An online journal of commentary, analysis, and dignified rants on national security issues. Other posts on home life, annoying things, and a vast 'other' are clearly marked.
I live and write in Ann Arbor, Michigan. University of Michigan AB and MA from Eastern Michigan University. One term in the Michigan Army National Guard. Former American history instructor and retired nonpartisan research analyst. I write on Blogger and Substack. Various military and private journals have published my occasional articles on military subjects. See "My Published Works" on the TDR web version or under the mobile version drop-down menu for citations and links.
I have finally salvaged my pre-Blogger TDR archives and added them into Blogger. They are almost totally in the form of one giant post for each month. And the formatting strayed from the originals. Sorry.
But historians everywhere can rejoice that this treasure trove of my thoughts is restored to the world.
And for your own safety, don't click on any old Geocities links or any of their similar variations in my posts. Those sites have been taken over by bad and/or dangerous sites. Hover over links first!
The Tomahawk has long enough range to where it can be fired from
within the complex littoral geography of the Japanese and Philippine
home islands and into a variety of Indo-Pacific maritime spaces. This
could allow U.S. forces to circumvent maritime buffers or fire upon them
from their littoral margins, which are mostly allied territories. This
concept is somewhat similar to the Cold War-era concept of hiding
carriers within Norwegian Fjords to launch strikes against the Soviets.
I have on the shelves [a book] about how NATO planned to use the shield of
Norway's mountains to operate aircraft carriers in Norwegian waters
closer to the Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula where we could hit the
Soviet military units at home and strike Soviet amphibious assets trying
to outflank NATO land defenses in northern Norway.
After Norway started to feel out on a limb in the late 1970s as Soviet
power pushed NATO's forward line of defense back to the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap well south of Norway, demonstrating
that we could include Norway in our defensive perimeter was important.
So it occurred to me that maybe our Navy could operate closer to China
behind the shield of Taiwan's mountains, which conveniently loom over
the eastern coast the length of Taiwan.
I wondered if even carriers could gain protection. Although I wondered if missile sensors had gotten good enough to see through the ground clutter.
But this might actually be an option across a wider area extending to Japanese and Filipino territorial waters.
Add in missile reflectors in the general neighborhood to decoy missiles away, and the sanctuaries might be numerous enough to really confuse China's kill chains.
Russia's Embassy in Norway on Tuesday harshly criticized a planned visit
by a U.S. aircraft carrier to Oslo as an "illogical and harmful" show
of force.
UPDATE: Ah, my fjords defense for carriers may work for long-range anti-ship missiles but gravity bombs defeat that obstacle. Is the new concept
just a repeat with nothing new to recommend it?
So I retract my
suggestion. If the suggestion has a major flaw back then it is flawed now.
I heard an analyst say that Russia isn't intending to achieve a battlefield victory
to win the war. That Russia is choosing to wage a war of attrition to
grind down Ukraine with Russia's larger size. I disagree that Russia
chose this path.
Russia chose to carry out a rapid regime change with a
virtual military parade into Ukraine's cities. That failed.
Then Russia
chose to wage a narrow military offensive in the Donbas. That failed.
People like to say Russia can't afford to end the war without victory.
So we should just let Ukraine die. At the moment Russia can't admit
defeat. But at some point if Russia continues screwing the pooch, ending
the war with retreat may seem like the best outcome Russia can get.
What is Putin's calculation now? Is clinging to Ukrainian territory at this price worth it? Or is that level of sacrifice finally dangerous to Russia or to himself? Will battlefield defeats and retreats in Ukraine's counteroffensive be too much to bear? Will fighting on seem too risky?
Putin is creating a narrative in which for all intents and purposes his
“special military operation” in Ukraine never happened, and instead,
NATO took up arms against poor, innocent Russia which, heroically and
against all odds, repulsed the Western attack without losing any
territory whatsoever. By this reckoning, Russia wins a great victory
even if the Ukraine-Russian border remains pretty much as it was before
the shooting started.
China did this after invading Vietnam in 1979, pulling its bloodied and stymied army out after claiming it had taught Vietnam a lesson against defying China.
If Putin can't afford to end the war against Ukraine without victory, he can simply claim victory by saying Russia's glorious military under Putin's leadership made Ukraine a desert by battering Ukraine into perpetual weakness and emptied NATO's armories of weapons and ammunition.
The fact that NATO doesn't invade Russia after Russian troops pull out of Ukrainian territory will be cited as proof of success. Never mind that NATO has no desire to do that.
And if any Russian challenges that narrative, they might fall down a flight of stairs or out a window. Eventually the message of victory will be pounded home.
Heck, what is Zelensky's calculation if the counteroffensive isn't successful--or isn't successful enough? Are the Ukrainian people willing to sacrifice more to reclaim more territory? Or do they think Russia received enough of a bloody nose to never try that again, as Finland achieved in its Winter War of 1939-1940?
You never know. Britain and France went to war with Nazi Germany in 1939 over the fate of Poland. By 1945 the fate of Poland as an issue was moot even with Germany crushed.
I keep recalling reading former German commanders on
the World War II Eastern Front who said it was always best to
counter-attack Russian advances quickly with whatever you could scrape
up rather than wait for the Russians to dig in and prepare. This was
more tactical than operational advice. But it worries me.
Many of the tank crews say Russian defenses are more dug in than they
were during the early stages of the war and Petro says that combat is
becoming more and more like "trench warfare."
I will say that the delay in Ukraine's counteroffensive that has given
time for Russia to build heavy fortifications is a problem the Iraqis
developed in the Iran-Iraq War. Dug in on a long line and optimized to
hold off Iranian human wave assaults, the Iraqi regular army lost its
ability to fight mobile warfare. That led the Iraqis to expand their
small Republican Guard force into a six-division mobile warfare force.
This problem also afflicted Western Front units in World War I where
many divisions were rated as "trench warfare only" units. How many of the
units on both sides would be rated this way now? But at least Ukraine is
building a mobile force.
UPDATE (Monday): Russia's invasion proved its army was highly over-rated by most
Westerners. Will Ukraine's counteroffensive prove the Russian army is
still over-rated?
As I've said, you can't win without attacking at some point.
Russians ran from a small and bold counteroffensive at Kharkiv and
pulled back rather than fight the small and cautious Ukrainian
counteroffensive at Kherson.
If the Russians run again, we'll again see
that Russia's ground forces are over-rated. I suspect the Russians are
still over-rated. But I fear the Russians are good enough.
Clashes broke out on Monday in Russian villages near the Ukrainian
border, according to local officials and verified videos. The Russian
regional governor said that a Ukrainian sabotage group had crossed into
Russian territory, while Kyiv said that anti-Kremlin Russian partisans
were behind the attacks.
The Free Russia Legion claims responsibility. If Ukraine set them up, so what? Russia denies invading Ukraine in 2014-2015, after all. Just local Ukrainians rising up, Russia claimed.
UPDATE (Monday): ISW: "Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted a raid into Belgorod Oblast on May 22."
Russian troops and security forces fought for a second day Tuesday
against an alleged cross-border raid that Moscow blamed on Ukrainian
military saboteurs but which Kyiv portrayed as an uprising against the
Kremlin by Russian partisans.
Russia should basically ignore this threat and simply send reaction forces to defeat any raids. But can Russia afford to ignore the threat after their propaganda campaign played up the threat?
Your humble TDR host was finally interviewed by a journalist whose deep appreciation of my skills, dignity, and--yes--rugged good looks fully displayed my powers of analysis, synthesis, perspective, and raw sexual magnetism.
Here's an excerpt:
The curious mind of Brian Dunn holds much of its
functionality in reserve. Even as he discusses Ukraine and the U.S. military,
down to the pointillist data that is his current stock-in-trade, The Dignified Rant author comes off like a Mensa black card holder who
might have a secret Go habit or a three-second Rubik’s Cube solution or
a knack for supplying, off the top of his head, the day of the week for
a random date in 1404, along with a non-condescending history of the Pastafarian aluminum and plastic colanders.
As freelance author Dunn and I
talked in his underfurnished corner patio one afternoon in early
spring, I slowly became aware that his blogging hobby requires only a
modest portion of his cognitive powers. Other mental facilities, no
kidding, are apportioned to Sledge Hammer, board games, and Clausewitz’s On War—though not in the original German (slacker). Fortunately, he was willing to devote yet another apse in
his cathedral mind to making his ideas about three mighty
themes—the proto-imperial EU, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and the military 3:1 rule—intelligible to me.
It went on like that for a while. As one would expect. My well developed sense of false modesty prevents me from excerpting more. Do read it all.
The interview may or may not have abruptly ended with the two of us ripping each other's clothes off as we stumbled inside my home to fulfill our deep hunger for each other.
Junk science: "Since groupthink is so pervasive, any citations that confirm academics’
left-wing biases are rarely double-checked. And so junk piles upon
junk." GIGO. Via Instapundit.
The Belarus autocrat Lukashenko is ill and out of sight. If he can't rule--or his supporters can't prop him up and rule through him--does that mean Russia takes over and annexes Belarus? Or does it mean the opposition rallies people to eject the regime and Russia?
Germany announces $3 billion military aid package to Ukraine that "includes 20 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 30 Leopard 1 tanks, 15
Gepard antiaircraft tanks, 200 reconnaissance drones, four additional
Iris-T antiaircraft systems including ammunition, additional artillery
ammunition and more than 200 armored combat and logistics vehicles."
Biden conducted another one of his two-minute hates against a shadowy threat that lurks out there. Armed. Watching. Waiting under rocks. And ready to strike. Oddly, the widespread threat didn't unleash the ultra violence on January 6, 2021, when it had the chance. But they're crafty that way. Planning. Trying to figure out how many of their members are federal agents or informers. Waiting for just one more case of MREs, another 1,000 rounds of ammo, and a gross of MyPillows to arrive in the mail. Until then, they let criminals and leftists get all the violence action to destroy our cities. Lulling us. But the threat never goes away. We clearly can't let down our guard. These left-wing clowns--I mean, not all are just senile--really believe this fake charge. Including Biden's repetition of the "Fine people hoax." And also, with equally intense indignation, they'd never rig an election to stop that evil from seizing power.
FFS: "The Biden administration plans to continue nuclear negotiations with
Iran despite the nation's crackdown on protesters who have demonstrated
in recent days following the death of a woman in police custody." Because of course that's their plan: "Democrats bizarrely love Iran and think a new nuclear deal and a box of
candy will turn them into a responsible regional power. And the Biden
administration will twist reality again to get that deal restored."
The Ukrainians believe the Leopard I will be sufficient to smash up Russian tanks. Which is interesting given its low armor protection. Of course, even Ukraine's old Soviet models with thicker armor can be destroyed by the Russian tanks. Crew skill and the quality of leadership in employing the tanks count the most. If Ukraine's experience is that their own Soviet tanks can beat the Russians, Leopard I's with better optics for shooting should do just fine.
Army soldiers are under stress because of a "breakneck operational tempo"?What? We have far fewer brigades deployed overseas even in a time of European war. And no full brigades in combat. I don't think we have any full battalions in combat. If the Army has problems, it isn't deployments overseas. The article doesn't persuade me. I'm sure some elements in high demand but few in number are under stress. But the Army as a whole?? What am I missing?
The end has been ten years away nigh for a long time in climate change circles. Is reason counterattacking (tip to Instapundit)? But will any leaders demonstrate the futility of promoting magical thinking? And now for something completely different:
And yet Democrats want to cripple American energy production: "it is supplies of liquefied natural gas
(LNG), the bulk again from the USA, which have permitted the rest of
Europe to resist Putin’s energy warfare and keep the lights on.
Continued US support will be just as vital this winter, and probably for
some years to come."
How long before China has a base in Eritrea? "Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Monday strong China-Eritrea
relations were key to bolstering peace in the Horn of Africa region and
pursuing mutually beneficial development, speaking at a meeting in
Beijing with his Eritrean counterpart."
In the nick of too late to save the LCS: "After several years of delays, the Navy’s mine countermeasures mission
package for the Littoral Combat Ship has finally reached its initial
operating capability." Well maybe the mission package will fit on small modularized auxiliary cruisers.
The threat endures: "U.S. 5th Fleet, along with other allies in the Middle East, will
increase the number of ships and aircraft patrolling the Strait of
Hormuz in response to Iran’s recent seizures of merchant vessels, U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command announced Friday."
Setting out the "Keep Out" signs: "The Philippines has placed navigational buoys within its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) to assert sovereignty over the disputed Spratly
islands in the South China Sea, a coast guard spokesperson said on
Sunday." The battle is on.
There should be prison time for those involved: "Special counsel John Durham exposed Monday how the FBI and Justice Department plotted to rig the 2016 presidential election." That Obama administration abuse of government power colluding with Hillary! to shield her and undermine Trump was the only collusion in 2016 and the next couple years.
Huh: "Russia's top army general and his South African counterpart discussed 'military cooperation' while meeting Monday in Moscow, the Russian
Defense Ministry said."
Awesome: "Britain is having to cannibalize parts from one of its two new aircraft carriers to keep the other one operational." I've been worried.
The media refuses to look: "It is the blindside of our First Amendment, which addresses the classic
use of state authority to coerce and control media. It does not address a
circumstance in which most of the media will maintain an official line
by consent rather than coercion."
Pawns: "Iranian leaders are stoking conflict between Israel and Palestinian militias, likely to enable the IRGC to transfer military equipment into Syria with a lower risk of Israeli interdiction."
Denmark: "In a new foreign and security policy strategy, the country's government
calls for more joint military exercises and coordination of defence
plans with its Nordic neighbours."
China has learned from Russia that invading Taiwan is too difficult. I hope so. More relevant perhaps is that the Taiwanese think resistance is not futile. If that's the most important lesson of Putin's invasion of Ukraine, China may in time regret they didn't invade while the Taiwanese were pre-defeated.
Rule of law. What is it? "Gunmen in south-eastern Nigeria have attacked a US convoy, killing [two consulate employees and two police], local police say." No U.S. citizens were in the convoy. And three people were kidnapped.
Shame: "The Justice Department — as well as the media that covered it —
effectively shut down a duly elected presidency, based on what turned
out to be a politically engineered hoax." And shame on the media for pretending this government abuse of power is nothing. What happened to Democratic championship of civil liberties? It's now open season on enemies of the state. Well, for targeting certain acto(R)s: "Durham documents that President Obama, Vice President Biden, top
intelligence officials, Attorney General Loretta Lynch, and FBI director
Comey were fully briefed by CIA director John Brennan on Russia’s
assessment of Clinton’s plan to frame Trump." Hillary! walks freely despite her security crimes as Secretary of State with destruction of evidence thrown in, not to mention her role in starting and sustaining the Russia collusion hoax. Via Instapundit.
Interesting times in Pakistan: "The world’s fifth most populous country is no stranger to political
unrest. No prime minister has ever completed their tenure in Pakistan’s
history, but never before has a politician challenging the country’s
all-powerful military and intelligence services, known as the
establishment, enjoyed such public support." Is the public tired of the military's political power? This crisis is far from over. How will China react to this problem in their new client state? Oh, Pakistan has nuclear weapons and a plentiful supply of jihadis. Have a super sparkly day.
I'm not sure that is fair to say Russia's ground forces have improved since beginning the war. Too much equipment, trained men, and leaders have been destroyed or killed. I think it is safe to say that Russia is adapting to its limitations by falling back on firepower and a willingness to let its troops die.
Also, it is less than optimal even for old tanks. The tank's engine is as much of a weapon as its gun. If used that way. But in a static front it is useful. As the U.S. used them in Korea and as the Ukrainians have already used them.
Do not become confused: "The Biden administration proposed to Israel a few weeks ago the idea of
engaging in joint military planning concerning Iran, three U.S. and
Israeli officials told Axios." This is obviously to prevent Israel from acting against Democrats' love interest.
Missile magnets won't command and control much: "Command posts of the past were relatively stationary, cumbersome to set
up and break down, and often identifiable by the heat, noise and
electronic artifacts they give off. Such easy targets will not cut it in
a fight against China or Russia[.]"
South Korea wants an arsenal ship: "When they are built and deployed, South Korea's ships will tell North
Korea and China that a surprise attack will not destroy its ability to
retaliate." I think the ship tells enemies that destroying on floating target will eliminate a lot of the deterrent force. Not a fan.
Shocking: "President Joe Biden's
Syria policy has been dealt its biggest blow yet as the Arab League has
welcomed back President Bashar al-Assad despite U.S. opposition to his
rule." Biden has a Syria policy?
The "Not Part of China" coalition: "The Philippines finds itself part of a growing anti-China coalition
dedicated to preventing China from exercising control over the South
China Sea. This coalition now includes South Korea, Japan, Taiwan,
Indonesia and Vietnam as well as the United States, Australia and
several NATO nations with navies and lots of trade passing through the
South China Sea. To China this coalition is seen as an obstacle, not a
defeat." Herding the cats is required to hold the line.
The Navy will be able to build frigates faster: "The Navy has previously committed to just 20 Constellation-class
frigates. The desire to add a second shipyard strongly indicates the
Navy wants far more than the original number. Two shipyards building two
ships per year would yield 40 frigates over ten years, and the actual
number of ships the Navy would like is probably somewhere around 50."
This will take time (tip to Instapundit): "The Biden administration has informed European allies that Washington will not block theirexport
of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, a person familiar with the decision
told The Washington Post. Biden has ruled out U.S. deliveries of F-16s
to Ukraine." Can the time be shortened?
Trade: "Chinese leader Xi Jinping promised to build more railway and other trade
links with Central Asia and proposed jointly developing oil and gas
sources at a meeting Friday with the region’s leaders that highlighted
Beijing’s growing influence." Flag to follow? And a flag that leaves?
An "accounting error" means the U.S. has $3 billion left in current appropriations authority to send military aid to Ukraine. It may or may not be fishy. Just as the FBI investigation of faux Trump-Russia collusion may have "only" seriously bent rules and standards to abuse government powers without technically violating any laws. But I know for sure that if a Republican administration had done either, we'd have 24/7 news drama about the "appearance of impropriety" that demands the truth and punishment--impeachment, anyone?--of those responsible. You know I'm right.
Combat veterans can learn faster, I guess: "Yahoo News has exclusively obtained an internal U.S. Air Force
assessment that concludes it would take only four months to train
Ukrainian pilots to operate American-made F-16 fighter jets, a far
shorter time frame than what has been repeatedly cited by Pentagon
officials."
I'm a traditionalist and think our most survivable nuclear deterrent loses survivability when visible: "Traditionally, submarines have relied on their invisibility and
stealth for their effectiveness. In a strictly operational sense, that
remains the case. But the more overt utilisation of deployments in times
of tension represents something new." But I'm sure our best and brightest aren't bound by mere tradition built on experience. This will be fine, right? Fine, show the SSGNs and SSNs if you must. I'd rather not, but fine. But keep the SSBNs underwater!
I'm not pleased with retired flag officers offering opinions on political matters. Civilian control is vital. But it seems to me that the left started this and have politicized serving flag officers to the point that victory has many substitutes. So perhaps the latest open letter is the least-bad option at the moment when responsible civilian leadership seems shaky.
This increase is not impressive: "The U.S. Army has placed a multi-year contract for 10,000 GMLRS guided rockets a year (up from 6,000) through 2026[.]"
As Ukraine takes its time to make sure it is ready for its counteroffensive, the Russians got time, too: "This has resulted in much closer integration of multiple UAVs directly
supporting commanders authorised to apply fires. Russian artillery has
also improved its ability to fire from multiple positions and to fire
and move, reducing susceptibility to counterbattery fire." And Russian engineers are building defenses and obstacles. But we'll see if the Russian troops with poor morale will hold them.
This is interesting: "There has been a shift in reliance upon 152-mm howitzers to a much
greater emphasis on 120-mm mortars in Russian fires; this reflects
munitions and barrel availability."
When tanks are destroyed, some say they are obsolete. How about those UAVs? "Ukrainian UAV losses remain at approximately 10,000 per month." Although we may have to revise what "tanks" look like. I concede most of those lost UAVs are pretty inexpensive. But countries lost a lot tanks in World War II.
One more: "Following the destruction of Russian command and control infrastructure
in July 2022, the Russian military withdrew major headquarters out of
range of GMLRS and placed them in hardened structures. They also wired
them into the Ukrainian civil telecommunications network and used field
cables to branch from this to brigade headquarters further forward.
Assigned assets tend to connect to these headquarters via microlink,
significantly reducing their signature." If Ukraine can shift the fight from positional warfare to one of maneuver, the Russian adaptation to static warfare will falter, I think. That's a separate issue from whether Ukraine can command and control maneuver warfare: "if Ukraine can disrupt Russian defences and impose a dynamic situation
on them, Russian units are likely to rapidly lose their coordination."
Is the Marine Corps Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) concept essentially replicating the Japanese experience from World War II American island hopping operations? Doesn't moving the Marine units or supplying them close to China assume friendly sea control that EABO is trying to achieve?
Col. Angell said that some LRPF lessons in Ukraine are that LRPFs offer speed, are more precise, and create a contested logistics battlefield environment.
Now long-range precision fires are a threat across the entire
battlefield, admitted Col. Angell, and enemy LRPFs can extend to the
range of USMC (expeditionary) advanced bases.
I worry about logistically supporting these Stand-in Forces (SIF) contingents. After all, by definition the United States won't have sea control around them. That's why the Marines are being committed. To gain sea control.
I worry that analogies to American island-hopping operations in the Pacific are mistakenly assuming the Marines are following the American side when it is actually following the Japanese side.
After early war America frontal assaults on Japan's island perimeter, America eventually gained enough naval and air superiority to leap past Japanese defended bases.
America had the power to bypass many bases and pound the bases into passivity to let them wither on the vine as America advanced on Japan itself.
Marine EABO and SIFs are skipping past the prerequisite of establishing naval and air superiority to deliberately put Marine forces within China's air and naval envelopes.
It isn't as if the Marines haven't thought about this issue (back to the initial article):
Granted, USMC SIFs are supposed to be small, light, fast, and mobile to increase their survivability, thus making them very hard to detect, and not depend on a noticeable logistics tail. That would factor into the enemy’s decision not to waste LRPFs on SIFs if SIFs’ locations are generally unknown, or SIFs are so small that an enemy would not waste an expensive missile to destroy them.
The units may be small enough to extract even in a contested environment. I admit that is a reason it might work.
Although the reasons the EABs can safely operate aren't accurate.
SIFs are mobile?
No. Once planted on an island they require outside assets to move them. Even a Marine with just his personal gear.
Hard to detect?
If they emit they can be detected. And if I may be so bold, I bet looking at a map will narrow down the range of possible locations considerably.
Too small to waste expensive missiles on?
Really? When the PLAN warships that the SIFs target are pretty darned expensive? Doesn't this argument essentially argue that the SIFs won't be effective in sinking Chinese warships? Because that's the only reason I wouldn't target them.
Still, the small size might be the ultimate enabler, meaning even intermittent and harder-to-detect logistics tails are good enough. As long as we don't count on barges with pretensions.
Operational maneuver within the island chains of the vast Western
Pacific is dependent on surface lift and air mobility. The huge
divestitures in Marine Corps aviation appear not to have considered lift
requirements to support its stand-in forces, or the support required
for more conventional operations against a peer or near-peer competitor.
And adding air defense assets to SIFs, which is the focus of that first article, isn't the answer. They just increase the logistics problem of supplying and extracting them by making them bigger and heavier--and less mobile.
I have worries.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: May 2026: Something that wasn't clear in my mind until after I wrote this is that SIFs are the joint and multinational recon screen and forward observer force for the joint combat forces that include land outposts organized by Marine Littoral Regiments. So while many of my concerns apply to the SIFS, I was thinking about the MLR outposts. I can't amend every post I've written that may have perpetuated this mistake. But this is one I often link.
China doesn't seem like it wants to bail out its Russian sidekick in the West. I've noted that history seems to be rhyming a bit. China would court trouble if it went along with that and discovered it had a liability without limits rather than a useful vassal.
Russia was a junior partner to China, at best. Which was humiliating enough given the history of Soviet-Chinese relations.
A short and glorious Russian takeover of Ukraine might have been viewed as a key humiliation of the West and the fracturing of a frightened NATO. Which would enable Russia to pivot to Asia to face China.
But the reality of a bloody and expensive war against Ukraine that has united and expanded NATO foiled that brilliant plan.
But China has choices. Does China learn from Germany's mistake with its little buddy Italy in World War II?
Consider that Italy was an over-hyped military power that was a useful diplomatic ally for Germany before World War II. The Pact of Steel, it was called.
Italy entered the war after Germany invaded France, in an effort to pounce on the corpse. That didn't work out. But at least it was harmless to Germany, which crushed France and the Low Countries, and drove Britain back to its islands.
Italy invaded Egypt but stalled out. The small British counteroffensive routed the Italians. Germany sent a small force to bolster the Italians in an arguably wise and fairly cheap effort. But as the Allies pushed the German-Italian forces back and American and British forces invaded Northwest Africa, the Germans belatedly pushed large forces into Tunisia just in time to be captured in an enclave cut off by Allied air power.
Italy invaded Greece to demonstrate Italy's prowess and watched its armies get defeated and pushed back into Albania. Eventually that required Germany to conquer Yugoslavia and Greece, requiring large garrisons to hold against partisans and potential Allied invasion.
And Germany had to bolster Italy's defense of the Italian peninsula against Allied invasion, eventually having to take over complete responsibility once Italy defected to the Allied side. One can argue the Allies tied down more of its own troops there than Germany had to deploy. But the Allies had sufficient troops for the Western front, too.
And you can hardly argue that Germany wouldn't have been better off if Italy had simply remained neutral for the entire war, protecting Germany's southern flank at little cost. Germany could have trained Italians and provided some military technology to keep Italy a target that looked too strong to take on to get at Germany.
Yes, Russia plunged into Ukraine. Perhaps thinking this would diminish the shiny new superpower glow that China has been casting, and give Russia some protective glory, too. Russia is back, baby!
Russia is stuck in the west even if it defeats Ukraine against a revitalized and alarmed NATO rather than having a meek and de-fanged NATO flinching every time Russia waved its nukes at the West.
Without much greater aircraft range or much greater defenses or other protections, can America really risk our super carriers close to Taiwan to deter or defeat China and to reassure and encourage American allies to help defend Taiwan? Committing our carriers to defend Taiwan without those advantages just to send the right "message" to China and allies is insane and counter-productive.
Openly accepting the premise that US carriers can-
not survive Chinese attacks also means openly stating that moving carriers toward Taiwan, Japan, or through the strait is always an American bluff and should not be seen as a serious demonstration of Washington’s willingness or ability to fight.
American super carriers and other capital ships are either vulnerable when fighting too close to Chinese anti-ship weapons weighted to China's littoral regions on land and afloat. Or they aren't. That isn't a mere premise to accept or reject.
Could an American super carrier in a multiple carrier task force have
one carrier equipped with long-range drones for naval strikes against
Chinese invading forces with the rest of the carriers optimized for air defense to protect the task force and send some F-35s with tanker
support for escort?*
And I'd like the AABONE
from Guam to help escort the drones or shoot down Chinese transport aircraft carrying PLA airborne forces.
Or maybe we just need to convert container ship hulls into drone-carrying escort carriers (CVEs). Those
would be expendable enough to risk within China's A2/AD bubble early in the war to supplement submarines, cheap long-range anti-ship missile carriers, and long-range aircraft, no?
Eventually, as sea control is established, the capital ships can press closer to Taiwan to add more firepower in a power projection role.
NOTE: I drafted this in late February and for some reason left it languishing as a draft until I discovered it by chance. That sentence with the asterisk was written before I wrote the post linked about an article on that topic.
Australian defense policy makes Australia capable of projecting air and naval power, with an assist from lighter ground forces, to the South China Sea. This encourages and enables America, Japan, and India to move forward behind that shield to face a common enemy.
American forces, supported by Australian forces and supplied from
Australian bases, can swing west or north to support allies or react to
natural or military crises from South Asia to Northeast Asia.
The Obama administration "pivot" is merely the most vocal stage of our
long shift to Asia following the collapse of the Soviet threat in Europe
and the Atlantic. The announcement serves more to indicate our national
focus rather than any real addition of forces.
And by giving America this central position, Australia gains a shield against Chinese power.
Finally, by allowing America access to northwestern Australia bases,
Australia helps provide a shield that makes it safe for American forces
to rush to Australia's defense without undue worry that the fleet has
embarked on a death ride into the teeth of Chinese power. It also gives
America confidence that Australia can hold on long enough to be saved
and that Australian forces will be there to fight at our side when we
get there.
The public version of the classified review recommended that
Australia’s government spend more on defense than the current
expenditure of 2% of gross domestic product, improve the Australian
Defense Force’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer ranges and
make munitions domestically.
Other recommendations include
improving the force’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases
and to deepen defense partnerships with key countries in the
Indo-Pacific region including India and Japan.
China’s military buildup “is now the largest and most ambitious of any country” since the end of World War II, the review said.
China’s campaign of economic coercion against Australia failed because
of support from other Asian trading partners who turned to Australia to
secure their energy supplies.
This speaks well of American and, to a lesser extent, Indian and Japanese intent to contain a Chinese offensive. Australia is small and arming up can only provide a shield that lasts long enough for help to arrive. To commit to the burden of building that shield, Australia needs to trust that help will arrive in time.
And other nations that enabled Australia's decision had to have similar trust. They were just as important economically as American military help to build the foundation of an Australian collective defense policy strategy.
We welcome the release of Australia's Defence Strategic Review (DSR)
— it is the latest example of the pivotal role Australia plays in
preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific, including through participation
in AUKUS and the Quad.
There's a plan. Let's see how it is funded and developed.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
While the current focus is on Taiwan, analysts with broader vision
watch the humble deference Putin is showing to Xi out of necessity.
It’s
not too soon to wonder about the future of the Russian Far East – parts
of which have a Chinese ethnic majority – in the event of a collapsed
or badly weakened regime in Moscow. Given Xi’s clear intent to unify
China and the Chinese, including Taiwan and elsewhere, it’s to be hoped
that the right people in the Pentagon and elsewhere are already thinking
about this.
And despite my revulsion for what Russia has reverted to under Putin, I raised a potential American Army role in helping Russia hold that territory against China in this Military Review article.
The
failure of Russia's army to quickly crush Ukraine as promised will harm
Putin in the high-stakes game of Russian politics even if he manages to
defeat Ukraine's army and "only" have to shift to a counter-insurgency
campaign.
Really, Russia can't hope for rescue from the West if China exploits Russia's face plant in Europe, as that initial author speculates:
A badly weakened Russia, potentially newly free and democratic in that scenario, might ask to join Nato as well.
Even before Putin initiated the Winter War of 2022, there was no way NATO would extend its defense guarantee to the Amur River to deter China when many members don't think of the Suwalki Gap as a reason to fight.
And after the brutal and destructive war, Russia can't even count on the kind of support that non-NATO member Ukraine has gotten from NATO.
The Russian winter offensive in the Donbas seemed to put most of its effort into taking the small city of Bakhmut. The way Russia attacked so persistently and at such a high cost, you'd think the city was named "Zelenskygrad."
Glorious victory, comrades! After twenty-thousand dead Russian soldiers in 5 months of attacking, Russia has finally almost captured that fulcrum of Ukraine, the small Donbas city of Bakhmut!
Ukraine is apparently counterattacking a bit with small-scale operations to exploit the Russian depletion of their army. This includes around Bakhmut. Which may signal peak Russian advances in that long-sought objective. Still, Russian attacks continue at points across the front, including inside Bakhmut.
Given that Putin is already flouting the UN charter, the 1994 Budapest
Memorandum, and even a more recent ceasefire plan, by invading Ukraine,
in what alternate world do we think we must test Russia's commitment to a
diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War?
If Ukraine can win, let them. The issue now is whether Ukraine can conduct a large offensive to take land without enduring casualties on the scale of Russia's expensive hammer blows.
And Ukraine might do better than we think they can: "What if Ukraine ends up routing
Russian occupation positions relatively swiftly and effectively, with
the Russian military in a hopeless retreat?" I'm hoping the Russians are
sitting there like the Italian army in Egypt before the British Wavell Offensive.
One reason for Western pessimism is that Ukraine does not have air superiority. I think air superiority isn't as important for ground
combat in an age of precision, long-range ground artillery. With a
caveat that you at least have to nullify enemy air superiority.
In
reviewing a book I read a while ago on operational art by Robert M. Citino, I noted his observation that Germany's World War II
integration of mechanized ground forces, close air support, and radios
wasn't fully developed at first. In the 1940 France campaign, German air
power was not yet able to directly support the German army once it broke
through French lines and began its exploitation drive to the English
Channel. So that's a prominent example of ground-based advances in the absence of close air support by either side in a decisive ground advance.
Not that air power isn't extremely useful to have. That's not
my part of my conditional argument. I just don't assume Ukraine can't attack
without air support. Ground-based precision fires may be able to replace what we've long assumed air power must provide.
Now, whether Ukraine can sustain an advance if Russia can unleash its air force on the attacking Ukrainian units is another question. Pity we didn't jump start a Ukrainian fighter force last year.
The reported Russian reinforcements to the Bakhmut area suggest that Russian forces are continuing to concentrate offensive capabilities there despite an assessed wider effort to reprioritize operations to prepare for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives.
Interesting. Russia really has tunnel vision on Bakhmut.
Putin said that the battle - the longest and bloodiest of the 15-month
war - had ended in a Russian victory, and that all those who had
excelled in it on Moscow's side would be given state awards.