Monday, September 26, 2022

The Winter War of 2022 Gets Awkward for Putin

Putin has to decide whether to sacrifice Russia to save himself. I suppose Russia has to decide if that's a fair bargain.

The war is not going well for Putin. He thought his legions would roll through Ukraine, with Ukrainians showering his troops with thanks; and his people full of pride that their glorious leader had brought more glory to Russia.

Not so much. It's been donkeys bled by lying. Putin's legions were hollow, the Ukrainians didn't want Putin's rescue, and the West rallied to support Ukraine, which has resisted enough that Russia pulled its troops back from Kiev and the north; and now Ukraine counterattacks in the east and south, pushing the Russians back.

And now, on Putin's orders, Russia will involuntarily recall up to 300,000 former troops to fight in Ukraine:

The decree is short on detail. It says nothing about a cap on numbers or about any exceptions, such as not recruiting students or conscripts.

Instead, it is left to regional heads to decide how to meet quotas. In theory, the net could be cast far wider than the Kremlin has specified.

Russian officials said it would announce "very soon" those who would be exempt from its partial mobilisation.

The call-up stops short of full conscription, a move that would have risked turning a public that has so far largely been in favour of the conflict against it.

Properly speaking, these aren't reservists. They are former soldiers. Which is different. Let me tell you, I forgot my MOS skills shockingly fast when I got out. These Russians are cannon fodder until trained and equipped. 

Russia has problems replacing combat losses. And equipment losses mean Russia seems better at equipping Ukrainian units than Russian units. Worse for those Russians mobilized, Russia has been sending training establishment personnel to the front. And Russia's brigades have had their ability to train new units crippled. So how much training can these people get?

And bizarrely, the Russians are forcibly enlisting protesters. Which violates the entire "reservist" concept. Who, Russians may ask, is next?

If done right and with enough time, Russia could convert this decree for manpower into combat power. Who thinks that will happen?*

Will domestic opposition sharpen as the prospect of going to war and dying for Putin's place in the history books hits home in a lot more homes in Russia?

What happens when these troops get sent into the meat grinder with predictable results? Assuming Russia's nearly shattered ground forces hand on until that "help" arrives.

As for Putin's nuclear threats? This answers the question of how many nuclear weapons Russia has. I want to know how many actually work. Freedman raises the same point. Fear of technical failure might be the biggest deterrent to Russian use of tactical nukes in Ukraine. What does Putin have left to deter China if people doubt his nukes work?

Without a credible nuclear deterrent Russia would have to accept full vassal status under China in a desperate effort to hang on to its Far East--on paper. What concessions will China demand for letting Putin pretend he is powerful?

We can go back to my questions from December 2021, including the main one:

Honestly, this level of crisis that Putin is stoking might just provoke enough powerful and ordinary Russians to wonder if Putin himself is the foreign plot to destroy Russia. Could Putin end up hanging from a lamp post by his heels before this is over?

Or maybe Russia will leave him, and we'll see Putin in charge of the Grand Duchy of Moscow.

But other than that, Putin is brilliant!

*Yet still I have nagging worries. Mostly because I don't have as clear a sense of what Ukraine has lost. As bad as Russia's personnel and weapons losses have been, could Russia still have a resource advantage? Could the addition of even cannon fodder in large numbers overwhelm Ukraine's ability to hold the entire length of its frontier? 

Remember, despite some protests the mobilized men are accepting going off to war.

I'm not worried in the short term. I think the war is tilted toward Ukraine. But if Ukraine can't exploit its advantage while it has it, could Russia emerge in the spring ready to push Ukraine over the edge?

The cost to Russia might be astronomical and ultimately ruinous. But Ukraine could lose.

UPDATE (Monday): ISW issued its latest report largely on Russia's mobilization effort. Unless Russia fixes personnel and equipment issues, shoving ill-trained bodies into the front is the only likely outcome.

UPDATE: Lukashenko flew to Russia to meet with Putin. Last week I noted that in a UN speech Belarus has seemingly tied its fate to Putin. Will Belarus join the war and invade Ukraine from the north?

UPDATE (Wednesday): Nearly 200,000 Russians have fled abroad to avoid military service already. That's a lot, considering that 30-40,000 Americans fled to Canada to avoid Vietnam service--over nearly a decade

Although the number seemingly includes supporters of draft resisters who aren't liable for service. But that adds to the economic harm to Russia, doesn't it?

Still, this might just be the accepted price of doing business for the Russian government.

UPDATE: Are the Ukrainians on the verge of enveloping Lyman and capturing more Russian troops, supplies, and equipment? 

Mud is approaching. But could Ukraine mount a winter offensive in the south when the ground hardens? If Ukrainian troops are better prepared for the cold, Russia might not get as much of a break to recover as they think? Surely the Ukrainians and the West are getting cold weather gear in place. Right?

UPDATE (Thursday): According to ISW, Russian sources say Ukraine has isolated Russian troops around Lyman.

UPDATE (Friday): Russia illegally annexes conquered Ukrainian territory. On paper, Russia has a victory.

UPDATE: Ukraine has cut off Russian supply lines to Lyman by fires--not by physically controlling all routes in

UPDATE (Saturday): ISW thinks Ukraine will capture or isolate Lyman in the next few days. Also, I have to conclude that Ukraine is finding it harder than it thought to advance on the Kherson front than they expected. Which must mean the Russian troops there are more numerous and willing to fight than on the Kharkov front that collapsed.

UPDATE: Has Lyman fallen? 

UPDATE: Literally moments after I asked if Lyman has fallen, Russia says they retreated from there. It's somewhat of a win for Russia if the Russian troops escaped. We'll see if any took up Ukraine's offer to accept their surrender.

UPDATE: Ukraine says the battle is ongoing; that thousands of Russians are trapped; and that some have surrendered already. Will Ukraine capture more weapons and supplies there?

And can Putin admit a defeat that would justify using any means necessary to reverse this defeat?

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.