I viewed Ukraine's Kursk operation as a raid. As long as Ukraine doesn't lose too many troops and too much equipment to hold it, I felt this was useful. Has Ukraine grown too attached to holding the region, risking a catastrophic defeat? Is this a salient too far? And if it is, how much further away is Crimea and other areas Russia has conquered since 2014?
I've been increasingly worried about this:
Unfortunately for Kyiv, the offensive operation in Kursk can produce catastrophic results. Especially if we speak about the upcoming engagement of the Northern Korean Armed Forces in Kursk region. With this operation Ukraine has overextended the front line, depleted reserves of the best-trained and younger forces, drained the supply of armored and motorized vehicles, and expanded the warzone by several hundred additional square kilometers. Although Ukraine continues its operation despite the Russian counteroffensive, the associated risks are now dangerously high. A potential defeat of Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) —whether through encirclement or a chaotic withdrawal—would be far more damaging to Ukrainian leadership than the initial surge of emotional support that followed the beginning of the operation.
I don't assume that just because Russia hasn't achieved a breakthrough that Russia can't. So far my worry has been focused in the Donbas near Pokrovsk and more recently the area north and northeast of Vuhledar. Russia's long, slow drive on Pokrovsk ground to a halt at the gates of Pokrovsk. But my worry that Russia can resume that advance may be misplaced. And my worry the Vuhledar front where Russian advances have recently picked up may be misplaced:
Ukraine’s ability to stave off the seizure of Pokrovsk thus far and force the Russian military to divert its efforts to advances in arguably the least operationally significant sector of the frontline is a positive indicator of Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting this war despite the challenges Ukraine faces and the setbacks it has suffered.
Granted, my worries are not in the short term but in the long term if Ukraine can't stop Russia before it takes something of significance. And ISW seems to share that worry. But my worry that Ukraine's troops on that front could crack under the pressure might be unjustified right now.
And I worry that the Kursk salient could join these areas as a cause for active worry.
Ukraine can't be so attached to the territory it captured from Russia that it risks its military. As I've advised Ukraine from the beginning in 2014, preserving the army is the foundation for all else. Taking excessive risks for little real gain is a mistake. I might be worried about Ukraine essentially doing what I think is best. And I may worry because the metric of seeing Russia advance and Ukraine retreat is the only tangible result my brain is really absorbing. How the armies are holding up under the stress remain a fear for Ukraine and a hope for Russia, rather than something I can readily measure.
Russia seems to be going for broke, throwing armored vehicles at Ukraine to gain ground--possibly anticipating a ceasefire wherever the armies stand when the whistle blows--and losing staggering amounts.
The Russian military command’s poor treatment of and failure to support Russian soldiers is likely contributing to mass desertions.But it remains a hope. And I hate to rely on that. But sometimes you have to hang on and hope for something to change--either from your own actions or outside factors. But if Russia's army breaks under the strain of its intensified but costly attacks, we may look at hiring the North Korean contingent as a desperate effort to stop a Russian collapse rather than a scary step to break Ukraine.
Yet if Ukraine thought the Kursk incursion would change the course of the war, it seemingly failed (back to the initial link):
It seems that Ukraine is desperately trying to escape the Donbas-centric war, which has become a deathtrap. In the Donbas, Ukraine has limited chances to alter the course of the war, as the Donbas remains one of the most urbanized areas of Ukraine.
After Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive crashed and burned, I wrote that each side would seek to overcome the stalemate and I went through a number of efforts in World War I to do that. Can either side find something to break the ground stalemate?
At some point Ukraine has to stop Russia. Retreating to preserve the army has limits. Ukraine is big but it isn't infinite. Eventually Russia's small gains could be decisive even if Russia never breaks through to take territory at wholesale prices. Will North Korea feed men to die in this war indefinitely to make the price in Russians acceptable? Can Ukraine strengthen its military enough with Western military aid to achieve that? Will Russia falter as the price it pays to win climbs ever higher?
That initial author's conclusion seems about right:
In general, it can be concluded that both armies are nearing culmination and perhaps the final stage of the war.
Could be. But if so I don't think that mutual culmination means the war ends. The Iran-Iraq War certainly showed that big, bloody operations can be followed by relative quiet and rebuilding for the next big operation. I also suspect that both Ukraine and Russia effectively culminated in autumn 2023. Yet the war went on.
The initial author raises the possibility that NATO forces might enter the fight if Russia advances too far west. Early in the war I said I didn't think America should directly intervene if Russian remains in the east. But I thought that if Russia threatened to capture territory west of the Dnipro River that we'd have to consider that scary option. Before the war I said I wouldn't be shocked at this outcome:
Sometimes I wonder if the end point of the Ukraine crisis is an East Ukraine under Russian control and a West Ukraine admitted to NATO and the EU.
That's not ideal, however. It would be a new front line between NATO and Russia. Because if the Russians then take all of Ukraine, the future could look very scary. And at best the cost of holding the line at NATO's existing front becomes much higher. And the price of holding the line gets higher as the Russians push west.
Have a super sparkly day.
UPDATE (Monday): My brief suspension of worry about the Vuhledar sector is over:
Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.
Not long after Russia captured Vuhledar, I could see Russia was advancing at a faster pace and that worried me. Unless Ukraine is pulling Russian troops into a trap to launch a major counter-attack, I'm officially beyond worried and into "concerned" territory.
UPDATE (Monday): Is the race between Russian and Ukrainian popular support for the war?
If so, Ukraine has the advantage of defending its homeland rather than waging a war of aggression.
When I wrote about World War I providing lessons for breaking a ground stalemate, I noted cracking morale for both the Russians and Germans--and almost for France.
In World War I, Russia cracked first and agreed to peace on German terms. But Germany had other enemies and eventually broke second, losing the entire war and negating Russia's initial cracking. In the Winter War of 2022, whoever cracks first loses the war.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: I made the image with Bing.
