An Odd Pivot to Asia

I find this assessment of Russia's failure to bolster their Asia front fascinating:

Over the last five years, Russia has been trying to achieve two strategic goals: A “Pivot to Asia” (away from Europe) and a renewed focus on post-soviet integration with its Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Both of those aspirations are rooted in the desire to break away from dependence on Europe, while reasserting its influence in what Russia refers to as its “near-abroad.” The “Pivot” was supposed to bring Russia closer to new Asian markets and energy consumers, and the EEU is conceived to counter European influence through creating a “Eurasian alternative” to the EU in the post-soviet space.

It is an odd pivot to Asia that features a Russian invasion of Ukraine (in violation of the UN charter, the Budapest Memorandum, and the agreement dissolving the Soviet Union) and occupation of part of that state's territory plus vocal hostility to NATO and the non-NATO states of Finland and Sweden.

The Central Asian states of the EEU have reason to worry that being an ex-Soviet state like Ukraine is just a temporary loss as far as Russia is concerned, to be remedied when a revival of Russian power and opportunity bring those ex-Soviet states back into the empire.

Not that Russia doesn't need a pivot to Asia to succeed soon. I've noted on a number of occasions that the expiration of a 20-year pact suspending China's land claims against Russia in Asia will take place at the start of the next decade.

If Russia has to face a China that rediscovers a "core interest" of recovering lost Asian territory, the Russians might want to end their pointless hostility to NATO and America.

Of course, the situation is very different than a failed pivot to Asia if Russia has decided it cannot match China despite the 20-year pause in Chinese claims, with a policy that is more like this:

Today, Russia's ties with Asia are centred on China in multiple areas, including geopolitics, security and defence cooperation, trade, arms sales, and energy exports. Russia has resumed exports of advanced arms to China. The existing and planned oil and gas pipelines are mostly bound for China – Russia is now China's largest supplier of crude oil. Joint naval exercises have been tailored first and foremost to meet Beijing's strategic needs. The unintended consequence of ever closer relations with China has been a reduction in Russia's capacity to establish deeper ties with other Asian states. In effect, Moscow's policy of turning to the East has been crippled.

Russia's acquiescence to Chinese pre-eminence has been even more conspicuous in Central Asia.

If Russia has truly resigned itself to this unequal relationship, Russian efforts to conceal their appeasement of China with hostility to the (so far) weak European NATO states will continue.

It's an odd pivot to Asia that simultaneously stokes tension in Europe.

But if Russia needs to oppose the West--even at the risk of creating the threat Moscow pretends threatens them--to pretend it hasn't bent the knee to China, it makes more sense.

The NATO Recruiting Office

Europe's defense capacity is a joke despite the amount of money they spend on their militaries and the number of people wearing a uniform. We simply can't expect them to reverse that trend. Let's treat Europe as a recruiting pool for military efforts that we lead.

Why the Eurocrats think they need the European Union to suppress nationalist impulses for war is beyond me when you consider that European militaries are mostly a joke--and getting worse:

Europe once was a military power—many military powers, in fact. But no longer. Today Europe is turning into a continent without a military. ...

No amount of whining by Washington will change this reality. There is no political will to increase outlays. And despite the Europeans’ unwillingness to fulfill their alliance responsibilities, some of them have criticized the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia. Panetta claimed that “Europe should not fear our rebalance to Asia; Europe should join it.” But the likelihood of the Europeans deploying military personnel in Asia is about as likely as the Europeans conquering Mars.

The Europeans rightly fear that the “pivot” will shift U.S. military resources from Europe. Yet there is no compelling reason why Washington should continue to protect the populous and prosperous continent from largely phantom threats.

Europe barely defeated Libya, for God's sake, and took far longer to do it than they assumed. And it took a Libya wracked by civil war and a substantial assist from America to do the job. It was a closer thing than you think, in my opinion.

It is time to stop trying to get Europeans to build even small versions of our military. We can't lead from behind when there is nothing in front.

And the idea that NATO will pivot to Asia with us is ridiculous. I count it a success if our European allies just decline to sell China military technology useful to kill our military personnel.

Let's just get the European to make whatever they are willing to field good enough to take the field at our side if we can round up a coalition of the willing for the problem at hand. That's what we need to do anyway, so why not accept it? Think of the dribs and drabs of European military assets as a source of tribal auxiliaries to attach to our actual military.

I take exception to the idea that there is no compelling reason to protect Europe from phantom threats. One, you never know when real threats will emerge. Once they do, we may not have the will to rebuild what we abandon in Europe. And the Europeans might be too frightened to accept our help (calling it "provocative" or some such rot). So best to stay as insurance, no?

More to the point, it is in our interest to remain in Europe even if that presence looks like a free defense against phantom threats because Europe is a convenient staging area for deploying our forces into a vast arc of crisis from West Africa to Central Asia.

Remember that "leading from behind" essentially assumes we can get allies to fight for our interests. Libya worked because it was in Europe's interest to fight the war. I argued for that interest all along as a reason to let Europe handle the job. They let us handle Iraq, for the most part, alone. Same with Afghanistan. There are honorable exceptions by allies who shed blood at our side at one point or another (Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, Britain, and Poland, off the top of my head, have my gratitude), but they were and are more rare than the war tourists who went along for the t-shirts and snow globes, with more caveats than capabilities in their kits.

So even if we could get Europeans to build up their militaries, we can't get them to fight for us. Let's just accept that only we will fight for our interests and seek the most effective way to get real allied help when our interests coincide. Even if select European states decide to rearm, Europeans will rely on us to take the lead anyway. Even France's commendable effort to rout the jihadis in Mali was a fairly tiny expedition (yet still required substantial American help):

Going into Mali there were only about two thousand troops heading north, and only a few hundred of those were commandos. But like their American counterparts, the French have elite infantry units (airborne and Foreign Legion) who were flown in (or parachuted in) to assist. The basic French tactic was to use months of air reconnaissance to identify buildings where the al Qaeda men were staying in the dozen or so major towns (and a few cities) in northern Mali they occupied. Using a dozen or so fighter-bombers and several hundred smart bombs and missiles, these al Qaeda targets were hit. Then, when the commandos approached the al Qaeda held town in their Patsis (or even lighter vehicles) they would call in smart bomb strikes as needed.

Our tankers and surveillance were key to getting French troops to Mali and allowing that air support to work. But how often is a threat going to be small enough for our European allies to handle? When their capabilities continue to drop? If we treat Europeans as tribal auxiliaries, we might be the ones to organize and lead a force with a couple thousand French plugged into our organization to carry out the mission. It might not even look much different than the way it turned out. But at least we'd be clear from the start what our allies can and can't do.

Europe As an Economy-of-Force Front

American military power is still needed in Europe. Don't pretend it isn't. We're simply replacing the Europe-first policy with an Asia-first policy.

Yes, European NATO states need to carry more of the burden of dealing with Russia and Iran. 

Colby argues for a more sensible division of labor. “America,” he writes, “should laser-focus its military on Asia, reducing its level of forces and expenditures in Europe.… Meanwhile, Europe should focus on taking the lead on Ukraine and, more broadly, assuming the primary role in its own conventional defense.” This division of labor would enable the United States to rely less on economic warfare against China, thereby lessening the strain on the Atlantic alliance.

I've certainly said NATO doesn't need America nearly as much as our allies in Asia need us. We need to fill gaps in NATO capabilities more than anything:

While the China threat is more pressing, Europe has the power to blunt Russia, as long as America is there in NATO to knit together the European military forces scattered across the continent. 

And Russia's self-immolation in Ukraine buys European NATO states time to rebuild their military. 

As for Iran, with the Abraham Accords we have the nucleus of a local coalition that Europeans could increase their support for, without needing to deploy many forces. 

That said, I don't think it has been a mistake to send help to Ukraine. America needs a forward defense in Asia and Europe. That proposed division of labor requires Europe to be secure enough for America to further pivot to Asia. That requires the Russian threat to be defeated and not simply assumed away.

In World War II, even after Japan struck America first, America had a Europe-first policy based on the need to defeat the more powerful Nazi threat. But while America focused on deploying and using power in Europe, that didn't mean America ignored the Pacific. America initially even deployed more power in the Pacific to hold the Japanese at bay. 

So a focus on growing Chinese threats in Asia and the Pacific should not mean ignoring still-dangerous Europe.

Also, don't forget that America has already withdrawn a lot of military power from Europe and the Atlantic! This reduction was made possible not by additional European military power but by the great reduction of the threat from the Soviet Union--geographically and militarily. No American fleets roam the Mediterranean Sea or guard Atlantic supply lines. Aircraft don't darken the skies of Europe. The Army doesn't possess a multi-corps army to hold back the enemy. You want reduced American power in Europe to focus on Asia?

Done!  

The increased American presence in Europe since Russia invaded Ukraine (again) is a pittance compared to the legions that once guarded Europe.

Further, much of the early war decisive weapons America sent--Javelins and Stingers--are older (but obviously still very good) weapons that will eventually be replaced. Sending Ukraine some of that stockpile to defeat an avowed enemy makes sense rather than holding them to eventually scrap. And the war is an alarm to build up our production capacity to cover war ammunition usage and weapons replacement. I just don't see an early war against China need for Javelins and 155mm ammunition. Or Stingers beyond what we've held back from Ukraine.

I'll also ask, when the issue is "diverting" forces to Europe, where do we put all the military units that we're supposed to commit to Asia with a "laser-like" focus? We don't need to cram ships into the few ports and planes onto few air bases to make them target-rich environments for Chinese missile attacks.

In addition, too much of a reduction in American power committed to NATO will just encourage the European Union to exploit that to kick America out of Europe--not to focus on Russia's threats.

Pivoting to  the main front of Asia requires a secure Europe. And reducing the Russian threat is key to that. It is an economy-of-force front, but a front that still requires American force. History is rhyming and Putin clearly gets the supporting role.

I'm all on board helping Ukraine stop Russia now, as far east as possible, to minimize the need for American military power n Europe. Flipping the Russian threat to an ally--as in if China invaded Hell I'd make a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons--would be better. 

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.

The Pivot is Dead; Long Live the Pivot

The word is that the Obama administration "pivot" to Asia is over as a term. There is some unease over this change in terminology. But that ship pivoted long ago.

The term is dead:

The Obama administration’s Pacific rebalance effort — also known as the Pivot to the Pacific — effort is officially dead, according to a top State Department official. ...

However, [Acting Assistant Secretary of State Susan] Thornton — speaking on the eve of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s first visit to the Asia-Pacific region — stressed that the new administration remains committed to the region, even if the flavor of that commitment may change.

But the need to reinforce Asia and the Pacific is not dead.

In my opinion, the Pivot to Asia and the Pacific was really a cover for President Obama to pivot away from the Middle East.

But that proclamation that wars in the Middle East were "responsibly ended" was premature and the once-quiet European theater heated up a lot.

So now we are pretty much pivoting to everywhere, making a concept of pivoting away from vanquished threats to dealing with a rising threat rather pointless as a concept.

UPDATE: In related news, Japan is edging toward "offensive" weapons (At some level the distinction between shooty things as either offensive or defensive is rather pointless. But it is common to make.):

Japan's ruling party urged the government Thursday to consider arming the country with more advanced and offensive military capabilities, such as striking enemy targets with cruise missiles, further loosening the self-defense-only posture Japan has maintained since the end of World War II.

I find this amusing. Japan is too cautious to arm up in the face of China. But by pointing to the North Korean threat that China has supported for so long, enjoying how it made Japan, South Korea, and America squirm, Japan has an excuse that China can hardly oppose too strongly.

Will China actually deal with their little problem child to undermine Japanese, South Korean, and American moves to resist North Korea that are also very useful against a Chinese threat?

Defense Ties to Europe Prevent--Not Risk--War

Letting Europe develop strategic autonomy in the military field at the expense of NATO will just add a new threat to American interests while increasing the existing risk from Russia. 

Saying America should disassociate itself from Macron's threat to send training troops to Ukraine and encourage EU strategic autonomy to avoid getting drawn into a war with Russia is silly:

Discussion of European strategic autonomy peaked during the Trump administration when it became abundantly clear that the U.S. president viewed Europe as not doing enough for its own defense. The ongoing Ukraine crisis is a stark reminder that our wealthy and capable European allies cannot afford to ignore defense matters. While some dismiss the concept as a “pipe dream” or as “dead”, strategic autonomy remains the only, albeit difficult, path to making Europe an attractive partner and thus strategically relevant in the modern day.

Crucially, a conventional—but contained—war in Europe, interminable and destabilizing conflicts in the Middle East, and great power competition across the globe all mean that it is in America’s and Europe’s interest to shore up European defense and enable the U.S. to focus on higher priorities elsewhere.

Oh, please. Europeans recognized they weren't doing enough for their own defense when they pledged in 2014--during the Obama administration--that NATO states, largely European, should increase defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2024.

This EU partner foolishness is a variation of the "Dormant NATO" fad that pretends America can safely walk away from defending Europe. The "strategic autonomy" argument pretends that the EU is the proper partner for letting us pretend America isn't walking away from defending Europe. 

And the partner folly uses that "higher priorities elsewhere" argument. It never ends:

I've long noted that the Left has a history of opposing the current threat we are resisting in order to focus like a laser beam on the "next" vitally important threat. Obviously, when the current threat defeats us, that "next" threat becomes the current threat. Lather, rinse, repeat. The "bad war" versus "good war" dance of two decades ago is the most obvious example of this process.

The right has adopted this "we need to focus on the real threat" approach to advocate a pivot to Asia in order to abandon Europe and/or the Middle East to their fates. It'll be fine, they say.

This author's denial that America has pivoted to Asia ignores the departure of hundreds of thousands of American troops from Europe since the Cold War. The denial of a pivot ignores the massive reduction in American military power in the Middle East after winning in Iraq and losing in Afghanistan. As I observed in this post[.]

Walking away from Europe will just cause America to lose influence in Europe through NATO about what Europeans do. 

And if Russia fought Europe, we'd still need to fight. 

I don't mind defense production cooperation across Europe, but that's a means and not an objective for the EU (back to that initial article):

The EU Commission’s strategy aims to create an industrial foundation for European strategic autonomy.

Using that production objective to obscure "strategic autonomy" separation of America from Europe in military cooperation which is now done through NATO is harmful to American national security interests.

And it gets worse. The EU is designed to thwart democracy in favor of a pan-European ruling elite that does what it wants through opaque Byzantine power levers:

Even Brussels insiders can’t predict which European party group the largest national delegations from France, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands or Austria will belong to after all the behind-the-scenes deal-making.

And this adds to the disconnect between voters’ choices and EU politics.

Defense ties with Europe through NATO don't create a risk of war. It's designed to prevent that risk. Two world wars when we had no defense ties indicates that, no? That's one reason why I wanted to keep a corps in Europe (see pp. 15-20) back when the post-Cold War peace dividend still had that new car smell. 

The proto-imperial EU bureaucrats and fanboys never miss a chance to strip away the prefix. Nobody who values American security and Western liberty should advocate throwing away a robust NATO insurance policy.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

Go West, Young Han

China is eying the former Soviet republics in central Asia for economic advantage. Russia worries that the flag follows trade, with the PLA right in the middle of that hand off. A Chinese pivot to the interior of Asia certainly helps our pivot to the littorals of Asia.

China wants better rail links to central Asia:

China is offering to build new railroads into Central Asia. This is part of a $300 billion plan to upgrade and expand Chinese railways over the next two decades years. Chinese businesses are investing more billions to create new businesses in Central Asia and the cheapest way to get goods in or out of this landlocked area is via rail.

Which raises interesting possibilities:

Something Russia does not like to discuss openly is the fact that Chinese railroads extending into Central Asia would make it easier for China to carry out major military operations in the area. With rail lines extending deep into Central Asia China could more easily threaten a long feared invasion of Russia to take back the eastern territories that many Chinese believe are theirs.

Strategypage says China is unlikely to do that as long as Russia has lots of nukes, but I'm not so sure. Does Russia really carry out a nuclear murder-suicide pact over control of limited peripheral areas outside of the core of European Russia?

Still, getting China pointed to the interior of Asia is surely in our interest. It might also end that annoying tendency of the Russians to loudly complain about the non-threat that NATO poses to Russia while pretending to ignore rising Chinese power that could start round three of territory shedding, following the 1989 loss of Eastern Europe and the 1991 loss of many non-Russian republics of the USSR.

The European Pivot to Asia

China surely has an interest in keeping Europe in the market for Chinese products. Especially now when China's economy appears fragile and they are preparing a changing of the guard at the top of the Communist party. But I find it hard to believe that the hard bargainers of Peking will loan money to the European Union for only that general objective.

Right now, it is all smiles for the cameras:

China is prepared to buy more EU government bonds amid a worsening European debt crisis that is dragging on the world economy, Premier Wen Jiabao said, in the strongest sign of support for its biggest trading partner in months.

The debt crisis, which has dented demand for Chinese exports and dragged China into its worst downturn in three years, was the primary focus of talks between Wen and German Chancellor Angela Merkel who arrived in Beijing on Thursday.

In the short run, it's hard to complain if China spends some of its foreign currency reserves on shoring up major allies of ours. Two birds with one stone, and all that.

China has already bullied and bribed Europeans into halting arms sales to Taiwan.

China has been urging Europe to end their arms embargo on China put in place after the unpleasantness of 1989. And Europe would love to have that market again for their own arms sales.

As Europe's new banker, China is in a position to push Europe to end that embargo.

And to make the Europeans feel less guilty, I'm sure the Chinese are telling the Europeans that China is making such progress in domestic arms production that if Europe doesn't establish markets soon, China won't even want to buy European weapons.

Whether or not there is a decent interval between the Chinese loan and the announcement of the end of the arms embargo, I think we can say that this will be the first step in Europe's own pivot (and deep bow) to the Asia-Pacific region.

Yelling "Halt!" in a Crowded Theater

Europe is important to American security. Don't pretend it isn't important just because Asia is more important. Stopping Russia farther east enables a more significant American pivot to Asia.

Sure, Asia is more important to American security and prosperity than Europe.

A Russian victory in Ukraine or a negotiated settlement that left Russia in control of some eastern provinces of Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula would not undermine the balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic, but China’s control of Taiwan would seriously undermine the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. That is the stark geopolitical reality. But the very worst-case scenario would be if our refusal to engage in strategic sequencing results in the United States fighting a two-front war in Europe and the western Pacific.

America has been pivoting its military power to Asia since the West won the Cold War. 

But don't make the mistake of thinking Europe has no or minimal importance. 

And yes, sequencing our main effort has always been necessary. 

Still, recall that in World War II, despite the "Europe first" policy, America initially had to devote scarce military power to Asia to hold off the surging Japanese. 

Right now the Russian threat is smaller but ongoing while the Chinese threat is latent but more dangerous. So yes, a little short-term focus on Europe is justified even as we continue to pivot to Asia in the big picture.

As for Ukraine not being that important, as the author states? Sure, maybe not exactly at this exact moment in time. But in the long run I want Russia as far east as possible. How far west is the red line for Russian advances before Europe increases in importance? And how much more dangerous would Russia be with those conquests?

And how much more power would America need to earmark to defending Europe at the expense of Asia if Russia strengthens? Perhaps Europeans should be able to defend themselves. But I worry how "Europe" does that. The cure would be worse than the disease. I'd rather knit together national European militaries through NATO. Remember, Europe is an American objective and not a charity case.

Mind you, I'm not wed to the idea that Russia can only be defeated by taking back all the Ukrainian territory it has conquered. 

But let's not lead with territorial concessions as our opening negotiating position. Russia will bank that as a foundation of a deal and push for more. And God help us but there will be Westerners who think splitting the difference between our opening offer and Russia's greater demands is actually a "compromise" deal.

Let's focus on helping Ukraine achieve battlefield victories over the invaders as our priority now. That's the sequencing I want.

But the bottom line is that I really don't like all the "let the Wookie win" arguments for a Russian victory over Ukraine masquerading as hard-headed realpolitik.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 continues here.

Economy of Force Front

Let's not forget to hold Europe as we pivot to Asia, shall we?

While our pivot to Asia doesn't actually move many forces, the shift of our focus to the Pacific from the Atlantic is really the key part. But are we forgetting Europe?

As the Pentagon sets its strategic sights on the Asia-Pacific region – warning of the rise of China and the growing importance of naval power – some US military commanders are concerned about the fate of America’s relationships with its traditional allies in Europe. ...

The point, US military commanders say, is that Europe – both “old” and “new” – are vital to US national security. In a world were multilateral action is increasingly important, military cooperation with European powers can pave the way to peace. And relations with former Soviet states have proven useful.

Yet the number of US troops in Europe continues to diminish, from nearly a quarter of a million in 1975 at the height of the Cold War to an expected 30,000 in 2015. “Thirty thousand soldiers can do a lot of things,” Hertling said. “If they’re positioned to do the right kinds of things.” ...

Yet keeping many bases open in Europe is a tough prospect, he acknowledges, because of budget concerns and because there are no US citizens or congressmen to oppose the closure of European bases. “We have no constituency,” he said. “I mean, I can’t go to our congressman and say, ‘Hey, you really need to protect this base because it’s important to us.’ ”

I stand by my worries that we reduce our Army commitment to Europe at our peril. Europe is both an objective to defend and a launching pad for defending our interests in a broad arc of crisis from West Africa to Central Asia.

In World War II, we had a "Europe first" policy to defeat Nazi Germany. That front got the priority. But we still fought an offensive war in the Pacific against Japan.

It is right to make holding Europe our economy-of-force front given the potential threats in the Asia-Pacific region. But we should not avoid paying the relatively small price and attention to hold Europe.

The Dog That Did Not Bark in the Far East

This is an informative article on Russian objectives and policies in the Far East. Almost unmentioned is Russia's vulnerability to rising Chinese power. I think that is the heart of Russia's defense dilemma.

Russia faces serious territorial threats from China in Russia's Far East and potential loss of influence in Central Asia from Chinese competition.

But it was not until the very end that the article's author raises the most important aspect of Russia's dilemma:

The more pressure Moscow feels on its European frontier, the more its western regions will take priority — leaving Russia with even fewer options in the Indo-Pacific and potentially forcing it to accept temporary Chinese hegemony in Eurasia. 

Yes, Russian failure to deploy more power to its Far East risks perpetuating Russia's junior partner status.

But the author ruins the ride in that one final sentence.

One, "the more pressure Russia feels" in the west? Russia is itself creating the pressure by threatening NATO and other states that escaped Soviet domination and impoverishment. Even once-neutral Sweden and Finland are edging closer to NATO as a result of Putin's insane threats, currently centered on Ukraine.

And two, Russia already accepted what it hoped would be temporary Chinese hegemony.

But the pressure in the west that Russia created didn't allow Russia to escape that appeasement of China. Despite a 20-year period to repair Russian weakness, Russia was compelled to extend its appeasement five more years.

What I don't know is if Russia only needed a five-year extension on that 20-year effort to buy time, or if China wouldn't commit to more time because it has designs on Russia.

China has claims on Russian territory and influence, yet few want to discuss that, preferring to inflate the so-called Russian-Chinese alliance that is a mere non-aggression pact that lasts until one side sees it as a constraint rather than a shield.

Let me go back to the beginning of that essay:

Geography and demography will always compel Russia to prioritize its European frontier, but shifts in global economic and security dynamics have drawn Russia back into the Indo-Pacific, where Moscow is finding it has limited tools to maintain its strategic interests. 

True enough. Most of Russia's population and industry are in Europe. Yet Russia needs to pivot it's military to the east to counter Chinese threats.

"Prioritizing" Russia's European frontier should have meant diplomacy to turn former enemies and vassals into friendlier states. This would have allowed Russia to turn its European portion into a safe rear area for a pivot to deploy its limited tools for the actual threats in the Far East and Central Asia.

But no. #WhyRussiaCan'tHaveNiceThings

The Signal for a True Pivot

Russia really needs Japan in its corner of Asia and Japan really wants at least some of its territory that the USSR took from Japan in 1945. Could a peace treaty after so many false starts to signing one finally take place in the next couple years?

Europe has been nothing but a disaster for Putin who has effed up the west royally, and so Putin needs a helping hand in Asia that doesn't come from the rising power of China:

Putin’s interest is both economic and geopolitical. A deal with Japan would potentially open the flow of Japanese investment to Russia’s Far East, a vast, underdeveloped region where Russia needs to counterbalance a growing Chinese influence. Improving relations with Japan would also help Putin in his search for alternatives to cooperation with the West. He knows by now that U.S. economic sanctions and weaker European restrictions are here to stay, so he’s working feverishly to buttress other partnerships in the Middle East and Asia.

There are Russians who complain that Russia loudly took Crimea but quietly plans to cede territory to Japan. The quietly ceding land part was already established in May 2005 as I note in this post, which is a problem should China refuse to continue a 2001 treaty that muted China's large land claims against Russia in the Far East.

I recently noted that I wouldn't believe Russia is truly pivoting to the Pacific until they agree to a peace treaty with Japan.

A Russian pivot to Asia after alienating NATO and America would be futile if Russia is sticking its head in the meat grinder of a rising China with territorial claims in addition to a hostile Japan and America.

A deal with Japan effectively nullifies America in Asia as a force to fight Russia there, the Bering Strait being an inhospitable region to wage war.

And that would provide Russia with a rear area if China decides to signal their rise to world power status by striking Russia.

But a treaty with Japan ends the pretext that Russian military improvements in the Far East is directed at Japan and not China. And how much can Russia give back to Japan and still retain the Sea of Okhotsk as a SSBN bastion for a survivable nuclear deterrent in the Pacific?

So who knows? Maybe this time for sure. Or maybe not. It makes sense but that never stopped Putin from effing up royally.

Status of Forces

Nearly a quarter century after Poland threw off Soviet control, American forces are finally coming to Poland. As we pivot to Asia, we have to make sure we can hold the line in our economy-of-force (and currently quiet) front. Bolstering Poland makes sense. As we pivot to Asia, it is more important to support the forces that exist in Europe to hold our gains from two world wars and a Cold War.

So far it is just small rotating units of fighters and transport aircraft, but it is a beginning:

Ever since the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's initial post-Cold War enlargement, the absence of United States military assets in Central Europe has been seen as indicative of the new NATO members' second-tier status. The perception has endured, even though the Barack Obama administration pushed through NATO contingency plans for the defence of Central Europe and the Baltics. The administration's 'reset' with Russia, the new strategic guidance of 2012, the so-called 'pivot' to Asia and American public relations missteps in Poland only deepened the sense of disconnect.

Yet, the bad karma notwithstanding, critical work was being done to tackle the core concern about the absence of US boots on the ground. In December 2010, Obama and President Bronislaw Komorowski agreed to pursue closer military-to-military cooperation between the US and Poland by creating a platform for joint work by the two air forces. Two years later, the first American Air Force detachment at the Lask Air Base, in Poland, became operational. Today, on the threshold of Obama's second term, the aviation detachment at Lask offers an opportunity to change the security narrative in Central Europe - an opportunity that should not be missed.

Yeah, I complained about the two-tier status. I credit the Obama administration for actually putting plans in place to defend the new NATO countries even if a more belligerent Russia poses no imminent threat to NATO.

And I've wanted American ground troops in Poland and central Europe now, while the threat is distant, on the theory that our presence will keep the threat distant and if the threat grows, we might not move to Poland out of fear of appearing provacative:

In addition to maintaining sufficient forces deployed in Europe able to move east to reinforce the eastern European NATO frontline states, we should establish American, British, and German equipment depots for additional heavy brigades in southern Poland. If we can fly in troops to man these forces, in a return of forces to Poland (REFORPOL) concept, we'd enhance deterrence without forward deploying powerful NATO offensive units that would scare the Russians in reality instead of their faux fear of Georgians and Latvians. Those units could swing north or south or stay put once manned and fielded.

So far, counting on a benign Russia that is a strategic partner, we've extended NATO membership east without extending NATO military strength east in any significant fashion. It is time to correct that mistake. Russia has shown they'll strike at gaps in our defenses. Fill those gaps.

I'm not getting a more robust American ground presence in Europe, since we are drawing down to two brigades there (a Stryker brigade in Germany and a parachute brigade in Italy). Could we at least get unit sets in Poland? Let's not miss this opportunity to bolster the security narrative in central Europe.

America Can Pivot and Chew Putin at the Same Time in the Winter War of 2022

Abandoning Ukraine to the tender mercies of Russia in order to devote our military power to facing China is penny wise and pound foolish.

The Russian invasion continues with small gains in the Donbas and reduced activity overall indicating the renewed Russian offensive is approaching culmination. But Russia still stands on its conquests.

Ukraine remains reliant on Western money, weapons, and ammunition to fight back. The anticipation building for the Ukrainian counteroffensive adds to its military importance. 

Will the West continue to heavily back Ukraine if the offensive fails? Especially given how much it is hyped? Arguments have been made to scale back aid to somehow engineer a so-called peace deal or to preserve our own weapons for dealing with China:

And saying supporting Ukraine "distracts" us from achieving other more important objectives has a long history as an excuse to lose a war. Once the existing war is lost, the "more important" issue fades away. Some people are perpetually looking for Mister Good War.

America doesn't really have a two-war capability despite longstanding arguments over the standard. Not from a standing start, anyway. I've addressed the issue of preparing for X number of wars. 

But failing to meet that standard is no reason to abandon support for Ukraine as it fights a Russian invasion in order to add to the pivot to Asia. Supplying Ukraine and pivoting to Asia to deter China aren't even two wars.

Stopping Russia farther east actually enables America's pivot to Asia. A Russia farther east is less dangerous because it requires fewer American assets to protect. Making Russia go through more European states to rebuild its empire gives America time to prepare. And buys time for Europe to mobilize power to stop and drive the Russians back.

Seriously, if America can't supply an ally in one theater that is fighting at the same time it prepares to fight a peer threat in another theater, we have major defense budget problems. 

Ukraine really needs to make the debate center on Ukrainian battlefield gains and Russian defeats rather than Western resolve to help Ukraine keep fighting. 

My primary focus is on the south for Ukraine's effort to achieve those outcomes. I think the impact would be the greatest:

But the key point is not where Ukraine wins and Russia loses, but the Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat. If another front is more conducive to providing that, then that is where the counteroffensive should begin.

UPDATE (Tuesday): The latter course of action might be the only way Ukraine can gain a battlefield victory if the situation described in February reflects what it will be in May:

Ukraine’s challenges in massing troops, ammunition and equipment could cause its military to fall “well short” of Kyiv’s original goals for an anticipated counteroffensive aimed at retaking Russian-occupied areas this spring, according to U.S. intelligence assessments contained in a growing leak of classified documents revealing Washington’s misgivings about the state of the war.

I already concluded that Ukraine's military was operating closer to the edge of sufficiency given the many postponements of Ukraine's big push over the last 6 months. 

And Ukraine's course of action depends on how well the Russians can resist a large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Russian troops have relinquished territory three times now. A voluntary withdrawal in the north after the drive on Kiev failed; the Ukrainian breakthrough southeast of Khakiv and pursuit to the Luhansk border; and Russia's withdrawal across the Dnieper River in the face of a cautious Ukrainian counteroffensive to liberate Kherson.

Do these operations hint that the Russians will resolutely hold the line under duress?

Does the advertised construction of extensive fortifications in Russian-occupied Crimea indicate Russia has confidence it can hold the line north of Crimea?

I don't expect Ukraine to win the war in one blow with their looming counteroffensive. But I don't expect it to falter the way that leaked intel seems to indicate. [NOTE: I edited this update to clarify my point.]

UPDATE (Friday): So far, Russia is not prepared to draft and train a lot of men. And then you have to equip them and lead them. Also problems.

NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here.

Russia Needs All Quiet on the Western Front

Can Russia salvage its national defense in the wake of the difficulties it is facing in its invasion of Ukraine? Russia's rulers have stupid and self-destructive ideas. Matching Russian defense means to its needs must start with a decision to stop digging the hole it is excavating in Ukraine, and in the West generally.

Don't buy the idea that Russia invaded Ukraine because it feared American offensive missiles in Ukraine. I think the invasion is more related to Russia running out of time to build a buffer before Russia has to pivot to face China.

Russia is clearly a regional conventional military power with continents-spanning defense needs. Until Russia invaded Ukraine, Russia created a false image of power. How can Russia do what it needs after its military image has been deflated in Ukraine, as NATO is reinvigorated, and as the Chinese threat looms over Russia in both Central Asia and in the Far East?

If Russia hadn't screwed up their assessment of Ukraine's ability and willingness to resist, Russia could have launched a more effective and localized invasion with more achievable goals. I even thought Russia might plan on simply pillaging Ukraine in order to pivot east. I was struggling for a reason for a broad invasion that might make sense in light of Russian conventional military weaknesses.

Instead, Putin prepared for a cake walk on a broad front. And Russia's army is flailing as it tries to recover from that mistake and fight a war that was already committed to the cake walk path. But don't assume Russia is a complete paper tiger:

This war right now—Russia’s poor performance in the early part of the war—has interesting similarities, or at least some parallels, with the winter war of 1939-40, and the Soviet invasion of Finland and the Soviets’ rather poor performance back then. And one of the big concerns I have with additional impressions of the problematic Russian performance is, first, that it’s already clear to me that I’m going to spend the coming years talking about how the Russian military is not four feet tall, either.

That was one reason I started calling this the Winter War of 2022. I brought up the issue of the Soviets initial failures that colored judgment of their military. The Soviets regrouped and pounded Finland with determination but did not overcome the initial impression. Nazi Germany found the Soviet army in 1941 much more resilient than they assumed from watching the 1939-1940 war and thinking the initial failures were all that mattered. 

Russia can recover from this public humiliation and build a military able to fight. Russia might yet defeat Ukraine. It would be a costly win. But still a win. Which will dull but not erase the embarrassment of its military prowess. Or Russia could proclaim it has sufficiently punished Ukraine and withdraw, with a nice victory parade in Moscow. And then Russia could pivot east counting on a devastated Ukraine needing a lot of time to recover. 

Yet as the war has dragged on and Russian forces have killed civilians and wrecked cities, Putin has severely damaged NATO's ability to forgive Russia and enable that pivot. The longer the war drags on, the worse this problem gets. Russia is in a hole it must escape. It must stop digging and end the war.

Regardless of how Russia ends its war with Ukraine, Russia must reconsider its conventional military. Russia needs to emphasize ground forces and the air power to support them. A surface fleet that is more than a powerful coast guard plus the ability to protect SSBN bastions is a complete waste of Russian resources.  And a lot fewer long-range nukes--because Lord knows if many work.

On the bright side for Russia in the east, if China wants to invade Russia the burden will be on China to show it can carry out a large-scale offensive with its untried army and air force. Which is at least what Russia's armed forces were designed to fight:

Gerasimov had designed a modern Russian army under Putin’s leadership based on an active defense concept. This envisaged waging a fighting withdrawal that would bring an enemy deep into Russia to be destroyed, as was done against Napoleon’s and Hitler’s armies.

Let's see if Putin's fantasy world of restoring Russia's empire in the west can be replaced by the real world of defending its empire in the east with a military that matches Russia's needs. If Russia doesn't try to quiet the European front, it might face a two-front war threat from NATO plus Ukraine in the west and China in the east (which could add a third southern front in Central Asia, actually). 

NOTE: War updates continue in this post.

The Winter War of 2022 Needs a Buffer Zone

If a ceasefire in the Winter War of 2022 is accomplished, Ukraine needs a buffer zone large enough to prevent Russia from using "take and talk" tactics to nibble away at Ukrainian territory. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe could be a template to protect Ukraine and provide a fig leaf for Russia about NATO "retreat" that conceals a Russian pivot east.

The war goes on. Ukraine inflicts disproportionate casualties on the Russians who persist in slowly advancing. Russia hopes to freeze Ukrainians with aerial bombardment and Ukraine seeks to throttle Russia's offensive with their own aerial offensive. The shiny object in the deadly grind was Ukraine attacking a Russian Kilo submarine in a Russian Black Sea port, apparently with a suicide UUV. It is unclear how much the sub was damaged.

America participated in talks with contributions to terms of post-war security guarantees for Ukraine: 

According to Zelenskyy and Ukrainian officials, the discussions in Berlin focused on a package of five documents that would underpin an eventual peace deal, several of which are dedicated to long‑term security guarantees for Ukraine.

Russia won't accept that. And even if they are really desperate enough to pretend to accept that, we cannot become confused by that outcome. It is not enough to end the war. Russia has to be pointed away from Ukraine and NATO.

Getting a ceasefire without setting Ukraine up for the killing blow as Russia reloads and resumes the war from advanced positions inside its Ukrainian conquests is the problem. We should insist on a new Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

That treaty limited troops and weapons in Europe to eliminate the chance of a "bolt from the blue" offensive. Having enough troops to go to war would require detectable large-scale ground force movement. The original agreement limited armaments within a geographic region:

The CFE Treaty set equal ceilings for each bloc (NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization), from the Atlantic to the Urals, on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive operations. 

In addition:

To further limit the readiness of armed forces, the treaty set equal ceilings on equipment that could be deployed with active units. Other ground equipment had to be place in designated permanent storage sites. 

And:

The treaty further limited the proportion of armaments that could be held by any one country in Europe to about one-third of the total for all countries in Europe – the "sufficiency" rule.

All sea-based Naval forces were excluded from CFE Treaty accountability.

Further sub-limits addressed sensitive regions:

In addition to limits on the number of armaments in each category on each side, the treaty included regional limits intended to prevent destabilizing force concentrations of ground equipment. 

I think the new geographic scope for active duty ground troops should be from the new, NATO state territory bordering or near Russia and Ukraine to Russia's Ural Mountains. This has advantages for NATO states, Ukraine, and Russia:

• Nobody in "old" NATO wants to deploy many troops east. This means they don't have to. 
• Putin could claim this troop limitation amounts to "rolling back" NATO to protect Russia. 
• Regional limits could offer reassurance for Russia in Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, Transnistria, and Crimea; Ukraine could get reassurances in specific regions to protect Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa, for example; and European NATO could have reassurances about limits on Russia's military presence in Belarus, for example.
• Russian security and puppet forces in occupied Ukraine would be limited to non-combat ground forces. 
• NATO would have limited "outside" forces in the east; but could instead focus on the logistics infrastructure to move and host reinforcements from old NATO countries in a crisis--which Russia already has on their side of the line.
• America gets justification for maintaining a limited role in NATO in order to achieve American objectives in Europe. 
• By pushing Russia's forces east, it implicitly allows Russia to pivot east to face China without explicitly naming China as the real threat. Surely Russia wants its deepening humiliation in the east to end.
• And with more Russian troops weighted to the east, Russia gains the ability to attract allies to counter China.

And really, this deployment would broadly reflect what happened in 2021 as Russia prepared to invade in 2022. Russia needed time to scrape up troops from all of Russia to invade. Yes, it should be more difficult for Russia under this type of agreement. But that is its purpose. And again, it could be spun by Moscow as validating their conquests, rolling back NATO, and preventing NATO from being a threat to Russia. Plus a justification for moving troops closer to China, where they are needed.

I'm not sure how this would affect a European monitoring force in Ukraine. But it probably means that to the relief of Europeans it will be smaller and lighter, especially on the ground. A provision to allow NATO to send more forces east to match any Russian troops sent west (or vice versa, I suppose) should be part of the deal. 

If Russia lies about NATO moves to justify moving troops west, NATO would know if Russia is lying and could--if it chooses not to ignore the deployments--declare Russia is violating the agreement and take steps to beef up NATO forces in the east and reinforce the Ukrainians.

Yet Russia may be relieved to have an excuse to treat European Russia as a safe rear area in order to focus on blunting Chinese influence in Central Asia and getting a firmer grip on its Far East territories taken from China in the 19th century that China no doubt covets. 

Over time, Russia may get used to friendlier relations with the West. But if not, it will take time for Russia to pose a threat to Ukraine and NATO. As long as the West has the will to act on Russian violations. But that has long been a problem.

UPDATE (Tuesday): The European Union provided Ukraine with a financial buffer (tip to Instapundit):

The loans are likely to provide enough support for the Ukrainians to continue their fight for another year or more. And perhaps just as significant, they represent a rare example of European states acting in their own interests without any outsourcing to Washington. 

The loan is zero-interest and backed by frozen Russian assets or Russian reparations for invading Ukraine. It will be interesting to see if Ukraine uses some of that loan to buy American weapons.

UPDATE (Wednesday): Ukraine is going to need a bigger boat buffer:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he would be willing to pull troops out of the eastern region of Donetsk and create a demilitarized free economic zone as part of a potential peace deal, provided Russia took similar steps to withdraw from areas it controls. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.  

NOTE: I made the map with mapchart.net. Although the map extends Russia in Europe beyond the Ural mountain eastern boundary of a buffer zone, as near as I can tell.

The Winter War of 2022 Victory Parade?

Russia has new Ukrainian territory from its two-month war. Their new and improved offensive (Now with competence!) is either fizzling or can't seem to get off the ground. Is the cost in Russian troop lives and economic damage so high that Russia must end the war by declaring victory?

Russia still hasn't really ramped up its offensive in the south despite the stated intention to make the south the main effort following the retreat from Kiev.

If you can't win your original objective but can't afford to admit defeat after suffering heavy casualties, the only option is to declare victory with what you did get and act like you won. Russia has a convenient date to try that coming up, May 9th, celebrating the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

The problem is that NATO won't go along with that fiction. Russia has lost much of its propaganda fear factor, which has encouraged Sweden and Finland to think about joining NATO. And China won't fear Russian military power, either.  

I didn't think Russia would do more than try to bite off a bit more Ukrainian territory given Russian military weakness. If Russia had treated Ukraine like a capable enemy rather than parade crowds, Russia could have focused on a campaign for the land bridge to Crimea. Russia would have what it has now, but with fewer casualties and way less humiliation. European resolve would not have formed and Russia could have ridden its energy exports to Europe to a ceasefire that ended European support for Ukraine.

Russia could have then pivoted east before their non-aggression pact with China expires, with a stronger position in the west (including the Anschluss with Belarus) that demonstrated NATO would not ride to Ukraine's rescue in time to prevent defeat. That might have demoralized Ukraine and encouraged corrupt Ukrainian officials to make deals with Russia that pulled Ukraine away from NATO and the EU.

But perhaps the short time before the non-aggression pact with China ends convinced Putin he had to go big to get his buffer and still have time to pivot to face China and block potentially renewed Chinese territorial demands in the Far East. And competition for influence in Central Asia. So Putin attacked big. Putin convinced himself the Ukraine campaign would be short and glorious.

But is has been neither short nor glorious. Even if Russia manages to bulldoze its way to a battlefield victory, Russia has crippled its army and destroyed its reputation. And Russia will be tied down fighting Ukrainians or at least manning a front line that leaves fewer troops to pivot east. A revitalized NATO is in no mood to "reset" with Russia to enable a full Russian pivot.

But Russia is still stuck in a war with NATO growing stronger and China perhaps thinking more about exploiting Russia's quagmire. 

Bravo, Russians. You let Putin take you on a viking funeral ride to national doom. Will Russians go along with whatever "victory" Putin demands? Or eventually proclaims? Or will Putin end up (figuratively if not literally) hanging by his heels from a lamp post?

UPDATE: Ukraine claims to have destroyed two Russian patrol boats in the Black Sea.

UPDATE: Ukraine claims it destroyed a command center in Izyum, inflicting large casualties on the Russians.

UPDATE: "France has sent several of its truck-mounted 155mm Caesar systems to Ukraine along with ammunition and some accessories. More are on the way."

UPDATE: Bigger weapons for the next phase of Ukraine's fight. A lot of emphasis on the Donbas front. But Russia's advantage in a shorter supply line there makes it harder for US and Western weapons to be supplied that far from NATO territory. I still think the Western artillery makes most sense for a Ukrainian counter-offensive on the Kherson front. The line of supply for Western ammunition and spare parts to NATO will be much shorter and secure.

UPDATE: Are Russian officers shooting reluctant soldiers? Probably. I'll find it newsworthy when reluctant Russian soldiers are shooting officers. Tip to Instapundit.

UPDATE: Russia may annex the Donbas this month.

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. All quiet on the Russian front:

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Ukraine on May 2. The April 30 Ukrainian artillery strike on the Russian command post in Izyum may be continuing to disrupt Russian efforts on the Izyum axis. Russian troops on the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline and Southern Axis continued to regroup, likely in preparation for renewed offensives or to resist or reverse Ukrainian counter-offensives.

Artillery did not take a break.

UPDATE (Tuesday): NATO is treating Ukraine like an alliance member. Well, NATO isn't sending troops into combat. So not quite. But it is true as I've said that NATO is treating Ukraine pretty darned well given Ukraine isn't in NATO.

UPDATE: Related to the report that Russia appears to have shot some reluctant soldiers that I mentioned yesterday, the USSR executed 19,000 troops in the Stalingrad campaign alone. So yeah, SOP. I'll pay attention when Russian soldiers return fire.

UPDATE: Russian ground forces appear to be assaulting the Mariupol steel plant.

UPDATE: Ukrainian source says the Russians are landing troops by boat at the steel plant.

UPDATE: The impact of American artillery in Ukrainian hands. I'm glad the West is sending artillery. But unless Ukraine is running out of ammo for their existing guns, I don't understand the hype. Ukraine has lots of artillery pieces. According to my 2018 The Military Balance, over 500 self-propelled and 500+ towed pieces, plus over 300 multiple rocket launchers and 300+ large mortars. Again, unless ammo is a problem. Although I hope we appreciate what American artillery can do in the Army's hands.

UPDATE: Interesting: "The Pentagon said on Monday that Ukrainian forces are mounting a successful counteroffensive against the Russian military, pushing them 40 kilometres outside the north-eastern city of Kharkiv."

UPDATE: Is Russia's Donbas offensive faltering or simply not succeeding yet?

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Ukraine's counterattacks around Kharkiv are taking ground; Russian attacks on the largely stalemated Donbas front seem composed of broken units (but does Russia have more intact units in reserve to throw into a main effort?); Ukraine's Mariupol defenders are still holding out against air and ground attacks; Russia may be preparing to attack in Kherson province; and Lord knows what the Russians are up to in Transnistria. 

UPDATE (Wednesday): Britain will supply cargo drones to Ukraine. Those will be useful for resupplying irregulars, partisans, and special forces behind Russian lines.

UPDATE: What is Belarus up to? "Ukraine is vowing Wednesday that it’s "ready" after its northern neighbor Belarus – which Russia used as a springboard for its invasion – announced military exercises to assess the combat readiness of their armed forces." Preparing to help Russia? Or eject Russia from Belarus?

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment. Russian attacks continue to falter. Russian troops entered the Mariupol steel plant. And Russia has struck Ukrainian supply lines in an effort to hinder Western supply efforts. Those efforts have apparently failed.

UPDATE (Thursday): Ukrainian troops continue to hold out in the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol. The city will fall to Russia. But the loss will not demoralize Ukraine. This city--and this plant--are Ukraine's Alamo. I hoped it would be Rorke's Drift with a Ukrainian counter-offensive taking the pressure off of the defenders. But I clearly was wrong about Ukraine retaining a strategic reserve capable of doing that. May the example of the defenders inspire the Ukrainian counter-offensives when they come.

UPDATE: When near, appear far? "Ukraine is unlikely to launch a counter-offensive against Russia before mid-June, when it hopes to have received more weapons from its allies, an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has said."

UPDATE: I'd like some confirmation but I can't say Russia wouldn't do this: "Mariupol’s advisor to the mayor said Thursday that the filtration camps set up by Russian forces outside the southern port city have become "ghettos" where men face torture and forced labor."

UPDATE: Belarus President Lukashenko doesn't sound like a man eager to hitch his future to Putin's war on Ukraine: "'I am not immersed in this problem enough to say whether it goes according to plan, like the Russians say, or like I feel it. I want to stress one more time, I feel like this operation has dragged on,' Lukashenko said." 

UPDATE: Question. How many of Putin's Victory Day parades will be marred by Ukrainian missile or drone strikes, special forces, or intelligence agents?  

UPDATE: Could Ukraine defeat Russia? Maybe. I think a Ukrainian victory requires a successful counter-offensive on one section of the front that really hammers the Russian army and destroys a portion of it while driving deep into Russian-occupied territory. Then maybe the panic and defeatism spreads and makes serial Ukrainian local counteroffensives on the rest of the front possible and not too expensive to prevent multiple repeats. My candidate initial front is the Kherson front.

UPDATE: The latest ISW analysis:

The Ukrainian counteroffensive out of Kharkiv city may disrupt Russian forces northeast of Kharkiv and will likely force Russian forces to decide whether to reinforce positions near Kharkiv or risk losing most or all of their positions within artillery range of the city. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zalyzhnyi stated on May 5 that Ukrainian forces are transitioning to counteroffensive operations around Kharkiv and Izyum, the first direct Ukrainian military statement of a shift to offensive operations. Ukrainian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the last 24 hours but repelled Russian attempts to regain lost positions. Russian forces made few advances in continued attacks in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces may be able to build their ongoing counterattacks and successful repulse of Russian attacks along the Izyum axis into a wider counteroffensive to retake Russian-occupied territory in Kharkiv Oblast.

Interesting. I'm a little surprised that Ukrainian forces could be counter-attacking this effectively on the main Russian front. Although Kharkiv is on the fringe of that main front.

And in the south, "Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Zaporizhia City but did not conduct any attacks in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on May 5."

Russian forces continue to battle into the Mariupol steel plant.

Also, is Russia's puppet government in Transnistria going to make a suicide attack for the marginal distraction that would cause Ukraine? 

UPDATE (Friday): War crimes.

UPDATE: Good: "The United States provided Ukraine with intelligence that helped Kyiv attack and sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, the Moskva[.]" I'm still pissed at Russia for this.

UPDATE: RUMINT? "Russia's massive Admiral Makarov warship has reportedly been hit by Ukrainian missiles causing it to burst into flames." But the frigate isn't massive. Tip to Instapundit. 

UPDATE: Russians continue to assault the Azovstal defenders in Mariupol.

UPDATE: Indeed: "Even the people taking part in this conflict do not have full information, and it is worth emphasising that one of the things that characterises this conflict and this section of the conflict is how hard it is to know exactly what is going on." Please note that the odd British aversion to the letter "z" pre-dates Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

UPDATE: The deep roots of Ukrainian will to resist Russian invaders.

UPDATE: Russia denies Admiral Makarov was hit. Tip to Instapundit.

UPDATE: The latest ISW update:

The Ukrainian counteroffensive north and east of Kharkiv city secured further gains in the last 24 hours and may successfully push Russian forces out of artillery range of Kharkiv in the coming days. Ukrainian forces captured several settlements north and east of Kharkiv in the last 24 hours, reducing the ability of Russian forces to threaten Ukraine’s second-largest city. This Ukrainian operation is developing into a successful, broader counteroffensive—as opposed to the more localized counterattacks that Ukrainian forces have conducted throughout the war to secure key terrain and disrupt Russian offensive operations.

Russian attacks on the Donbas front have not made gains; Russia continues attacking the last defenders in Mariupol; and Russia was quiet on the Kherson front, although the Russians may be preparing an offensive.

The scale of the Ukrainian counter-offensive makes me wonder if it could develop into a threat to the rail lines supplying the Russian Izyum front. 

UPDATE (Saturday): Ukraine claims to have hit a Russian landing craft, apparently at Snake Island. The craft isn't that significant. But the capability to carry out such strikes makes Russian amphibious operations far less likely. 

UPDATE: I assume Russia does this to attack logistics rather than thinking about an amphibious operation: "Several missiles have hit Odesa on Saturday, a spokesman for the administration in the southern Ukrainian city says."

UPDATE: I expressed my surprise that Ukrainian counter-attacks around Kharkiv have expanded to the breadth of a counter-offensive. I've expected a counter-offensive on the western edge of the Kherson front to aim for the destruction of Russian army units and subsequent recapture of territory to the Crimea isthmus and then northeast. 

 

Is my map-based analysis ignoring internal Ukrainian politics? Must the Ukrainians demonstrate a roll-back of Russian forces in the east before going on offense elsewhere?

Or is my map analysis wrong? I think securing Odessa from a land threat, threatening Sevastopol, and exploiting Russia's longer lines of supply to the Kherson front (with a shorter Ukrainian line of supply to Western sources) argue for the Kherson front. Am I missing something or just wrong on timing?

UPDATE: Ukraine continues its counter-attacks around Kharkiv.

UPDATE: More American aid will go to Ukraine: "A U.S. official said the new aid includes funds for 25,000 155-mm artillery rounds, counterartillery radars, jamming equipment, field equipment, and spare parts." This gets to near the end of existing authorization. Congress will need to authorize more spending for assistance.

UPDATE: The latest ISW update. Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv are pushing the Russians back--who seem to be willingly retreating and blowing bridges as they withdraw:

Given the current rate of Ukrainian advances, Russian forces may be unable to prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border, even with additional reinforcements. Ukrainian forces are not directly threatening Russian lines of communication to Izyum (and ISW cannot verify claims of a separate Ukrainian counteroffensive toward Izyum at this time), but the Ukrainian counteroffensive demonstrates promising Ukrainian capabilities and may set conditions for further offensive operations into northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russia has had to reinforce the Kharkiv front in the face of Ukrainian advances. Otherwise, Russian forces remain largely stalemated in the Donbas and on the Kherson front. Ukrainian defenders still holding in their sliver of Mariupol but all they can do is delay defeat.

UPDATE (Sunday): Russia faces bad options that don't seem to involve victory. Of interest is the statement that 40% of Ukraine's army was on the Donbas front. That makes far more sense than earlier reports of 67% that I read, based on what I thought was Ukraine's number of active duty maneuver brigades.

UPDATE: I don't mean to drink the Ukraine koolaid, because I just don't have the view into their problems. I wasn't overly excited by Russia's withdrawal from the north because Ukraine followed rather than pursued the Russians out. And Ukraine hasn't hit on the Kherson front as I've long anticipated.

But Ukraine has expanded counter-attacks into a broader counter-offensive around Kharkiv. What will Ukraine be able to do when it incorporates Western-provided weapons into veteran hands?

Yet Russia might still get their act together. And Russia is much bigger. If Russia even partially mobilizes, it could build enough power to bulldoze some type of territorial win at a high cost in lives; while wrecking Ukraine for a generation.

Still, I don't rule out that Ukraine could launch the big effort on the Kherson front. My view was a smaller one from the west end. Maybe with Ukrainian mobilization an attack from west and north will take place, sealing off Crimea and eventually rolling up the Sea of Azov coast with an end point on the Donbas-Russian border.

I want Ukraine to win. I'm trying not to let that color my judgment. Often enough, the bigger battalions--even crappy Russian BTGs, if backed by enough firepower--win.

UPDATE: This Strategypage YouTube podcast says the Russians captured a bunch of Ukrainian marines who got cut off from the Azovstal plant. But the Azov unit and some marines still hold out in the plant. Also, Ukraine may have used helicopters for nighttime supply runs for a while. But that is uncomfirmed. Still, this might have been a Stalingrad For Russia if Ukraine had a line of communication to feed reinforcements and supplies in overland. As it is, it may be--as I've commented--Ukraine's Alamo, supplanting the Snake Island defenders who filled the role early.

UPDATE: In Russia, the blame game is on over bad intelligence and poor military performance. But so far nobody is taking the anti-war side to save their skins. Could that change?

UPDATE: The latest ISW assessment is all quiet static on the Russian front the day before Victory Day:

Russian forces did not make any significant advances on any axis of advance on May 8. The Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv City has likely forced Russian troops to redeploy to Kharkiv instead of reinforcing stalled Russian offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine. 

The Donbas front remains stalled, Ukrainian defenders still hold out in the Azovstal plant in Mariupol, and the Kherson front.

The worrying part of my brain says surely the Russians have some forces in reserve to unleash a firepower Hell on Ukrainian troops. But there isn't evidence of it. Surely our reconnaissance would detect anything significant, right?

NOTE: War coverage continues at this post.