Thursday, July 17, 2008

Fawzi Thinking

Iraqis are divided about whether our troops should withdraw on a timetable. This isn't too shocking. We want to leave when Iraqi can defend itself and destroy al Qaeda on its own with minimal help. The Iraqis want this, too. This is a good sign. The question is when we can safely withdraw in the face of domestic and foreign threats.

All that is ordinary. What is fascinating is this quote from an Iraqi who wants us out:

Ashraf Fawzi, a secondary student in northern Kirkuk, disagreed: "American forces must leave at once, without any timetable. They brought us sectarianism, which we had never heard of before. The Iraqi security forces can protect us."


So, slaughtering Shias and bulldozing them into mass graves wasn't sectarianism. Nor was gassing Kurds. It was only when we got rid of Saddam that sectarianism reared its ugly head in Iraq.

Let me take a shot in the dark here. Fawzi is a Sunni Arab, right? Because it isn't sectarianism if Sunni Arabs are killing Shias and Kurds.

Remember that reconciliation doesn't just consist of getting the Shias and Kurds to allow Sunni Arabs back into Iraqi society. Reconciliation means more Sunni Arabs have to lose that attitude that they are natural rulers of mere Shias and Kurds. The attitude expressed has got to go.

UPDATE SHORTLY AFTER POSTING: Our press needs to adjust their attitude toward the Sunni Arabs, too:

Throughout the country, al-Qaida in Iraq, an insurgent organization thought to be affiliated with the global terrorist network but comprised mainly of Iraqis, has lost so much clout it is close to becoming irrelevant to the outcome of the war. The group has not been eliminated, however, leaving open the possibility of resurgence if the Iraqi government fails to follow up the military gains with civilian services like the irrigation that's badly needed here.


I don't know why it is less al Qaeda for recruiting locally in Iraq. But I digress.

More to the point, why is it accepted that lack of irrigation is reason enough for Sunnis to build and detonate car bombs in crowds of Shia civilians?

Wanat Ambush

The battle at Wanat did not unfold as I assumed. Instead of the enemy assaulting the outpost with the defenders absorbing the first blast that allowed enemy inside the perimeter until repelled, eight of our deaths took place in a patrol outside the base:

When the attack occurred, the U.S. and Afghan soldiers were scouting for a location in the remote area to set up a coalition observation point. The Taliban never breached the main coalition base near the village of Wanat in Kunar province, which borders Pakistan.


So a squad was ambushed rather than the base itself being stormed.

Which makes the decision to abandon the fort all the more stunning.

UPDATE: I'm confused. This article says that the fighting at the main outpost was very intense:

The base was occupied by 45 US soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division and 25 Afghan soldiers. It was only two days old when it came under fierce bombardment on Sunday morning. Taleban fighters successfully breached the outer defences and were prevented from overrunning the base only after fierce hand-to-hand fighting.


Yet 8 of our 9 deaths took place away from the outpost at a site for an observation post. I'd have expected that an assault that breaches the outer defenses to get inside that line would have caused more casualties. And the enemy had every reason to assault the position:

Western military sources told The Times that the Wanat Combat Outpost was poorly sited and overlooked on three sides by buildings in the village, which Taleban fighters from a force estimated to be around 200 strong were able to use as firing points.


But given that the article says the outpost was poorly placed, it is more understandable that the post was abandoned.

Still, we should move back to the village in another outpost better positioned to repel the enemy--and with more troops assigned to it.

Why Do They Hate Us Still?

Since about March 20, 2003, our Left has insisted that Iraq has caused Moslems to flock to the jihadi green banner. If only we'd restricted our war to the "good" war in Afghanistan, we'd have no problem with radicalized Moslems.

I disagree. I think that our enemies just need an excuse to kill us. Iraq or Afghanistan or badly drawn cartoons will incite our enemies.

Further, with the Iraq War all but won, our anti-war side will quickly lose their enthusiasm for the Afghanistan War since that support was only about providing cover to advocate losing in Iraq. Without the greater objective of losing Iraq possible, the reason to support the Afghanistan War is ending. So Afghanistan is well on the way to being the "bad" war.

And our Left will have even more reason to hate the Afghanistan War since our enemies will use this war rather than Iraq to justify killing us:

This week's brazen and deadly attack on a US-Afghan outpost in an area near the Pakistani border is raising new concerns that foreign fighters bent on fighting the West are retraining their sights from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan.


I know this is inconvenient for our anti-war Left, but they'll adapt and oppose the only war they've got to hate.

UPDATE: Look out, Moslems are incited by the "good war":

More foreigners are infiltrating Afghanistan because of a recruitment drive by al-Qaida as well as a burgeoning insurgency that has made movement easier across the border from Pakistan, U.S. officials, militants and experts say. For the past two months, Afghanistan has overtaken Iraq in deaths of U.S. and allied troops, and nine American soldiers were killed at a remote base in Kunar province Sunday in the deadliest attack in years.


If our enemies hate us enough to fight us over Afghanistan, our Left will agree with our enemies that we are provoking them by fighting in Afghanistan. This by definition cannot be a good war for our Left.

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

The Lexington Campaign is About to Begin

This post says we are about to invade Pakistan in an effort to fight al Qaeda in their Pakistan sanctuary:

The West has just about concluded that the government in Islamabad has become useless as an ally in fighting terrorists. They have lost all control of the FATA regions along the border, and according to Afghanistan and India, their intelligence service is working for the enemy. The attacks coming out of Pakistan have begun including Pakistani armed forces, which led to the US killing a number of them as they ran back across the border after a failed ambush. Pakistan protested the deaths, but the US released video showing soldiers fleeing American gunships in Afghanistan — where they didn’t belong.


This isn't an invasion but the Pakistanis are certainly nervous about reports of just hundreds of NATO troops being moved to the border.

It might seem like these rumors are correct given our commitment to reinforcing Afghanistan this year:

Although there are no brigade-sized units that can be deployed quickly into Afghanistan, military leaders believe they can find a number of smaller units such as aviation, engineering and surveillance troops that can be moved more swiftly, said the official, who requested anonymity because the discussions are private.

The moves are expected to happen within weeks rather than months, the official said.


But I dare say we won't invade Pakistan. But U.S. troops on the border will allow us to support intelligence and limited special forces presence across the border, to be sure. We aren't about to invade. Even several more brigade wouldn't give us the force levels needed to invade Pakistan's frontier areas.

But we could be on the verge of kicking off what I've called a Lexington Campaign that accepts that Pakistan does not control their territory:

If we can't get Islamabad to control the frontier area, it is time to bypass Islamabad and deal directly with the tribes who don't recognize the control of Islamabad in the first place. We cannot allow the fictions of sovereignty to keep us from defending ourselves from fanatics who straddle the gray boundary that lies between reality and international law.

Using limited military assets such as special forces and drones to back civilian armed assets such as the CIA or contract personnel (with either former or seconded special forces from Western countries, or perhaps even hiring security companies to provide the personnel) or even Arab special forces that would live and work inside the frontier areas, we may be able to turn the frontier tribes against the jihadis who target us.

We should be able to start at the Afghan-Pakistan border and extend the network of anti-al Qaeda tribes toward the interior of Pakistan.


It will, I think, be an attempt to create a FATA Awakening by trying to get the tribes of the frontiers to work with us, bypassing the theoretical sovereign in Islamabad in favor of deals with de facto leaders of the tribal forces. As I noted earlier in the year, our war is no longer restricted to Afghanistan. It is a Taliban Campaign that straddles the Afghan-Pakistan border and we can't pretend the border matters to us when it clearly does not matter to our jihadi enemies.

We won't let fictional Pakistani sovereignty in the tribal areas prevent us from going after al Qaeda. This will get ugly. But hey, even the anti-Iraq War side says we have to fight here and deal with Pakistan. I hope they have the guts to stand by their convictions.

Well This Will Be Great for Morale

After our troops and our Afghan allies heroically held Fort Apache against heavy odds, we have abandoned the outpost?

Omar Sami, spokesman for the Nuristan provincial governor, said American and Afghan soldiers left the base Tuesday.

NATO confirmed that the post, which lies amid precipitous mountains close to the Pakistan border, had been vacated while insisting that international and Afghan troops will "retain a strong presence in that area with patrolling and other means."


Good grief, why would be abandon what we paid such a relatively high price in blood to defend?

I can't believe this is a good thing for morale. We expect our troops to hold, and these 173rd Airborne paratroopers did their duty. They won that battle, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy despite being heavily outnumbered.

And we abandoned the fort when it was over.

We just gave our enemies a victory for free.

I'd love to read something that refutes my impression.

The Best News You've Never Heard

Our ground forces have made great strides in making sure technology helps command and control of our company through brigade commanders as they fight the battle, rather than hurt it by enabling micromanagement by colonels and generals who want to act as squad leaders (from Strategypage):

The new procedures have eliminated a lot of the micromanagement nightmares of the past. Lower ranking officers, especially company commanders and platoon leaders, are largely left to get on with the battle (or raid, or whatever). Meanwhile, the battalion, brigade and division TOCs are handling support chores, especially keeping an eye on video feeds of areas around where the company commanders and platoon leaders are doing the actual fighting. If someone at battalion or brigade TOC spots more bad guys approaching, the new procedures insure that the soldiers on the ground, and perhaps under fire, get the word quickly and accurately. The TOC also makes the most of the new generation of highly accurate bombs, artillery and missiles.

Interrogations of prisoners indicate that the enemy is in awe of what they are up against, often attributing the seeming omnipresence of the Americans, and accuracy of their weapons, to some kind of magic. But there are many ways these new drills and procedures could be exploited by an enemy who knew what they were. So details remain secret. That secrecy is further enhanced by the rapid evolution of the TOC, both in terms of equipment and procedures. All this is very important stuff you just never hear about. But at least now you know why.


And by fighting and winning a lengthy war with these procedures, we are pounding these lessons into our military.

I tell you, I'm nearly giddy with relief over this development. This is very good news.

Forged in War

The Army insists that it is committed to 12 month tours with 12 months at home:

Despite talk of needing more soldiers in Afghanistan, the Army remains committed to reducing deployments from 15 to 12 months starting in August, said Army Chief of Staff Gen. George William Casey Jr., who Saturday toured Fort Bliss.


I can't see any reason we can't do this. And I think we are in range of going to 2:1 home-to-deployed time.

You need 1.15 brigades to keep one brigade in the field for one year (to account for overlap and movement). We have 42 Army brigades (moving to 48 in a few years) and 9 Marine regimental combat teams as the base force in the active components.

Subtract 1 Army brigade in South Korea from the mix and subtract 3 brigades (heavy, infantry, airborne) as a strategic reserve. Subtract 2 Marine regiments for MEU rotations and 1 in the Western Pacific, leaving 6 Marine regiments. That's 44 brigades (going up to per year for next three years).

Multiply those 44 brigades by 0.87 (that 1.15 ratio) and you get 38 brigades deployed for one year. So for 1:1 deployment, we could field 19 brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. With 2 years home and 1 deployed, we could field close to 13 brigades.

This doesn't include 28 Army National Guard brigades and three reserve Marine regiments. Assuming we deploy these only once every six years, these get us up to 5 brigades extra per year. These would serve only 9 months rather than a year so multiply 5 by 0.75 and round down to 3 brigade-equivalents deployed for a year that can be added right to the numbers above (19 and 13) for up to 22 brigades in the field while keeping active deployments one year deployed with one year home or 16 with a 2:1 home:deployed ratio. Although it is more likely that we'd be talking a couple combat brigades per year from the reserves at any one time.

Even as we speak of having perhaps 5 combat brigades in Afghanistan, we could easily see our forces in Iraq down to 10 brigades by the end of next year. Barring complications, the 1:1 ratio will be short-lived as we move to 2:1 home-to-deployed time.

The strain on our ground forces has peaked without breaking them. They will emerge not as battle scarred but as battle tested. Our enemies have reason to fear our ground forces for another generation at least.

Tuesday, July 15, 2008

Already the Bad War

Perhaps you scoffed when I said that the Afghan War would become the bad war for our anti-war Left in due time as the Iraq War is won:

If we are not fighting in Iraq, I've long held, the so-called "good war" in Afghanistan will become bad in the views of our anti-war side. Now the anti-war side protests Iraq and claims that they oppose Iraq in order to commit resources to the "real" fight in Afghanistan.


Boy was I optimistic in stating that as a prediction of the future:

Majorities of Republicans and independents think the war in Afghanistan was worth fighting and that the effort there is linked to the eventual defeat of terrorism more broadly. Majorities of Democrats disagree.


If the broader category of Democrats is barely against the war in Afghanistan, imagine the majorities rolled up in San Francisco? With July on track to become the third month in a row with higher casualties in Afghanistan than Iraq, our Left's commitment to fighting the "good war" in Afghanistan that the war in Iraq "distracts us from" will not last beyond election day this year. Especially when talk of invading Pakistan's tribal areas is part of the debate.

Of course, the very premise of "good" Afghanistan and "bad" Iraq has always been idiocy, but you don't let the anti-war Left pretend to have a clue about military matters and strategy, do you?

Preparing for the Imminent Threat

Despite the talk of Israeli or American air strikes on Iran to destroy their nuclear facilities, I'm beginning to think that as far as America is concerned, we won't try this. It will be too easy for Iran to claim innocence and the world will believe them.

But do you really believe the mullahs of Iran can be deterred?

Yet Iran is driving for nuclear weapons without a doubt. So what do we do?

Given that even anti-war types claim they'd support action if the threat was obvious and imminent, how do we meet that standard and still protect ourselves?

I had a couple posts last year that pointed to what we may be planning (see here and here).

As I wrote in the latter link:

So, we will have bunker-busting missiles to hit the silos and other nuclear infrastructure in a disarming strike, aircraft to circle launch sites to shoot down missiles we don't knock out in their silos, long-range ground and sea-based anti-missiles to shoot down missiles that escape the fighters orbitting the launch sites, airborne PAC-3s that can be flown to hit the missiles while still far from the target, and point-defense ground-based PAC-3s. It will be a layered defense that starts with offense and ends with last-ditch shots taken from the target site.

In the entire depressing area of the lack of will to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, this is the one really hopeful sign that I've seen. We will be able to detect new missile launching facilities. And if our government and people belatedly discover that Iran is a threat after Iran deploys nuclear missiles, we will still have an offensive option rather than believing we can deter nuts with nukes.


We won't rely on the mythical ability to deter crazed religious fanatics. But we won't try to defang Iran with a preemptive aerial campaign.

We will hope for a revolution inside Iran (do I hope too much to think we are actively working on this?) and in case we don't get that lucky, prepare for the moment that Iran's mullahs show their first nuclear missiles to the world.

Then we'll strike hard using advance penetrating precision weapons with a layer of defenses backstopping our effort to kill leakers, stretching from the Iranian target site back to our assets that might be struck. We'll use modified Sidewinders and AMRAAM on fighters over the enemy target to hit missiles in their boost phase, airborne PAC-3 missiles to strike missiles in flight once we know where the enemy missiles are headed, and ground-based point defense PAC-3s and area missile defenses based on land and sea. Add in airborne lasers later. Hopefully, we nail the missiles on the ground and if not, somebody on the ballistic arc manages a hit before detonation over the Iranians' target.

If war opponents really won't let us defend ourselves until the threat is obviously imminent even to the most dense in the West, this just might do the trick. I hate it that we must defend ouselves under such ridiculous restrictions, but you go to war with the anti-war side you have and not the anti-war side you wish you had.

Of course, Israel may not have signed on to this last ditch strategy, given that they're the first target of an Iranian nuke.

UPDATE: A briefing on our defense in depth, including plans and current systems.

Although boost-phase interception is discussed, this briefing does not mention the fighter-carried modified air-to-air missiles that would only be useful during a strike on Iran's missile sites.

Monday, July 14, 2008

Jackpot

The enemy in Afghanistan got their headlines touting their so-called progress.

The enemy succeeded in killing nine of our soldiers in a mass assault on a base in Afghanistan:

An insurgent raid that penetrated an American outpost in eastern Afghanistan, killing nine soldiers, has deepened doubts about the U.S. military's effort to contain Islamic militants and keep locals on its side.


I didn't comment initially because I wanted to read more. I was only sure that the press would paint this as a major defeat and a sign of our imminent defeat in Afghanistan--yet again. I wasn't ready to panic at the first report.

One thing that has amazed me about both Iraq and Afghanistan is the almost total absence of enemy attacks that overrun our outposts or patrols. As bad as this attack was, it did not overrun the post:

Moving in darkness before dawn Sunday, some 200 fighters surrounded the newly built base in a remote area near the Pakistan border without being spotted by the troops inside, said Gen. Mohammad Qasim Jangalbagh, the provincial police chief.

He said people in the adjacent village of Wanat aided the assault. About 20 local families left their homes in anticipation of the raid, while other tribesmen stayed behind "and helped the insurgents during the fight," Jangalbagh said. ...

The militants showered the small base — which had been established just three days earlier — with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortar shells, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to release the information.

Some of the militants breached the wall and got inside, killing nine American soldiers and wounding 15 others, he said.

Other American soldiers managed to drive out the attackers and called in air support. Attack helicopters swooped over the battlefield, and in hours of fighting dozens of insurgents were killed and about 40 were wounded, the NATO official said.

The official described the militant raid as "serious," but also said it was a rarity for insurgents to get inside a base.


Strategypage also comments on the battle:

A newly established American-Afghan base near the Pakistani border in northeastern Kunar province, was attacked by the Taliban, and the battle left over a hundred dead, and many more wounded, in several hours of fighting. About a third of the dead were U.S. and Afghan troops. A large Taliban force attacked from nearby buildings, including a mosque. U.S. and NATO warplanes responded quickly with smart bombs and missiles. Spectacular, but futile, attacks like this are mainly playing to the Western media.


So we know this was a new base on the frontier. It was not yet tuned in to the local region. And it probably wasn't fully set to detect enemies. The enemy was able to hit this forming outpost, possibly by crossing the border with heavy weapons, at least in part.

A couple hundred enemy troops attacked what I assume was a company-sized US-Afghan outpost (100+ troops).

Local residents from sympathy or fear assisted the jihadi attackers.

The enemy penetrated the perimeter but the Coalition defenders rallies and ejected the attackers.

Our air power than savaged the enemy, which could not stay close enough to our troops to keep our air power at bay.

The enemy lost twice as many men as our side did, but the price they paid got the result they wanted--pants-wetting reporting from our press that depicted an attack that failed as a great victory.

I still want to know how the enemy approached the base in such strength and managed to penetrate the perimeter. That could have been very bad. But our troops held the line, and in the end won the victory. Don't be surprised if some major medals are awarded from this action. It sounds like it was probably touch-and-go for a while.

With more outposts established on the border, the problem of Pakistan sanctuaries will risk further such battles as the enemy crosses into Afghanistan to hit us. We can't invade Pakistan and Pakistan won't control their border areas.

But there is a third option to guard against such attacks.

UPDATE: The outpost garrison seems smaller than I assumed (though there could have been other services present in small numbers to bring it up to 100) and we really didn't have full defenses up or situational awareness established, according to this report:

Sunday's assault occurred just three days after 45 US soldiers, likely from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and 25 Afghan troops established a new combat outpost in the town of Wanat. The troops had little time to learn the lay of the land, establish local contacts, and build an intelligence network. The fortifications were not fully completed, according to initial reports.


And 200 enemy is at the lower end of the estimate. Another week of settling in and this wouldn't have happened. But the enemy was able to pounce quickly. If those weapons and a lot of the attackers came in from Pakistan to exploit the early stages of the outpost, the importance of operating inside Pakistan as i linked above is more important than ever.

Sunday, July 13, 2008

If Present Trends Continue

Winning the war in Iraq should take priority over sparing the Army the stress of winning the war. We should not draw down strength too fast and risk our accumulating victory. But with victory we can begin to draw down.

This could be good:

No final decisions have been made, but at least one and as many as three of the 15 combat brigades now in Iraq could be withdrawn, or slated for withdrawal, by the end of the administration in January, the Times said, citing officials.

The White House declined to discuss the withdrawals, but spokesman Gordon Johndroe told the newspaper that while the president hoped to bring more troops home, he would await the recommendation in September of Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, the Times said.


I won't cheer yet, since at the beginning of 2005 it looked like we could be down to 10 combat brigades and 100,000 troops in Iraq by the end of that year. Unfortunately, the Mahdi Army arose as a threat despite Iraqi promises that Sadr could be dealt with in the political arena. So we could not reduce our troops. And in the beginning of 2006, the Sadrists and al Qaeda seriously tried to ignite all-out civil war. We ended up increasing strength in 2007 in response.

But the prediction is much more near term and so more possible since there is less time for our reduced enemies to undermine the current conditions that make withdrawal possible. And there is less time for a new battlefield enemy to emerge to wreck the good trends visible the last ten months.

I'll be cautious and say that we are down to 14 combat brigades by January 2009. In no small measure, we will want to guard against a new president determined to withdraw as fast as possible.

We are winning this war despite the claims of the anti-war side that we are doomed to defeat. At some point we will be able to draw down combat troops.

But our anti-war side knows less about war than I know about lesbian hand puppet theater. You never listened to them, did you?

The Third Choice

Pakistan won't let us use our military inside Pakistan to hunt al Qaeda, since it is a matter of state sovereignty as far as they're concerned:

"Our government's policy is that our troops, paramilitary forces and our regular forces are deployed in sufficient numbers. They are capable of taking action there. And any foreign intrusion would be counterproductive," he said Saturday. "People will not accept it. Questions of sovereignty come in."

The United States has grown increasingly frustrated as al-Qaida, the Taliban and other militants thrive in Pakistan's remote areas and in neighboring Afghanistan, and has offered U.S. troops to strike at terror networks. Critics in Washington also have expressed frustration with the new Pakistani government's pursuit of peace deals in the region.


But Pakistan--despite their claims--will not, in fact, press hard enough in the frontier regions to seriously threaten al Qaeda's safe haven.

But if our military can't go in and the Pakistanis can't win, that doesn't mean we are out of choices.

I'm just guessing here, but when the other choices are ruled out this third choice doesn't seem so fanciful.

Saturday, July 12, 2008

Axis of Evil Update

The Taliban government in Afghanistan is overthrown and desperately attacking while losing lots of rabble gunmen.

In Iraq, the situation is rapidly evolving from a military problem to a governing problem:

In the rural outskirts of Baghdad, where the war seems distant in Iraq's new period of relative calm, a prominent Sunni tribal chief makes no bones about what is lacking in the drive to turn security improvements into lasting economic and political change.


The Iraqi government needs to take advantage of the new relative calm to give the Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds reason to value the central government and their place in a democratic Iraq.

With al Qaeda in Iraq reeling and the Sunnis unwilling to fight us, it is good to see that the Shia thugs are weak:

Hundreds of followers of a radical Shiite cleric in Iraq have taken to the streets to protest a proposed security agreement between Iraq and the United States.


Hundreds? A randomly called protest in my home town could get hundreds to shout "no to America". This is the Mahdi "Army"? A weak battalion at best, I'd say.

Meanwhile in North Korea, negotiations seem to be making progress after years of squeezing North Korea that have resulted in North Korea teetering on the edge of collapse:

The agreement, reached after three days of talks, requires North Korea to finish disabling its main nuclear facility by the end of October. Meanwhile the United States, China and the other three nations taking part would complete promised deliveries of fuel oil and other economic aid.

Beyond that, the envoys agreed to a robust verification team of experts who will visit North Korean nuclear facilities, review its documents and interview its technical experts, said a press communique read out by China's envoy, Wu Dawei, at the end of the meeting.

Some specifics of the verification remained to be worked out, but experts and diplomats from the six nations hoped to agree on those steps by early September, said U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill.

Verification--if our government over the next decade has the will to act on any violations--will be the difference between a real agreement and the sham 1994 Agreed Framework.

I have to wonder why North Korea has agreed to this route. I'd have thought that Pyongyang would have decided to wait for a new administration whose idea of change is to send Madeleine Albright back to North Korea to dance with the dictators. Could China have done something to get the North Koreans to agree to the verification process? Like in exchange for the US halting arms sales to Taiwan for a while?

This seems unlikely. What could China have done to pressure North Korea? Maybe the deal (sheer speculation here) is a US threat to end one Axis of Evil threat one way or the other by the end of President Bush's term and the Chinese looked the North Koreans in the eye and said they'd not stand in the way of an aerial campaing to defang North Korea of nukes. Or maybe North Korea [Oops, make that "China" and not "North Korea"] threatened to invade themselves with America agreeing to stand aside (or perhaps to limit any advance north to south of Pyongyang to de facto divide North Korea to give both China and South Korea buffer zones). Mind you, I'd rather squeeze the North Koreans enough to collapse their regime, but I'll settle in the short run for denuclearizing Pyongyang.

Iran, too, is weakened even if it is closer to acquiring nuclear weapons:

Iran is a mess. The economy suffers from growing inflation (over 25 percent) and unemployment (ditto). Jobs are more available to those who behave and avoid outspoken opposition to the religious dictatorship that has ruined the economy and made Iran an outlaw state in the world community. The government uses police state tactics to harass or imprison trade unions and media that speak openly about the incompetence and cruelty of the government. Thousands of "Revolutionary Guards" and guys who can best be described as "street thugs", are on the government payroll to intimidate or assault anti-government people, wherever they can be found. This sort of thing even makes many government supporters (about 20 percent of the population, mostly Islamic conservatives) uneasy.


Which is why my preference is to overthrow the Iranian government, hopefully by assisting a completely home grown movement, but provoked and led by sympathetic elements in the Iranian military and government if necessary. An Iraqi democracy on their border to provide an example will help this goal, I think.

But if Tehran gets nukes, Iran's mullahs may become untouchable. Sanctions could collapse based on bald nuclear threats or just terrorism threats issued from behind a nuclear shield. As much as I don't want to strike Iran, I don't want Iran to get nukes even more. A lot depends on how far away Iran is from getting nuclear weapons. We can afford to wait until the mullahs are about to field them. But I have no idea how far away Iran is and I have little confidence we can detect when Iran is "about" to go nuclear. And I don't know if a future president will have the will to strike even if Iran invites the media to photograph their nuclear missiles.

So the Axis of Evil is weakened and possibly on the verge of being destroyed or defanged, depending on the breaks.

Add in the Libyan and Pakistani defections from the nuclear proliferation path, the Syrian ejection from Lebanon, and the destruction of al Qaeda's aura of power in the Moslem world, and you have a good record against the Axis of Evil and associated powers.

Don't pretend we're losing when we're not. Take heart if you hate President Bush too much to give him any credit for steadfastly fighting our enemies. You may yet have a president who you can credit all this progress to even if you have to pretend it was all done in a few weeks--which is about how long it will take for our press to put this narrative of progress together if their chosen presidential candidate wins this November.

Not bad at all for government work, I'd say.

Getting What They Wish?

Taiwan's president still wants arms despite warming relations with China:

The comments were the first direct response from the Taiwanese president following media reports last month that the U.S. had suspended weapons sales to the island to avoid the ire of Beijing.

Among the items at issue are F-16 jet fighters, Patriot III anti-missile missiles and Apache helicopters.

In comments to Taiwanese reporters on the arms issue, Ma said that improving relations with China, including the start of the first weekend direct flights in almost 60 years, were no reason for Taiwan to let down its defenses against its communist rival.

"Our stance will definitely not change just because we have improved relations with the mainland," he said.


If we're doing this as a favor to China or because China gave us something in return, unless China invades Taiwan in the near term this suspension will not prevent Taiwan from defending themselves.

If Taiwan can't get conventional arms from America, Taiwan will go nuclear. One way or another, Taiwan will get the arms they need to defend themselves. But in the short run, Taiwan will have neither conventional nor nuclear arms. Is this important to China? And how long is the suspension of arms sales? Indefinite or just through the Olympics? If the latter, it is all just symbolic and an insignificant additional delay given past KMT interference with arms purchases over the last seven years.

The whole situation is just odd. I'm not sure what to make of it.

National Unity it Isn't

The Cedar Spring is chilling considerably:

Hezbollah and its allies solidified their hold on Lebanon's government Friday with the formation of a national unity Cabinet that gives them veto power over government decisions.

Still, the Western-backed parliamentary majority managed to deny the Hezbollah-led opposition any of the most important Cabinet positions, except for the one it had already held — foreign affairs.


All I can say is that it could be worse.

Professional Courtesy

Zimbabwe is in horrible shape largely due to the efforts of Robert Mugabe, who couldn't have destroyed that country more if he was an agent of Zimbabwe's mortal enemy.

The vaunted international community has refused even symbolic actions:

Russia and China vetoed proposed sanctions on Zimbabwe's leaders Friday, rejecting U.S. efforts to step up punitive measures against the authoritarian regime after a widely discredited presidential election.

Western powers mustered nine votes, the minimum needed to gain approval in the 15-nation council. But the resolution pushed by the Bush administration failed because of the action by two of the five veto-wielding permanent members.


Hey, birds gotta fly and thug regimes gotta protect their own. Remember, Zimbabwe's "discredited" election was still more free than what China or Russia conduct.

Time Flies

I just realized that this is the sixth anniversary of The Dignified Rant.

One of these days I should try to make money off of this effort. Or just enable comments. Or even add a blog roll.

When I sometimes review old posts or run across posts I'd long forgotten I'd written, I think I've done a decent job of commenting on world events and the war. And I think I've been honest in admitting where I've gone wrong. I take comfort that I revisit issues without remembering I've written on it before and wrote broadly the same thing. And I strive not to claim that I've predicted events accurately.

Thanks for reading and thanks for your emails.

Don't Surge Without a Net

Strategypage writes about the network of informants that we built inside Iraq:

The "surge offensive" of last year was largely possible because the informant network had grown to the point where commanders were confident that many Sunni Arab tribes were ready to switch sides.


This is just one reason why the talk of the surge rescuing a failed strategy is all wrong. The war went through many stages that required different approaches. So while we needed the surge for the new circumstances that our prior strategies could not cope with, we did have success under previous circumstances. The surge built on those past successes.

The talk of why didn't we do the surge earlier misses, among other things, that we didn't have the informant network to exploit. One of my worries about the surge early on was that I didn't want more troops milling about in alien terrain just increasing our casualties while increasing expectations at home which would erode our ability to fight faster. An earlier surge would have done exactly this and quite possibly have led to our defeat. Heck, even when I looked at what the surge intended, I worried that it would exhaust our home morale despite being a correct approach militarily. This is because I figured the new approach was more important than additional troops. But the network of spies we developed over time was a key factor in giving our surge a point and giving the new troops good information to act on.

Our success in defeating the terrorists and insurgents in Iraq should indicate how we should prepare future battlefields years before we arrive:

Instead of drawing up nice plans of governing structures and new roads, why don't we spend our pre-war preparation time building up similar databases of leaders and groups in the target nation? This might be a good task for the CIA and other intelligence agencies to focus on, building on those country studies.

Such detailed knowledge of the society and political elites of a potential enemy would be useful for a lot more than just suppressing an insurgency. We could use it to target sanctions, foster a revolt or revolution, or sow dissent and suspicion among the ruling elites.

If we had a database of local actors anywhere near what we have today, we'd have rolled up the insurgency a lot faster and perhaps prevented al Qaeda from effectively invading Iraq and dragging the killing out years longer.


Of course, Congress is working up the nerve to cripple our intelligence agencies as the fears of 9/11 fade:

The U.S. Congress is again, as it did in the 1970s, trying to "rein in" the CIA. Congress wants to outlaw many real, or imagined, techniques that the CIA has employed since September 11, 2001. Much of this effort is political, to placate the many people, and politicians, who now take it as fact (or on faith) that the Islamic terrorist threat was overblown, or that the U.S. response was not commensurate (and itself a form of terrorism) with the threat.


So without people on the ground, we won't be able to study the social battlefield until we are hip-deep in terrorism and insurgency, and we'll have to start from scratch--again. And another president can be unjustly accused of mismanaging a war.

Who knew the power of the purse involved whacking our troops with one?

Friday, July 11, 2008

Hard to Believe

The release of Ingrid Betancourt and the other hostages by the Colombian military was an act of hard power made possible by years of hard power fighting against leftist FARC terrorists by the US and Colombian governments. The terrorists were not shamed or convinced to release the long-held prisoners:

She was, however, only one of the high-minded West's many causes. Solemn condemnations have been issued from every forum of soft-power fecklessness -- the European Union, the United Nations, the G-8 foreign ministers -- demanding that Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe stop butchering his opponents and step down. Before that, the cause du jour was Burma, where a vicious dictatorship allowed thousands of cyclone victims to die by denying them independently delivered foreign aid lest it weaken the junta's grip on power.

And then there is Darfur, a perennial for which myriad diplomats and foreign policy experts have devoted uncountable hours at the finest five-star hotels to deplore the genocide and urgently urge relief.

What is done to free these people? Nothing. Everyone knows it will take the hardest of hard power to remove the oppressors in Zimbabwe, Burma, Sudan and other godforsaken places where the bad guys have the guns and use them. Indeed, as the Zimbabwean opposition leader suggested (before quickly retracting) from his hideout in the Dutch embassy -- Europe specializes in providing haven for those fleeing the evil that Europe does nothing about -- the only solution is foreign intervention.

And who's going to intervene? The only country that could is the country that in the past two decades led coalitions that liberated Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Having sacrificed much blood and treasure in its latest endeavor -- the liberation of 25 million Iraqis from the most barbarous tyranny of all, and its replacement with what is beginning to emerge as the Arab world's first democracy -- and having earned near-universal condemnation for its pains, America has absolutely no appetite for such missions.


My conditions for such missions are clear, as I've mentioned.

But I'm sure our "restored" stature in international circles will cause lambs to lie down with lions and there will be no need for something as crude as hard power to fight our enemies (if we even have any enemies in those happy nuance-filled future days!) or release damsels in distress.

Good Luck, Nick

The French think they can flip Syria from being Iran's ally to becoming a friend of the West. Is it really possible that Syria thinks that they can pursue their national objectives with the West as an ally instead?

Syria's ruling elite has four interests (in descending order of importance): self-preservation; sabotaging the UN investigation into Damascus's role in political murders in Lebanon; a Syrian return to Lebanon in a form that enables the elite to restore and expand its business interests, and recovering the Golan Heights, captured by Israel in 1967.

Except for the Golan's return, none of Assad's goals merit French or international support. Why should anybody else help prolong the life of a regime that may not be the choice of the Syrian people? What interest would France have in derailing the inquiry into the murder of Lebanese leaders, including ex-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, to save Assad and other senior Syrian leaders from ending up in front of the International Criminal Court at the Hague? Nor would a return of the Syrian domination of Lebanon serve any French or European interest.

Once the Syrian first couple returns home after a Paris shopping spree, the real question will remain: Is the Ba'athist elite prepared for a strategic switch from alliance with the mullahs to one of partnership with the Western democracies? We might know the answer after Assad visits Tehran to brief his Iranian counterpart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the talks with Sarkozy.


In theory, I'm ok with Syria "flipping" if that is what they do. I want to end state support of terrorism and I'm fine in the short run with destroying, converting, befriending, or just scaring any regime into not supporting terrorists who try to kill us and helping us track them down.

In the long run, I'd still want justice for any country who was against us in the past; but I can wait for the short-term benefit of prying another piece of the terror puzzle out of the picture.

Gook luck on the Syria project. They all start so hopefully. But I have serious doubts about Syria's intentions to switch sides.