Putin believes he needs to drag the war with Ukraine into the new year to win. Can his army last the short term to get there? And is Putin foolish to think a longer war will make a difference?
Prior to the last couple weeks, the Russians seemed to be thinking about next year in Kiev:
For about a month, the front line has remained almost unchanged. Russian troops have gone as far as they can.
Obviously, this situation annoys the Kremlin, forcing it to look for new, rather unconventional ways to replenish human reserves and worn-out weapons. But Moscow is also playing for time, believing that the onset of cold weather will play into its hands, as an impending energy crisis spreads through Europe.
Moreover, Putin needs time to restore the Russian army’s ability to fight.
I have strong doubts that expanding the Russian military's size next year will work when it can't replace losses now.
I have strong doubts that suddenly Russian industry will have the ability to build enough new weapons to replace losses let alone equip expanded forces.
I sure don't think North Korean artillery ammunition is the answer to ammo problems.
And Ukraine's unexpected attacks south of Kharkov had legs. Rather than petering out, the Ukrainian offensive operation pushed deep into Russian-occupied territory:
A day after routing Russian forces in a lightning advance that seized hundreds of square miles and a strategic town in the northeast, Ukraine claimed additional territory on Sunday in an offensive that has swiftly reshaped the battlefield in the nearly 200-day-old war and left Moscow reeling.
So winter weather may arrive in time to help Ukraine defend new territory that it has started to retake from Russia in the east in early September and then set up the logistics lines:
Russia’s retreat from key cities is likely aimed at avoiding encirclement after Ukraine captured the town of Kupyansk, which sits on a rail and road hub, and severed the last artery that connected Russia with thousands of its front-line troops.
“It’s a complete collapse,” Phillips O’Brien, professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, said about the Russian pullout of forces between Kupyansk and Izyum. “In the battle of Donbas, they probably had more troops deployed there than anywhere and now they seem to be unable to hold anything.”
It seems to me in retrospect that Ukraine fully intended to carry out the offensive south of Kharkov. And the long-telegraphed Kherson operation provided a convenient distraction. Keeping the Kharkov front low key provided a ready excuse if the offensive ran into serious resistance. Recall too, that it "leaked" that America had advised Ukraine not to spread out their offensive operations too much beyond Kherson. America may have lost that debate, but the debate may have been let out to lull the Russians in the east. Or it was all disinformation.
Still, Ukraine needs to do much more. Russia experienced a collapse of their troops in the Kharkov operation. But the rot did not spread. Can Ukraine push the Russians over the edge on a broader front? And keep the Russians running back to the frontier? As Freedman writes of the dramatic Ukrainian advance:
It serves as a reminder that just because the front lines appear static it does not mean that they will stay that way, and that morale and motivation drain away from armies facing defeat, especially when the troops are uncertain about the cause for which they are fighting and have lost confidence in their officers. Who wants to be a martyr when the war is already lost?
Could Ukraine switch their main effort from Kherson to the east and hope to hit the weaker Luhansk and Donetsk puppet state forces and create a big hole in Russia's lines?
Russian failures to rush large-scale reinforcements to eastern Kharkiv and to Luhansk Oblasts leave most of Russian-occupied northeastern Ukraine highly vulnerable to continuing Ukrainian counter-offensives.
Just where are the four Ukrainian brigades that speaheaded the Kharkov offensive now? I heard they were pulled out of the line and replaced with other troops.
Does Ukraine have more reserves to commit? And if so, are they earmarked for the Kherson front or the Kharkov front?
Planning for the long run is prudent for Russia, under the circumstances. As long as Russia doesn't lose in the short run. What can Ukraine do before winter arrives to win and what more can the Russian army endure in that time? ISW doesn't think Ukraine can win before 2023 arrives. At this rate, no. But present trends continue--until they don't.
If Ukraine can't score another big win soon, could the West equip Ukraine for a winter offensive in the south that
denies Putin the time to rebuild his army for a spring campaign?
I don't rule out a broader Russian troop collapse before the winter. And given how thinly the front line is held, that could result in dramatic Ukrainian advances into friendly but Russian-occupied territory.
And if that happens, territorial fissures within Russia could break open in a matter of months or years.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Strategypage goes over Russia's problems, including:
Russian commanders are also concerned about their supply situation. They are not receiving enough ammunition, especially artillery shells and rockets. Food, clothing and medical supplies are inadequate, especially now that winter is coming and most of the troops will be at the front, not in barracks or other housing. Hunger, cold and a lack of fire (artillery) support makes troops more willing to desert or surrender at the first opportunity.
Ukrainian winter offensive, anyone?
Also, are Ukrainian estimates of Russian KIA really inflated that much? Hmm.
And one more interesting thing: "The U.S. has finally agreed to supply Ukraine with the larger (300-kilometer range) ATACMs missile that HIMARS vehicles can also use."
UPDATE: This has been apparent for some time, but bears repeating: "Russian forces have used steadily smaller echelons as their main tactical units — moving from battalions to companies and in some cases platoons dramatically reducing the combat power the new units bring."
UPDATE (Wednesday): Putin has ordered the first mobilization of reservists since World War II. Up to 300,000 could be recalled to service. Putin clearly intends this war to reach winter 2023 and beyond. But how good will the reservists be? Can Russia equip them? How will Russian society react?
Remember, too, that Russia doesn't have "reserves" in the sense Western countries have them--with continued training and equipment already in existence. Russia has people who used to be in the military. Big difference. As I've mentioned, you'd be shocked how quickly I forgot all useful military knowledge after I got out.
And as ISW has noted for a while, Russia keeps sending its training personnel to the front, which makes it harder to turn newly inducted cannon fodder into soldiers.
UPDATE (Sunday): I'm not sure what to say about Lavrov's speech at the Security Council. These are selected highlights
(via reader Eric by email), but I haven't seen an English transcript yet. But there is video.
I assume this reflects thinking in Moscow around Putin, regardless how ridiculous it sounds to our ears. So my main conclusion is that the Russians aren't ready to end the war they started. Not with the current leadership unless Russia's position seriously deteriorates to force a reassessment of what is best for Russia through their lens of what is happening.
But perhaps his statement about the UN preventing Hell at least suggests Russia isn't thinking of committing nuclear suicide over its invasion. I've never been in favor of ejecting Russia from the UN. Better to have them talking even if it sounds nuts to us, than to have them isolated, more paranoid, and speaking even more dangerously in private.
Interestingly enough, Lukashenko has yoked himself to Putin if Belarus' speech is any indication.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
