Russia prepares to meet a Ukrainian counteroffensive after clawing forward at high cost without breaking through in its Donbas winter offensive.
Russia has persisted this year in clawing forward in the Donbas, expending their lives, materiel, and ammunition for little to show for it. Twenty thousand KIA just from December to now, in fact. Plus 80,000 other casualties. (Although this defies my expectations, there is a limit to what the Russian public will endure, right?)
Aside from very limited and localized attacks in the Kreminna area and near Donetsk City, Russian forces have largely ceased offensive operations throughout the theater, likely signifying a transition to the defensive.
Meanwhile the Ukrainians have been equipping and training a core counteroffensive force of three corps that are closer to large Cold War-era Western divisions.
The site of the Ukrainian main effort is unclear. Deliberately so, I assume. Ukraine achieved surprise in the Kharkiv region last year even as its high profile Kherson region counteroffensive worked over the Russian army's logistics support with firepower.
My preference is a counteroffensive that attempts to cut off Russia's land line of supply through southern Ukraine.
The main effort should kick off on the Zaporizhia front using existing forces on the line. At some point the bulk of the core counteroffensive force would push toward Melitopol. Existing Ukrainian forces would establish defensive positions facing east to hold off Russian counter-attacks.
The Ukrainians will need to mass enough forces concentrated to get high odds on narrow sections of the front to break through. This might get the Russians running if the Ukrainians can press into Russian support formations and sow panic.
I assume one of Ukraine's corps would be needed as a reserve initially. It might deal with Russian counter-attacks if needed or be committed to the southern drive to exploit success.
On the Kherson front, once the main effort got the Russian army retreating, the Ukrainians would face lower risk crossing the Dnieper River with watercraft and helicopters while engineers build bridges. This effort would pose a threat to lines of supply and retreat to Crimea. And would give the Russians a dilemma of fighting the supporting drive or the main effort.
Or, given the Russian fortifications built on the Zaporizhia front, could that sequence be reversed? Ukraine has already put light troops on the Dnieper River's east bank. Does Ukraine have the river-crossing and air defense assets to cross the Dnieper River in Kherson province first--where Russian defenders are less dense because of the river--while Russians are pinned in place anticipating a drive on Melitopol?
Alternatives for a main effort include the Donetsk region where Russian troops are exhausting themselves attacking entrenched Ukrainian troops.
Or the Luhansk region to add to their 2021 Kharkiv counteroffensive.
These might have the advantage of hitting exhausted Russian troops who have been conducting a winter offensive, unlike those on the southern front which has been relatively quiet and static for many months since Russia retreated from the Kherson front west of the Dnieper River.
On the other hand, eastern drives would push into the teeth of Russia's logistics system and allow Russia to react faster and fall back on established logistics infrastructure.
Heck, could Transnistria be a target?
That would be considered escalatory. It shouldn't be. But it will be framed that way. The advantage is that it would be a clear defeat for Russia with a number of POWs captured. A major Russian arms depot could be captured or destroyed. And Ukraine would have a bargaining chip.
The disadvantage is that it does nothing to directly liberate Ukrainian territory. And it is a potential distraction from that objective. And if Western supporters act as if it is an escalation, that alone should rule it out.
Still, keep in mind that wherever Ukraine strikes, the troop density is rather low. Russia may have built defenses in depth, but in the past I've read that Russia focuses on defending major roads. Can Ukraine sustain cross-country axes of advance to penetrate less-defended zones to bypass the defended fortification zones?
Will that lead to Russian panic and retreat, with units disintegrating? Honestly, I don't know if the Russians will resolutely defend even well sited and well built fortifications.
Or will the Russians hold and die in place, forcing Ukraine to sustain heavy casualties for small territorial gains?
Honestly, does Russia have more than we think? Is it possible that, contrary to reports, Russia has a virtual ground force reserve? That is, while there are no brigades visible, could Russia have companies scattered across the country--perhaps many looking like border or interior ministry troops--with headquarters elements lying low? Could these be brought together with hidden equipment to create a reserve the size of a couple divisions?
They
wouldn't be cohesive. But they would be a reserve force. Would that be enough--with artillery units (and will the Russian air force intervene in this campaign?) moved to the point of attack, too--to defeat a Ukrainian counteroffensive?
The bottom line is that the high stakes of Ukraine's counteroffensive means it has to score a significant battlefield victory to keep Western support at a high level. So regardless of my dream offensive the Ukrainians need a victory somewhere to keep Western support for subsequent offensives. Where that front is remains beyond my knowledge to judge.
UPDATE (Monday): Okay, options I didn't include but would if this was a simulation is either an offensive into Russia east of Kharkiv, designed to outflank the Russians on the Luhansk front while tearing up some Russian logistical assets; or a Ukrainian drive into Belarus to help Belarus eject the Russians, like Italy's flip in 1943.
I don't think either of these is likely, however. Attacking into pre-2014 Russia would free Russian conscripts for the war and perhaps rally Russians; and the Belarus flip would be a nice for NATO but a distraction from liberating Ukrainian territory. But it relies on an actual desire by Lukashenko to escape Russia's orbit. And Russia would wet its pantskies. Not a good look for a nuclear power.
Still, interesting what ifs, I suppose.
UPDATE (Saturday): Exactly!
[While Ukraine's defense efforts to stop and compel retreats by Russian troops were great successes,] the greatest success of Ukraine’s frontal resistance has occurred behind the front, with the gradual build-up of an increasing large, well-trained, and well-armed operational reserve of combat units that could be held back from combat because the frontal forces proved sufficiently strong to stop Russian advances without need of large reinforcements. It means that, for the first time since the start of the war, Ukraine’s war leaders can now take the initiative, instead of just repelling one Russian attack after another in different sectors of the very long front.
Both my expectation of a big Ukrainian counteroffensive in fall/winter 2022 and worry about a renewed Russian offensive this year rested on my assumption that both sides would ruthlessly keep or build a reserve.
When Ukraine didn't attack, I had to admit that Ukraine really was throwing everyone they could into the fight while they built that reserve. And while I still worry Russia has something held back, I'm starting to doubt that given the failed Wagner-dominated winter offensive petering out this spring.
But Russia is big and I can't rule out that Russia is waiting until Ukraine commits its strategic reserve to a counteroffensive before committing Russia's (hypothetical) strategic reserve to a new offensive.
What does our intelligence say about this ballet of options and capabilities?
Now we'll see if Ukraine can change the attritional war into a war of movement. Or if Russia has that same thing up their sleeve.
Early I heard Ukraine was building up a reserve of 18 maneuver brigades in three corps. One thing I'll say is that I've mentioned I'd hold a Ukrainian corps in reserve to either block a Russian offensive or to exploit a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Now I only read about 12 brigades (including 9 new brigades). Does this change match my early expectations of the attack force while the final reserve of six brigades is unmentioned?
UPDATE (Sunday): There's a lot of talk about expecting the Ukrainian counteroffensive to be less successful than we hope. At some level it is good to lower our high expectations--and lull the Russians.
But what if all of this [pessimism] turns out wrong? What if Ukraine ends up routing Russian occupation positions relatively swiftly and effectively, with the Russian military in a hopeless retreat?
I'm hoping the Russians are sitting there like the Italian army in Egypt before the British Wavell Offensive. Are we gaming the proper Western course of action if Russia is routed? We'd certainly want to be ready to credibly reassure nuclear-armed Russia that Ukrainian mechanized forces won't be advancing on Moscow. That is highly unlikely, too difficult, and would not be sustained by the West. But a panicked Russia might still fear it.
And we'd need to reassure Russia that the West is prepared to welcome Russia into an anti-China coalition--which Russia needs--as long as Russia helps rebuild NATO Ukraine.
If ever there is a reason for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reach out to his foreign counterpart to reassure him, that would be it. Let's hope the White House has issued that order. And maybe one face-saving avenue is open for Russia in all this if Russia does turn against China.
UPDATE (Sunday): Related:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Sunday that his country is preparing a counteroffensive designed to liberate areas occupied by Russia, not to attack Russian territory.Not that the paranoid Russians will believe reassurances. Unless their defeat gives them little choice.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here.
