'Murica

Be grateful that notwithstanding our problems, others have greater problems. And our system allows our country to pivot when the voters demand change to address the problems. Once again, don't assume America's time has passed.

In 2008 the European Union (EU) economy was almost as big as America's. In 2023, America's GDP was 50% larger (tip to Instapundit):

Yeah, I'd be seeing stars swirling around my head if my precious "ever closer union" was faltering that much against hated America's economy.

Sure, Britain left the EU and Croatia entered between those dates, but that's not why America grew much larger. Experts keep wrongly predicting America's decline in the face of a rising economic power. 

Maybe if the EU had remained the European Economic Community of a common market rather than becoming a proto-imperial project overly focused on stripping away the prefix, the gap wouldn't have grown. Perhaps this is the difference between Americans demanding better from our leaders while EU leaders demand their subjects accept what is granted to them.

One day the experts might be right about America's decline. But that's not how you should bet on any given day. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

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Doctor Strangemullah

I see we're at the stage of learning not to worry about the Iranian nuclear bomb and beginning to love it.

Is it "stage four" Western diplomacy already? 

Two facts are now obvious. First, the Islamic Republic of Iran desires a nuclear arsenal. Second, it will obtain this nuclear arsenal soon. Given the political realities in the United States, and the military constraints of Israel’s position, there is little chance of a major strike that meaningfully degrades the Iranian nuclear program.

First, what will the character of Middle Eastern competition be once Iran announces its nuclear status? Second, how can the United States and Israel adapt their forces to an Iranian nuclear arsenal in the short-term and long-term alongside the broader threat that Iran poses?

Well, America has been locked in a futile diplomatic track that leads to acceptance. Will that continue?

But is Israel's military really constrained? Their two direct strikes on Iran seem to show a pretty good capability:

Interesting: "More than 100 Israeli fighter jets attacked 20 targets inside Iran, ranging from its top air-defense systems to key missile manufacturing facilities, early on October 26. Their weapon of choice: air-launched ballistic missiles." I've read that 100 warplane sorties are needed to hit Iran's nuclear program. 

We will regret deciding to stop worrying and love the mullah bomb.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.

Putin's Focus on Ukraine is a Bug and Not a Feature

Russia boasts Putin doesn't need an envoy to talk to America about his invasion of Ukraine because that's his job. Okaaaaay ...

I don't think that boast sounds as macho as Peskov thinks:

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is personally dealing with issues concerning Ukraine and that he requires no special envoys, likely in response to reports that US President-elect Donald Trump will "soon" appoint a "Ukrainian peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the war."

When you ef up as badly as Putin did when judging his ability to conquer Ukraine, you naturally have to focus on your clusterf*ck rather than delegate it to a minion. It's that immediately important to your political survival and perhaps life. Heck, Putin's attention might indicate he can't assume a minion won't meet with Trump's envoy to throw Putin under the bus to get a peace deal at any price.

But what bigger threat--one that will arise in the future rather than at your daily briefing about your invasion--is outside of Putin's tunnel vision on his own current FUBAR?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.

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The Charge of the Airmobile Brigade

The Army pursues deep air assault operations. Tilt-rotor transports are to enable this charge of the airmobile brigade.

The Army expectations for the V-280 tilt-rotor transport craft include "entirely overhauling the speed, range, and survivability of air assault operations." This worries me:

According to Sylvia, L2A2 [Large-Scale, Long-Range Air Assault] is defined by the ability to “deliver one Brigade Combat Team in one period of darkness, over 500 miles, arriving behind enemy lines, and be able to conduct sustained combat operations.”

While I'm pretty confident parachutists are never going to be significant above small, shallow, tactical drops, I have doubts about this operating concept:

For tactical insertions behind enemy lines, helicopters are probably the way to go--if even that is possible these days given that armored attack helicopters that can shoot back may be too vulnerable for operations forward of our front lines. We'll see how the V-280 tilt-rotor (planned for 2030) works for the Army in deep missions rather than for faster behind-the-lines movements.

Up to 500 miles behind enemy lines? Talk about a bridge too far!

2030 is a long way in the future. Just imagine what networked swarms of small drones will do to a flotilla of V-280s heading over enemy lines in six years. As I imagined:

With a warning from radars, drones defending a fixed asset, or eventually a ground unit in the field, drone swarms would be released that rise up to have the best-positioned drone in the swarm guided into the path of the incoming threat. Perhaps the air defense drone spreads out arms to let the incoming round impact the drone defender and be disabled, destroyed, or detonated. Perhaps the air defense drone fires a Claymore mine-like weapon into the path of the weapon (assuming it can be designed to avoid too much collateral damage on the ground from falling projectiles. Or maybe it would be HEAT-type salvo.

I don't think darkness--and flying higher--will be the shield the Army is counting on. Or will a fleet of escorting drones shoot down enemy fighter drones and suppress ground-based air defenses to keep the air bridge open?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.

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A Military Rots from the FOGO Down

Leadership reforms for our bloated military flag officers and general officers (FOGO) caste that doesn't seem to focus on fighting and winning a war should be the priority even above increased defense spending. But then I digress bigly.

I'm on board much of this author's wish list for restoring military warfighting capabilities. But this claim? 

The current crop of FOGOs spent twenty years in Afghanistan without realizing that they were trying to build an Afghan army in our own image that would not be able to sustain itself after we left. The "Forever War" should have been handed over to an Afghan army built along Taliban lines in 2006 to fend for itself.

I'm fully on board the critique of our flag and general officers. That they lost me should tell you something. I respect and value the institution of our military. I'm unhappy with how our leadership has evolved.

But I reject that charge about Afghanistan. We did not build an Afghan army in our image. We built a light infantry and paramilitary security force. 

I further reject the idea that an army trying to hold a state should look like an irregular and insurgent army trying to overthrow that state. Why deny the Afghan security forces the advantages of some relatively cheap support like artillery, light armor--mostly wheeled, propeller-driven ground support and transport aircraft, and helicopters? Would we consider fighting that way superior?

Sure, some Afghan troops like special forces and rangers could take the insurgency/irregular fight to the Taliban. But that's it. With continued NATO and contractor support this would have been a good plan. 

Mind you, I think the kind of force we built should have been for a decentralized state rather than trying to sustain the fiction of a unified nation-state in Afghanistan. Had we done that a Taliban conquest of a city--even Kabul--would have been a localized defeat that wouldn't panic other friendly centers of power. So that was a FOGO error. 

Finally, the notion that the kind of military we help an ally build only counts if America doesn't need to support our ally at war is nonsense. European NATO needed American help to defeat civil war-wracked Libya under Khadaffi in 2011. A weak and splintered enemy! What American ally doesn't need American support to keep fighting after a week? 

Remember, having allies who need American support has long been a feature rather than a bug of our foreign policy.

Okay, my digression kind of took over. But my editor is fully supportive. Especially since it looks like a needed Roman decimation--figurative but targeted--is coming.

Start reforms from the top. Good leadership can fix the rest. 

UPDATE: Related thoughts on restoring Americans' faith in our military.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

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The Winter War of 2022 Aims For a Bridge Too Far

I viewed Ukraine's Kursk operation as a raid. As long as Ukraine doesn't lose too many troops and too much equipment to hold it, I felt this was useful. Has Ukraine grown too attached to holding the region, risking a catastrophic defeat? Is this a salient too far? And if it is, how much further away is Crimea and other areas Russia has conquered since 2014?

I've been increasingly worried about this:

Unfortunately for Kyiv, the offensive operation in Kursk can produce catastrophic results. Especially if we speak about the upcoming engagement of the Northern Korean Armed Forces in Kursk region. With this operation Ukraine has overextended the front line, depleted reserves of the best-trained and younger forces, drained the supply of armored and motorized vehicles, and expanded the warzone by several hundred additional square kilometers. Although Ukraine continues its operation despite the Russian counteroffensive, the associated risks are now dangerously high. A potential defeat of Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) —whether through encirclement or a chaotic withdrawal—would be far more damaging to Ukrainian leadership than the initial surge of emotional support that followed the beginning of the operation.

I don't assume that just because Russia hasn't achieved a breakthrough that Russia can't. So far my worry has been focused in the Donbas near Pokrovsk and more recently the area north and northeast of Vuhledar. Russia's long, slow drive on Pokrovsk ground to a halt at the gates of Pokrovsk. But my worry that Russia can resume that advance may be misplaced. And my worry the Vuhledar front where Russian advances have recently picked up may be misplaced:

Ukraine’s ability to stave off the seizure of Pokrovsk thus far and force the Russian military to divert its efforts to advances in arguably the least operationally significant sector of the frontline is a positive indicator of Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting this war despite the challenges Ukraine faces and the setbacks it has suffered.

Granted, my worries are not in the short term but in the long term if Ukraine can't stop Russia before it takes something of significance. And ISW seems to share that worry. But my worry that Ukraine's troops on that front could crack under the pressure might be unjustified right now.

And I worry that the Kursk salient could join these areas as a cause for active worry.

Ukraine can't be so attached to the territory it captured from Russia that it risks its military. As I've advised Ukraine from the beginning in 2014, preserving the army is the foundation for all else. Taking excessive risks for little real gain is a mistake. I might be worried about Ukraine essentially doing what I think is best. And I may worry because the metric of seeing Russia advance and Ukraine retreat is the only tangible result my brain is really absorbing. How the armies are holding up under the stress remain a fear for Ukraine and a hope for Russia, rather than something I can readily measure.

Russia seems to be going for broke, throwing armored vehicles at Ukraine to gain ground--possibly anticipating a ceasefire wherever the armies stand when the whistle blows--and losing staggering amounts.

This gives me hope that behind Putin's Potemkin Village facade of indifference to his own casualties that the foundation is crumbling:

The Russian military command’s poor treatment of and failure to support Russian soldiers is likely contributing to mass desertions.

But it remains a hope. And I hate to rely on that. But sometimes you have to hang on and hope for something to change--either from your own actions or outside factors. But if Russia's army breaks under the strain of its intensified but costly attacks, we may look at hiring the North Korean contingent as a  desperate effort to stop a Russian collapse rather than a scary step to break Ukraine.

Yet if Ukraine thought the Kursk incursion would change the course of the war, it seemingly failed (back to the initial link):

It seems that Ukraine is desperately trying to escape the Donbas-centric war, which has become a deathtrap. In the Donbas, Ukraine has limited chances to alter the course of the war, as the Donbas remains one of the most urbanized areas of Ukraine. 

After Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive crashed and burned, I wrote that each side would seek to overcome the stalemate and I went through a number of efforts in World War I to do that. Can either side find something to break the ground stalemate?

At some point Ukraine has to stop Russia. Retreating to preserve the army has limits. Ukraine is big but it isn't infinite. Eventually Russia's small gains could be decisive even if Russia never breaks through to take territory at wholesale prices. Will North Korea feed men to die in this war indefinitely to make the price in Russians acceptable? Can Ukraine strengthen its military enough with Western military aid to achieve that? Will Russia falter as the price it pays to win climbs ever higher? 

That initial author's conclusion seems about right:

In general, it can be concluded that both armies are nearing culmination and perhaps the final stage of the war.

Could be. But if so I don't think that mutual culmination means the war ends. The Iran-Iraq War certainly showed that big, bloody operations can be followed by relative quiet and rebuilding for the next big operation. I also suspect that both Ukraine and Russia effectively culminated in autumn 2023. Yet the war went on.

The initial author raises the possibility that NATO forces might enter the fight if Russia advances too far west. Early in the war I said I didn't think America should directly intervene if Russian remains in the east. But I thought that if Russia threatened to capture territory west of the Dnipro River that we'd have to consider that scary option. Before the war I said I wouldn't be shocked at this outcome: 

Sometimes I wonder if the end point of the Ukraine crisis is an East Ukraine under Russian control and a West Ukraine admitted to NATO and the EU.

That's not ideal, however. It would be a new front line between NATO and Russia. Because if the Russians then take all of Ukraine, the future could look very scary. And at best the cost of holding the line at NATO's existing front becomes much higher. And the price of holding the line gets higher as the Russians push west.

Have a super sparkly day.

UPDATE (Monday): My brief suspension of worry about the Vuhledar sector is over:

Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.

Not long after Russia captured Vuhledar, I could see Russia was advancing at a faster pace and that worried me. Unless Ukraine is pulling Russian troops into a trap to launch a major counter-attack, I'm officially beyond worried and into "concerned" territory. 

UPDATE (Monday): Is the race between Russian and Ukrainian popular support for the war?

If so, Ukraine has the advantage of defending its homeland rather than waging a war of aggression. 

When I wrote about World War I providing lessons for breaking a ground stalemate, I noted cracking morale for both the Russians and Germans--and almost for France. 

In World War I, Russia cracked first and agreed to peace on German terms. But Germany had other enemies and eventually broke second, losing the entire war and negating Russia's initial cracking. In the Winter War of 2022, whoever cracks first loses the war.

UPDATE (Wednesday): Ukraine's air offensive is hurting Russia. But are the air attacks hurting Russia enough as Russia pounds away at Ukraine's army and cities? I have my doubts.

As I watch Russia grind forward, I continue to wonder if Ukraine is starving front line units of infantry replacements in order to build a reserve to conduct some type of counteroffensive to interrupt Russia's war-wide battlefield initiative. Nobody will have the expectations of 2023, but that's good. It's risky. But so is having no reserve.

UPDATE (Friday): Reaction:

Ukraine's army chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said on Friday he would strengthen troops deployed on the eastern front with reserves, ammunition and equipment after he visited two key Ukrainian-held sites in the Donetsk region.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

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Weekend Data Dump

I post at The Dignified Rant: Evolved on Substack. Help me out by subscribing and by liking and sharing posts. I continue posting here on TDR seven days a week, including Weekend Data Dump and Winter War of 2022. I occasionally post short data dump items on my Substack "Notes" section. 

Talk of what territory Trump might pressure Ukraine to cede is a spring 2023 discussion. After Ukraine's failed 2023 counteroffensive, the question is how much will Ukrainians sacrifice to liberate their territory. That's Ukraine's obstacle. Its leaders may in time welcome "pressure" to seek security off the battlefield.

Not silver bullets: "Further improvements to Ukraine's drone capabilities and continually improving integration of Ukrainian drones with ground operations remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against advancing Russian forces and liberate occupied territory in future counteroffensive operations." 

Build auxiliary cruisers using civilian container ships and military systems mounted in standard shipping containers? Endorsed!

Europe crushed Nazism only to import new Jew haters: "Antisemitic prejudice still endures in Eastern Europe, but the region has not seen the kind of violence against Jews visible today in Amsterdam, Paris, Berlin and other Western European cities. ... " Eastern Europe is not suicidal. Also, the hate is not new.

Thanks, Turkey: "Israeli media reported on November 17 that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey. " Turkey is a NATO "ally." We have an Erdogan problem. Unless his rule has infected the rest of government. Although to be fair, Turkey's society was already moving that way.

Train the way you need to fight: "The U.S., Australia and Japan agreed to broaden a series of drills and trainings Sunday, the next step in preparing their militaries to work together in crisis."

Big news? "The executive arm of the European Union approved €300 million (US$317 million) in funding for five joint defense-procurement projects by member states, the first time the bloc uses its budget to finance common defense buying." Is the EU goal the power to buy or actual defense purchases?

Evil, petty, and annoying: "Relations between the neighbors have sunk to the lowest level in years. Now, Pyongyang is blaring eerie sounds across the border that villagers say is making their lives hell.

Hanging together to avoid hanging separately: "Under AUKUS Pillar II, the three nations have entered the Hypersonic Flight Test and Experimentation (HyFliTE) Project Arrangement (PA) to use each other’s testing facilities and share technical information to develop, test, and evaluate hypersonic systems."

In the Philippines, Secretary of Defense Austin and his hosts "highlighted the need for deeper coordination to address challenges in the South China Sea, where lawful operations by the Philippines have encountered repeated harassment by the People’s Republic of China."

Huh: "Currently only about 40 percent of Iranians consider themselves Moslems and most adhere to other faiths, including the ancient Iranian Zoroastrianism. Iranians don’t care what their leaders, a religious dictatorship, think and the Iranian leaders quietly go along with this subterfuge." Is Islam eroding in Iran?

"The Navy’s failure to re-establish control of the critical Bab el-Mandeb choke point threatens about 12 percent of the world’s oil shipments. Keeping sea lanes open to commerce has been one of the Navy’s core missions since the founding of the Republic." Indeed. We choose not to succeed. Admirals must do better.

The CMV-22B Osprey variant is "tailored to meet certain high-demand Navy missions such as the Carrier On-Board Delivery mission and long-range force and equipment transport. The Navy Osprey is taking over the Carrier on-Board Delivery mission previously performed by the C-2 Greyhound."

The process: "The U.S. military services should routinely train their officers about the intricacies of their officer evaluation systems and provide detailed feedback after each evaluation cycle, the Government Accountability Office concluded in a new report." Is the least of the system's problems.

Is this really unlikely? "North Korea may deploy as many as 100,000 troops to aid Russia’s war on Ukraine if the alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow continues to deepen, according to people familiar with assessments made by some [G20] nations." Rotated--assuming survivors. And it's is an old proposal.

Hmmm: "Russia may be preparing for yet another pivot—this time away from Iran." Iran is too useful to Russia for weapons and harassment of American forces and interests in the Middle East. Perhaps it is better to say Russia may be ready to pretend to pivot away from Iran--for a very real price from the West.

When you start to lift limits on Ukraine's use of American surface-to-surface missiles, lift the limits on Ukraine's use of American surface-to-surface missiles. The partial way it was done just gives America the blame without the effectiveness of actually lifting the limits.

These captured documents provide details, but we already knew Iran helped Hamas with capabilities used to murder Israelis. There is no information pointing to Hamas attacking Israel on October 7, 2023, on direct orders from Iran, which we think we know.

With American permission, Ukraine can use ATACMS against targets inside some parts of Russia. So "lawmakers aligned with President Vladimir Putin in Russia said Monday that the move was unacceptable and warned it could lead to a third world war." No, the big step was Russia bringing war back to Europe.

Until Russia can rebuild its army, this general has better skill sets for covert Russian threats: "A career special operations veteran who was featured in a hazy green, night vision photo as the last American soldier to leave Afghanistan has been nominated to pin a fourth star and lead the U.S. Army in Europe." 

Let's hope this is true here and in Europe: "Given the damage being done to Europe’s industrial base, the political tide is unsurprisingly turning against the greens." We can't repair our defense industry base without industry. But the climate-industrial complex will resist. 

So what's really going on? " An unspecified Turkish diplomat also rejected claims that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey."

Russia is suspected: "Finnish Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen said Tuesday that NATO and the European Union must raise their game to protect themselves from hybrid threats and defend undersea cables from attack." But a Chinese ship could be the culprit.

China's aggression pushes us together: "The U.S. and the Philippines finished an agreement on how to share classified information, firming the foundation for their militaries to operate together."

This seems prudent: "After years of building bespoke networks to connect with individual allied and partner militaries, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is preparing to bring nearly two dozen countries into a single network in 2025."

America's quest to rapidly defeat China over Taiwan neglects the possibility--perhaps likelihood--that the war will drag on. Does the short-term focus harm preparations to win a long war? Sadly, simulations that have a time limit reinforce the short-war bias.

Is it just RUMORINT that Russia's railroad system seems to be breaking down? Or maybe just anecdotes that don't reflect the entire system? Big, if true, as the expression goes. Tip to Instapundit.

Russian covert sabotage? "Damage to communication cables between new NATO members Finland and Sweden and their alliance partners Germany and Lithuania was likely sabotage, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said on Tuesday."

Oh? "German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said that Chancellor Olaf Scholz's conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin last week is further evidence that the Russian leader is uninterested in negotiations with Ukraine." Talks are probably futile. But it may just be Putin's opening bid.

The idea that the Biden administration is starting World War III by letting Ukraine launch a small number of ATACMS into limited areas of Russia is grotesque. Any risk is solely caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the first place. Remember Russia's history of nuclear bluffs. This is just more to bolster fear.

The war in the shadows: "The Ukrainian security service (SSU) recently detected several Russian agents operating in Kherson, which is near the Black Sea northwest of Crimea. Three Russian spies were arrested." Plus a broader survey of Russian espionage.

Clearly a point defense system small enough to be mounted on a Stryker: "The U.S. Army has developed and deployed four Locust Laser Weapon Systems at undisclosed locations overseas. ... The laser has a range of about 800 meters and is used against large drones in places like Syria and now Ukraine."

So it's to be nuclear sabre rattling, Putin? "A B-52 Stratofortress bomber dropped weapons on a range in Lithuania on Nov. 15 in an unusual live fire display, a U.S. defense official told Air & Space Forces Magazine." General Grant smiles. Seriously, don't let the Wookie win.

The short war temptation. Nations can be seduced by the promise. But reality is usually not the happy ending imagined.

A useful essay about restoring the Navy with applications across the Pentagon.

Back to the "proxy war" issue. I don't like the term. It implies amoral exploitation of another country to fight an enemy for us. See Ukraine. But "proxy war" is often helping an ally or enemy of our enemy resist the common foe. Was pre-Pearl Harbor U.S. help to Britain and China a bad proxy war against the Axis?

Via Instapundit, Iran's mullah regime is almost unbelievably evil. I'm not saying we need to organize a revolution.

But FFS at least don't be blinded by loving the mullah regime!

Hmmm: "Western countries have been imposing sanctions on Russia since the war in Georgia in 2008. They have always been too little, too late, and poorly enforced." Well, it isn't a blockade. And after 2008 Europeans blamed Georgia--so sure, sanctions were half-hearted. But Russia's economy is suffering now.

Finland has lots of artillery and believes artillery has proven its worth in Ukraine: "U.S. soldiers are firing away north of the Arctic Circle this week as Finland hosts the largest NATO artillery exercise in Europe for the first time since joining the alliance last year."

The INDOPACOM commander worries that increased Chinese military exercises mean China may invade Taiwan by 2027; and he worries about needing the missiles we send to Ukraine. I worry about that, too. But we should not lose the actual war now to prepare for a potential war later. Focus on producing more.

Huh: "Donald Trump is expected to consider recognizing Somaliland as an independent country once he assumes office, according to the former U.K. defense secretary, it was reported on Tuesday." Rewarding people who manage to bring some stability to a corner of the Horn region should be rewarded, no?

Look here! "Iran has defied international demands to rein in its nuclear program and has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels, according to a confidential report by the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog[.]" I think weapons-grade uranium is a mullah red herring.

Germany has a political crisis because economic and financial reality are too much to face, it seems.

The Navy's "classic" dual purpose, rapid-firing Oto Melara 76mm cannon. I did not know that the weapon can shoot down missiles, and so: "Phalanx is not required on ships armed with the 76mm cannon." This must be new because old Perry frigates had the 76mm gun and Phalanx.

The new American Roadrunner jet-powered drone that destroys other drones. We're not at my fighter drone concept (in Army magazine) because Roadrunner is a suicide drone and it costs $400,000 each. That's way too expensive to cope with cheap suicide drones.

The U.S. is sending more military aid to Ukraine. One might consider that rather than trying to start World War III--a ridiculous accusation--Biden may be cooperating with Trump to rush aid to Ukraine to allow Trump to avoid early decisions to arm Ukraine to try the role of "good cop" to Putin for negotiations.

INDOPACOM commander: "Years of high-profile intercontinental ballistic missile tests by North Korea have fallen short of demonstrating that Pyongyang can successfully launch and deliver a nuclear warhead against the US mainland[.]" I read North Korea hasn't perfected warheads. It's good to get that updated.

Wait. What? "President Biden approved sending anti-personnel mines to Ukraine late Tuesday, a reversal of policy[.]" We haven't already approved of land mines when Russia is invading Ukraine? When the global ban was agreed to by countries with little risk of being invaded?? When Russia uses lots of mines?!

Top three priorities for the next secretary of defense to deal with: "DEI. Political generals. After dealing with these issues, SecDef Hegseth can turn to rebuilding the Navy." I'm not sure about the next steps.

Ukrainians are fighting for their lives. Of course they need them: "The Pentagon will send Ukraine anti-personnel land mines, a U.S. official said, in a response to what Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said were changing dynamics on the front lines." Why doesn't Ukraine doesn't make these simple, cheap weapons?

To be fair, the Russian navy is crap: "The U.K. is scrapping five warships, along with a dozen military helicopters and drones, as part of a cost-cutting program for the army, Defence Secretary John Healey said Wednesday." Still, we're heading to a Royal Navy I feared. And my hopes for the British army fade.

Well, not literally: "Russia has lost so many soldiers in Ukraine that they have run out of troops." But Russian units will over time become dominated by the support "tail". Although to be fair, Ukraine seems to have a similar problem with infantry.

Women in the Navy. They certainly can cope in peacetime. But in a war, their lack of upper body strength will be dangerous because even a high-tech navy needs muscle power at sea.

China's stealth fighter path. 

The Marines are getting what sounds like a suicide drone--"autonomous kinetic interceptor"--to down enemy drones: "The new CES will soon be deployed to Marine units operating on the frontlines." Still not a fighter drone, as I wrote about in Army magazine.

The U.S. is seen as the weak horse by adversaries. Indeed: "America's efforts to not lose in Ukraine and the Middle East have emboldened enemies in the Middle East to see infinite opportunities to defeat America. If America isn't trying to win, our enemies know that at worst they fail to win. Until they win."

If Russia wants to use ICBMs with a conventional warhead to strike Ukraine, waste them. If Russia wants to pose as a nuclear threat and risk an ICBM spectacularly failing, that will expose Russia's nuclear deterrent as a hollow threat. DOD says it was an IRBM and Russia warned us to avoid nuclear escalation.

FFS: "The Space Force is keeping tabs on test flights for SpaceX’s new Starship megarocket, in anticipation that the super heavy-lift launch vehicle could be used by the Defense Department to send military supplies from one point on Earth to another." This is stupid even with SpaceX efficiency.

Plan B after losing F-35s: "The Baykar TB-3 combat drone landed and took off from the flight deck of the amphibious assault ship Anadolu for the first time this week, a demonstration that officials called a milestone for Turkey’s military capabilities." I mentioned this CVE.

Culture prevents Islamic Arabs from embracing democracy: "Arabs, even Arab leaders, know they need democracy. They have tried everything else, and nothing else works. But democracy is strong medicine for Arabs, and many would rather just talk about it, and go no further. ... Islamic terrorism is the result."

The Netherlands rearms. I commented on their new modularized auxiliary cruisers here. 

Good: "Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has approved a comprehensive plan to revitalize the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and strengthen fleet logistics support capabilities to address mounting workforce challenges." Enemies and the allies they target are far away. But it is just a first step.

Is China sabotaging Baltic Sea underwater cables for Russia? Or is China cooperating with Russia to conceal Russian submarines doing the actual destruction? Did China go from the first to the second to avoid repercussions by having plausible deniability?

Putin and strategery: "The West could never have achieved what Putin has: Ukraine’s total alienation from Russia." That will happen when you grant the F**k-Up Fairy citizenship. #WhyRussiaCan'tHaveNiceThings

This entry is to remember this Army Special Operations Command primer on Russia's "little green men."

Allowing Ukraine to use ATACMS and other Western missiles against targets in the Kursk region is unlikely to be decisive. It will help. But it isn't a silver bullet. Which I think means Russian chest-beating and flinging ballistic nuclear poo is (again) performance art. 

Were there problems in the civilian or uniformed military chain of command? Political interference in stopping lawful orders? Civilian leaders should have confidence that lawful orders will be obeyed in emergencies. Tip to Instapundit.

I'm just not scared by Russian nuclear threats. That is suicidal and if they are suicidal, ATACMS aren't the problem. Russians helped enemies kill a lot of American troops in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere. Putin wants to put on big boy pants to strut on the world stage. If he doesn't like the price, go home.

Treat the International Criminal Court as a propaganda arm of our enemies trying to make it impossible for the West to defend itself. Israel is merely the target of the moment. Tip to Instapundit. Please review actual rules of war, particularly the concept of "proportionality." A handy video at the end is included.

Russia's air war against Ukraine's civilians. So far it seems that Russia is killing enough to anger Ukrainians but now enough to demoralize them Ukraine fights back by striking military and defense industry targets.

Resistance to the military government in Myanmar continues with little attention from the outside world. That's in part because the Palestinians are a political fuel air explosive that sucks the oxygen out of the media space, choking any other news.

Constellation is the only game in town: "the U.S. Navy is officially seeking a second shipyard for the FFG 62 program, adding to the capacity of Midwest-based Fincantieri Marinette Marine." Are the design problems fixed? I've read we packed 10 pounds of gear into a 5-pound sack. Are costs under control?

Oooh! a censure, a censure! "The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) censure resolution against Iran on November 21." So what? We all know what follows from the IAEA when Iran lights the nuke-shaped beacon:

The Third World's Developing World's effort to extort money from the West using a "climate change" club at the COP29 meeting seems to be collapsing in chaos. So sad. Go berate China, eh? See how that works out. Tip to Instapundit.

Hopefully we can carry out the rest of the comprehensive plan I noted in an earlier entry: "Military Sealift Command will sideline 17 ships to ease the stress of civilian mariners, MSC’s commander confirmed Thursday." Keeping mariners in the MSC is good. But eventually more mariners and ships are needed.

"Appears": "Instead of merely guarding Chinese naval bases and supporting an invasion of Taiwan, China's Marine Corps appears to be preparing for amphibious operations around the world — just as US Marines do." China is opaque about what it wants to do from the sea. Heck, what do the U.S. marines do? 

Africa corps: "For over a year Ukraine has been supporting rebel groups in Africa that are fighting members of the Russian Afrika Corps. Russia is currently supporting rebel or government forces in several African countries."

Stopping the destruction of its army seems like a good first step: "Because of its heavy personnel and material losses in Ukraine, Russia plans to slowly rebuild its depleted armed forces by 2030."

Is Iran risking an Israeli attack by expanding uranium enrichment? "Iranian media reported that Iran is activating 5,000 centrifuges in response to the censure resolution that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed on November 21." Or does Iran already have nukes?

The Final Countdown?

Is Iran finalizing its ability to build a nuclear arsenal?

ISW notes this development:

Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program in the past year. This assessment is based on publicly reported US and Israeli intelligence about Iranian research activity at the Parchin Military Complex outside Tehran in recent months. 

Yet ISW also assesses that Iran hasn't decided to build nuclear weapons.

I wondered if Iran would use the distraction of the war with Hamas as cover to dash to nukes.

My worry is not eased by ISW's assessment that Iran has not decided to build nukes at this time. I believe Iran knows that signs of building nukes puts Iran in a period of maximum danger. That's when Israel and maybe even America would feel that the "last option" of striking Iran's nuclear infrastructure has arrived. 

For that reason I think that Iran will want some fully working nukes in place to deter such a strike in that danger period. Especially since Israel is famously a "one bomb state". And as I note in that post, I think North Korea is a possible source of working nuclear missiles. With so much North Korean weapons--and not troops--flowing into Russia, could some nukes be hidden in that traffic? And there is already weapons movement between Iran and Russia.

Right now, the only weakness in that Iranian strategy is that Israeli missile defenses are excellent. On the other hand, I've long felt that Iran slowed its nuclear warhead progress to let missile development catch up. Iran needs both to have nuclear weapons. I know that's from the "Well, Duh" files, but it is important, no? Two barrages of missiles on Israel could be viewed as a massive test of the missile design rather than a military failure, no?

Still, what level of risk is acceptable for a "one bomb state"? And could Iran find another way to get a nuke into Israel?

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.

Damn the Torpedoes? Belay That Order!

The Red Sea is no longer freely accessible to ships because of Iran's proxy campaign via the Houthi to threaten ships trying to use that vital waterway. Operation Simulate Resolve continues.

FFS: 

The Red Sea, one of the world’s busiest and most strategically vital waterways, has become so hazardous that even the German Navy is steering clear. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius’s decision to redirect the frigate Baden-Württemberg and support vessel Frankfurt am Main around the Cape of Good Hope on their return from an Indo-Pacific deployment speaks volumes. The Red Sea is now deemed too perilous, underscoring just how ineffective current U.S. and EU naval protections are in this region.

I know why the EU mission is ineffective. Securing the seas is not the EU's mission. But what is our Navy's excuse for its failure to secure the sea?  

UPDATE: A timely article notes that shipping container traffic through the Red Sea is down 90% since December 2023, and that:

the United States should go on the offense against the Houthis by going after their command and control centers, logistical infrastructures, arms shipments, and drone production facilities.

UPDATE: And a timely report that preaches to the TDR choir:

The Houthis now pose a strategic threat with global implications for the United States and its allies. The United States and its allies have failed to prevent Iran from strengthening the Houthis’ military capabilities since 2015. The Houthis have grown from a small, militia in Yemen’s northern mountains into a major strategic threat with ties to multiple US adversaries. The US has sought to “avoid escalation” in response to dramatic Houthi escalations since October 2023 by taking a series of reactive half-measures that have failed to accomplish decisive effects or materially degrade Houthi military capabilities.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.

Mission Accomplished?

Colombia still has problems despite their 2016 "peace" deal with communist rebels.

In addition to the land mines still littering the countryside, Colombia isn't getting the peace dividend it expected from the 2016 peace deal with the major communist insurgency group that had plagued the country for many decades:

In 2017 FARC demobilized, as agreed. The demobilization did not bring peace because the demobilized FARC members then formed nearly three dozen new gangs that engaged in a variety of criminal activities including robbery, drug dealing, kidnapping for ransom and multiple other forms of violent mischief. These crimes are rarely punished because the gangs either bribe, intimidate or murder judges presiding over these cases.

And corruption plays a role. Hey, if you weren't allowed to beat them, why not join them?

I had my doubts about the process. I wasn't happy with the deal our government was apparently pushing Colombia to accept which welcomed FARC into the political process. 

The idea that a deal should save an enemy being defeated is insane:

If you want peace, you need someone to win. Make sure the good guys are the victor. In the war and in the post-war. A Participation Ribbon is not good enough.

That path turns victory into a ceasefire until the enemy can return, perhaps on different battlefields. 

And two years ago I noted the new battlefield:

Colombia votes for "bad luck" by choosing a "former" Marxist to lead them.

Colombia didn't win in 2016. But it's taken time to make it apparent.

The initial article takes a lengthy side trip into Venezuela as well. Obviously we'll aim for another Participation Ribbon that the Best and Brightest will celebrate as Smart Diplomacy.®

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.

The Evil Empire (The Other Guys)

The European Union is an enemy of America and European freedom and democracy. Let's not forget that.

Well put:

To elite Remainers in the UK, the EU represents all that is good and holy. Apparently, it is a motor of economic dynamism, a haven of political stability and a shining beacon of liberal, democratic values. Leaving it, they say, as the public voted to do in 2016, has put Britain on the path to economic and social ruin. ...

But this starry-eyed view of the EU seems to be a delusion confined to Britain’s ruling class. Over on the continent, even ardent Europhiles are sounding the alarm about the EU’s mounting problems. ...

Despite posing as a bastion of liberal democracy, the European Union is a thoroughly anti-democratic, illiberal institution, led by an unelected Commission, designed to take decisions out of the hands of European voters. Which is why the issue of democracy and control was at the forefront when Brits wisely voted to leave this thing back in 2016.

You might think that your reasonable host ups the rant-to-dignified ratio a tad high when I write about the anti-American European Union as a proto-imperial project with the EU leadership and paid minions working every day to strip away the prefix.

But I stand behind that assessment. It's just the reality readily apparent without a starry-eyed (distant) view of "ever closer union" under Brussels rule. FFS, Britain wouldn't voluntarily walk back into that open-air continental prison camp, would it? 

UPDATE: Meanwhile on the continent:

German Government Collapse Is a Bad Sign for Europe

Hmmm. While no doubt bad for Germany, is this really bad for "Europe?" While it may be bad for the European Union, do not become confused and believe geographic Europe is the same as political Europe.

And I should note the author is a self-described "activist and commentator on EU policy, especially the environment, energy, and the rise of the far-right". Her doubling down on one cause of Europe's economic decline--a single-minded focus on "green" energy--as the solution undermines her credibility in my eyes.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.

NOTE: I made the illustration with my old DALL-E 3 account.

The Latest Fad From Europe Arrives

I think we should ease off on the enthusiastic embrace of unmanned surface drones.

Oh? 

A number of NATO countries are pursuing new naval concepts based on sea drones programmed to keep adversaries out of allied waters, a nod to Ukraine’s pursuits with such weapons against Russian ships. 

The alliance nations belong to the so-called Joint Capability Group for Maritime Unmanned Systems, or JCGMUS. The group, created following the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, comprises more than a dozen nations considered full members, partners or observers.

I see we are fully into Torpedo Boat Craze 2.0.  

UPDATE: The INDOPACOM commander isn't screeching like a fanboy.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

The Winter War of 2022 and the Art of the Ukraine Deal

Donald Trump will become the next president and the question of how this will affect American aid to Ukraine is obviously a big question. I see the issue as reliant on two main factors. Trump would not want to have a loss like Afghanistan on his watch. And Trump does not want America to look like a sucker for paying too much for what benefits Europe, too.

For now the war goes on, and the Biden administration is accelerating appropriated military aid to Ukraine, hoping to commit it before Trump is sworn in. Then the question is what Trump's policy will be.

First of all, the foundation of our options should be preventing Europe from being a platform to threaten America. That has been a longstanding problem for America that America's growing power only allowed it to seriously affect a little over a century ago.

This should mean America remains strongly involved in NATO but with Europeans picking up more of the defense slack. This keeps Russia away from the Atlantic at a lower cost than the Cold War required. And prevents the rise of the proto-imperial European Union that would eventually be a threat.

Second, Biden's approval and reputation abroad took a big hit when he needlessly lost the Afghanistan War in the mistaken belief that American desire to end that war included support for any path including abandoning the Afghanistan government, letting the Taliban win and capture a lot of American military equipment intended to fight the Taliban. 

And third, let's not pretend that ending the war is solely in American hands. As much as I believe Russia could crack first, Russia has the initiative on the battlefield and so Ukraine could break. No matter how much Ukraine wants its territory back, after nearly three years of war with no sign Russia can be pushed out, how much longer will Ukrainians be willing to fight even with massively escalated American military aid?

Yes, I remain perplexed that a lot of Republicans oddly came to oppose aiding Ukraine too much--or even at all. But when faced with defeat in Europe, some of that opposition to aid may well be superseded by horror at losing, if the Afghanistan defeat is any predictor. Given the highly partisan nature of our politics these days, other Republicans who oppose aid to Ukraine will tolerate or support continued aid. Welcome back to the party, eh?

Further, as I explained in that "perplexed" link above, I believe Biden only accidentally supported Ukraine in his belief that token arms for an insurgency and accepting a Ukrainian government-in-exile as Russia overran Ukraine would be enough to show this time--unlike in Afghanistan--America tried to do the right thing. Growing Democratic reversion to an anti-war stance on Ukraine--remember how Afghanistan went from their "good war" to just another bad one to "end"--will make it easier for Trump to find a way to support Ukraine.

I of course will not change my views on defense and national security issues based on political changes.  I've certainly changed my mind on some issues. Changing facts can require that. But you can certainly see that I don't blow with political winds given I have blogged since 2002.

I firmly believe "ending" the Winter War of 2022 should not mean that Ukraine loses the war. The problem is whether preventing Ukraine from losing now with a deal actually secures Ukraine or simply provides a decent interval before Russia resumes the war in a better military position than Ukraine.

Basically, does Trump let Putin get away with pretending the war is ended without any withdrawal; or does Trump react by arming Ukraine to the teeth?

The former risks Russia resuming the war sooner rather than later, possibly against a Ukraine demoralized by the losses it suffered without reclaiming any land it has lost since 2014.

And if the latter, how is the aid structured to be transactional and beneficial to America as well as to Ukraine? By using frozen Russian assets in the West? By deals that are paid with loans (and let future leaders decide if and how the loans are repaid)? By deals paid for by Europeans unable to increase their own defense industry to replace some of our weapons and munitions? By getting percentages of economic assets or strategic materials inside Ukraine as payment for arms that Ukraine says it must have to win?

Face it, a lot of ways exist for arms to flow to Ukraine without it being "aid" on our financial ledger. Including a peace deal that "sells" Crimea to Russia--plus back rent--and uses frozen Russian assets to pay Ukraine a high price for the lost territory that Ukraine can use to rebuild Ukraine. Heck, maybe that formula extends to pre-2022 Donbas conquests because Ukraine doesn't really want pro-Russian people inside Ukraine as a Fifth Column. Could Putin sell either as a victory that allows him to withdraw from Ukrainian territory captured since 2022?

Heck, Trump the deal maker might be entering office with really good timing to get a good deal:

The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy will likely face significant challenges in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is worried about Russia's economic stability in the long term.

And:

A recent Russian state-affiliated poll suggests that most Russian residents feel largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, supporting reports of growing concerns among Russian officials and elites that many citizens remain indifferent towards the war.

Remember, the idea that Trump is in thrall to Putin is refuted by comparing his record to Obama's. If that myth shapes your view on what Trump will do, the foundation of your opinion is weak. Given that Russia needs American friendship much more than America needs Russian friendship, Trump could get a very good deal for any so-called "reset." And if Ukraine is kept strong enough after the guns fall silent (I won't call it "peace"), the high losses Russia has endured may well--as it did in the original 1939-1940 Winter War that kept Finland independent--deter Russia from reigniting the war because it has bigger problems to cope with.

Trump might carry out policies in regard to Ukraine that I strongly oppose. But I don't think that the factors shaping Trump's policies mean that is likely. We'll see.

UPDATE (Monday): Related thoughts. I don't know how I missed it unless it only recently was added here. 

UPDATE (Tuesday) I think this is an accurate assessment at the thousand-day mark, as artificial as this mark is:

Russia is expending huge amounts of weaponry and human life to make small-but-steady territorial gains to the nearly one-fifth of Ukraine it already controls. Ukraine, meanwhile, is struggling to minimize losses, maintain morale and convince allies that, with more military aid, it can turn the tide. 

But implicit in that assessment is that the cost to Russia is a struggle for it to maintain, too. Yes, Putin is willing to pay that price. But can Russia cover his bloody check made in the currency of their lives?

UPDATE (Tuesday): I find this a fascinating inversion from the reason tanks were invited over a century ago--shielding infantry from growing battlefield firepower:

The Russian military command has likely assessed that offsetting Ukraine's drone advantages and reducing Russian armored vehicle losses through urban combat is worth the large numbers of Russian casualties that will come from grinding, attritional advances in frontline towns and cities.

The cogs will just have to turn and break their teeth on command. Can't risk those ancient T-62s, eh?

UPDATE (Wednesday): America now allows Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles in Russian territory around the Kursk salient:

Ukrainian forces struck the Russian military's 67th Main Military and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) arsenal of the 1046th Logistics Support Center near Karachev on the night of November 18 to 19 and that the strike caused an initial detonation and 12 secondary explosions.

This is not an American escalation and provocation that will lead to nuclear war between America and Russia. Russia is loudly complaining to frighten Westerners into limiting Western support. The big escalation was Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the first place.

UPDATE (Thursday): Regarding my Crimea proposal mentioned and linked in the main body, I've long said Ukraine may not want to pay the price to drive the Russians out:

Zelenskiy, interviewed by Fox News on a train in Ukraine and broadcast on Wednesday, said his country could not afford to lose the number of lives that would be required to retake Crimea through military means.

Ukraine needs our military aid and financial help. But Ukraine bleeds.

Maybe a peace plan requires Russia to withdraw from all Ukrainian territory in exchange for Ukraine remaining outside of NATO. It would be a well-armed Ukraine that cooperates with NATO. But not an alliance member with other NATO facilities or combat units inside Ukraine. If Russia declines that bargain, Ukraine enters NATO.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.