Forward Defense

America tries to keep overseas threats from developing to the point of threatening America at home.

This Geopolitical Futures essay summarizes America's strategy nicely:

America’s goal in Ukraine, then, is to deny Russia the strategic depth it wants in order to limit the Russian threat to Europe. With China, its goal is to retain American strategic depth in order to prevent China from threatening the U.S. or obtaining global reach.

The issues are similar in principle, but the stakes for the United States are not. For Washington, the China question is much more important than the Russia question. A Russian victory in Ukraine would redraw unofficial boundaries and increase risks. A Chinese success would create a more global power that challenges the U.S. and its allies around the world.

So we try to keep Russia as far east as possible where it can't harness the resources of Europe. And we try to keep China penned inside the first island chain by supporting allies there, preventing China from organizing the resources of the western Pacific.

Achieving both objectives prevents powers in control of Europe or Asia from threatening North America.

While the China threat is more pressing, Europe has the power to blunt Russia, as long as America is there in NATO to knit together the European military forces scattered across the continent. 

I'll add that American leadership in NATO prevents a second threat from arising in Europe--the European Union. The EU is a proto-imperial state that seeks to strip away the prefix.

And to achieve those goals America needs a quiet home field.

Do read all of the GF piece. It goes into Chinese and Russian needs regarding America that are interesting:

China needs to reach an understanding with the United States. Russia does not have that need. The U.S. is flexible.

In theory, America can throttle China's seaborne trade. But America is clearly fine with China prospering within the Western system. And if America was truly a military threat to Russia, Russia would need an understanding, too. 

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.

The Effort to Keep Carriers Afloat and in Action

China's 600-mile range DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile (and the newer longer-ranged DF-26B) looms over American carriers in the western Pacific.

America has invested a lot of money in our carrier task forces. The ships, aircraft, and escorting subs and ships represent a lot of money.

I think the damage to American national morale if one or more are lost could be significant given their glorious history and status as symbols of American power. Notwithstanding nonsense notions that they are unsinkable. And even if they are unsinkable, much less than that takes them out of action, possibly for the duration.

The Navy is not oblivious to the threat of working anti-ship ballistic missiles: 

While the U.S. Navy has been quiet about how it plans to defend its ships against Chinese ship-killer ballistic missiles, they have not been idle. The navy has quietly expanded its layered air defense system with the addition of new electronic defenses. The navy is particularly quiet about any efforts to conduct realistic tests of its defenses against Chinese ballistic missiles.

It's a long kill chain to attack. Fingers crossed it can be broken at multiple points. 

And I still have the worry that targeting is much simpler than we like to think. Is my worry really ridiculous given China's broad role in our supply chains? 

And the Navy is working on even more capabilities:

The U.S. Navy will deploy a carrier strike group with advanced networking capabilities next year, in furtherance of the Pentagon’s vision for Joint All-Domain Command and Control.

Yes, networked carriers able to plug into networked defenses will add to the defensive strength of carriers. This says nothing about whether the effort to keep the carriers alive is worth the expense. 

And what capabilities are lost in this effort to create a bubble at sea to protect the carriers close to China?

Of course, the DF-21 is not the only threat to carriers, which have been attacked and sunk long before the DF-21 appeared. Aircraft, submarines, shore-based anti-ship missiles, and missile-armed surface ships are threats.

I'm not comfortable with big carriers--the apex of platform-centric warfare--being the center of our surface fleet for sea control missions when network-centric warfare (or whatever the current term of art is) is increasingly possible to mass effort without massing platforms.

Before you object to that assessment, are you defending the carrier for sea control missions? Or for power projection missions? They are different. Once you appreciate that, my views may not be so different than yours.

And God help us, the Chinese are practicing to strike before the carrier strike group is formed at sea with its layered defenses up. Worse, there are newer threat in American home ports, too.

We're spending a lot of money to keep carriers in the sea control battle, shoehorning them into network-centric warfare. Wouldn't it be better to keep fewer for power projection and use the money freed up for assets more suitable--and cheaper and expendable--for network-centric warfare?

Keep in mind, too, that China can use those anti-ship ballistic missiles against other enemies. Including Russia, should China sour on their frenemy with benefits' usefuleness.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.

A Peace Constitution is Not a Suicide Pact

China's military rise has reached Japanese shores. Japan has issued a white paper on the defense of Japan.

Japan is far less hesitant about asserting its right to defend itself as threats arise, citing Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a threat to global peace:

This defiance of international order is not just Europe’s problem. As strategic competition between nations becomes more apparent against the backdrop of changes to the global power balance, the existing order is being exposed to serious challenges, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, which is at the center of this competition. 

In particular, China continues to unilaterally change or attempt to change the status quo by coercion in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The country’s ties with Russia, an aggressor nation, have deepened in recent years, with joint navigations and flights being conducted in the areas surrounding Japan by both Chinese and Russian vessels and aircraft. Furthermore, China has made clear that it would not hesitate to unify Taiwan by force, further increasing tensions in the region. 

North Korea has repeatedly carried out ballistic missile launches well into 2022, thereby unilaterally escalating its provocations towards the international community. It has also defended Russia in respect of the latter’s aggression against Ukraine, asserting that the fault for this situation lies with the United States and other Western countries. On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2022 KISHI Nobuo Minister of Defense 

And Japan highlights its close friendship and alliances with America, Australia, and India. And notes European interest in defending international waters under threat by Chinese claims. Which removes the stigma of unilateral defense measures by placing Japanese concerns along with these nations' concerns:

Standing firm in its policies as a peace-loving nation, Japan resolutely continues to oppose any parties who attempt to forcibly change the world order. Japan also intends to continue demonstrating the strength of freedom and democracy and the significance of human rights and laws to the world through its unwavering conviction and tireless efforts.

After lengthy discussions placing Japanese defense concerns in wider contexts, Japan claims the right of self defense:

The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. In addition, peace and security are essential for the people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper. However, peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing for them. The essence of national security can be found in creating an international environment that is stable and predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats before they occur, through diplomacy.

And proclaims that Japan's efforts protect regional security from threats, benefiting all under threats to the peace. A discussion of the peace constitution and the right to self defense follows, with the statement that Japanese defense efforts will be sufficient for defense and not enough to threaten others.

The paper then goes into organization and capabilities, including those of American forces based in Japanese territory. And highlights Japan's defense cooperation with numerous states and peacekeeping initiatives, highlighting the position within a broader alignment of countries defending what Japan seeks to defend. 

The report looks at defense technology and the defense industrial base, along with softer topics (complete with pink borders, although I may read too much into what is an American view) that seem like they seek to take the hard edges off of what is a defense paper that at its core is about killing people and breaking things.

But the cost is not clear even if the direction is:

Japan’s Defense Ministry made a budget request for the coming year Wednesday without specifying the costs of missiles for preemptive strikes and dozens of other weapons as well as its development plans, as the government aims to drastically raise Japan’s military capability.

The ministry said it can disclose details only after the government in December adopts a new national security strategy and defense guidelines. They are being revised to fundamentally strengthen Japan’s military over the next five years. ...

Only a partial sum of 5.6 trillion yen ($40.4 billion) was disclosed for 2023, but the ministry’s budget plan could rise to around 6.5 trillion yen ($47 billion), up 20% from this year, Japanese media said.

Japan has cited the NATO 2% goal for the portion of GDP going to defense. Which will provide a lot of funding from what until recently had been an effective cap of 1%. Japan's economy is hefty, remember.

The Japanese rising sun is visible from China's shores. 

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.

If You Can't Be With the Nuke You Love, Love the Nuke You're With

North Korea's apparent decision to pursue tactical nuclear weapons is pointless or perhaps an admission of difficulty getting working ICBMs that can survive the journey and get past American missile defenses.

Is this a dangerous turn?

In January 2021, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un told his country – and the world – about the plans he had for the evolution and modernization of his nuclear deterrent. He outlined a far-reaching, ambitious menu of military modernization goals. Among these were tactical nuclear weapons, a capability that North Korea had until then not formally sought.

The development and eventual deployment of tactical nuclear weapons by North Korea will represent the most serious negative development for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula since the country’s development of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles capable of ranging the United States.

The article rightly notes that the idea that "tactical" nukes going off around South Korean cities is unlikely to generate the nuanced calm in South Korea of not being hit with a bigger nuke.

And I'm not convinced North Korea has working ICBMs. It is possible that pursuing easier-to-build short-range nukes is more likely to succeed with North Korea's resources.

Although shooting those down is much easier.

To me it seems that nukes don't add anything that North Korea's chemical weapons capabilities don't already threaten--to weaken South Korea's ground forces to pave the way for a North Korean ground offensive.

Yet North Korea's army and even the once-supported commandos are rotting away. How will they exploit the potential chaos of nuclear strikes? Hell, the U.S. is making a claim that might be relevant: 

The Russian Ministry of Defense is in the process of purchasing millions of rockets and artillery shells from North Korea for its ongoing fight in Ukraine, according to a newly downgraded U.S. intelligence finding.

Are tactical nukes intended to make up for less ammunition? Or do the North Koreans accept that their conventional forces are so degraded that ammunition levels are irrelevant. And North Korea finally has a customer desperate enough to use their probably ancient ammunition?

I think pursuing tactical nukes makes it more dangerous for North Korea. South Korea is more likely to launch decapitation strikes on Pyongyang leadership with precision weapons; and more likely to advance north of the DMZ to deny those tactical nukes launching positions for strikes on Seoul.

Worse for Kim, if we conclude that North Korea is emphasizing tactical nukes because its longer-range weapons don't work, America is more likely to respond for South Korea with a nuke or two on North Korean military targets. This kind of joint South Korean-Japanese-American unity of response is thus more likely.

And if we won't commit to that kind of respone, South Korea may pursue nukes. Might China finally get serious about reining in their little pet psycho to keep that cascading choice around China's periphery from starting? (Note that I was clearly wrong to expect American military action. All I can say is that in 1994 I thought we were on the edge of striking, yet we did not. Years later I read we were actually close.)

NOTE: LOL. After writing this, I find I went over the some of the same ground 5 months ago.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.

The Winter War of 2022 Glimpses Winter 2023

Putin believes he needs to drag the war with Ukraine into the new year to win. Can his army last the short term to get there? And is Putin foolish to think a longer war will make a difference?

Prior to the last couple weeks, the Russians seemed to be thinking about next year in Kiev:

For about a month, the front line has remained almost unchanged. Russian troops have gone as far as they can.

Obviously, this situation annoys the Kremlin, forcing it to look for new, rather unconventional ways to replenish human reserves and worn-out weapons. But Moscow is also playing for time, believing that the onset of cold weather will play into its hands, as an impending energy crisis spreads through Europe.

Moreover, Putin needs time to restore the Russian army’s ability to fight.

I have strong doubts that expanding the Russian military's size next year will work when it can't replace losses now.

I have strong doubts that suddenly Russian industry will have the ability to build enough new weapons to replace losses let alone equip expanded forces.

I sure don't think North Korean artillery ammunition is the answer to ammo problems.

And Ukraine's unexpected attacks south of Kharkov had legs. Rather than petering out, the Ukrainian offensive operation pushed deep into Russian-occupied territory:

A day after routing Russian forces in a lightning advance that seized hundreds of square miles and a strategic town in the northeast, Ukraine claimed additional territory on Sunday in an offensive that has swiftly reshaped the battlefield in the nearly 200-day-old war and left Moscow reeling.

So winter weather may arrive in time to help Ukraine defend new territory that it has started to retake from Russia in the east in early September and then set up the logistics lines:

Russia’s retreat from key cities is likely aimed at avoiding encirclement after Ukraine captured the town of Kupyansk, which sits on a rail and road hub, and severed the last artery that connected Russia with thousands of its front-line troops.

“It’s a complete collapse,” Phillips O’Brien, professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, said about the Russian pullout of forces between Kupyansk and Izyum. “In the battle of Donbas, they probably had more troops deployed there than anywhere and now they seem to be unable to hold anything.”

This offensive in Kharkov province seems to have been planned and not just local counter-attacks that were expanded when successful. Yet this does not mean the Kherson front is a feint.

It seems to me in retrospect that Ukraine fully intended to carry out the offensive south of Kharkov. And the long-telegraphed Kherson operation provided a convenient distraction. Keeping the Kharkov front low key provided a ready excuse if the offensive ran into serious resistance. Recall too, that it "leaked" that America had advised Ukraine not to spread out their offensive operations too much beyond Kherson. America may have lost that debate, but the debate may have been let out to lull the Russians in the east. Or it was all disinformation.

Still, Ukraine needs to do much more. Russia experienced a collapse of their troops in the Kharkov operation. But the rot did not spread. Can Ukraine push the Russians over the edge on a broader front? And keep the Russians running back to the frontier? As Freedman writes of the dramatic Ukrainian advance:

It serves as a reminder that just because the front lines appear static it does not mean that they will stay that way, and that morale and motivation drain away from armies facing defeat, especially when the troops are uncertain about the cause for which they are fighting and have lost confidence in their officers. Who wants to be a martyr when the war is already lost?

Could Ukraine switch their main effort from Kherson to the east and hope to hit the weaker Luhansk and Donetsk puppet state forces and create a big hole in Russia's lines? 

Russian failures to rush large-scale reinforcements to eastern Kharkiv and to Luhansk Oblasts leave most of Russian-occupied northeastern Ukraine highly vulnerable to continuing Ukrainian counter-offensives.

Just where are the four Ukrainian brigades that speaheaded the Kharkov offensive now? I heard they were pulled out of the line and replaced with other troops.

Does Ukraine have more reserves to commit? And if so, are they earmarked for the Kherson front or the Kharkov front?

Planning for the long run is prudent for Russia, under the circumstances. As long as Russia doesn't lose in the short run. What can Ukraine do before winter arrives to win and what more can the Russian army endure in that time? ISW doesn't think Ukraine can win before 2023 arrives. At this rate, no. But present trends continue--until they don't. 

If Ukraine can't score another big win soon, could the West equip Ukraine for a winter offensive in the south that denies Putin the time to rebuild his army for a spring campaign?

I don't rule out a broader Russian troop collapse before the winter. And given how thinly the front line is held, that could result in dramatic Ukrainian advances into friendly but Russian-occupied territory.

And if that happens, territorial fissures within Russia could break open in a matter of months or years.

UPDATE (Tuesday): Strategypage goes over Russia's problems, including:

Russian commanders are also concerned about their supply situation. They are not receiving enough ammunition, especially artillery shells and rockets. Food, clothing and medical supplies are inadequate, especially now that winter is coming and most of the troops will be at the front, not in barracks or other housing. Hunger, cold and a lack of fire (artillery) support makes troops more willing to desert or surrender at the first opportunity.  

Ukrainian winter offensive, anyone?

Also, are Ukrainian estimates of Russian KIA really inflated that much? Hmm.

And one more interesting thing: "The U.S. has finally agreed to supply Ukraine with the larger (300-kilometer range) ATACMs missile that HIMARS vehicles can also use." 

UPDATE: This has been apparent for some time, but bears repeating: "Russian forces have used steadily smaller echelons as their main tactical units — moving from battalions to companies and in some cases platoons dramatically reducing the combat power the new units bring." 

UPDATE (Wednesday): Putin has ordered the first mobilization of reservists since World War II. Up to 300,000 could be recalled to service. Putin clearly intends this war to reach winter 2023 and beyond. But how good will the reservists be? Can Russia equip them? How will Russian society react?

Remember, too, that Russia doesn't have "reserves" in the sense Western countries have them--with continued training and equipment already in existence. Russia has people who used to be in the military. Big difference. As I've mentioned, you'd be shocked how quickly I forgot all useful military knowledge after I got out.

And as ISW has noted for a while, Russia keeps sending its training personnel to the front, which makes it harder to turn newly inducted cannon fodder into soldiers.

UPDATE (Sunday): I'm not sure what to say about Lavrov's speech at the Security Council. These are selected highlights (via reader Eric by email), but I haven't seen an English transcript yet. But there is video.

I assume this reflects thinking in Moscow around Putin, regardless how ridiculous it sounds to our ears. So my main conclusion is that the Russians aren't ready to end the war they started. Not with the current leadership unless Russia's position seriously deteriorates to force a reassessment of what is best for Russia through their lens of what is happening. 

But perhaps his statement about the UN preventing Hell at least suggests Russia isn't thinking of committing nuclear suicide over its invasion. I've never been in favor of ejecting Russia from the UN. Better to have them talking even if it sounds nuts to us, than to have them isolated, more paranoid, and speaking even more dangerously in private.

Interestingly enough, Lukashenko has yoked himself to Putin if Belarus' speech is any indication.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

Weekend Data Dump

Liberals are comparing the January 6th riot to 9/11 (the first one, not the second one--although details have changed, the basics are constant)??! "I mean, if the 1/6 attacks had involved the destruction of the Capitol by America-hating Islamists, lefties would be making excuses and blaming America." Exactly. I prefer to ask, "Why do we hate us?".

After 9/11, we set up a domestic security agency to fight foreign jihadis. And now that entrenched bureaucracy has decided it is easier--and convenient to Democrats--to include certain American "enemies" in its threat list.

In the long run, Europe can adjust to Russia's decision to stop exporting energy to it. But is Europe already able to cope?

I'm not going to say I don't admire the guts of those who travel long distances to enter America illegally for a better life. But follow the rules and stand in line with the rest.

Russia struck Ukraine's power grid. 

In the last war update I noted that satellites and drones didn't prevent Ukraine from achieving surprise on the Kharkov front. Which is amazing if Ukraine outnumbered the Russian defenders 8:1, as the Russians claimed. This emphasizes that surprise is achieved in the enemy's mind and not on what they see.

Biden seems to have repeatedly gotten Covid. If life was a movie, Vice President Harris would know by now she's not going to be selected to run to replace Biden in 2024. Wouldn't the movie plot have Harris exposing herself to the virus and having close contact with Biden as much as possible? In real life, I don't think Harris would do that. She's many things but I have no reason to think she's evil. But in real life is it really out of bounds to think someone in her circle who hitched their career to her star might be enough of a sociopath to attempt that? They'd know that only being vice president when the president dies will get her into the Oval Office. Again, I'm just spitballing here. For a movie plot.

The Ukrainians may have captured many Russian troops in their Kharkov counteroffensive. At first I thought this might be an opportunity for Ukraine to trade for their POWs. But perhaps not if the experience of Russian POWs trying to go home after World War II. Putin won't want witnesses to defeat going home now.

It's good to be a Democrat.

I got live TV back. After a two-year absence when I got sick of the political excesses in the 2020 election. The political excesses are still evident. So I won't leave news on as a kind of background radio. But what really shocks me is how many commercials there are. I'd forgotten. And gotten used to skipping adds on YouTube. When the Super Bowl is over, I'll likely quit it again.

Why won't you backward, stupid, white supremacist, deplorable young people enlist in the U. S. military?! The mystery continues.

American F-22s arrived in Australia for exercises with Australian F-35s. 

America's ability to see into Afghanistan activities is perhaps 2-3% of its pre-defeat level. Indeed.

The Army is speeding up modernization by sending older M-113s in our units to Ukraine.

Just to note that I speculated that Russia's first invasion of Ukraine could have put Russia on the road to significant shrinkage. The second invasion is putting much more strain on Russian unity.

China's slowing economy and aging population could make China dangerous? Pardon me, but China is dangerous because of the Chinese Communist Party. A slowing economy and aging population will lessen the source of danger in the long run. 

Kill whitey. With footnotes. Tip to Instapundit. Is the answer to racism really different racism? Why are so many listening to evil and stupid people?

The Syria multi-war lingers. Jihadis still roam and many remain in SDF prison camps. Iran gets Russian help as the price for supplying Putin's war effort in Ukraine. I won't say we don't have reasons to keep forces in eastern Syria. But it would be nice if our government explained why we risk out troops' lives there.

More on the Vampire 70mm guided rocket system, which can be mounted on even civilian vehicles. It is suitable for anti-UAV and ground attack roles. America sent them to Ukraine.

Huh: "A former member of Afghanistan’s parliament urged the world on Monday to label the Taliban a 'gender apartheid' regime[.]" I will never run out of reasons to re-use this, will I?

 

Newly wary of Russia, Germany wants to buy Israeli Arrow 3 missile defense systems.

Iran has decided to counter Israel's aerial interdiction campaign across Syria by just building missiles and other weapons (drones?) inside Syria.

No! Way! And I'll note that they use food as a raw material when we have growing shortages. Tip to PJ Media.

The Army is trying to figure out how to build up to about 100 more HIMARS vehicles per year.

I'm not sure changing the organizations that can be bribed and terrorized to leave the drug cartels alone is the answer to Mexico's crime problems.

Oops. Darn shame.

Azerbaijan has taken advantage of Russia's floundering offensive against Ukraine to hammer Russia's client Armenia, in theory under Russia's protection. More here. Who else exploits Russia's difficulties? Turkey? China?

Inflation is not under control. 

Actions speak louder than words. Via Instapundit.

Russia basically just has a manpower advantage over Ukraine and may be trying to use that. But I think that Russia's manpower (and military industrial) advantage over Ukraine is misleading. Putin is in a hole and may be just digging a deeper mass grave for his soldiers.

I heard a retired American Army lieutenant general (A show host humorously called him a "first lieutenant general") say that the Kherson offensive was absolutely a diversion for the main effort on the Kharkov front. If true, they fooled me. I wondered if the highly telegraphed Kherson offensive was to disguise a real effort elsewhere. But the south is so important I assumed it had to be the main effort.

What is the administration's major malfunction when it comes to energy production? Tip to Instapundit.

Somalia.

The ultimate tactical drone to see the enemy first.

Remember all the talk about how the American Army was "breaking" in Iraq? It didn't. But if you want to know what an army breaking looks like, take a look at Russia's ground forces 6 months into invading Ukraine. Maybe the troops recover enough to hold the line. Maybe they break and run back to Russia in large numbers.

FBI-Hillary collusion in the Russia-Trump witch hunt. Tip to Instapundit.

Will China roll the dice in a war, thinking it has a window of opportunity before its relative power compared to America and our allies begins to decline? 

The U.S. Air Force can turn its scarce cargo planes into precision-weapon trucks. I've mentioned them. Russia says it is easy: "Put explosives in barrel, roll off back ramp on city! Can't miss!" Back to the instant gunships. It's so cute how the Army convinces itself the Air Force will airlift its stuff when the Air Force has lots of other uses for its cargo planes.

Russia's sphere of influence is getting interesting: "Kyrgyz and Tajik border guards have exchanged fire after a dispute over the border between the two Central Asian nations, officials on both sides said."

Tactical nukes options. Last week I noted that America replaced most tactical nuke jobs with precision conventional weapons. And if Russia uses tactical nukes for the shock value, might we find Ukraine didn't give up all their Soviet-era nukes?

As Ukrainian forces reach the Russian border, it may be tempted to attack into Russia with ground forces for tactical and psychological gains. But Ukraine shouldn't make it easy for Russia to declare general mobilization to defend Russia from invasion.

As we discuss Russian options for using nuclear weapons, I'll repeat my observation: How do we know Russia's nukes are in any better shape than their conventional military? Does Russia really want to risk exposing his nuclear arsenal as less than robust? What if Putin used a nuke and it was a dud?

Six, huh? "For the Army to fight the way its top civilian leader envisions by the next decade, the organization must fulfill at least six objectives in that ever-shrinking window." I can think of just two: stop wasting lower ranks' time with BS courses; and get the flag officers to learn there are no substitutes for victory. Or get rid of them. 

So we have the cadre of commissars for the military in place, now (via Instapundit). I remember when everyone in the Army was green. But perhaps this is an opportunity for "anti-racists" to enlist!  With any luck our enemies are even worse. But no, the Army thinks the problem is the media portrayal of military service.

I have no opinion on the H96. But the Navy certainly needs a large number of ship-killing expendable warships, networked to exploit sensors and targeting provided by other more capable assets. 

The Navy wants to design its replacement for the successful Burke-class destroyer. It had best work. We've run out of time having the luxury of effing up the building of new warships.

The Navy and Marines disagree over the Light Amphibious Warfare ship concept. I think the LAW is a barge with pretensions.

Nuclear attack submarines give Australia the ability to fight China away from Australia's shores. The Lombok Strait is one key area.

It is unclear to me if the Russians rallied at the Oskol River after their front line collapsed when the Ukrainians attacked in Kharkov province; or if the Ukrainians set the river as their limit of advance as a defensible line to the east.

Yes, as I've mentioned, unmanned vessels are more vulnerable to being captured. They need the ability to shoot back, blow up, or be under close overwatch by assets that can blow up the attackers.

Iran gets the big promotion from old Axis of Evil: "Iran has moved a step closer towards becoming a permanent member of a central Asian security body dominated by Russia and China[.]"

The Biden administration may have averted a railroad strike. Good. Tip to Instapundit.

Russia did not launch Patriot missiles at Ukraine. I'm sure the reporter was told that a Russian missile similar to the Patriot was used as a ground attack missile. In this case the S-300. But our reporters as a class, with few exceptions, have no clue about military matters. No fashion, celebrity, or food reporter would be allowed to write about their subject with a similar lack of knowledge.

The Russians rely on heavy armor for offensive action. We really need more anti-tank weapons in our brigade combat teams. We would likely fight outnumbered early in a war. We have more options with drones that can be part of the option to reach whatever number we need to cripple Russian units that might strike NATO on the Baltic front.

The demand for racism far exceeds the supply. Tip to Instapundit.

Has Russia permanently destroyed its reputation as a global and even regional power? (Tip to Instapundit) No. Lot of nukes--even if we can't be sure they work--and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council will keep their limited global status. And eventually Russia will regain regional military power status. But will Russia concentrate their limited conventional military power in the east to protect the Far East or pretend NATO is a threat? And unless countries that rely on Russia can find an alternative protector, they'll remain with Russia to some degree. But some will have the opportunity to switch which they may never have thought could happen until now. Belarus?

Corruption and the anchor of socialism harm India's ability to arm itself.

I heard--possibly on a Telegraph podcast--that Ukraine pulled the four spearhead brigades from the Kharkov offensive and are moving them elsewhere. Will they go to Kherson? Will they aim for Melitipol? Or are they a reserve in case the Russians mount a desperate offensive somewhere?

Al Bundy? Tip to Instapundit.

Is Iraq on the verge of a Shia civil war? Differences are fine. Even stalemate is acceptable. As long as they are settled by ballots and not bullets. But with one side in that "civil war" pro-Iran, America has an interest in this fight.

Advocating a European Union plan to support Ukraine through a long war until Russia is willing to admit defeat and negotiate. An alternative to Russian energy that doesn't involve burning Unicorn horns would be helpful. Although the advocates insist on yoking Ukraine to the EU green energy plan. So I find it hard to take this seriously.

Eritrea, Ethiopia's longtime enemy, is mobilizing as Ethiopia's conflict with its Tigray region continues.

Poland will buy 48 South Korean combat jets.

If the FBI and DOJ are still looking for organized street mobs undermining our Constitutional rights. Tip to Instapundit.

What can Russia possibly do in Ukraine?

LOL:

Ukraine is repairing captured Russian equipment from the Kharkov counteroffensive. This is a major advantage of controlling a battlefield when the battle is over. Ukraine exploited this on the Kiev front early in the war. And Russia could do this in areas it took. 

The Russians invade Ukraine yet tell Germany that providing weapons to Ukraine to defend itself crosses a red line. Russia's leaders are a-holes.

The liberation of territory in Ukraine's east has revealed more Russian war crimes.  More.

Artillery is back in fashion because of the war in Ukraine. Was I on that, or what? And a related aspect.

More American military aid to Ukraine to sustain their counteroffensive, but no details.

The Army wants to triple 155mm ammunition production; and increase rocket production. That's a good start.

I was unaware of this limit: "Poland’s top leaders celebrated the opening Saturday of a new — albeit unfinished — canal that they say will mean ships no longer must secure Russia’s permission to sail from the Baltic Sea to the ports of the Vistula Lagoon." Another reason Kaliningrad should be captured early if Russia goes to war with NATO.

Via Instapundit, without enough police in Minneapolis, private security is booming:

Yawn: "Russian nuclear-powered submarines fired cruise missiles in the Arctic [near Alaska] on Friday as part of military drills designed to test Moscow's readiness for a possible conflict in its icy northern waters, the defence ministry said." Prioritizing Russian naval power in Asia only makes sense if focused on China. Just in case.

What fresh Hell is this? Via Instapundit.

Putin's domestic political problems don't kill themselves, you know.

The People's Republic of China tells former Soviet states that they shouldn't let people determine the form of their republic.

I haven't read any reports of Russians captured in Ukraine's Kharkov offensive. So the Russians did manage to pull back and escape the attacks.

And Now For Something Completely Different

That's it, man. Meme over, man. Meme over.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This is a repeat. But it's real. And it's also spectacular.

 

 

 

 

 

Train the Way You'll Lose Because You'll Lose the Way You Train

Train the way you fight, because you'll fight the way you train. If signals from the Navy are any indication, we are undermining the most expensive military in the world. We will pay a price for that.

A year of success for the Secretary of the Navy! 

Carlos del Toro marked his first anniversary at the helm of the Navy Department with a 1,141-word message to the Navy and Marine Corps extoling [sic] his accomplishments to date. But there was one glaring omission in his list of achievements: any indication that the Navy is better able to fight and win wars than it was one year ago.

The Navy Secretary cited progress made on many fronts: Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault, Mental Health, Education, Housing, Keeping [personal] Costs Down, Child Care, Spouse Employment, and the Exceptional Family Member Program.

It's not just that the Secretary of the Navy is declaring this list as significant. It's that he knows his bosses expect this. And his subordinates know that, too. That eventually works its way down to ship crews at the pointy end of the floating stick.

Many of his achievements are certainly good things, in isolation. But they are only really good if they are the foundation of a Navy that can fight and win. Where is the evidence that he is doing that? How does achieving those good things translate into a fighting Navy and Marine Corps?

Without using those achievements as the means to an end rather than the end itself, we won't get victory:

I'm not truly worried about a recent spate of leadership firings by the Navy. I worry that this data-driven project--while useful--is treating the symptoms for the real problem in the flag officer and civilian leadership ranks:

What we should do but won't is revamp selection and training for our senior officers to reduce the climate of stupidity that cripples American warfighting abilities. 

Somehow our flag officers are convinced that there are many substitutes for victory. But the truth is that woke lips sink ships.

I think that the purge doesn't go high enough. I've lost trust and confidence in our flag officers' ability to command the Navy. What oversight of those human factors will we carry out?

Pretending we have a good military doesn't make it so. Shiny new weapons, futuristic jargon, and sharp uniforms hide the rot.

Train the way you'll lose. Because you'll lose the way you train, eh?

UPDATE: Huh:

A Buddhist pennant appeared on a Navy ship earlier this week for the first time in the sea service’s history, the Navy announced.

Is this bad? I won't say that. But I will say it should be way down the priority list.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.

When the Last, Bad Option Moves to the Top

Is China's debt about to sink its economy? If so, scratch that "China won't go to war and risk their economy" theory of peace.

China's debt may be 350% of its GDP. And maybe more if economic statistics are being rigged (at some level in the system) to hide the problem. This will have repercussions (tip to Instapundit):

However much debt there is, senior Chinese leaders are facing problems they cannot solve, something evident from, among other things, defaults by large property developers, the so-called “mortgage boycotts” of homeowners refusing to pay loans, and bank runs.

The Communist Party knows—and has known for a long time—the game could not go on forever. Wen Jiabao himself in 2007 talked about what has become known as the economy’s “Four Uns.” Growth then, he said, was “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”

What happens now? 

Mind you, Gordon Chang has been predicting doom for decades, now. But he concludes, "There is now no hope the country can avoid one of the biggest economic crises in history." Could be. China has a large economy to judge and with the perspective of historical time rather than news cycle time, even being off by 3 or 4 decades on a prediction is really pretty good.

Hell, I've been watching for signs of decline and collapse, too. But the big problem is that if China's rulers see the signs of their economic distress before we do, China rulers may take actions we won't like and don't see coming.

With securing the Chinese Communist Party monopoly of power the prime function of the Chinese state, China might decide a short and glorious war is just the thing to keep the people in line during bad economic times. Replace prosperity with nationalism, and the CCP buys time. 

And smashing up a weaker target and occupying it might allow China to loot the target and buy even more time. Mostly I'm thinking Taiwan, but it could even be Russia, weakened and exposed as a Potemkin power by its war against Ukraine.

China might go to war for a lot of bad reasons that they think are good--or the least bad option. Stuff happens. But if China can't manage that victory for the purpose of looting, regardless of the reason the war starts, even a losing war might provide the excuse for the CCP to clamp down at home and maintain power. That path means all our talk of how China won't risk war because it puts their economy at risk goes out the window:

And as long as I am on a roll of worst-case scenarios, what if something happens that completely upsets the variables in China's calculation that it prefers trade and prosperity to the potential failures of war? What if their economy tanks? Doesn't that make the trade prosperity issue less compelling? Especially if the peasants are revolting? Especially if the xenophobia the Chinese rulers have been stirring up to replace faith in communism leads to public pressure to deal with whatever foreign devil is "causing" their economic problem?

And if we look at what China is doing mobilizing and moving their military forces, yet believe the Chinese aren't facing economic decline that causes internal unrest, we'll rationalize China's apparent war preparation as something else. An exercise. Diplomatic pressure. Preparations for a domestic crackdown. Something other than launching a war, because that just doesn't make sense, right?

Never forget that the Chinese rulers get to define what is rational for themselves.

UPDATE: If we have a narrow window to prepare to defend Taiwan from a Chinese assault, in the short run we need more anti-ship missiles before we rely on more hulls that take longer to build and put into action. 

UPDATE: Congress is moving a bill forward to expedite more arms to Taiwan. 

UPDATE: China has problems.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.

Nobody Ever Won a War By Sitting On the Defensive

Is the Ukraine war over? No. But if Russia has lost the initiative it is a good thing despite the tactical superiority of the defense over the offense.

I've noted that we shouldn't get ahead of ourselves about the war after Ukraine's decisive but relatively small victory on the Kharkov front. But this is not quite right:

While the Ukrainians have moved swiftly to bloody Russia’s nose, the Russians can simply fall back into defensive positions, consolidate their forces, and defend their gains in Donbas and the vital land bridge to Crimea that runs through Mariupol. As the Russians shift from offense to defense, their military position will get stronger — in military parlance, “defense is to offense as three is to one.” 

First, people often get the 3:1 rule wrong. It is a ratio of power--with a number of factors contributing and not just troop numbers engaged--for tactical battles, and not a measure of necessary troop strength superiority overall in a war.

Second, in military parlance there's another saying. "Nobody ever won a war by sitting on the defensive."

Third, while being on the offensive is harder than being on the defensive, having the initiative has a number of advantages.

--One, you can choose enemy weak points to attack. Which is what Ukraine did on the Kharkov front.

--Two, having the initiative allows you to more easily take advantage of enemy mistakes. And it makes it more difficult for the enemy to take advantage of your mistakes. If you get the enemy running, of course. Otherwise a competent enemy will be able to counter-punch after blunting attacks. Which is what Ukraine is doing now with its counteroffensive after enduring and bleeding the Russian attackers.

--Three, the Russians don't appear to have either enough troops, good enough troops, good enough troop morale, good enough commanders, or good enough command and control to be good counter-punchers.

And finally, if Ukraine doesn't take advantage of Russia's culmination and seize the initiative, Russian weaknesses can't be exploited. Too few crappy troops with poor morale, commanders, command and control, and logistics can sit in their defenses pretty much forever if nobody attacks them.

The bottom line is that it is good that Ukraine is beginning to seize the initiative. Ukraine has to do a lot more to win this war. But seizing the initiative is necessary because Russia is sitting on Ukraine's land that it conquered.

And it is a good sign that Russia's thinly held line in Kharkov province broke and ran, with Ukraine capturing troops, equipment, and supplies. The offensive feeds itself in that situation.

More of that can happen if the Ukrainians keep pushing and the Russians fail to counter the Ukrainian new edge. 

Mind you, I'm not advocating some kind of "cult of the offensive." Ukraine was on the strategic defensive. And rightly so. And while they lost significant territory, Ukraine inflicted heavy personnel and equipment losses on the Russians and may have demoralized Russian troops past recovery while inside Ukraine--if pushed.

And yes, Russia has dangerous options if it begins to lose. But using those options have problems of their own that could backfire on Putin or Russia. If there are no bad repercussions for extreme options, why didn't America nuke the Taliban as we started to lose there? 

You can say that the Russians put more value on Ukraine than we put on Afghanistan. But we fought in Afghanistan for twenty years. That speaks to a high value. And only extreme paranoia allowed Russians to believe Ukraine was a military threat to Russian territorial integrity.

Don't be afraid of helping Ukraine pursue victory. I prefer the Russians as far east as possible in Europe.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.

The Army's Disco Inferno

The Army's Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) vehicle is coming. Burn, baby burn.

After getting the new light tank in the first quarter of 2024 (I assume calendar and not fiscal year), the Army has to integrate them into infantry and airborne brigades:

After MPF crews have established logistics and strategic practices the platform will attach with US Army Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), where they will train together to establish a new battlefield role.

Ah yes, the light tank with a 105mm main gun. And hardly any armor. Which is designed to fight opponents who don't send tanks against those infantry brigades.

Thank God we have enemies cooperative enough to refrain from using main battle tanks against our MPF-supported infantry. Who says Chivalry is dead?

And for God's sake, don't even pretend that the long-gone M-551 Sheridan light tank that used to support airborne units wasn't garbage.

Oh! But you say the MPF can be airlifted! Dream on, crunchies. My advice to airborne infantry is to load up on Javelins--if the Air Force will load them after making time in their busy schedule for your light tanks.

The infantry needs support. As I argued in Army magazine, give them Abrams tanks. Even older models would be better than this Future Burned Out Hulk (FBOH).

Burn, baby burn.

NOTE: Winter War of 2022 updates continue here.

The Winter War of 2022 Becomes Existential

Russia decided that a war that hardly needed to be noticed because it was just a "special military operation" is actually an existential war for the very survival of Holy Mother Russia. Well that really escalated quickly, as Ukraine continues to hit Russian forces on the Kherson front; and make sweeping gains south of Kharkov.

Well, that really escalated. Perhaps not quickly. But whoa (tip to PJ Media):

Listen to the messaging now — and you can sometimes hear an entire Russian TV broadcast that never mentions a specific front line or battle in Ukraine itself. What you hear now — incessantly — is talk of a struggle of civilizations. This is a fight for the soul of Russia, for its rightful place on the planet. The enemies are not in Kyiv, or in the Donbas; they are in Brussels and Berlin, London and Washington, D.C. ...

Perhaps because of Russia’s well-documented troubles on the battlefield; perhaps because it became clear that the “Nazis” in Kyiv were not to be easily ousted; whatever the case, the arguments have shifted. One hears less about “denazification,” and less about Ukraine itself. Now it’s more about the demons well west of Kyiv. Russia is no longer at war with Ukraine, but with NATO and the collective west, led by the United States.

How is this supposed to work out? Russians unwilling to fight and die in Ukraine for Putin in order to "save" Ukrainians from "Nazis" will now sign up for a freaking global war against the West in Ukraine?

Seriously?  I swear the Russian leaders fear being ignored more than anything else.  

Russia's leadership might want to take counsel from a joke reportedly making the rounds in Moscow back in March:

According to Putin, the special military operation is really a conflict between Russia and NATO about world dominance. What’s the situation now?

Russia has lost 15,000 troops, 6 generals, 500 tanks, 3 ships, 100 planes, and 1,000 trucks. NATO hasn’t arrived yet.

#WhyRussiaCan'tHaveNiceThings.

Russia is falling prey to the impulse to increase your objectives to justify the casualties you've already taken: 

A top ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Friday that Moscow would not stop its military campaign in Ukraine even if Kyiv formally renounced its aspirations to join NATO.

But Russia has not been paying attention. I wrote several weeks ago that I thought the war had tilted toward Ukraine from the knife's edge as Russia's offensive faltered. Ukraine is increasing their edge. Can they accelerate that or will Russia reverse Ukraine's gains?

Ukraine has over the last week expanded apparently local counter-attacks in the east to advance deep through Russia's lines, outflanking Russians on the Izyum front and threatening them with isolation:

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast is routing Russian forces and collapsing Russia’s northern Donbas axis. Russian forces are not conducting a controlled withdrawal and are hurriedly fleeing southeastern Kharkiv Oblast to escape encirclement around Izyum.

See also here, here, and here. 

The Russians have really effed up by not having reserves to reinforce their thinned out lines weakened to reinforce the Kherson front. Russia has had to move troops already committed to holding the line laterally--again--to cope with the eastern losses. Which will weaken the lines losing those Russian troops. Will Russia commit the so-called new Third Corps of cannon fodder as a counter-attack force in the east?

I've heard Ukrainians are taking prisoners and that the Russians are abandoning equipment and supplies. Russia could be supplying Ukraine's army. But I'll wait for confirmation. 

Now we need to figure out if Ukraine is carrying out a major effort in the east with the Kherson front a feint at some level. I'd wondered that, as I noted. But I'm not prepared to say that is so given the importance of the Kherson front. But if the east is the main effort, so much for satellites and drones preventing the surprise massing of troops for offensives.

NATO governments take note. Ukraine is winning. If they can push the shaken Russian ground forces the Russians might break and run on a wide front. But Russia is big and could stop it and reverse the losses. If Russia can fight long enough to defeat Ukraine, Russia has enough to outlast NATO's ability to sustain a war. While Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, NATO has been given the gift of time to repair a shrunken defense industrial base. Use it wisely.

The chimps with nukes are running around scraping their knuckles, yelping in pain, and flinging poo and beating their chest with extra gusto. Truly, the Fuck-Up Fairy is now Putin's brain. But God help us, we might be dumber if we don't get our defense industries geared up to stop Putin.

UPDATE: Just a thought. I believe Kherson is still the main front. Could the Kharkov front attacks have been a test run to see if Russian troops can be broken and pursued? Would failure on a secondary front have been more palatable to Ukraine and also provide notice that it could not switch to major attacks yet on the Kherson front? Just wondering.

UPDATE: When America sent 105mm howitzers to Ukraine, I assumed it was for airmobile operations. Then I read it was because we were short of 155mm pieces and ammo. Now I read this story about airdropping howitzers in an American exercise. This 105mm piece, which can be airlifted by helicopter. So. There's that.

UPDATE: Some apparent confirmation of some of the equipment Russia abandoned. As I've noted, controlling the battlefield after a fight is a windfall for repairing your own disabled stuff and grabbing the enemy's. Tip to Instapundit. 

UPDATE: A good recap.

UPDATE (Tuesday): Another good description of Ukraine's counteroffensive. Five regular brigades were massed for the attack plus others supporting, including Territorial Army.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.