Well that's interesting:
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, in March 2014, was a boon for Putin’s approval ratings. Hovering around 61 to 65 percent before the seizure, they climbed to dizzying heights of above 80 percent thereafter. For many Russians, Putin’s territorial grab restored the country’s national greatness, and for that they rewarded him with increased support. In the last few months, however, rising public frustrations over domestic policy and a government proposal to weaken the social safety net have led to a sharp decline in Putin’s popularity.
In theory, I'd say that Putin can't count on another short and glorious war (Crimea counts--except for sanctions--but the Donbas and Syria linger on) to bolster his popularity.
But Putin has a Plan B to stay in power in case the people sour on his continued rule, consisting of political officers in the military to keep it loyal plus his own personally loyal National Guard formed from military and security forces.
Putin might think that with security forces behind him, he can risk a drop in popular opinion for the gamble that a clear foreign military victory will restore his popularity.
Worse, Putin might only care about the glory that "history" will bestow on him for restoring Russian power and territory despite the difficulties he had to overcome against NATO and even Russians who failed to appreciate his mission.
Could Putin decide to go for broke, gaining land and glory or risking the dissolution of what he has even now?
Rational decision making models always seem to make the mistake of mirror imaging the rationality of others. Just what is a rational choice for Putin and his supporters?
