The People's Liberation Army Army (PLAA) is moving to 915,000 active duty troops assigned to combat units (I assume this means the total strength is higher) with 13 group army headquarters each containing 6 combined arms maneuver brigades plus supporting brigade of aviation/air assault and an artillery brigade. Five of the maneuver brigades have amphibious training.
Add in 6 airborne brigades and 7 marine brigades within the 915,000 ground force total.
The total ground force size including support and institutional parts is not mentioned.
So that's 91 maneuver brigades under 13 headquarters which seem to me kind of like our divisions (but a bit bigger, perhaps?) but with more maneuver brigades under them.
Although in the Iraq stabilization phase, I think that for the COIN campaign our divisions might have had close to that number of maneuver brigades assigned. But I don't assume span of control would handle that many in a conventional campaign--say four maneuver brigades tops despite the 3 normally under command. Would six maneuver brigades be a problem for Chinese command and control? Or would the group armies command fewer in war with the excess part of a replacement pool?
By comparison, we have about 40 active ground force maneuver brigades in 10 Army divisions and 3 Marine "divisions" with a total of about 700,000 active duty personnel in all parts of those forces.
I'm not sure about reserve structure, which has had mostly light infantry (in 18 divisions, according to 2012 data I have). If similar, they seem more appropriate for rear area security. But I'm guessing.
American ground force reserves are more potent with 31 brigades in the Army National Guard and Marine Corps Reserve.
Of course, American forces would have a higher proportion of support troops than the Chinese, meaning China would have more troops for maneuver units. But America needs the logistics support for overseas operations, which is pretty unique, as well as the troops that generate more troops.
Given some apples and oranges in the personnel issue, I'm not sure what can be said about the direct comparison of American versus Chinese brigades. American brigades are twice as big as Russian brigades, but I don't make the assumption that this is true for the Chinese given the far larger size of the Chinese army compared to the Russian army.
Basically, China's ground forces are getting smaller overall but more high tech.* Where once the PLAA was a large sponge of low-tech forces capable of reverting to irregular guerrilla warfare if defeated, the army is becoming a more professional force. While that means it is more potent in combat, it also means it is less resilient. If defeated, it's not going irregular. Worse for China, the combat-experienced American Army and Marine Corps will be better unit-for-unit than the new PLAA.
I addressed this earlier this year in Military Review. America, I wrote, has an opportunity from China's reforms, opening up the possibility of defeating China's army to assist in dominating the Asian littoral regions in cooperation with our allies located there:
The basic issue is that China is big, making it difficult for even a large invasion force to conquer China. On the other hand, if China must defend its far-flung coastal regions from American invasion because America does not assume such limits, the People’s Liberation Army ground forces could be dispersed, both ceding the initiative and giving the U.S. Army an opening to gain victories with local superiority after early-entry forces secure a lodgment on the mainland. ...
In many ways, given the hard-earned experience gained in Iraq since 1991 and Afghanistan since 2001, American ground forces have a greater relative advantage over China’s ground forces than American naval and air power have over their opposite numbers. Just maintaining a ground war option against China will cause China to divert resources from air and naval capabilities, giving American air and naval assets a greater chance of defeating Chinese A2/AD to enter and remain in the western Pacific.
Indeed, military planning in World War II before the invasions of Okinawa and Luzon were decided upon saw as an alternative an invasion of Taiwan (Formosa, held by Japan) with related operations on the coast of Japanese-occupied China (CAUSEWAY) (see page 11 in this volume of the history of the Marines in World War II) to set the stage for operations against Japan itself.
So while I'd rather not embark on a mission to the mainland of China, I don't assume there are no circumstances that would make such a mission worthwhile; nor do I think it our ground forces couldn't succeed in a limited mission in scope and/or duration, as if the Chinese army is a massive attrition-proof force that would overwhelm our ground forces.
As for the report itself, it just doesn't give the details I'd like despite the length that repeats past language and addresses the banal (Chinese practice striking American targets! From the Duh Files ...).
*A lot of the PLAA's reduction in size has been from transferring infantry to the People's Armed Police where they have primary internal security missions to control the people. But they would be able to perform rear area security for the army, and I assume would have the capability of going irregular behind American lines in case of an American expedition into China.
