that aim to get applicants within weight
standards and boost scores on the military's entrance exam as it
scrambles for recruits to fill the ranks." When I went in, the Army had a pre-basic training fitness detour for those who couldn't pass the initial push-up test. Also, all Michigan Army National Guard troops went to a pre-boot camp weekend to get you used to what to expect. I learned my push up lesson there.
Yes, well-trained troops are key to success. Add in logistics and good morale. Then we can talk about the fancy high-tech advanced weapons that don't last long when the fighting drags on.
Trudeau: "Using protests to demand changes of public policy is something that I think is worrisome." It's funny. Whatever progressives do in mass numbers--even taking over state legislatures--they chant "this is what democracy looks like." That judgment only applies to progressive protesters.
Thank God Biden is restoring our relations with Europe! "Former United States President Donald Trump was a useful bogeyman for
Europe. His successor, Joe Biden, is proving much trickier — a friend
who says all the right things but leaves you in the lurch when it
counts."
Even if America helped fund Covid-19 research in China, China bears the responsibility: "the U.S. response to Covid-19 had more than its share of problems. It is
worth noting that the virus had likely arrived in the U.S. long before
the U.S. government could mobilize a response, and the Chinese health
officials stopped communicating with their American counterparts when it mattered most.
Chinese authorities in Wuhan and later in Beijing knew they were
dealing with a dangerous and contagious virus, and instead of warning
the world, they chose to allow contagious carriers to travel around the
world." The only question is whether that Chinese failure to warn was from incompetence or a CCP decision to avoid suffering alone.
Good: "The United States on Tuesday announced $53 million to support the
purchase of power grid equipment to Ukraine to help Kyiv fight Russian
attacks targeting its energy infrastructure that left millions in the
dark with no heating."
I'm really not interested in another booster when Covid has gotten so weak. And when the booster is so ineffective. I had Xi Jinping Flu in the spring and it was mild. Unless another booster is required to fly commercially, I don't see why I need this. You do you, of course. TDR is not a medical doctor. He has a MA. In history.
Interesting: "Russian forces have largely stopped deploying as battalion tactical
groups because the formations have proved ineffective, the UK's Ministry
of Defence (MoD) has said." BTGs were always over-rated.
Recently the American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said both Russia and Ukraine had suffered 100,000 casualties. Originally I assumed that the Russians had a higher KIA:WIA ratio than Ukraine. But now I wonder if the estimate for Ukraine is disinformation to lull the Russians. Really, why would we advertise Ukrainian losses if we want Ukraine to win? Unless we're trying to pressure Ukraine to negotiate now, before Russia is ejected from at least its 2022 conquests. It is perplexing.
Why do climate alarmists want poor people to starve? "'The Dutch government plans to buy and close down up to 3,000 farms
near environmentally sensitive areas to comply with EU nature
preservation rules,' the British daily Telegraph confirmed on Monday."
Before the election, Democrats lied that crime hadn't gotten much worse in the last three years. The media cooperated, using obviously bad statistics. Only now is the media admitting crime has gotten worse. It's so weird. Democrats pushed to "defund the police" and supported woke prosecutors, and somehow the police were less effective in preventing crime. Tip to Instapundit.
Interesting: "Reports from Russian sources indicate that Russia may attempt to use prison labor, overtime, and child labor to resuscitate the Russian military-industrial complex and fill general labor shortages."
Say, you know how America has reduced the Strategic Petroleum Reserve for political purposes? That depletion has foreign policy consequences: "Australia and the United States of America have signed a milestone
Arrangement to bolster Australia’s access to emergency oil supplies in
the event of a major global disruption." How much of the oil left in the SPR is actually Australian? And if we had an emergency, would America send it to Australia with less of our own oil there? That agreement was in March 2020. Since then America got busy "restoring our reputation abroad".
Coping: "The United States has reduced the number of partnered patrols in
northern Syria with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Pentagon said on
Tuesday, after Turkish strikes in the region and ahead of a feared
ground invasion by Ankara." The media won't freak out that America is abandoning the Kurds the way the media wrongly claimed three years ago.
Yeah, I liked Andorwhen I had a month of Disney+. I was happy to recently notice Hulu has it on delayed release. I only saw a few so I look forward to watching the rest on Hulu.
Neat: "SpaceX is set Wednesday to launch the first private – and Japanese – lander to the Moon." When I was a child watching Apollo, I thought we'd be established in space decades ago.
Well, not yet: "As China modernized, the U.S. bet that political liberalization would
follow. International integration would mellow and moderate China's
Communists. But it didn't happen, did it?" The "mellowing" may have to happen not from voluntary CCP actions but from the demands of the people.
Oh? "Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell said Wednesday that the central bank
could ease its pace of interest rate hikes 'as soon as' December." When you start to take Vienna curb inflation, take Vienna curb inflation. Or we could undo what progress we started to make and start all over when inflation is worse.
The Russians have a role, of course: "
Mali is slipping back to its corrupt and chaotic past." The Russians want chaos south of Europe. Amazing that the locals are paying Russia in gold to foment chaos there.
Sure: "Finnish PM Sanna Marin has said Europe is 'not strong enough' to stand
up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine on its own, and has had to rely on US
support." But as Finland joins NATO, don't make the mistake of thinking the EU can replace America-led NATO. Hopefully Finland is exposed to Russian aggression enough not to be deluded.
Germany's military can't fight? "Alarming headlines have appeared in the German media in recent days about the state of the country's military, suggesting the Bundeswehr
only has enough ammunition for two days of intense fighting — a figure
apparently leaked by unnamed sources in defense circles." This is shocking. Who knew Germany had a military? The "German Question" remains unresolved.
I never thought mask mandates were effective for containing this pandemic. But I did believe voluntary masking provided some individual protection depending on type of mask, user skill, threat level, and time in the threat zone. My reasoning was based on Army chemical warfare training. But perhaps it was all pretty worthless? "If you can wear an N95 for more than about 30 minutes you are wearing it wrong." If user skill is impossible practically speaking, there goes my reasoning. Of course, the study was in healthcare facilities. So those people were in a high threat zone for a long time. Which by my reasoning reduces net protection. And it is tough to wear a mask effectively for that long without at least occasionally screwing up. So another reduction. But I'm open to being totally wrong. Tip to Instapundit.
Biden rewards Maduro for destroying democracy in Venezuela: "According to a U.N. report
this year, the regime is responsible for crimes against humanity,
detaining and torturing at least 245 current political prisoners. The
regime actively kidnaps
American citizens, colludes with China and Iran to evade sanctions and
harbor terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, and uses its oil wealth to
support and expand anti-American political projects in neighboring
states." And we stiff-armed Guyana. So watch China get involved, I imagine. Strategery. WTF?
LOL: "Mr Lavrov named former US Secretary of State John Kerry as the kind of
figure who had in the past been able to solve problems and engage in
true dialogue." Well naturallythe Russians have fond memories of the former Fuck-Up Fairy of State!
The new B-21 was carefully unveiled. It looks like the B-2. Perhaps because the basic physical design is good and why waste money reinventing the wheel? The biggest improvements are in materials and computing technology. Oh, and greater range.
Yes, would it really have been better if Kanye West's hateful statements had been suppressed and hidden? It's always better to see hate speech. Which is just part of free speech and not an exemption to it. And remember, the hate doesn't disappear if regular people don't see it. It just grows out of sight, fueled by the motivation of knowing "they" (whoever the haters decide is "they") are suppressing their views.
Oh: " U.S. troops Saturday resumed joint patrols with Kurdish-led forces in
northeast Syria days after they were stopped amid Turkish threats of a
new ground incursion into the war-torn country." I assume America explained that without the counter-ISIL mission there is little reason for American troops to remain--and provide at least some restraint on Turkish actions.
Just a reminder: "The PLA is the principal armed wing of the CCP and, as a party-army, does not directly serve the state but rather is under the direct control of the party."
I have no idea if this is accurate: "Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, said between 10,000 and 13,000 troops had died."
One more thought on Twitter revelations. Even if this was mostly about Democrats out of government targeting actors for Twitter cancellation, imagine the media reaction if Republicans out of government had been routinely doing this and Twitter routinely carrying out the cyber-hits? Not every shameful act is banned by the Constitution. Still, if Democrats hang their hats on the Hunter laptop issue as a defense, they may be squirming as the trail leads from that point in 2020 through 2021 and this year.
Domino's Pizza is advertising that their delivery fleet includes electric vehicles. I guess the fact that the company isn't focusing on the quality of the product indicates a lack of confidence in quality. Duly noted.
I think I'm going to end the "And Now For Something Completely Different" Saturday morning meme post. Adding memes to most posts has added to the burden of a weekly dedicated post on separate mostly political issues. Sometimes the inspiration hits and sometimes it doesn't. I think I'll just add the memes to the Weekend Data Dump when inspiration hits me. This used to be fun. Now it is fun only sometimes. And I was more worried about autocratic tendencies in our government when I started it. That worry exists. But elections and rival centers of power can still change things, clearly. Maybe I'll put this in effect in January. Or maybe the decision to end the category will drain the will to meme earlier than that.
SIGAR’s latest report found that the stunning collapse of Ashraf Ghani’s
U.S.-backed government was influenced by a failure to recognize that
U.S. President Joe Biden was serious about withdrawing American troops,
his exclusion from diplomatic talks with the Taliban and the
unwillingness of the militant group to compromise, and the stacking of
loyalists around the presidential palace that made corruption an endemic
problem in Kabul. ...
“U.S. efforts to build and sustain Afghanistan’s governing institutions
were a total, epic, predestined failure on par with the same efforts and
outcome in the Vietnam War and for the same reasons,” said Chris Mason,
an associate professor of national security at the U.S. Army War
College, who was interviewed for the report.
The failure of the Afghanistan government to recognize we were really leaving might have been encouraged by the folly of really leaving totally, eh? After nearly twenty years of mowing the jihadi grass we finally got to the point when American dying while helping Afghan forces kill jihadis every day was rare. We were trying to prevent another 9/11. Gosh, why would the Afghans fail to recognize we'd shoot ourselves in the foot by actually leaving?
I worried that Obama's great reduction in American forces would lead to collapse as fear of fighting alone overwhelmed them. But Obama's small footprint was enough to prevent government collapse. So I certainly didn't think we'd really totally abandon our allies.
I was horrified that we didn't keep Afghan government officials involved in the talks, making it look like the government wasn't legitimate and encouraging the government to feel we could be selling them out.
The "failure" of the Taliban to compromise was actually our failure to recognize the Taliban were trying to win--not trying to compromise.
And the problem of corrupt loyalists around the president was something we should have recognized from Iraq after we left in 2011 as a natural result of leaving too soon.
The end result in Afghanistan, if all goes well, will be a nominal
national government that controls the capital region and reigns but does
not rule local tribes and which actually helps the locals a bit rather
than sucking resources from the locals, who in turn do not make trouble
for the central government or allow their areas to be used by jihadis to
plan attacks on the West. We press for reasonable economic
opportunities, with bribes all around (I mean, foreign aid), to keep a
fragile peace.
And we stick around this time, unlike after the
Soviets left Afghanistan when we ignored the place, for a generation or
two to see if we can move Afghanistan into the 19th century (hey, let's
not get ahead of ourselves).
Hopefully our military surge recedes
by the end of 2011 and we can get down to a single combat brigade plus
air power that function as a fire brigade and a hammer for the central
government should a local difficulty exceed Afghan military
capabilities.
Afghanistan is a tribal territory with a UN seat and not a country in any sense of the word. Pretending it was a country that could be built was the foundational cause.
And the immediate cause for defeat is that America fled from Afghanistan on a deadline rather than on conditions, in order to have a politically motivated celebration on the 20th anniversary of 9/11.
Rather than line up for our victory parade, the Taliban pursued victory. And the fearful and corrupt government ran rather than being the last to die for a cause that America inexplicably didn't care about. Remember, the Taliban could see we had a dead pool on how long the government would last before collapsing after America left!
And while this wasn't raised, don't even pretend the reason for defeat was that we created an Afghanistan military in our own image. That's nonsense.
So, no, SIGAR, you're close but you don't have it quite right pointing at the shortcomings of the Afghanistan government. You're right about the shortcomings. But America screwed the pooch. There's little point arguing we didn't have the ally we wanted rather than the ally we had--and implicitly encouraged.
America is a global superpower. Sealift capacity eroded after the Cold War but was supplemented by private sector shipping for the short conventional campaigns and long counterinsurgencies America fought. But that is not enough for an era of great power competition. America is not a super power without that power projection capability.
What are the measures of a superpower? Is it the number and diversity of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems?
Is it the size of its Army? Or the number of ships in its fleet? These
are necessary, but not sufficient, measures of a nation’s military
capabilities.
A unique strategic advantage for the U.S. is its capacity to move
large amounts of forces and supplies across oceans and sustain them
while engaged in combat, often for years. This is essential for the
military’s ability to achieve integrated deterrence, conduct
expeditionary and humanitarian operations, and provide reassurance to
friends and allies. Should deterrence fail, moving forces to a fight and
sustaining their presence is vital. That makes sealift an important
measure of U.S. military power.
I've been droning on about this issue. Sealift is still insufficient.
As we focus on shooters for great power competition, let's not forget
the logistics that will allow us to move and sustain the shooters long
enough to shoot and win.
We've seen the problems Russia has sustaining combat operations just 100 miles from their rail heads. The problem of moving an expeditionary force abroad and sustaining it through opposition at sea and in the air is far more difficult and expensive. But that is vital to preventing that American expeditionary force from dying far from home. Let alone winning campaigns to sustain Eurasian allies to keep threats far from our shores.
And maybe, just maybe, China learns the wrong lesson from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Maybe the Chinese don't learn that it is too dangerous to invade Taiwan.
One of the overriding themes inherent in this effort is that the U.S. Navy is no longer an expeditionary navy, that it is a forward based navy.[iv]
In dealing with the “peace dividend” defense budgets of the 1990’s, the
Navy made the discussion to cut many of the ship classes that
underpinned expeditionary operations: tenders, repair ships, salvage
ships, logistics ships, etc. It was able to do this, in part, by being
able to secure the long-term use of forward operating bases in Japan,
Spain, Singapore, and other countries around the world, as well as enter
into ship husbanding contracts for supplies and repairs in ports around
the world. But the Navy never went back and replaced the ship classes
it reduced and eliminated in the 90’s, and the ability to use facilities
located in other countries is entirely dependent on the sovereign
decision-making of host nations.
If we lose those forward bases from enemy action or host nation decisions, our Navy is largely pushed back to North America.