Russia has a sizable population advantage over Ukraine. Russia uses it to grind forward across the Donbas region. But what are the limits on exploiting that? Because have no doubt, there is a limit even for Russia.
The war goes on. Russia is seemingly poised to capture the town of Vuhledar in eastern part of the south, which has
withstood Russian assaults for over two years. While it is not itself
significant, the loss after holding it for so long is bound to be
deflating for Ukraine. We'll see if Russia's losses were worth it. Attacks in the east continue to claw forward. Meanwhile in the Kursk region, Russia's command-and-control seems chaotic.
Russia has been plugging disposable cogs into the Russian war machine at a blistering pace:
The number of Russian deaths in Ukraine since the start of the invasion has topped 70,000, according to a new report.
The BBC citing data from Russian independent media outlet Mediazona said that at least 70,112 Russians have now been killed in Ukraine, with most of the dead being civilian volunteers who signed up to fight in the war after the 2022 invasion.
According to the outlets, the figure was compiled from obituaries, death notices, information on graves, and other public information, such as official reports.
We're not talking World War II levels of Russians being slaughtered. But Putin, as bad as he is, doesn't have the level of fear-based control that Stalin wielded. And Russia was invaded in 1941 by a brutal enemy in contrast to being the brutal invader this war.
Putin certainly gives indications he believes Russia has manpower limits:
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential. ...
Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability.
The Kremlin appears to be reorganizing Russia's decentralized, regional volunteer recruitment campaigns into a federal effort, indicating that Russia is struggling to meet the manpower demands of its war in Ukraine despite previous claims that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast caused a spike in Russia's volunteer recruitment.
Oh sure, even demographically imploding but still-large Russia has the young men it could put in uniform. We'll gloss over whether they can be trained, equipped, and properly led before being thrown into the war.
But people are not cogs no matter how much Putin might want them to be. So far Russians accept volunteers being killed in large numbers. Hence Putin's hesitation to mobilize reservists again to keep potential resistance away. Yes, Russia's will to fight could break.
Maybe Russians unaffected by the death toll will remain tolerant enough. That's certainly the way to bet based on recent experience:
A rebellion against the new dictatorship has been derailed by astute propaganda depicting Russia as under siege by the West and NATO. Opinion polls show wide popular support for this paranoid fantasy but some Russians continue to struggle for better government and beneficial reforms.
For now. But Putin can't count on that:
Kremlin officials are likely wary of war fatigue among the Russian population and are attempting to maintain public support for the war by highlighting the Kremlin's attention to social projects.
And at the front, will the cogs who are expected to die revolt? Or at least stop volunteering?
UPDATE (Tuesday): The West has limits, too, and Ukraine knows it:
Zelenskiy stressed the importance of the upcoming Ukraine Defense Contract Meeting at the U.S. Ramstein Air Base in Germany and stressed the need to make gains ahead of the gathering to assure Western allies of Ukraine’s ability to make battlefield gains.
Ukraine feels it faces a Saratoga moment.
UPDATE: Attrition:
Recent Ukrainian attacks destroyed substantial stockpiles of Russian munitions, in addition to stockpiles of vehicle and aviation fuel. This means that for the next few months the Russians will be unable to launch major military operations. Attacking with just infantry and no artillery or airstrike support is suicidal. Russian infantry losses have been so heavy since 2022 that Russia is running out of even untrained and ineffective infantry.
Yet Russia continues to be able to rely on the willingness of the cogs to die.
UPDATE: This author doesn't see any limits:
Russia has also suffered dramatic losses. But it is in position to replenish casualties. Even without resorting to a general draft, the Kremlin has been feeding its army with hundreds of thousands of new troops, most of whom are under contract. Mother Russia pays rather well too. An average soldier from Moscow gets about $60,000 a year.
As for hardware, contrary to what Western media had predicted in the beginning of the war, Russia has been able to fully repair and replace – or even increase – the number of damaged or destroyed tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery pieces.
Although I strongly quibble with the notion that either Napoleon or Hitler intended to wage a war of attrition to defeat Russia (or the Soviet Union).
He says the realization has set in that Ukraine may not be able to liberate its territory is now being broached. Nobody would raise it until now. I certainly did in 2022 because I recognized that there are limits to what Ukrainians would sacrifice to liberate territory. And I've raised that willingness to die since then.
Still, I don't assume Russia will necessarily win a war of attrition. I said that early, too.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
