Is Russia sowing the seeds of its own destruction? But would that do Ukraine any good in the short run?
Russia continues to target Ukrainian cities--at a substantially higher rate now--while Ukraine strikes deep in Russia against military targets and logistics. While the front as a whole only changes slowly, it worries me that Ukraine is losing ground in the western Donbas under the stress of Russian ground pressure:
Outmanned, outgunned, exhausted, Ukrainian troops are stretched to the breaking point by a Russian Army willing and able to throw more men and more weaponry to overrun Kyiv's defenses.
I worry that Ukraine can't stop the Russians and wonder how long can Ukraine endure this. Is Russia's advance limited more by their own shortcomings rather than Ukrainian resistance? ISW reports two things that seem to indicate the war is on the knife's edge. One, my worry as Russia grinds forward:
Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop ongoing Russian offensive operations, but the Russian military cannot sustain such loss rates indefinitely, especially not for such limited gains.
And two, my hope that Russia can't continue as it is:
Russian forces reportedly lost almost 200 tanks, over 650 armored vehicles, and suffered an estimated 80,000 casualties in taking roughly 1,500 square kilometers during a period of intensified Russian offensive operations in September and October 2024.
Whose will to fight breaks first? For now the war drags on. Time alone pushes combatants to extreme measures to finally win and escape the drain of blood and treasure with no end in sight. It is most evident in the conduct of Russia's ground forces. Is Russia's brutality in war creating a fifth column inside Russia?
ISW has observed numerous instances of Russian military personnel, especially former Wagner Group fighters, committing gruesome acts against fellow Russian servicemen on the frontlines, Ukrainian forces and civilians, and Russian citizens upon their return from the frontlines. Russia is likely to see a significant rise of brutality and cruelty in its communities upon the arrival of more traumatized Russian servicemen home as long as it continues to brutalize its soldiers; refuses to provide the necessary psychological assistance to returning veterans; and militarizes its society, educational institutions, and government.
As I've long noted, I think an important reason to have rules of war is that it helps our citizen-soldiers fight what is inherently a brutal business come home with their heads held high. By fighting by means judged by superiors to be lawful, killing becomes less of a "thou shalt not kill" murder and more of a fighting for a good cause to defend our free nation.
Russian soldiers are more at risk of coming home with the mindset of the former rather than the latter because they are expected to--and often ordered to--be brutal to their enemies, the people they've conquered, and even their fellow troops.
And if that is a spark inside Russia, Putin is also scattering gasoline across Russia.
But Russian internal disorder may not matter to Ukraine if it loses this war first.
UPDATE (Monday): It is certainly true enough that "the Russo-Ukraine War is a secondary concern that needs to be concluded so that we can restore our focus on China."
But that doesn't mean Russia isn't a serious concern. And it doesn't mean that "concluded" can include "lost" unless we want the price of defending our national security interest in Europe to go up and dilute our ability to focus on China.
As the author notes, it doesn't seem like Trump will accept a serious defeat of Ukraine even if it involves losing territory. But I honestly don't know if Ukrainians are willing to pay the price to eject Russia from all the territory Russia has conquered since 2014, no matter how much the West arms and support Ukraine.
UPDATE (Tuesday): ISW sees more of a threat from Russia's offensive in the Vuhledar region:
ISW is revising its previous assessment that Russian forces would not likely be able to take advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. That assessment was incorrect.
Yeah, in an update in this post I had my doubts about the previous comforting assessment:
This seems to be moving the goal posts quite a bit to minimize the significance of recent Russian advances around Vuhledar. Obviously nothing Russia has done matches their very early war advances into Ukraine.
The Russian advance may very well culminate before achieving anything of operational significance. But the advances are faster lately. Why?
Where are Ukraine's reserves? I've long hoped this year that Ukraine has reserves to give Russia a good counter-punch in the nose at one sector of the front where Russia is advancing. Hit them when they lack fortifications and are tired. I especially hoped for a counter-attack at the Avdiivka salient apparently aiming for Pokrovsk. But there has been nothing.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: I made the image with Bing.
