Australian defense policy makes Australia capable of projecting air and naval power, with an assist from lighter ground forces, to the South China Sea. This encourages and enables America, Japan, and India to move forward behind that shield to face a common enemy.
I've wanted Australia to be a shield and sword:
American forces, supported by Australian forces and supplied from Australian bases, can swing west or north to support allies or react to natural or military crises from South Asia to Northeast Asia.
This shift to Asia where Australia holds a critical area has been going on for a while and makes sense.
The Obama administration "pivot" is merely the most vocal stage of our long shift to Asia following the collapse of the Soviet threat in Europe and the Atlantic. The announcement serves more to indicate our national focus rather than any real addition of forces.
And by giving America this central position, Australia gains a shield against Chinese power.
Finally, by allowing America access to northwestern Australia bases, Australia helps provide a shield that makes it safe for American forces to rush to Australia's defense without undue worry that the fleet has embarked on a death ride into the teeth of Chinese power. It also gives America confidence that Australia can hold on long enough to be saved and that Australian forces will be there to fight at our side when we get there.
This role enables and so encourages American forces to reinforce Australia against a threat from the north. China is the current threat. And as India looks to Act East to protect its shores--and to cut off China's sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean--India is pulled east.
The public version of the classified review recommended that Australia’s government spend more on defense than the current expenditure of 2% of gross domestic product, improve the Australian Defense Force’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer ranges and make munitions domestically.
Other recommendations include improving the force’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases and to deepen defense partnerships with key countries in the Indo-Pacific region including India and Japan.
China’s military buildup “is now the largest and most ambitious of any country” since the end of World War II, the review said.
Mechanized infantry is downgraded.
Australia has seemed to be on the right path despite my worries of more than a decade ago.
And it is important to note that Australia resisted heavy Chinese pressure to submit:
China’s campaign of economic coercion against Australia failed because of support from other Asian trading partners who turned to Australia to secure their energy supplies.
This speaks well of American and, to a lesser extent, Indian and Japanese intent to contain a Chinese offensive. Australia is small and arming up can only provide a shield that lasts long enough for help to arrive. To commit to the burden of building that shield, Australia needs to trust that help will arrive in time.
And other nations that enabled Australia's decision had to have similar trust. They were just as important economically as American military help to build the foundation of an Australian collective defense policy strategy.
As I've noted, trust in American power and credibility is key to herding the cats in INDOPACOM.
Our Defense Department seems satisfied:
We welcome the release of Australia's Defence Strategic Review (DSR) — it is the latest example of the pivotal role Australia plays in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific, including through participation in AUKUS and the Quad.
There's a plan. Let's see how it is funded and developed.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
