I spend some effort in maintaining the Santa thing. Gift tags and notes for both my home and my Ex's so we both have that Santa continuity. Santa NORAD. Cookies eaten, milk drank, and carrot bits scattered by the fire place.
So it was with some horror that I realized I almost blew it with Lamb on Sunday.
I'd already gone over present options with Mister for his sister. Mister is old enough to know the truth about Santa and the Social Security Trust Fund, so I gave him the choice of what present would be his. The rest would be allocated to being from me or Santa. He knows this is probably his last year of not buying his present for his sister with own money, so he made it good.
So when I wanted to do the same with Lamb, I started naming presents she could give.
And then stopped in horror, quickly recounting which presents I'd named, because I realized that none of those presents named could now be from Santa! Doh! Lamb still believes!
I bluffed my way through on restating the name of one present that had to be from Santa, and Lamb bought that instant change of history. And I could see that Santa's gifts for Mister would be less robust than I'd planned. Oh well. Lamb will probably take it as a good sign of her relative naughty-nice ratio that she comes out better on the Santa front than Mister.
Oh well. It could have been worse. Santa came darn close to leaving socks and nail clippers for Mister.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Echelon Above Reality
I've mentioned before that I have grave doubts about trusting the judgment of PhDs on their area of expertise. Not that I doubt their knowledge. But they know so much that they think it is significant to know which local whackjob is 95% nuts as opposed to the fellow only 65% nuts who we can work with--if we don't upset the apple cart by actually doing something about the nutsiness that surrounds the guy.
So it is no surprise that a Yemen expert has his panties all in a twist over our use of some cruise missiles to help the Yemen government fight jihadis:
He says we can't just kill a few jihadis and expect the problem to go away. Well, duh, doctor. It boggles my mind that so many experts conclude that fighting back is counter-productive to defeating our jihadi enemies. Just let them keep killing us without riling them up by resisting, and eventually they'll grow tired of the whole caliphate project, I guess is their logic.
Killing jihadis is a good thing as long as we keep killing them and terrorize them.
As I always say, fighting back ineffectively is counter-productive. Defeating the enemy is productive.
So let's not believe that a salvo of cruise missiles solves our problems. Our jihadi enemies will claim we kill innocents whether or not we actually kill them. So let's not get too hung up on the issue of whether we accidentally killed innocents. Work to prevent such deaths, to be sure, but don't let that issue keep us from striking when we get a shot. Remember, the whole uprising thing started long before our cruise missiles struck. Something might have angered the jihadis and their backers already, huh?
Let's kill a whole lot more jihadis and keep killing them in larger and larger numbers until they come at us--or our imperfect allies--no more.
So it is no surprise that a Yemen expert has his panties all in a twist over our use of some cruise missiles to help the Yemen government fight jihadis:
With Yemen apparently on the verge of becoming the world's next failed state and a regional base for al-Qaeda, a series of U.S.-assisted air and ground assaults that shook pockets of Yemen last week might have seemed like a positive development in the troubled country's otherwise downward spiral. But the dramatic action, which appears to have resulted in a number of civilian casualties, may not right the situation at all. "The U.S. has been growing very concerned about al-Qaeda in recent years, but it seems as though the U.S. is coming rather late to the party," says Princeton University Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen, who contends last week's attacks would ultimately prove counterproductive.
He says we can't just kill a few jihadis and expect the problem to go away. Well, duh, doctor. It boggles my mind that so many experts conclude that fighting back is counter-productive to defeating our jihadi enemies. Just let them keep killing us without riling them up by resisting, and eventually they'll grow tired of the whole caliphate project, I guess is their logic.
Killing jihadis is a good thing as long as we keep killing them and terrorize them.
As I always say, fighting back ineffectively is counter-productive. Defeating the enemy is productive.
So let's not believe that a salvo of cruise missiles solves our problems. Our jihadi enemies will claim we kill innocents whether or not we actually kill them. So let's not get too hung up on the issue of whether we accidentally killed innocents. Work to prevent such deaths, to be sure, but don't let that issue keep us from striking when we get a shot. Remember, the whole uprising thing started long before our cruise missiles struck. Something might have angered the jihadis and their backers already, huh?
Let's kill a whole lot more jihadis and keep killing them in larger and larger numbers until they come at us--or our imperfect allies--no more.
Past Performance Sure Does Look Like the Way to Bet
Given all the deadlines we've set for Iran to do this or that regarding their nuclear weapons programs, it should be no surprise that Ahmadinejad is not quaking in his boots:
Mind you, President Bush was no better on pushing Iran. But at least Bush had the excuse that Congress would have impeached him (since 2007, anyway) had he taken a firm line against Tehran.
President Obama could nuke Tehran and get a second Nobel Peace Prize and a resolution of thanks from Congress.
My one consolation is that the late Saddam Hussein had about the same level of contempt for the West's resolve to stop him.
Iran's president on Tuesday dismissed a year-end deadline set by the Obama administration and the West for Tehran to accept a U.N.-drafted deal to swap enriched uranium for nuclear fuel, and claimed his government is now "10 times stronger" than a year ago.
Mind you, President Bush was no better on pushing Iran. But at least Bush had the excuse that Congress would have impeached him (since 2007, anyway) had he taken a firm line against Tehran.
President Obama could nuke Tehran and get a second Nobel Peace Prize and a resolution of thanks from Congress.
My one consolation is that the late Saddam Hussein had about the same level of contempt for the West's resolve to stop him.
Goodbye Flipper McGee
A big part of my college years went up in flames recently.
Source: http://www.annarbor.com/news/ann-arbor-firefighters-battling-blaze-at-south-university-and-church/
And the place is being torn down:
It annoys me that this building is called the former Pinball Pete's. Yes, I worked for that place. But it will always be Flipper McGees. I played there, worked there, and managed the store. It is one of the reasons I like to quip that I loved being a college sophomore--it was the best three years of my life.
It wasn't really the best three years of my life. But I had a lot of fun then, and the worries and angst and disappointments fade away over time.
I got amazingly good at classic Asteroids there. I'd have audiences watching me, amazed that I'd play for hours without using the "lurker" strategy. I'd just go through rack after rack of rocks, sometimes blanking out as my ship went thruster-end into a swarm of rocks, and muscles took over from conscious thought. Sometimes I'd be told that I swiveled left and right in a blur of shots clearing my path while also taking out a small saucer at the far end of the screen with a single shot.
I was a captive audience for a local Marxist who'd always come in on my shift to debate the joys of communism with me before getting his tokens and playing games.
And I'll never forget the uncomfortable time when I was working, and a (mostly) ex-girl friend, a women and co-worker I'd soon be dating for a short time, and a women who'd become my girl friend some months later, were all perched at the ledge of my small cubicle overlooking the arcade. I don't remember the conversation topics, but I do remember desperately wanting to be elsewhere and hoping that nobody would say anything that would get me stabbed in the arm with a fork.
I worked in other arcades that were really seedy (Mickey Rats, The Cross-Eyed Moose, and Tommy's come to mind), but Flipper's was always a great place. Never once had a gun drawn on me or a knife pulled there. And nobody ever tried to sell drugs or assault teen girls there.
Good times. Good times.
But now, that monument to younger days will no longer stand on South University. My boyhood home burned down ages ago. If my fraternity isn't razed to the ground as a fire hazard, it probably should be. Now that I think about it, the dorm I lived in had a fairly serious fire while I lived there. But it didn't burn down.
Oh well. Like I said, those really weren't the best three years of my life. It is just a jest, poking fun at my failure to really apply myself then. I'm sure I drove some teaching assistants and profs up the wall (sorry Minerva). But to be fair, some of them really annoyed me, too.
Every year it seems like I get to update that actual time span of the best three years of my life. And I hope to keep doing that for decades to come, regardless of the path of destruction behind me that wipes away the visible markers of my life passing through the world.
Source: http://www.annarbor.com/news/ann-arbor-firefighters-battling-blaze-at-south-university-and-church/
And the place is being torn down:
Starting Saturday, traffic on South University Avenue will be restricted for the demolition of the former Pinball Pete’s building at 1217 S. Forest Street in Ann Arbor.
The building was destroyed by fire in October. Investigators deemed the blaze arson, and two men have since been charged.
It annoys me that this building is called the former Pinball Pete's. Yes, I worked for that place. But it will always be Flipper McGees. I played there, worked there, and managed the store. It is one of the reasons I like to quip that I loved being a college sophomore--it was the best three years of my life.
It wasn't really the best three years of my life. But I had a lot of fun then, and the worries and angst and disappointments fade away over time.
I got amazingly good at classic Asteroids there. I'd have audiences watching me, amazed that I'd play for hours without using the "lurker" strategy. I'd just go through rack after rack of rocks, sometimes blanking out as my ship went thruster-end into a swarm of rocks, and muscles took over from conscious thought. Sometimes I'd be told that I swiveled left and right in a blur of shots clearing my path while also taking out a small saucer at the far end of the screen with a single shot.
I was a captive audience for a local Marxist who'd always come in on my shift to debate the joys of communism with me before getting his tokens and playing games.
And I'll never forget the uncomfortable time when I was working, and a (mostly) ex-girl friend, a women and co-worker I'd soon be dating for a short time, and a women who'd become my girl friend some months later, were all perched at the ledge of my small cubicle overlooking the arcade. I don't remember the conversation topics, but I do remember desperately wanting to be elsewhere and hoping that nobody would say anything that would get me stabbed in the arm with a fork.
I worked in other arcades that were really seedy (Mickey Rats, The Cross-Eyed Moose, and Tommy's come to mind), but Flipper's was always a great place. Never once had a gun drawn on me or a knife pulled there. And nobody ever tried to sell drugs or assault teen girls there.
Good times. Good times.
But now, that monument to younger days will no longer stand on South University. My boyhood home burned down ages ago. If my fraternity isn't razed to the ground as a fire hazard, it probably should be. Now that I think about it, the dorm I lived in had a fairly serious fire while I lived there. But it didn't burn down.
Oh well. Like I said, those really weren't the best three years of my life. It is just a jest, poking fun at my failure to really apply myself then. I'm sure I drove some teaching assistants and profs up the wall (sorry Minerva). But to be fair, some of them really annoyed me, too.
Every year it seems like I get to update that actual time span of the best three years of my life. And I hope to keep doing that for decades to come, regardless of the path of destruction behind me that wipes away the visible markers of my life passing through the world.
Thank You, Lithuania
Thanks for your help, Lithuania:
I hope the current administration doesn't punish you for helping us.
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ran a secret prison in Lithuania where al Qaeda suspects may have been held, a parliamentary probe in the Baltic state found on Tuesday.Although it seems like you are having second thoughts about that, what with the denials of any official approval.
I hope the current administration doesn't punish you for helping us.
Putting Their Money Where Their Mouth Isn't
For all the talk that comes out of Moscow about the evil American-led NATO plot to wreck or destroy Russia, when it comes to deploying their most important weapon system--their newest ballistic missile submarines--the Russians are a little more clear headed:
I'll never understand why Russians believe they shouldn't be part of the West. Do they really want to hold off China in the Far East at the end of the Trans-Siberian Railroad link back to European Russia?
The first three new Borei Class boats will be based in the Pacific. During the Cold War, most of Russias SSBNs were based in the north, at several bases east of the Norwegian border, and facing the Arctic ocean. But now Russia is spending over $350 million to expand and improve its submarine base on Kamchatka island. This will enable its new SSBNs to threaten China, as well as the United States.
I'll never understand why Russians believe they shouldn't be part of the West. Do they really want to hold off China in the Far East at the end of the Trans-Siberian Railroad link back to European Russia?
Laugh at the Clown! Laugh!
Hugo Chavez is basically why God gave us JDAMs, as far as I'm concerned. He is attempting to advance from his supporting role as a charter member of the Axis of El Vil to a big player in the Axis of Evil.
But however much this thug aspires to super villain status, let's not forget Chavez is a clown. Colombia's defense minister certainly hasn't forgotten that fact:
Chavez deserves a lot more mockery directed at him. And a JDAM, of course.
But however much this thug aspires to super villain status, let's not forget Chavez is a clown. Colombia's defense minister certainly hasn't forgotten that fact:
Chavez on Sunday accused the United States of violating Venezuela's airspace with an unmanned spy plane and ordered his military to be on alert and shoot down any such aircraft.Good one, Minister Silva.
The Pentagon has declined to comment on Chavez's accusations.
Colombian Defense Minister Gabriel Silva and armed forces commander Freddy Padilla told reporters Monday that Colombian aircraft couldn't fly the kind of espionage mission described by Chavez.
"Colombia doesn't have that capability," said Silva. He quipped that perhaps "Venezuelan soldiers mistook Father Christmas' sleigh for a spy plane."
Chavez deserves a lot more mockery directed at him. And a JDAM, of course.
Nice Little Continent Ya Got There
North Korea remains an out-sourced research lab for Iran's nuclear missile project. I'd say our estimates of when Iran might pose a threat to Europe underestimate what the Iranians are doing:
I'm thinking that cancelling the Bush ballistic missile defense plans for Europe on the assumption that we'll face only shorter-range Iranian weapons that can be handled by defensive missiles designed just for those shorter ranged ballistic missiles might be obsolete already.
If you think we get little enough support from Europe now, wait until Iran can point atomic-tipped missiles at Europe.
The weapons laden Il-76 jet transport seized last week turned out to be the third such aircraft to pass over Thailand recently. U.S. intelligence has been tracking cargo transports flying out of North Korea, and an increasing number of these flights take the southern route (rather than via China and Central Asia.) A more thorough inspection of the cargo on the seized Il-76 found components for North Korea's Taepodong-2 ballistic missile. This weapon has three times the 2,000 kilometer range of Iran's current largest missile. If Iran is building their version of the Taepodong-2, they will be able to hit targets throughout Europe.
I'm thinking that cancelling the Bush ballistic missile defense plans for Europe on the assumption that we'll face only shorter-range Iranian weapons that can be handled by defensive missiles designed just for those shorter ranged ballistic missiles might be obsolete already.
If you think we get little enough support from Europe now, wait until Iran can point atomic-tipped missiles at Europe.
Monday, December 21, 2009
Hearts, Minds, or Balls?
This author cautions against thinking two myths of the Iraq surge mean we will win in Afghanistan:
I wish to protest that it is a widely believed myth that the surge caused the Sunni Arabs to flip. I certainly never believed that it was anything other than a well-timed support that exploited the flip. And it had the advantage of having many more Iraqi troops with a minimum level of competence able to support the campaign. Timing was everything, and, as I've argued, it is pointless to speculate on whether we could have surged two or three years earlier to achieve the same results sooner. Timing matters. But the author has a point here. Not all surges are created equally.
Second, in complaining that Karzai is not the capable partner we need because his writ does not extend beyond Kabul seems to imply that Maliki was the Rock of the Green Zone, with a writ extending to the Kurdish north, Anbar province, and Sadrist south. Maliki was certainly not believed to be the capable ally he is implicictly being made out to be back then by contrasting Karzai with him.
It is true that there has been no great Awakening in Afghanistan, but the Awakening in Iraq required the jihadis there to basically run areas with their gentle touch that alienated Sunni Arabs and made America (who dethroned them from their privileged positioin) seem like the better alternative than al Qaeda and their buddies. Are we saying we need the enemy that robust before we can win? And remember, it isn't like the Taliban are popular in Afghanistan. The people do remember Taliban rule before we knocked them down in 2001, and there is no love for the Taliban.
What I worry about is what I worried about in Iraq for many years--if an enemy is committed to resisting as the Sunni Arabs were, especially in Anbar, how do you run a counter-insurgency to win hearts and minds of people whose hearts and minds support the insurgency?
I do worry that we can't win the hearts and minds of Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan. I worry that we assume that the people are ready to support us if only we provide security against the Taliban. What if that isn't the case?
If it is the case that the Pashtuns of southern Afghanistan are determined to resist us, then we can't win their hearts and minds. That means that restrictive rules of engagement don't win us friends but let enemies live to fight another day.
I'm not saying that we should go to a scorched Earth policy or go counter-terrorism rather than counter-insurgency. We shouldn't. It didn't work for the Soviets and we simply won't be that ruthless. I do think that there are many in the south whose hearts and minds can be won. But I thought one part of our Afghan surge strategy was to hammer the enemy resistance to convince the practical Pashtuns that there's no money and no future in fighting a US-backed government and backing the Taliban and drug lords. If we're not hammering the enemy, how do we sway the people who rather like them to abandon them?
If we really need to kill the enemy drug gangs and warlords to discourage resistance rather than just protect the people who don't want our protection and who aren't in the market for giving us their hearts and minds, how do we win?
"Protecting" the people in the broad concept of counter-insurgency does have the advantage of putting our side close to the people to discourage them from working for the enemy even if the people don't learn to love us. But we shouldn't mistake all counter-insurgencies as a battle for people who would love to be on our side but for the evil insurgents who keep the people from giving us their hearts and minds. Sometimes the people will be our enemy.
To repeat, I'm reasonably sure counter-insurgency is the way to go in Afghansitan. But the author is right, we can't just paste "Afghanistan" over "Iraq" in the PowerPoint presentations and think we're good to go.
OK, I've gone on a bit more than I planned so I've rambled a bit. I guess I'm still unsure of the surge given the importance of relying on Pakistan to control their side of the border. I thought our initial surge to 68,000 was more than enough for limited objectives if we had patience (and that level makes me nervous about our supply lines), but that if the military says we need 100,000 to blunt the enemy and win quicker, I'll trust them.
But if not in Afghanistan, we will one day surely face an insurgency that has the hearts and minds of the people. And that requires a different approach to the broad approach of counter-insurgency. As the saying goes, grab them by the balls--their hearts and minds will follow.
UPDATE: An article about 5th Stryker Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) in Afghanistan and the conflict between protecting the people and killing committed insurgents. I don't see the conflict, since you can't just sit in a village and let the enemy roam outside your perimeter to attack at will. Nor can you just sweep the countryside looking for the insurgents while failing to guard the people.
But clearly, setting up in the villages is necessary to make sure any killed (or otherwise removed from the roster) isn't just replaced by a new local recruit (forced or volunteer). If it makes commanders intent on killing the enemy (which is still necesarry in COIN) think of setting up in the villages not so much as "protecting" the people (who may or may not want protection from the Taliban) but as "separating" the insurgents from their recruit pool, source of intelligence and supplies, and refuge.
Remember, "securing" the population doesn't simply mean protecting them. It means keeping the population from supporting the insurgents--voluntarily or under threat.
UPDATE: A reminder that Russia faced the type of insurgency I worry we'll face--one where the enemy and people are one and we won't be able to win hearts and minds. Which is why I support limiting our rules of engagment for air power and artillery even if it risks American lives (subject to adjustments to adapt to enemy tactics and based on experience). We need to keep the generally good opinions of us intact so we can support friendly Afghans in fighting the Taliban, drug gangs, and al Qaeda. If we lose the people to the enemy causes, we will lose the war. Russia was willing to be as brutal as they had to be and still lost. We will never wage war that way and so cannot afford to let the situation deterioriate into such a fight.
The proposition that a troop surge in Afghanistan would contribute to stabilizing the country, as it did in Iraq, rests on two myths: First, the surge in Iraq caused the population to turn against the insurgents. Second, the conditions that enabled the surge to succeed in Iraq also exist in Afghanistan.
I wish to protest that it is a widely believed myth that the surge caused the Sunni Arabs to flip. I certainly never believed that it was anything other than a well-timed support that exploited the flip. And it had the advantage of having many more Iraqi troops with a minimum level of competence able to support the campaign. Timing was everything, and, as I've argued, it is pointless to speculate on whether we could have surged two or three years earlier to achieve the same results sooner. Timing matters. But the author has a point here. Not all surges are created equally.
Second, in complaining that Karzai is not the capable partner we need because his writ does not extend beyond Kabul seems to imply that Maliki was the Rock of the Green Zone, with a writ extending to the Kurdish north, Anbar province, and Sadrist south. Maliki was certainly not believed to be the capable ally he is implicictly being made out to be back then by contrasting Karzai with him.
It is true that there has been no great Awakening in Afghanistan, but the Awakening in Iraq required the jihadis there to basically run areas with their gentle touch that alienated Sunni Arabs and made America (who dethroned them from their privileged positioin) seem like the better alternative than al Qaeda and their buddies. Are we saying we need the enemy that robust before we can win? And remember, it isn't like the Taliban are popular in Afghanistan. The people do remember Taliban rule before we knocked them down in 2001, and there is no love for the Taliban.
What I worry about is what I worried about in Iraq for many years--if an enemy is committed to resisting as the Sunni Arabs were, especially in Anbar, how do you run a counter-insurgency to win hearts and minds of people whose hearts and minds support the insurgency?
I do worry that we can't win the hearts and minds of Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan. I worry that we assume that the people are ready to support us if only we provide security against the Taliban. What if that isn't the case?
If it is the case that the Pashtuns of southern Afghanistan are determined to resist us, then we can't win their hearts and minds. That means that restrictive rules of engagement don't win us friends but let enemies live to fight another day.
I'm not saying that we should go to a scorched Earth policy or go counter-terrorism rather than counter-insurgency. We shouldn't. It didn't work for the Soviets and we simply won't be that ruthless. I do think that there are many in the south whose hearts and minds can be won. But I thought one part of our Afghan surge strategy was to hammer the enemy resistance to convince the practical Pashtuns that there's no money and no future in fighting a US-backed government and backing the Taliban and drug lords. If we're not hammering the enemy, how do we sway the people who rather like them to abandon them?
If we really need to kill the enemy drug gangs and warlords to discourage resistance rather than just protect the people who don't want our protection and who aren't in the market for giving us their hearts and minds, how do we win?
"Protecting" the people in the broad concept of counter-insurgency does have the advantage of putting our side close to the people to discourage them from working for the enemy even if the people don't learn to love us. But we shouldn't mistake all counter-insurgencies as a battle for people who would love to be on our side but for the evil insurgents who keep the people from giving us their hearts and minds. Sometimes the people will be our enemy.
To repeat, I'm reasonably sure counter-insurgency is the way to go in Afghansitan. But the author is right, we can't just paste "Afghanistan" over "Iraq" in the PowerPoint presentations and think we're good to go.
OK, I've gone on a bit more than I planned so I've rambled a bit. I guess I'm still unsure of the surge given the importance of relying on Pakistan to control their side of the border. I thought our initial surge to 68,000 was more than enough for limited objectives if we had patience (and that level makes me nervous about our supply lines), but that if the military says we need 100,000 to blunt the enemy and win quicker, I'll trust them.
But if not in Afghanistan, we will one day surely face an insurgency that has the hearts and minds of the people. And that requires a different approach to the broad approach of counter-insurgency. As the saying goes, grab them by the balls--their hearts and minds will follow.
UPDATE: An article about 5th Stryker Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) in Afghanistan and the conflict between protecting the people and killing committed insurgents. I don't see the conflict, since you can't just sit in a village and let the enemy roam outside your perimeter to attack at will. Nor can you just sweep the countryside looking for the insurgents while failing to guard the people.
But clearly, setting up in the villages is necessary to make sure any killed (or otherwise removed from the roster) isn't just replaced by a new local recruit (forced or volunteer). If it makes commanders intent on killing the enemy (which is still necesarry in COIN) think of setting up in the villages not so much as "protecting" the people (who may or may not want protection from the Taliban) but as "separating" the insurgents from their recruit pool, source of intelligence and supplies, and refuge.
Remember, "securing" the population doesn't simply mean protecting them. It means keeping the population from supporting the insurgents--voluntarily or under threat.
UPDATE: A reminder that Russia faced the type of insurgency I worry we'll face--one where the enemy and people are one and we won't be able to win hearts and minds. Which is why I support limiting our rules of engagment for air power and artillery even if it risks American lives (subject to adjustments to adapt to enemy tactics and based on experience). We need to keep the generally good opinions of us intact so we can support friendly Afghans in fighting the Taliban, drug gangs, and al Qaeda. If we lose the people to the enemy causes, we will lose the war. Russia was willing to be as brutal as they had to be and still lost. We will never wage war that way and so cannot afford to let the situation deterioriate into such a fight.
I'm Out!
I know I vowed not to mock global warming for the rest of the year. I know that. Gore knows, I've passed up plenty of articles, I'll have you know. I thought I was the master of my environment.
But I'm only human. How am I supposed to pass up this piece prancing on about the carbon "pawprint" of pets?
I'm out! I think I lasted ten or eleven days.
Good grief, the two authors (husband and wife?) are "specialists in sustainable living at Victoria University of Wellington." Specialists in sustainable living? What the freaking heck is that? And the university has two of them on staff? What? They couldn't hire another resident poet? How can the university need even one specialist in sustainable living?
But even if you need one or more specialists on sustainable living, do you really think that examining the carbon footprint of pets is worth their time?
Not content to whip pet owners for buying planet-killing kibble, the eco-profs turn on the lower mammals in question as well:
We can't feed our pets with domesticated animal bits processed and shipped to our local stores. And the pets can't eat locally, either! Aren't those pets feasting on local wild animals working to reduce their carbon pawprints? Shouldn't pet owners be encouraged to let their pets eat off the land this way?
Not to worry, the two Vales have an answer for the eco-friendly pet-owner:
Since we can't eat the rich, because they are the Vanguard of the Warmetariate making sure we (but not they) live the eco-friendly, impoverished lifestyle, the Vales want us to eat the pets.
I must end with this quote from the male Vale:
Heavens. That can't be sustainable, eh? I think we can all be horrified at the thought of the impact of pussy scoffing choice cuts of meat.
I'm betting he didn't run that line past the female Vale first.
The Vales should be careful about their insistence that pets have dual use, since I'm not convinced the Vales--with all due respect to their exalted status that one would expect jobs as specialists in sustainable living would imply--have a single use.
I do concede they may have laid an egg with this study.
But I'm only human. How am I supposed to pass up this piece prancing on about the carbon "pawprint" of pets?
I'm out! I think I lasted ten or eleven days.
Good grief, the two authors (husband and wife?) are "specialists in sustainable living at Victoria University of Wellington." Specialists in sustainable living? What the freaking heck is that? And the university has two of them on staff? What? They couldn't hire another resident poet? How can the university need even one specialist in sustainable living?
But even if you need one or more specialists on sustainable living, do you really think that examining the carbon footprint of pets is worth their time?
Combine the land required to generate its food and a "medium" sized dog has an annual footprint of 0.84 hectares (2.07 acres) -- around twice the 0.41 hectares required by a 4x4 driving 10,000 kilometres (6,200 miles) a year, including energy to build the car.They also examined cats, hamsters, and goldfish for their carbon footprints. They ignored poets and eco-Lords jetting around the planet to conferences.
Not content to whip pet owners for buying planet-killing kibble, the eco-profs turn on the lower mammals in question as well:
And pets' environmental impact is not limited to their carbon footprint, as cats and dogs devastate wildlife, spread disease and pollute waterways, the Vales say.
With a total 7.7 million cats in Britain, more than 188 million wild animals are hunted, killed and eaten by feline predators per year, or an average 25 birds, mammals and frogs per cat, according to figures in the New Scientist.
We can't feed our pets with domesticated animal bits processed and shipped to our local stores. And the pets can't eat locally, either! Aren't those pets feasting on local wild animals working to reduce their carbon pawprints? Shouldn't pet owners be encouraged to let their pets eat off the land this way?
Not to worry, the two Vales have an answer for the eco-friendly pet-owner:
But the best way of compensating for that paw or clawprint is to make sure your animal is dual purpose, the Vales urge. Get a hen, which offsets its impact by laying edible eggs, or a rabbit, prepared to make the ultimate environmental sacrifice by ending up on the dinner table.
Since we can't eat the rich, because they are the Vanguard of the Warmetariate making sure we (but not they) live the eco-friendly, impoverished lifestyle, the Vales want us to eat the pets.
I must end with this quote from the male Vale:
"If pussy is scoffing 'Fancy Feast' -- or some other food made from choice cuts of meat -- then the relative impact is likely to be high," said Robert Vale.
Heavens. That can't be sustainable, eh? I think we can all be horrified at the thought of the impact of pussy scoffing choice cuts of meat.
I'm betting he didn't run that line past the female Vale first.
The Vales should be careful about their insistence that pets have dual use, since I'm not convinced the Vales--with all due respect to their exalted status that one would expect jobs as specialists in sustainable living would imply--have a single use.
I do concede they may have laid an egg with this study.
Surf, Sand, and Fun!
Martin Fletcher thinks Somalia's sorry state is the fault of Georgw W. Bush, who supported an Ethiopian military effort three years ago to prevent jihadis from taking over significant chunks of Somalia:
Yeah, that's why the place is no longer known as the Jewel of the Horn. Bush mucked it up.
It's so obvious, now! The CIA had best update its country book on the place!
Chaos briefly interrupted by dictatorial "stability." (Well, a degree of it, anyway) What simplistic rot when clear thinking writers like Fletcher can see Bush did it rather than seeing the place as a UN seat without a country to go along with it.
Afghanistan and Iraq have monopolised the headlines but Somalia is arguably an even greater victim of George W. Bush’s ill-conceived and lamentably executed War on Terror. America’s interventions have proved so catastrophic that its best hope of salvaging something from the wreckage is a president it chased from power three years ago, who controls a few square miles of a country three times the size of Britain.
Yeah, that's why the place is no longer known as the Jewel of the Horn. Bush mucked it up.
It's so obvious, now! The CIA had best update its country book on the place!
Britain withdrew from British Somaliland in 1960 to allow its protectorate to join with Italian Somaliland and form the new nation of Somalia. In 1969, a coup headed by Mohamed SIAD Barre ushered in an authoritarian socialist rule that managed to impose a degree of stability in the country for a couple of decades. After the regime's collapse early in 1991, Somalia descended into turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy. In May 1991, northern clans declared an independent Republic of Somaliland that now includes the administrative regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool.
Chaos briefly interrupted by dictatorial "stability." (Well, a degree of it, anyway) What simplistic rot when clear thinking writers like Fletcher can see Bush did it rather than seeing the place as a UN seat without a country to go along with it.
Crossing the Rubicon
Iranians in significant numbers seem to have decided that mere recounts are not enough to address their grievances with the mullah regime:
The regime has hoped the protesters would become discouraged and finally give up. What seems to have happened is that the protesters have escalated their goals.
The mullahs might still be right, of course, that this people power will be overcome by the persistent brutality of the state. But at least it can be said that the mullahs certainly aren't out of the woods yet.
UPDATE: Regime change is in the wind:
The protesters just don't seem very interested in a recount any more.
Opposition supporters chanted anti-government slogans in Iran's holy city of Qom on Monday after the funeral of Ayatollah Montazeri.
Mourners wearing green items, a symbol of the protests that followed last June's presidential election, chanted slogans similar to those used in the post-ballot demonstrations.
The regime has hoped the protesters would become discouraged and finally give up. What seems to have happened is that the protesters have escalated their goals.
The mullahs might still be right, of course, that this people power will be overcome by the persistent brutality of the state. But at least it can be said that the mullahs certainly aren't out of the woods yet.
UPDATE: Regime change is in the wind:
“Rape, atrocities, an unworthy government,” mourners chanted in Qom Monday. “This is the month of blood, Yazid will fall,” sounded another, referring to the 7th-century caliph who killed Hossein, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad. Today, Yazid is seen as the symbol of evil, and of every oppressive ruler.
“The silence of each Muslim is treason against the Quran,” rang out another slogan. And yet another: “Montazeri’s last wish, an end to this dictatorship.”
The protesters just don't seem very interested in a recount any more.
We'll Be His Enemy, No Matter What
Raul Castro isn't feeling the hope and change, it seems:
Is Raul unable to see that extended hand?
Sheesh. I wish we were seeking to topple his regime.
UPDATE: You lie! Raul's minions are certainly keeping up with the party line:
Cuba's foreign minister: tea bagger or white supremacist militia member? You decide.
Raul Castro gave the strongest signal yet his government's would-be honeymoon with the Obama administration is over, delivering a harshly worded speech Sunday charging that the White House endorses efforts to topple the island's communist system.
Is Raul unable to see that extended hand?
Sheesh. I wish we were seeking to topple his regime.
UPDATE: You lie! Raul's minions are certainly keeping up with the party line:
Cuba's foreign minister called President Barack Obama an "imperial and arrogant" liar Monday for his conduct at the U.N. climate conference, a reflection of the communist island's increasingly fiery verbal attacks on the U.S. government. ...
He singled out comments Obama made during a news conference in Copenhagen, when the U.S. president said no agreement had yet been reached but he was confident one would before the summit ended. "Obama knew he was lying, that he was deceiving public opinion," the foreign minister said.
Cuba's foreign minister: tea bagger or white supremacist militia member? You decide.
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Peace Prize Through Superior Firepower
Yemen has been busy fighting Iranian-backed tribes sheltering jihadi types. The Saudis have been heavily involved at sea and in the air along the border.
Apparently we've been involved, too. This is rather sparse on details:
"Provided firepower" is pretty vague. Drones? Missiles? Bombs?
And what other aid?
No doubt there are jihadis in Yemen who need to be killed. As the president noted, there is evil in the world--and in this case some evil got some HE dropped on it.
UPDATE: Ah, we Tomahawked them.
UPDATE: Strategypage has more on the strikes on two al Qaeda camps that we hit and the broader campaign in Yemen.
Apparently we've been involved, too. This is rather sparse on details:
Adm. Mike Mullen is applauding a military strike in Yemen against suspected members of the al-Qaida terrorist group. ...
The New York Times reported the U.S. provided firepower and other aid to Yemen for the strike this past week against suspected al-Qaida hide-outs and training sites within its borders.
"Provided firepower" is pretty vague. Drones? Missiles? Bombs?
And what other aid?
No doubt there are jihadis in Yemen who need to be killed. As the president noted, there is evil in the world--and in this case some evil got some HE dropped on it.
UPDATE: Ah, we Tomahawked them.
UPDATE: Strategypage has more on the strikes on two al Qaeda camps that we hit and the broader campaign in Yemen.
Proxy Rant
I swore not to rant about climate change for the remainder of the calendar year.
But I didn't promise not to link to a lovely rant.
But I didn't promise not to link to a lovely rant.
Just Cause and Correct Assumptions
Twenty years ago we toppled a anti-American dictator with a lightning strike that went right for the heart of the regime. We fairly quickly nabbed the dictator and then turned over the government to more friendly people and pulled back to bases to protect the country from external threats. There was no insurgency to suppress.
The place was Panama, the dictator Manuel Noriega, the time was twenty years ago, and the invasion was called Operation Just Cause:
It was not, in fact, unreasonable for us to think in 2003 that an unpopular and bloody dictator in Iraq could be overthrown, with the state taken over by more friendly elements, and the enemy incapable of fighting an insurgency.
We were wrong about that because of the strength of the Baathist organization, the potential of the pipeline of jihadis (from before the war) that ran through Damascus to Iraq, the vast amount of ammunition and money inside Iraq available to the enemy, the determination of Iran and Syria to fight us after the invasion, and the ruthlessness of the Baathists to stage an insurgency and terror campaign.
In Iraq, our cause was as just. But our assumptions proved wrong. But we still won.
UPDATE: And I should note that our assumptions weren't nearly as fatal to our war effort as Saddam's were when he based his actions on the near-war of Operation Desert Fox carried out 11 years ago this month:
And this calls into question whether we could have leveraged our miiltary deployments into coercing Saddam into making real concessions to verify his disarmament under UN Security Council resolutions rather than going to war.
The place was Panama, the dictator Manuel Noriega, the time was twenty years ago, and the invasion was called Operation Just Cause:
On December 20, 1989, the 82d Airborne Division conducted their first combat jump since World War II onto Torrijos International Airport, Panama. The 1st Brigade task force made up of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, parachuted into combat for the first time since World War II. In Panama, the paratroopers were joined on the ground by 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment which was already in Panama. After the night combat jump and seizure of the airport, the 82nd conducted follow-on combat air assault missions in Panama City and the surrounding areas.
They were followed later by the 2d and 1st Bdes, 7th Inf Div (L), while the in-place forces comprised of the 3d Bde (-), 7th Inf Div (L); 193d Infantry Brigade (L) and 4-6 Inf, 5th Inf Div (M), assaulted objectives in both Panama City and on the Atlantic side of the Canal. By the first day, all D-Day objectives were secured. As initial forces moved to new objectives, follow-on forces from 7th Inf Div (L) moved into the western areas of Panama and into Panama City.
It was not, in fact, unreasonable for us to think in 2003 that an unpopular and bloody dictator in Iraq could be overthrown, with the state taken over by more friendly elements, and the enemy incapable of fighting an insurgency.
We were wrong about that because of the strength of the Baathist organization, the potential of the pipeline of jihadis (from before the war) that ran through Damascus to Iraq, the vast amount of ammunition and money inside Iraq available to the enemy, the determination of Iran and Syria to fight us after the invasion, and the ruthlessness of the Baathists to stage an insurgency and terror campaign.
In Iraq, our cause was as just. But our assumptions proved wrong. But we still won.
UPDATE: And I should note that our assumptions weren't nearly as fatal to our war effort as Saddam's were when he based his actions on the near-war of Operation Desert Fox carried out 11 years ago this month:
Likewise, the 2004 ISG report stated that in 2003 Saddam discounted the threat of an American-led invasion and considered the air attacks associated with DESERT FOX as the “worst he could expect from Western military pressure.”
And this calls into question whether we could have leveraged our miiltary deployments into coercing Saddam into making real concessions to verify his disarmament under UN Security Council resolutions rather than going to war.
The Battle for Majnoon?
Ah. I think we may have a motive for Iran's occupation of an Iraqi oil field yesterday. I'd guess the Iranians were trying to stop this:
The Iraqis and Iranians had some fairly serious battles over this place during the First Gulf War in the 1980s.
UPDATE: I'm assuming this is related, as well:
Iran really doesn't want Iraq to get back on their financial feet.
Iraq has initialed a deal with a consortium led by European giant Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Malaysia's state-run Petronas to develop one of Iraq's most prized oil fields. ...
The two companies won the right earlier this month to develop the 12.5 billion barrel southern Majnoon field.
The Iraqis and Iranians had some fairly serious battles over this place during the First Gulf War in the 1980s.
UPDATE: I'm assuming this is related, as well:
Oil exports from northern Iraq have been halted by a sabotage attack on the pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, oil ministry spokesman Assem Jihad said on Sunday.
Iran really doesn't want Iraq to get back on their financial feet.
Seeing Victory
An NBC/WSJ poll shows that Americans have a good view of our achievements in Iraq:
I don't understand by what standards you'd claim the war was unsuccessful. You might say the achievements weren't worth the price we paid, but unsuccessful?
I imagine that 40% includes those people who thought we couldn't win before we crossed the border, believed Baghdad would be a modern-day Stalingrad that crushed us, and then believed that Iraqis wanted us out and that it was impossible to defeat those insurgents who just wanted foreigners out. Sheesh. They can see dead people but they can't see victory?
Fortunately, enough Americans wanted to win--or at least didn't want to lose--to give our outstanding troops the opportunity to win the war against a series of enemies inside Iraq.
We won the war. Let's win the peace by staying engaged in Iraq.
57% say the Iraq war has been successful, versus 40% who say it has been unsuccessful.
I don't understand by what standards you'd claim the war was unsuccessful. You might say the achievements weren't worth the price we paid, but unsuccessful?
I imagine that 40% includes those people who thought we couldn't win before we crossed the border, believed Baghdad would be a modern-day Stalingrad that crushed us, and then believed that Iraqis wanted us out and that it was impossible to defeat those insurgents who just wanted foreigners out. Sheesh. They can see dead people but they can't see victory?
Fortunately, enough Americans wanted to win--or at least didn't want to lose--to give our outstanding troops the opportunity to win the war against a series of enemies inside Iraq.
We won the war. Let's win the peace by staying engaged in Iraq.
Saturday, December 19, 2009
An Awakening Regional Giant
The new Iraqi military is not going to be as good as a Western army, but it is already showing signs of being better than it was before we built their new military.
The army has 250,000 troops organized in:
1st Intervention Corps of two motorized infantry, one infantry, and one armored division. One of the motorized divisions is the Reaction Force Division, which is the best of the lot--a new "Republican Guard" force.
Northern Corps of two motorized infantry and one infantry divisions. Two Kurdish divisions currently autonomous are supposed to become part of this corps and designated as mountain divisions.
Central Corps of two Presidential Guard and one Baghdad brigade, and two motorizied infantry, one infantry, and one commando divisions.
Southern Corps of three motorized infantry divisions and an infantry division forming.
There are also four federal police divisions, seven counter-terror commando battalions, border police, and six battalions of emergency police.
The navy is tiny and not yet able to take over coastal or Gulf patrol duties from Coalition naval forces.
The air force has only a 100 transport, helicopters, and recon aircraft. Iraq still relies on American aircraft to defend their air space and provide ground support and other functions.
The Iraqi military is a counter-insurgency force that has built a solid foundation of trained and combat experienced troops that will eventually get better equipment to become capable of taking on conventional foes:
I wrote about the Iraqi army past, present, and future:
Assad should take notice.
And Iran, too.
The army has 250,000 troops organized in:
1st Intervention Corps of two motorized infantry, one infantry, and one armored division. One of the motorized divisions is the Reaction Force Division, which is the best of the lot--a new "Republican Guard" force.
Northern Corps of two motorized infantry and one infantry divisions. Two Kurdish divisions currently autonomous are supposed to become part of this corps and designated as mountain divisions.
Central Corps of two Presidential Guard and one Baghdad brigade, and two motorizied infantry, one infantry, and one commando divisions.
Southern Corps of three motorized infantry divisions and an infantry division forming.
There are also four federal police divisions, seven counter-terror commando battalions, border police, and six battalions of emergency police.
The navy is tiny and not yet able to take over coastal or Gulf patrol duties from Coalition naval forces.
The air force has only a 100 transport, helicopters, and recon aircraft. Iraq still relies on American aircraft to defend their air space and provide ground support and other functions.
The Iraqi military is a counter-insurgency force that has built a solid foundation of trained and combat experienced troops that will eventually get better equipment to become capable of taking on conventional foes:
Even the army does not have a lot of heavy weapons. There are only about 300 old T-72 tanks, and lots of newer armored hummers. Thousands of new armored vehicles are on order. Compared to Saddam's force, the NCOs and officers (mostly from the Shia Arab majority), have less time in uniform, but are better trained. The Iraqis have learned a lot about fighting from their American mentors. For a long time, Iraqis were considered the most ineffective military forces in the region. Not so much, not anymore.
I wrote about the Iraqi army past, present, and future:
With some experience and our guidance, the new Iraqi army will in time be not only better than Saddam's army, but will be the best army in the Middle East other than Israel's.
Assad should take notice.
And Iran, too.
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