Friday, January 01, 2021

Power Projection for the Era of Great Power Competition

As a Western Hemisphere superpower, America needs to control the seas to project power into the Old World to defend allies and national interests. And that power includes ground power which is reliant on the control of the seas (and air above them) to contribute. An era of great power competition requires far greater resources to project more power and revives the need to protect the logistics effort.

The Navy needs to build the ability to project and sustain naval power to distant theaters of war:

Should the Navy have to reduce its presence, lose access to some of its few remaining forward bases, and then deploy into an area that it does not expect, it currently lacks the means to do so. The maritime infrastructure of the nation needs significant investment so it could quickly prepare its vessels. The Navy needs to invest in tenders or modular repair facilities to maintain ships in a forward operating area. It would also need vessels and crews to replenish them, meaning a viable American merchant marine with ships, trained personnel, and shipyards. Finally, it must ensure the safe arrival of supplies by defending merchant shipping with convoy escorts.

Even an Army general can recognize that naval, air, and space power is necessary to protect America and project power:

If the Pentagon needed to reorient its priorities with a lower topline, the current National Defense Strategy would lean toward naval power, Milley said.

“The fundamental defense of the United States, and the ability to project power forward is going to be naval and air and space power,” he said.

Any why wouldn't he recognize that reality? Do you think the Army wants a larger force just to be sent to a distant battlefield where it will be cut off and die? Bataan is not forgotten ancient history

Maybe being able to protect lines of supply would be a good thing for the Navy to master:

Current navy force structure proposals, part of the Future Naval Force Study, are too focused on the offensive at the expense of the convoy escort mission. For example, neither the Hudson Institute’s nor former Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s plans appear to allocate any vessels to this vital mission. While the plans do include several frigates and other escort vessels, those appear to be tasked with escorting replenishment groups or other striking forces — not merchant convoys. The force structures ultimately paint the picture of a Navy built for itself: offensive power and ships to sustain offensive power. The Navy is potentially preparing for the wrong war entirely.

I'm all on board that convoy issue:

Given the improvement in surveillance and precision weapons that make finding and sinking ships easier than the past when convoys were absolutely needed, I don't know why the need to protect unarmed merchant ships in sea lines of supply during a great power war is even being questioned.

One problem with the article about convoys is that ultimately the issue is framed as one of resupply at sea rather than supplying American forces fighting across the seas.

One thing that I really liked was this suggestion:

Additionally, we can increase the convoy's ability to be successful by adding modular defenses to existing platforms or developing logistics platforms with defense capabilities similar to what the modern-day destroyer has aboard. This is an area where containerized payloads and launchers may be a low cost, high leverage measure.

I wrote about using container ships as auxiliary cruisers equipped with containerized systems. I called them modularized auxiliary cruisers, and one use I mentioned was to escort convoys to free up warships for sea control duty. That was especially important as our post-Cold War fleet became more top heavy with fewer high-capability ships. The rise of Chinese naval power required a means to expand naval power for non-sea control missions that the Navy warships would need to focus on controlling the seas.

And I included the need to build the logistics to sustain the Army when I wrote, in Military Review, about using the Army for its core competency across INDOPACOM and for a Taiwan scenario in particular.

America once more needs to be able to project and sustain significant military power around the globe.