In the spring of 2022, Russia faltered and had to transition from a failed parade into Ukraine's cities into a firepower-heavy frontal assault that clawed forward at high cost on the Donbas front. This spring, Ukraine seeks to turn the tables and drive the Russians back in defeat.
The long-anticipated big Ukrainian counteroffensive is projected to take place in the spring:
With no suggestion of a negotiated end to the 13 months of fighting between Russia and Ukraine, the Ukrainian defense minister said [in late March] that a spring counteroffensive could begin as soon as April.
Ukraine said it is already conducting operations related to the long-telegraphed offensive:
Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions.
But this isn't news, really, if you accept that the Bahkmut defense is to support the counteroffensive. "Shaping" the battlefield. Although this assessment that Ukrainian forces are on the east bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson province would count:
The extent and intent of these Ukrainian positions remain unclear, as does Ukraine’s ability and willingness to maintain sustained positions in this area. ISW is recoding territory on the east bank of the Dnipro River to Ukrainian-held only now because this is the first time ISW has observed reliable geolocated imagery of Ukrainian positions on the east bank along with multi-sourced Russian reports of an enduring Ukrainian presence there.
I assume the big push timing depends on the drying of mud as much as bringing newly trained and equipped units online. Losing scarce Western armored fighting vehicles to mud would be a catastrophe.
Ukraine has been preparing a core force of three corps for their spring counteroffensive:
According to The Economist, each will have six frontline combat brigades, some outfitted with newly received Western armored vehicles, that may be employed for its Spring counter-offensive. The six maneuver brigades will doubtlessly be complemented by supporting brigades or battalions of artillery, air defense, combat engineers, and so forth under the control of the Corps HQs.
These may be similar to Chinese Group Armies. The Ukrainian corps are either very large divisions or small corps, in Western usage.
Do these units have sufficient air defense assets to blunt Russian air power if Russia commits planes to attack the Ukrainian units counter-attacking?
I remain wary of being too hopeful. But there are grounds for hope as Western countries train Ukrainian troops in contrast to what Russia's mobilized men received before being thrown against Ukrainian defenders:
Ukraine currently has larger ground forces than Russia and keeps it that way by having their troops undergo more training than their Russian counterparts. This was the case during the August 2022 Ukrainian counteroffensive and will be even more so for the upcoming summer 2023 offensive.
Do read it all. Ukraine has limitations. But the Russians are worse.
Ukraine needs to achieve a lot. Or at least begin the job of achieving a lot. I've worried that if Ukraine doesn't strike back that the Russians will eventually mobilize to leverage their larger size. The Ukrainians recognize the problem:
Hromov noted that Ukraine and its allies must not underestimate Russian force generation capabilities in the long run for a protracted war of attrition. ISW has previously warned that the US and NATO should not underestimate Russian capabilities in the long run, as Russia can regenerate by leveraging its population and defense industrial base (DIB) to threaten Ukraine and NATO if Russian President Vladimir Putin decides to fundamentally change Russia’s strategic resource allocation over the long run.
I warned about this nearly six months ago:
In the short run, Ukraine has the edge--if it can carry out a major offensive. In the long run, Russia may regain the edge if its ground forces don't crack under the pressure of casualties, poor morale, and battlefield defeats. I don't know how long the short run lasts.
The Russians have not yet taken steps to mobilize. But if they do take those steps, they might yet overwhelm Ukraine with mass. Especially if the West tires of supporting Ukraine.
Unless delaying mobilization for so long proves to be fatal to mobilization. Would Russian battlefield casualties break their army or break their population's willingness to send even more men to die in even larger numbers?
UPDATE (Monday): ISW judges that Russia's defenses are vulnerable to a Ukrainian counteroffensive if certain assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities are correct.
ISW confirms my obvious observation that the southern front Russian troops are more rested than those further east that have been continuing offensive operations.
As I've argued, I'd rather have a southern front offensive than an eastern front offensive. The former offers more important territorial objectives and is farther from Russian supply sources; but the Russian troops are not as damaged. The latter front has more damaged Russian units but is much closer to Russian supply and reinforcement sources.
And this bolsters my pondering about how Ukrainian forces on the Kherson front might take part in a southern offensive as either a supporting or even a main effort:
The Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast is likely the most disorganized and undermanned in the entire theater.
Ukraine has to judge which area offers a better chance of a battlefield victory to keep the West on board supplying Ukraine.
As I've noted, there's a lot riding on the Ukrainian counteroffensive:
The Biden administration is quietly preparing for the possibility that if Ukraine’s spring counteroffensive falls short of expectations, critics at home and allies abroad will argue that America has come up short, too.
I wonder if the Biden administration is secretly hoping it
will fail to give it an excuse to scale back military support for
Ukraine and engineer a limited Russian victory with a premature
ceasefire. As if that's a wise middle course between ramping up weapons to win or cutting off Ukraine and letting Russia conquer Ukraine.
As I've noted, I think Biden is only accidentally backing Ukraine after falsely believing a couple billion dollars in infantry weapons before Russia quickly overran Ukraine would be a cheap show of resolve.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Are the Ukrainians pushing the Russians back from the Dnieper River on the Kherson front?
Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Southern Operational Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces hit and destroyed Russian artillery systems, tanks, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. Humenyuk added that Ukrainian forces are working to clear the frontline on the east bank in a “counter-battery mode.”
Back in November I speculated that if Ukraine couldn't bounce the river as the Russians retreated, Ukraine could use artillery fire to push the Russians back from holding the river line. If successful, Ukraine would gain some room to throw troops across the river:
I've been pondering limited amphibious and air mobile operations to pry the Russians loose from the river line.
But if Ukrainian fires can keep the Russian back, Ukraine has river-crossing options. If bridges can be built, repaired, and defended to let heavy forces cross and establish supply lines.
Reports would put that sequence at the very beginning, with Ukrainian light forces across the river as earlier reports stated. Unless that sequence is completed, this front will be limited to a supporting effort in the counteroffensive.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Interesting discussion:
Opposed advance rates are very much influenced by 1) terrain, 2) weather and 3) the degree of mechanization and mobilization, in addition to 4) the degree of enemy opposition. These four factors all influence what the rates will be.
On the fourth point, I assume the relative lack of density of forces inside Ukraine should increase the rate of advance. But other factors could work to decrease the rate, of course.
UPDATE (Thursday): After 11 months of defense, Bakhmut is close to falling. That will apparently be enough for Putin to claim a victory.
UPDATE (Friday): I worry that one day one of these command reshuffles will put competent people in charge:
The Russian military command appears to be reshuffling the leadership of command organs associated with force generation, sustainment, and logistics.
UPDATE (Saturday): Yeah, I suspect Ukrainian movements on the Kherson front are basically a diversion. The Dnieper River is wide and requires air defenses and hefty bridge-building to send and support a major force across it.
When I hoped for an offensive there I assumed a "Remagen Bridge"-type advance would be necessary. Now it is more likely to be a supporting front when (if?) the main front starts pushing the Russians back. Unless the Ukrainians have the bridging and air defense capabilities necessary. That would be a big surprise.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here.
