Is the Russian grain export deal parallel to Ukraine's deal with Turkey an indication that Russia wants the war to be over, validating Russia's conquests to date? Is Ukraine capable of pushing Russia back before that can happen, militarily or politically?
The war feels like it tipped to Ukraine. Absent any new mobilization efforts by Russia, that tilt seems likely to grow. Although nothing dramatic on the battlefield is evident. Yet one analyst I respect wonders--doesn't predict--if ending the fighting might suddenly be in Ukraine's interest and in Russia's interest.
Russians and Ukrainians sitting side by side can’t help but bring to mind the possibilities of a peace treaty. The firings in Kyiv seem to indicate a degree of instability and discord in Ukraine, creating the possibility, however remote, that new considerations are being made that could lead to some kind of larger deal. ...
Both sides, then, would seem to have an interest in a negotiated settlement. The problem is that neither side can afford one.
Despite all the bluster of Russian officials talking about overthrowing Zelensky, taking lots of Ukraine, and denying anything is wrong with their military or economy, is Putin accelerating planned fake elections to pave the way for annexing occupied Ukrainian territory in an effort to declare the war over? Does he think Ukraine would agree? Or think a Europe worried about winter and a Biden administration worried about November elections would compel Ukraine to agree?
Without Russian mobilization, that seems more likely to allow Putin to claim victory given Russia's current limited offensive capabilities.
And how long can that sputtering Russian effort last?
Ukrainian military planners now predict that Russian forces will be weakened sufficiently by the end of August that Ukrainian forces will be able to go on the offensive on a wide scale.
Is Ukraine right? Does that weakening military effort drive Russia's annexation preparations? But can Ukraine exploit Russia's increasing weakness? Does Ukraine have the military power? Is Russian infiltration of Ukraine's government an indicator of decreased government capacity and troop morale to carry out a counter-offensive?
Not that I think the firings in Kiev affect Ukrainian troop morale. Troops at the front are focused on the fight, with Kiev at the echelon above their reality. But what about the senior officers planning and leading the fight? Will they be distracted or undermined?
There is a lot riding on Ukraine's nascent counteroffensive on the Kherson front. It could be Ukraine's last chance to achieve an offensive battlefield victory over the Russians and get some kind of clear victory rather than the victory of defying expectations and inflicting a devastating blow to Russia's military.
Would that kind of victory without ejecting Russia from most of this year's conquests be enough for Ukraine? Or will this war drag through the winter and see the first anniversary of Russia's invasion?
At my most optimistic in case the war does end with Russia holding Ukrainian territory, Ukraine may have bloodied Russia enough to deter another Russian invasion. Finland managed that in 1939-1940, after all. Today Finland is on the cusp of joining NATO.
At my most pessimistic, Russia pushes their logistics network deeper inside occupied Ukrainian territory and rebuilds their military. And in a decade or so invades again, at worst taking some more territory and at best learning enough to finish the conquest.
We'll know a lot more by September when the rival Russian and Ukrainian plans unfold.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
