Monday, August 22, 2022

The Winter War of 2022 Gets Interesting Again

As Russia's military power waned and its offensive sputtered, the war seemed to wind down as Ukraine held on, trained new troops, and accepted Western-supplied weapons. The campaign got boring.* It is getting more interesting.

As Ukraine began to integrate and use longer-range Western artillery, particularly Western rocket artillery such as HIMARS, things got more interesting. Just as Russia has seen their army bloodied and shaken. And reports of a long-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive on the Kherson front stirred. Just as Russia's focused and intense offensive on the Donbas front has seemingly exhausted its capacity to significantly advance for now.

The war seemed to be tipping--however slightly--in Ukraine's favor.

Thus far I haven't seen much in the way of major Ukrainian attacks on the Kherson front. Either Ukraine is still in the early stage, probing to find weak points on the front to focus a major attack on; there is no offensive outside of rhetoric; or we aren't seeing what is happening on the ground. Ukraine has reason to hide that. Russian commanders have reason to hide that from Putin. But as time passed the last explanation lost credibility.

But things are happening. Strategypage reports:

In the south (Kherson province, bordering Crimea) Russia has begun withdrawing troops, but not their heavy weapons across the Dnieper River. Ukraine has used its HIMARs missiles to disable or destroy all four bridges across the Dnieper (Dnipro) river and keep them unusable for anything but pedestrians and light vehicles since the 10th. This denies vital supplies to the twenty thousand Russian troops facing Ukrainian forces. Without fuel or heavy equipment (tanks, IFVs and artillery) replacements the Russian troops cannot attack, or effectively defend against the Ukrainian offensive. Already the Ukrainians are receiving less artillery fire from Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnieper River. There is less activity from Russian armor. If the Ukrainians can keep those bridges disabled, Russia will be forced to withdraw their troops to the left bank of the river, leaving the Ukrainians with a major win. That withdrawal process has begun, with headquarters personnel recently crossing.

As ISW notes:

Attacks on Russian positions in and around Crimea are likely part of a coherent Ukrainian counter-offensive to regain control of the west bank of the Dnipro River.

At some point, Ukraine may have interrupted lines of supply and identified weak points in the Russian lines. The battlefield will be "shaped" and then a counteroffensive can begin in earnest. We may then find out if Ukraine has built a new army formation based on new recruits since the invasion, leavened by combat veteran cadres from the ground forces that held the line.

Say, here's news on that issue:

As Ukraine goes on the offensive, they have organized tank brigades, something they have not used during the first six months of their war with Russia. The Ukrainian armor units are equipped with tanks superior to what the Russians are currently using.

And the latest American arms commitment includes mine-clearing equipment and demolitions munitions handy for clearing mines and obstacles for attackers.

Will Russia pull back successfully across the Dnieper River rather than face those brigades? Or will Ukraine launch an attack that bags thousands of Russian troops by pushing them against a river that they can't cross?

And if Ukraine reaches the river, will it be able to press on by crossing the river and sustaining an offensive toward Crimea and Melitipol?

Or Will Ukraine use the river line to more efficiently hold the line there and conduct a second offensive south from Zaporizhzhya toward Melitipol and through to the Sea of Azov to split Russia's southern holdings? Which would allow Ukraine to strike east or west to outflank and roll up Russian lines.

This report of Russian logistics problems beyond the river is interesting:

The rail situation in the south may be getting a little precarious for the Russians, with the rails and bridges going from Crimea to the provinces north of there mostly being interdicted.  

If Ukraine can continue to interrupt lines of supply in and around Crimea, that makes the Russia position on the east bank of the river precarious from either a Ukrainian river crossing or an attack south from Zaporizhzhya.

As long as the Ukrainian offensive beats the mud season, of course.

Interesting.

UPDATE: The Russians know why their initial invasion failed, but have no solutions; Russia's political scene is rumbling; and:

The Ukrainians are preparing major offensive operations that seek to expel all Russian forces from Ukraine. This puts Russia in a difficult position because loss of all its Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, in addition to its heavy losses in men and material, would be a disastrous regime-ending military and political defeat. 

There's been a lot of talk of the big push but little is apparent so far. Hopefully Ukraine is using the time more effectively than Russia is. Apparently, the big push will get big only over time.

UPDATE (Wednesday): Well that's interesting:

Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents.

If Russia has to divert troops to keep its Luhansk puppet fighting, that is a situation that subtracts combat power from the war. Both Russian and Luhansk puppet forces.

UPDATE: The biggest American arms package yet:

The $3 billion package will be the largest single chunk of the total of $13.7 billion the United States has U.S. announced since Russia’s February invasion. It will contain ammunition in amounts “we’ve never seen before” in the effort to help Ukraine fight off the invaders, the official said.

Lots of ammunition. Which is useful for offensive operations. Just saying. 

UPDATE: The DOD summary of the aid package.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.

*From a military assessment point of view, the map has been pretty static. This is not to minimize the casualties every day and Russia's continuing war crimes. Nor does it imply important things aren't happening beneath the surface of a static front line.