So what is the future of the super carrier in the Navy after 2040?
In March 2020, the now-former U.S. acting Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), Thomas Modly, established the “Future Carrier 2030 Task Force” (FC-2030). The task force aimed to commission a six-month study on the aircraft carrier's future viability (CV) and carrier-based aviation (CVA) concepts. The FC-2030 ran parallel to another study commissioned by the then Deputy Defense Secretary David Norquist on the USN’s “Future Fleet Platform Architecture” (FFPA).
The establishment of the FC-2030 and FFPA came amid an organization-wide transformative effort by the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) to prepare for a future great-power conflict against the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Indo-Pacific region. As such, both sought to complement the USN’s “Distributed Maritime Operations” (DMO) and the USMC’s “Expeditionary Advance Base Operations” (EABO) concepts, as General David Berger explained in a recent “Commandant Planning Guidance” report.
Quite some time ago I thought the carrier needed to be phased out of the fleet in favor of networked forces:
The emergence of network-centric warfare does not mean the near-term obsolescence of large aircraft carriers. The useful roles for these aircraft carriers will diminish in time, however, beginning with the forward presence role. In a peacetime operating routine, aircraft carriers that sail in another nation's surveillance and strike network will be vulnerable to a bolt from the blue and may actually invite war rather than deter it. Only against enemies incapable of striking them will carriers retain their power to awe in peacetime engagement. They may become the aging gunslingers relying on their reputation from the glory days. As strike platforms in the Navy's network, aircraft carriers will retain a role far longer, but even in this role they will face limits. The Navy will need to keep them far from the enemy, closing the range only to strike. This will preserve the carriers for war fighting missions on American terms and preclude tempting an enemy into initiating a conflict in order to strike a serious blow at the onset of war.
I should note that sinking a carrier isn't necessary for a mission kill that lasts the duration of a war.
And shore-based assets in advanced bases with the Marines' new EABO fit with this networked force, too. I wanted dispersed Marine Expeditionary Companies on fast armed transports, as I argued for in Proceedings several years ago (membership required):
[Marine advanced bases] will allow the United States to “turn the A2/AD table” on an enemy by deploying weapons and sensors in a “network of numerous austere bases—by occupation or seizure—as a means of dispersing aircraft, missiles, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets” that deny an enemy the ability to operate in those waters and in that air space. Such advance expeditionary bases equipped with long-range strike, antiship, and antiair systems would function as “sea denial outposts.”
Such outposts—quickly established and abandoned as needed—could be used for forward arming and refueling points to support dispersed air operations ashore, making a transition between sea-based and land-based Marine air power truly seamless.
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) also should be part of the dragon swarm concept. The NECC could create island defense forces of mixed infantry, air defense, and antiship (tube, rocket, and missile) units. Their coastal riverine force patrol boats also would contribute. Used in place of MECs, NECC coastal defense units would hold small islands and force an enemy to operate in an A2/AD environment.
The Marines have really embraced this role. Perhaps too much because I think NECC units could do a lot of what Marines will do. The first Littoral Regiment for that role will be formed next fiscal year.
And I'm not happy with the envisioned Light Amphibious Warfare ship for the new role.
My view on carriers supports the post-2040 time frame of the new inquiry. We have carriers. Simply dumping ships with 50-year lifespans loses their capabilities in situation short of general war for control of the seas. They will also be useful for air defense and for pursuing and destroying broken fleets. And for exploiting sea control to project power ashore. For a while, at least.
Mostly I want to move beyond carrier debates to sea power debates.
