Current projections at the Pentagon are for the first of the five surge brigades to start coming home in April 2008. The surge could be prolonged by either calling up more National Guard brigades or by extending deployments beyond 15 months, but neither option is terribly likely.
In all likelihood, by August 2008 the U.S. troop contingent will be down from 160,000 to 130,000, the pre-surge level. What then? The prudent course would be to maintain a substantial force into 2009, by which time Petraeus' Joint Campaign Plan aims to create "sustainable security." That goal seems consistent with the findings of a congressionally chartered commission led by retired Gen. James Jones, which reported that "the Iraqi army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from coalition forces."
It will be years before the Iraqi military is independent of U.S. support when it comes to vital "combat enablers," such as air cover, communications and logistics, but the same could be said about many of our NATO allies. More significant is that the Jones commission found "the Iraqi army possesses an adequate supply of willing and able manpower" and that "there is evidence to show that the emerging Iraqi soldier is willing to fight against the declared enemies of the state, with some exceptions remaining along ethnic lines."
I figured our surge would tail off after the spring. But if we need to do it to win, those Guard brigades will be called up to extend the surge into the summer.
And the issue of the Iraqi army being unable to fight without our help with combat enablers is correct. More importantly, Boot rightly notes that this is a common deficiency of our allies. Note Canada's intelligence issues in Afghanistan:
The Canadian armed forces are tackling a serious inability to quickly provide troops with military intelligence, a problem that has hampered the country's Afghan mission, a senior officer said on Friday.
This is nothing against the high quality Canadian army. But small countries often don't find it cost-effective to replicate the United States military at a small scale.
So you will read plenty of stories like this about the Iraqis:
It will be two years before Iraq's fighting forces are able to provide the support that combat units need to succeed on the battlefield, according to a new independent assessment.
"Logistics remains the Achilles' heel of the Iraqi ground forces," said a commission chaired by retired Marine Corps Gen. James Jones.
The commission's report, released Thursday, said U.S. and coalition forces often have to make sure the Iraqis have enough fuel even though the Iraqis took over responsibility for fuel distribution months ago.
The Iraqis don't take care of their equipment — preventive maintenance is an "alien concept," the report said. A depot in Taji, 20 miles north of Baghdad, is stocked with vehicles, ammunition, boots and uniforms, yet the commission heard frequently of Iraqi troops being unable to get the gear.
And with the need to train Shias and Kurds for the higher ranking officer positions in a new military, we should not be surprised that the Iraqis cannot do it all yet.
And that has been the plan. We focused on building up the frontline fighters so that in time we could pull back and support the Iraqi line battalions with our own combat enablers. Then, as the Iraqis learned the trade of logistics and other combat support functions, we'd pull out.
Don't get all worried about things comletely expected and normal.
