This is an informative article on Russian objectives and policies in the Far East. Almost unmentioned is Russia's vulnerability to rising Chinese power. I think that is the heart of Russia's defense dilemma.
Russia faces serious territorial threats from China in Russia's Far East and potential loss of influence in Central Asia from Chinese competition.
But it was not until the very end that the article's author raises the most important aspect of Russia's dilemma:
The more pressure Moscow feels on its European frontier, the more its western regions will take priority — leaving Russia with even fewer options in the Indo-Pacific and potentially forcing it to accept temporary Chinese hegemony in Eurasia.
Yes, Russian failure to deploy more power to its Far East risks perpetuating Russia's junior partner status.
But the author ruins the ride in that one final sentence.
One, "the more pressure Russia feels" in the west? Russia is itself creating the pressure by threatening NATO and other states that escaped Soviet domination and impoverishment. Even once-neutral Sweden and Finland are edging closer to NATO as a result of Putin's insane threats, currently centered on Ukraine.
And two, Russia already accepted what it hoped would be temporary Chinese hegemony.
But the pressure in the west that Russia created didn't allow Russia to escape that appeasement of China. Despite a 20-year period to repair Russian weakness, Russia was compelled to extend its appeasement five more years.
What I don't know is if Russia only needed a five-year extension on that 20-year effort to buy time, or if China wouldn't commit to more time because it has designs on Russia.
China has claims on Russian territory and influence, yet few want to discuss that, preferring to inflate the so-called Russian-Chinese alliance that is a mere non-aggression pact that lasts until one side sees it as a constraint rather than a shield.
Let me go back to the beginning of that essay:
Geography and demography will always compel Russia to prioritize its European frontier, but shifts in global economic and security dynamics have drawn Russia back into the Indo-Pacific, where Moscow is finding it has limited tools to maintain its strategic interests.
True enough. Most of Russia's population and industry are in Europe. Yet Russia needs to pivot it's military to the east to counter Chinese threats.
"Prioritizing" Russia's European frontier should have meant diplomacy to turn former enemies and vassals into friendlier states. This would have allowed Russia to turn its European portion into a safe rear area for a pivot to deploy its limited tools for the actual threats in the Far East and Central Asia.
But no. #WhyRussiaCan'tHaveNiceThings
