Monday, September 05, 2022

The Winter War of 2022 Buffers

Ukraine announced a week ago that its southern counteroffensive had officially begun. But the switch from bombarding logistics lines to retaking territory in wholesale amounts is taking time to unfold.


Ukraine's efforts to interrupt Russian supply lines northwest of Crimea continue. And Ukraine has been pushing and probing along the Kherson line west of the Dnieper River. ISW reports that the Ukrainians don't have the units to simply punch a hole in Russia's line and that it will take time to achieve results.

In the east, Ukraine continues to hold off small and largely unsuccessful Russian attacks along the Donbas front. Russia seems to have culminated for all practical purposes, as I wrote last week.

On the surface, it still appears to be a stalemate with Russia winning the territorial contest and Russia seemingly more affected by casualties than Ukraine. But Ukraine seems to have the trends going in its favor. I've written as much. Do read it all. But can Ukraine use that edge to push Russia to defeat? Can Ukraine send enough body bags home to Mother Russia (which I've long identified as a Russian weakness), as I wrote last December?

Mind you, I over-estimated what Russia could do notwithstanding my view that Russia's military was grossly overrated. Russia never made it to the river line all across the front. But then again, I didn't think Putin would assume he needed nothing more than a victory parade and throw away time, men, and equipment for the first weeks of war. Russia could have achieved more if it started the war believing it was actually going to war. But grant that my broader point of exaggerated Russian strength was valid.

What is Ukraine using for its counteroffensive? Has Ukraine built a new army in the six months since Russia invaded? If Ukraine has new brigades filled with newly trained recruits, a lot of Western equipment, and Ukrainian combat veterans as a cadre of leadership, we could see them in action soon. Certainly, interesting things started to happen before the announced counteroffensive.

Apparently the Ukrainians believe their firepower offensive and Russia's continued attempt to attack will lead to a Russian ground forces getting so shaky that they'll topple:

Much is made in the media about the coming Ukrainian offensive. That has been underway for over a month but without much fanfare or compelling video of Ukrainians on the attack. Ukraine is forming some tank brigades, but mainly to threaten the Russians, not attack them head on. When the Russian forces eventually begin to collapse, then the tank and mechanized brigades will move quickly to liberate cities and large towns.

Could be. The blurry start of the offensive may reflect that plan, which Ukraine is basically asserting:

Ukrainian officials directly stated on September 3 that the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine is an intentionally methodical operation to degrade Russian forces and logistics, rather than one aimed at immediately recapturing large swathes of territory.

The Russians collapsed in World War I; as did the French for a while, refusing to attack (but the Germans never discovered this and the French recovered); and of course, the German army broke near the end on the Western front. Although I prefer to call this "shaping" the campaign area, rather than being the offensive in action.

In some ways the Ukrainian counteroffensive is like the earlier Russian offensive in the Donbas. Ukraine is using ground probes to further expose targets for Ukrainian firepower. The differences are that Ukraine is using more precise and smaller-scale firepower, isn't hitting civilians, and isn't following up with ground units to force back the Russians at high cost.

Have no doubt, despite Ukraine having success "shaping" the battlefield in the south, ultimately Ukraine has to have a visible victory over the stalled Russian army holding Kherson:

An army defending from static positions can endure logistical shortcomings and the slow grind of combat, but may fall apart when attacked with intent to overrun or encircle. To enjoy strategic success, damage to Russian forces must be accompanied by liberation of real territory of strategic importance.

Or victory somewhere. I can't rule out that the Kherson front is a feint, but I strongly doubt it. The front makes too much sense. And has since Kherson fell.

I'd rather see Ukraine mount a clearly successful counteroffensive sooner rather than later to avoid giving Russia time to regroup--and time for the West to grow weary of supporting Ukraine. But I have no idea if Ukrainian new units are ready--or even if many are forming. If there is no new army and Ukraine had to pull units that have slowed, bled, and largely stopped the Russian invasion from the line to rebuild and rest, that will take some time.

Certainly, a failed Ukrainian counteroffensive could bolster Russian morale and shake Ukrainian resolve. Not to mention risk Western countries eager to restore their economies pressuring Ukraine with reduced logistics support to cut a deal at the price of lost territory. 

So I understand the refusal to rush in before ready. Yet if this war goes into the winter and the next year, the war could turn in different and dangerous directions. But at least Ukraine has started. Friends of Ukraine need to be patient.

UPDATE (Wednesday) Early in the week, ISW assessed that Ukraine is making territorial progress

The Ukrainian counteroffensive is making verifiable progress in the south and the east. Ukrainian forces are advancing along several axes in western Kherson Oblast and have secured territory across the Siverskyi Donets River in Donetsk Oblast.

Earlier talk I reported of attacking in Donetsk was not empty. Even if not a major offensive, the eastern gains will draw off Russian forces and attention from the Kherson front. Hopefully, Ukraine is not taking casualties too heavy to achieve their objectives.

In addition, the shaping aspect is intensified:

Ukrainian officials explicitly confirmed that Ukrainian troops seek to attrit Russian logistical capabilities in the south through precision strikes on manpower and equipment concentrations, command centers, and logistics nodes.

I assume this is enabled by the Ukrainian ground attacks forcing Russian movement and concentration to react to the attacks.

This analyst says that the Ukrainians are more interested in getting the Russians to retreat than in killing Russians and destroying their equipment at the price of higher Ukrainian casualties. 

In addition, Ukraine is seemingly taking advantage of Russian troop diversions from the east to the south by launching some local counter-attacks there.

UPDATE (Friday): The big news is a sizable Ukrainian advance in the East with some apparent momentum.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.