A Proceedings article argues for arming merchant ships with missiles and systems in shipping containers to supplement the fleet and reinforce it in wartime. Welcome to the party, pal.
I fully endorse this call for auxilary cruisers, citing foreign systems:
The Russian Kalibr cruise missile, with a 1,000-pound warhead and a range of up to 1,500 miles, can be purchased installed in standard shipping containers. Russia also offers command-and-control and support containers. Israel’s Long-Range Attack (LORA) system has a range of about 250 miles and an accuracy of 30 feet. The mobile land-based system has been in service for ten years, and the containerized naval system has been test fired. According to a published report:
No modifications to the ship are required once the weapons system is loaded on. In addition to offensive missiles, cargo ships can be equipped with canisterized and/or concealed anti-ship missiles and guns, as well as air and missile defense interceptors and sensors—making them asymmetric and concealable warships.
For its part, China appears to be developing a container-launched version of the YJ-18C (a version of a Russian Kalibr variant missile).10 Given China’s large merchant marine fleet and tens of thousands of fishing vessels, this system could provide the PLAN effectively unlimited launch platforms.11
Containerized weapons and support equipment are multimodal. They can be employed from container ships and the decks of warships or even moved ashore.
I endorse it because I proposed the same thing in 2007 and posted it here in 2009:
Our Navy defends our nation within the incompatible and unforgiving boundaries formed by the tyrannies of distance and numbers. We struggle to build enough ships both capable of deploying globally and powerful enough for fighting first-rate opponents. Operating within a network-centric Navy, auxiliary cruisers could once again play a valuable role in projecting naval power. Using modular systems installed on civilian hulls, auxiliary cruisers could handle many peacetime roles; free scarce warships for more demanding environments; add combat power within a networked force; and promote the global maritime partnership.
Our Navy is surely superior to any conceivable combination of potential foes, alarmism notwithstanding. Yet as a global power, our sea power cannot be narrowly defined by our superb warships able to win conventional sea-control campaigns. We have many objectives at sea. Modularized Auxiliary Cruisers could provide the numbers we need to achieve our maritime objectives. The tyranny of numbers matters to the United States Navy.
I've mentioned all three "missiles in a box" noted in that initial article over the last nine years in support of the concept. And in a late entry to this issue as I write this post, I received an email about this news:
The U.S. Marine Corps general in charge of the U.S. Navy’s expeditionary warfare directorate said the Navy is looking at options to increase the lethality of its amphibious warfare ships with a containerized weapon system. A demonstration of this capability may occur after a year of development.
Speaking to reporters on Jan. 8, MGen Tracy W. King, director of expeditionary warfare in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, did not specify which types of missile could or would arm an amphibious warfare [L-class] ship, but a leading candidate is the RGM-184 Naval Strike Missile (NSM) — built by a Raytheon-Konigsberg partnership, being installed on littoral combat ships and the Constellation-class guided-missile frigate.
So the building blocks are finally being made here.
China's fleet has made great strides in the last 14 years, of course, since my initial proposal. So sea control is a major mission that auxiliary cruisers should be focused on. Yet auxiliary cruisers used for secondary missions could also free up warships for sea control missions.
I only hinted at the potential for landing containerized assets for humanitarian missions. Yet when I adapted the proposal for power projection missions around Africa, in a 2016 Military Review article "The AFRICOM Queen," I raised that issue more directly:
Some ground-oriented missions could be carried out by American forces that remained on a modularized auxiliary cruiser that would enter the port or stay offshore if the mission was a single, brief operation or if local sentiment or threat levels ruled out even a temporary land presence. Longer missions could be conducted by personnel and mission packages deployed ashore for months, on the coast, or inland via contractor-provided land or air transport. Deploying elements ashore would allow the modularized auxiliary cruiser to move on to other locations and other missions. Ground-force mission packages used by small detachments of Army, Marine Corps, or Special Operations Command troops could provide a ground-force option on the scene to support local security in a nonmilitary mission, or as a rapid-reaction force for Army regionally aligned forces.
With Marines more focused on supporting the fleet, these containerized missiles and systems would make excellent assets for creating a web of missiles to torment the PLAN from islands in the western Pacific.
Rather than owning the merchant ships, I called for a naval version of the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet:
The Department of Defense Civil Reserve Air Fleet program presents a model for building a pool of available container ships to create modularized auxiliary cruisers. This aviation program compensates American civilian airlines or other entities for enrolling aircraft that meet performance requirements as a reserve source of airlift capacity. As of June 2014, the Air Force had 553 aircraft from twenty-four carriers contracted through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).18 The Army could create a Civilian Reserve Cruiser Fleet by paying shipping companies to modify certain container ships to accommodate mission packages and keep USAFRICOM informed of their location and availability status at all times. With a large enough pool of container ships to draw from, some would be clear of most cargo at any given time. For emergencies, there could be additional payments from the U.S. government to compensate the shipping company and cargo owners for inconvenience.
But ownership should be considered for war time given that container ship losses would be assumed rather than a rarity calling for compensation for losses during the post-Cold War era environment I originally wrote about. The need for numbers is greater now so the value of Modularized Auxiliary Cruisers is greater.
As the author notes, China would initiate combat and so we'd have to survive the initial onslaught on our outnumbered forward deployed ships before reinforcing and counterattacking, as I've noted. Dangling cheaper ships, including modularized auxiliary cruisers, for forward peacetime presence would be preferable to losing high-end ships right off the bat if the area goes hot fast.
I heartily endorse the T. X. Hammes' proposal and commend him for it, including the details of cost that I did not have the background to even attempt. He also proposes different sized auxiliary warships which I hadn't considered until Think Defence commented on my post, as I noted in an update. My thinking was more for power projection than sea control. And for the latter, smaller modularized auxiliary cruisers would be more useful than the long-endurance ships I wanted.
Although I'll admit it would have been nice to have made a footnote. But the idea is the important thing and I'm grateful it has a Navy audience now.
NOTE: I really don't like the new Blogger editing. I have much more difficulty formatting and fixing formatting.
NOTE: I added links regarding Marines supporting the fleet and the Navy surviving the initial PLAN onslaught that I forgot when published.
