Tuesday, December 03, 2024

Israel Pauses to Regroup?

Israel has accepted a ceasefire that pushes Hezbollah out of the war. Will it work or will it just allow Israel to regroup for a bigger war? 

Israel has ended the phase of its war that focused on Hezbollah (and so I won't be updating that post going forward). With only a shallow ground invasion of Israel and a long and an effective espionage and air campaign against Hezbollah's leadership and rocket arsenal--combined with apparent Hezbollah reluctance to do more than Solidarity Theater at the side of Hamas--Israel has pushed Hezbollah (and its Iranian patron) to a ceasefire in Lebanon that went into effect on November 27th:

The text published by Israeli media requires a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26, 2025. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported the deal in a message to his ministers and noted that Israel needs to focus on Iran, the need to rest its forces, and further isolating Hamas. The ceasefire calls for a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to dismantle all non-state military infrastructure, prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament, and deploy to southern Lebanon to play a predominant security role there. The ceasefire agreement also contains a self-defense clause that would allow Israel to act against Hezbollah if needed. US President Joe Biden said that the deal is designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. Only Lebanon and Israel are parties to the agreement, and it is the Lebanese state’s responsibility to ensure Hezbollah’s compliance. An independent committee advised by the United States and France, in addition to the current UN observer force in southern Lebanon, will monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement. The exact structure of the monitoring committee is not codified in the ceasefire text. The deal includes a US letter affirming support for any future Israel operations needed to combat Hezbollah violations of the deal.

Hezbollah is defeated. But it is not destroyed. But why die to support crushed Hamas? And Iran sure isn't coming to the rescue.

Hamas is feeling alone now, and announced it is ready for a ceasefire deal with Israel. That could be good as long as the ceasefire is actually a Hamas surrender with the term "ceasefire" is just a fig leaf to let Hamas pretend it didn't surrender. 

What does Israel do now? 

Is this peace for our time? Can the Lebanese army really keep Hezbollah and other jihadis out of southern Lebanon? Can UNIFAIL reform into UNIFIL as it was supposed to be after the 2006 war? Will America back Israel's efforts to maintain the Hezbollah-free zone?

Does Israel anticipate Hezbollah trying to re-infiltrate southern Lebanon? And with two or three months to prepare, Israel can resume the war to really tear up Hezbollah? This deal runs counter to my expectations for a deep ground raid lasting months. 

To be fair, my expectation was formed by the inability of Israel's Iron Dome to stop a hail of Hezbollah rockets and missiles. But Hezbollah--perhaps unwilling to do more than carry out Solidarity Theater for Hamas--never really surged a barrage to do that. Instead, Israel was able to destroy a large fraction (80% by memory) of Hezbollah's rockets from the air over the last year--and especially over the last couple months. Israel also smashed up Hezbollah's command structure.

So the foundation of my expectation did not take place. Is this good enough? And if so, is it lasting? And if Hezbollah returns and rearms, will it fire at maximum rate from day one to avoid their rocket arsenal's destruction in this war?

Is it time for quiet intelligence and police work to find Hamas in the West Bank?

Could Iran's assets in Syria be the target? This takes advantage of the surprise opposition offensive. Although some portion of the opposition is made up of jihadis, so encouraging them at this point might be a problem for Israel if no jihadi alternative to Assad is likely to take over. Maybe Israel could support Assad in order to defeat the jihadis and eject Iran.

Of course, if this is the next phase of the war it may not be Israel's choice:

The assault comes as Assad faces growing domestic and external pressures in a country shattered by a civil war that erupted after a 2011 popular uprising. He was able to quash the original rebellion with military backing from Russia, Iran and Iranian-backed groups, including Hizbollah, the Lebanese militant movement.

The fighting in Syria’s civil war had largely diminished in recent years, with the remnants of the armed opposition pushed to northern and northwestern areas of the country close to the Turkish border.

But over the past year, Israel has stepped up its air strikes on Iranian-affiliated targets in Syria as it has launched an offensive against Hizbollah in Lebanon, weakening the groups that had played a crucial role in supporting the Assad regime. The Israeli military said it struck “military infrastructure” linked to Hizbollah in Syria near the Lebanese border on Saturday.

HTS’s ability to fight inside Aleppo is a devastating blow to Assad and underscores the regime’s weakness.

“This is very serious for Assad,” said Malik al-Abdeh, a Syrian analyst. “Israel’s attacks against Iran and Hizbollah created the window of opportunity for this to happen. The long attritional war between Israel and Iran has clearly taken its toll on Iran’s capacity to deploy and fight in Syria.”

There is some irony in this given that I believed that Hezbollah's losses propping up Assad in Syria provided an opportunity for Israel to attack a weakened Hezbollah while Syria was recovering.

I could see Israel feeling compelled to bomb jihadis to prop up the Assad regime as the lesser of two evils. Assad at least had kept the Golan Heights front quiet. Israel would be happy to kill two birds with one stone if Hezbollah and Syrian jihadis chew each other up. And maybe Iran will be able to convince Hezbollah to once again enter the breach of Syria's multi-war (it's too complicated to call it a mere civil war) now that it doesn't have to worry about Israel. Or maybe Iran expended too much of its power (both its own and its proxies) attacking Israel to prop up Assad now. Especially with Turkey assisting the jihadi-led offensive.

Or maybe Israel turns to smash up the Houthi and re-open Red Sea shipping. That scores points with Egypt, which gets significant revenue from Suez Canal tolls.

Maybe Israel exploits Hezbollah's defeat to really put the screws to Hamas while Hezbollah has stood down to lick its wounds. Israel now has explicit approval to pound Hezbollah if it tries to react to such an effort. Could Israel be radical in a long-term plan to help Gazans choose leaders who will build up Gaza rather than kill Israelis?

Maybe Israel expands the war to Iran's proxies in Iraq--which should have been America's fight to eliminate Iran's power inside Iraq. Iraq doesn't want to get involved but hasn't been able to suppress the largely unpopular Iranian influence. Although I strongly object to the idea that Iranian and American forces "exacerbate" the threat of violence. Iran exacerbates violence and America is a force balancing that malign influence.

Or--and I'm reaching--does Israel think it can go to the source of Israel's lethal ring of enemies to cut the Gordian Knot? 

I just don't believe for a moment that we have peace for our time or that Israel thinks it achieved that with this ceasefire. 

Still, it is also possible that Israelis are at their limit of sacrifice after crushing Hamas and Hezbollah.

And one last thing. Perhaps Hezbollah's defeat will temporarily tamp down the perennial claim that killing jihadis isn't effective and likely counter-productive. Because I don't see Hezbollah really fired up about their jihad against Israel right now.

UPDATE: At what point would Iranian troops provoke Israel to strike them?

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran is open to the possibility of sending troops to Syria to help President Bashar al-Assad's forces after a major offensive by rebels.

Assad would have to be desperate to make that request, knowing Iranians would be hard to expel once inside Syria. 

UPDATE: Two more audition for the lead role in the next act:

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels said they have targeted Israel with drones three times in the past 48 hours in cooperation with their allies in Iraq.

UPDATE: ISW looks at Israel's victory over Hezbollah that drove it out of the war Hamas started.

But can Israel keep Hezbollah from rebuilding the threat it recently posed to Israel? Much depends on the Lebanese government and UNIFIL not being intimidated by or sympathetic to Hezbollah.

UPDATE: I'm hearing that what I thought were jihadis have evolved into "Islamism in one state" rebels focused on Syria. Even if true, I'm skeptical that Islamists can restrain their ambitions for long if they get their state.

UPDATE: As I read debates about how the frozen conflict in northwestern Syria thawed out right now, I'd rather know who equipped and supported the rebels to the extent they could launch an offensive. I guess Turkey has a hand in this. But did it really want or even just anticipate an offensive?

UPDATE: Hezbollah knows it got its butt kicked. That's why it agreed to a ceasefire and effectively retreated. So why is Hezbollah still shooting at Israel?

As tit-for-tat strikes strain a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah less than a week since it went into effect, Israel’s defense minister on Tuesday threatened to directly target the Lebanese state should the agreement fall apart.

Monday was the deadliest day since that agreement came into force last Wednesday, with Israeli strikes killing nine in southern Lebanon after Hezbollah fired at Israeli-occupied territory, citing Israeli truce violations.

“If we return to war, we will act with strength, go deeper,” Israel Katz said during a visit on Tuesday to the 146th Division of the Israel Defense Forces, near the Lebanese border. 

Has Hezbollah had second thoughts? Does it think it can resume the old rules of limited fighting that Hezbollah can endure? Are factions who disagree with giving up for now outside of Hezbollah command and control that the beeper and walkie talkie operations disrupted? Can Hezbollah restrain such factions--assuming Hezbollah wants to?

And why is Israel's defense minister giving this message to an Israeli army division rather than an air force unit?Is the logic behind my expectation of a deep multi-division ground raid into Lebanon too strong to ignore? 

I noted in the main body of this post that I was wrong about my long-held expectation. Perhaps I'm just not correct yet. The revived multi-war in Syria certainly reduces the amount of help Hezbollah can expect from Iran.

UPDATE: ISW looks at the resurgent multi-war in the northwest:

This isn't as dramatic or as big as ISIL's 2014 offensive through western and northwestern Iraq. And like the 2014 advance/uprising where I was only very slightly worried ISIL could take Shia areas including Baghdad, I'm not too worried this offensive could threaten Assad's Alawite base of power from the coast to Damascus. But Syria does need to hold Homs, as ISW notes, to keep that corridor from the sea to Damascus. 

Back in 2012 when things looked darkest for Assad before Russia intervened, I thought that to survive Assad might have to focus his limited forces on clearing and holding core territory in an arc from the Turkish border along the coast to Damascus and then to the Israeli border to hold his Alawite homeland, the capital that gives him a UN seat, and the border with Israel to at least pose as a "frontline" state as a source of legitimacy. I don't think we're anywhere near that stage yet.

UPDATE: Also, I haven't followed Syria's army development, but is it still a core of technical support personnel surrounded by a shell of often foreign militias that replaced the dead Syrian combat elements? With reports of Iraqi militias controlled by Iran reinforcing Assad, I'll guess nothing has changed significantly.

UPDATE: I'm trying to catch up on Syria after not paying much attention for years. I watched a French program. It seems like Assad's base of power is teetering. The claim is the Islamist rebels have tried to look moderate and have reached out to Christians and the Druze to weaken their alliance with Assad. And the core base of Assad, the Alawites, are so bloodied by the multi-war that they don't have heart to fight.  And Russia lacks the Wagner mercenaries and special forces to more accurately call in air strikes. So Russian air power is even more limited than its reduced numbers would indicate.

We'll see. Assad had portrayed himself as the only thing standing between the minorities and the bloodthirsty Sunni jihadis. Is that gone?

Further, one analyst thinks that Turkey hopes the jihadis will conquer Damascus and take over, allowing Erdogan to send refugees back to Syria. Can they? Another analyst thinks Syria could fragment. That's something I discussed in 2016.

We'll see. I still bet Assad could rally Alawites to defend their homeland from Sunni jihadis. The question will be can Assad get enough Iranian-purchased Iraqi and Afghan mercenaries to hold Damascus, too. If he can get that support, whatever Assad holds will be a rump Syria rather than just another fiefdom in a fragmented Syria with no more claim to the UN seat than any other fiefdom.

UPDATE: How will the jihadi-led rebel offensive in Syria affect Israel-Lebanon relations? Lebanon with its fragile peace that balances rival religious groups would be easily thrown into chaos if the rebels reach the Lebanon border. 

Will this push Lebanon to work with Israel more closely to resist the jihadis? Or push Lebanon closer to Hezbollah as a force able--if it rebuilds--to fight the jihadis. Hezbollah would have quite the dilemma between confronting Israel which is its reason for existing on the one hand and protecting its rear area in the Bekaa Valley that will be more directly threatened by the jihadis if they advance far enough.

UPDATE: This article says Turkey's aim in the renewed Syrian multi-war is to eliminate Kurdish autonomous regions in Syria.

In addition, the article notes the decline of Russia's air power in Syria:

Moscow only has 13 fighter jets stationed there now, seven of which are operable, after having 50 there before its war of aggression against Kyiv.

UPDATE: Apparently Hama has fallen to the rebels and the rebels have pushed south nearly 16 miles. That's bad for Assad. If Homs falls, that's officially Really Bad. Tip to Instapundit.

Would Israel use its air power to keep the Devil it knows in power and gain big points with Russia?

UPDATE: ISW has more. Assad's forces seem to have collapsed at Hama. Some villages of past Assad supporters have cut deals with the rebel jihadis to basically declare themselves open cities. The jihadis are pushing south toward Homs. The jihadis are attempting to get Iraq to ban Iraqis from fighting for Assad.  Hezbollah declined to intervene, saying it must rebuild inside Lebanon. And Israel hit a weapons depot near Aleppo which is now in rebel hands, answering my most recent question.

If Assad can't hold Homs, he may have to abandon Damascus and focus on surviving in the coastal enclave of Alawites. Assuming the Alawites aren't so exhausted by fighting that even they are willing to take their chances with allegedly reformed jihadis ruling them. Would Assad have to contract a core Syria  by abandoning Damascus and moving the official capital into the coastal enclave to attempt to hold the UN seat? 

Amazing how my old stuff is still relevant.

Can Assad loyalists make a stand? Will the jihadis culminate? Remember that the jihadis in Iraq made spectacular gains in 2014 before stalling at the figurative gates of Baghdad. 

UPDATE: Russia isn't going to waste scarce assets unless Assad looks like he can win:

“Russia doesn’t have a plan to save Assad and doesn’t see one emerging as long as the Syrian president’s army continues to abandon its positions,” said the source. ...

The Kremlin told all Russian citizens to flee Syria on the next available commercial flight.

UPDATE: Hezbollah sent commanders or advisors, apparently, but not troops:

Lebanese armed group Hezbollah sent a small number of "supervising forces" from Lebanon to Syria overnight to help prevent anti-government fighters from seizing the strategic city of Homs, two senior Lebanese security sources said on Friday.

UPDATE: Assad is prioritizing the core of Syria:

The Syrian army withdrew from much of southern Syria on Saturday, leaving more areas of the country, including two provincial capitals, under the control of opposition fighters, the military and an opposition war monitor said.
Those are non-jihadis in the south, I believe. ISW reports the jihadis have advanced south to the outskirts of Homs, which is critical for Assad to hold to maintain lines of communication between Damascus and the Alawite homeland in the coastal regions.

The America-backed SDF in eastern Syria has also captured territory from Assad, which cuts off an Iranian line of supply from Iraq to Damascus.

ISW also reports that Assad desperately needs reinforcements from its foreign allies. And those allies are weakened and quite busy saving themselves.

Finally, ISW reports that Turkey does not want to stop short of overthrowing Assad. Thus finally making good on its ultimatum.

UPDATE: For Israel--and the West in general--let's draw another lesson from this rebel offensive. When you start to take Vienna, take Vienna. Or in this case, Idlib province from which the jihadi-led offensive has erupted.

In 2018 I figured the surging Assad offensive would not stop before capturing Idlib province because an enemy that survives there looms over Assad's core territory.

But Assad did not kill his weakened enemy. And in the eight years since, his weakened enemy strengthened itself while Assad and his allies weakened to allow the jihadis to unfreeze the conflict.

UPDATE: Just going to say that I don't assume Assad's regime falls. Initial shock at the enemy offensive may fade and Assad's backers may fear defeat enough to fight. The rebels can run out of momentum short of capturing decisive objectives. 

Assad may have to contract the territory it defends quite a bit to survive. But he could survive. I have no way to judge the odds.

But I strongly doubt the jihadis could advance east to conquer the Kurds and its local Arab allies as long as they have American and coalition support.

UPDATE: Damascus looks cut off from the Alawite homeland in the western coastal region. How Assad holds Syria is beyond me at this point. His troops needed to make a stand at Homs and they did not:

The Bashar al Assad regime faces imminent collapse. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) appears to have already collapsed itself, as its units have fled repeatedly from advancing opposition forces across the country. The SAA is combat ineffective and has yet to present a meaningful defense against the advancing opposition. The opposition forces led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) have exploited the collapse of the SAA by advancing further southward and taking control of Homs City, which is the last major obstacle before Damascus.

Rebels south of Damascus are expanding their control.

The only question may be whether the Alawites can defend their home region.

UPDATE: The Assad government has fallen (via Instapundit):

The Syrian government appears to have fallen in a stunning end to the 50-year rule of the Assad family following a rapid rebel offensive.

Syrian rebels declared victory over President Bashar al-Assad’s regime early on Sunday, after fighters entered Damascus and the president reportedly fled the country.

Did rebels from the north or south enter the capital? Will various rebels fight each other? And again, will the Alawites fight on for their part of Syria?

UPDATE: Will a new Syrian government cut a deal with the Western-backed SDF--the Kurd-dominated alliance in eastern Syria? 

Will this affect anti-ISIL operations by Western forces inside Syria? 

Will America need its forces in eastern Syria to screen Iraq from infiltration? 

Is Hezbollah cut off or will the new government allow Iranian supplies to flow through? 

Will this shake Iran, too? Syria was a major part of its informal empire that it spent huge amounts of money to prop up. It collapsed quickly.

What is Israel's position? Can it negotiate with the new rulers to keep the Golan Heights front quiet?

If it is to be a coalition government, won't the more ruthless jihadis eventually come out on top regardless of the nice feelings at the moment of toppling Assad?

Is there going to be a new Syria in anything but name? Or will rebels have power in their own regions in a decentralized Syria? I've heard some hints that the Alawites have given up, too. But it isn't clear to me yet.

Are the Russians pulling a Dunkirk from their Syria bases as fast as they can? Or will there be a deal  on this issue, too?

What does this mean for refugees? Will more try to escape? Will those in other countries go home?

I've got to say, I thought Assad forces would rally at Homs. And if not there that they'd fight to hold the Alawite western coastal region.

And I'll note that Assad working with Iran to funnel foreign jihadis through those "rat lines" to be suicide bombers during the Iraq War seemingly backfired on Assad with a bloody multi-war, the rise and fall of the Islamic State across eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq, and now the fall of his regime to the rebels he failed to crush when he had the advantage.

UPDATE: For those claiming the jihadis in HTS are reformed, I'll remind you that we were told the same fantasy about Taliban 2.0 when we retreated from Afghanistan.

In addition, Israel is stepping up protection on the border with Syria:

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced today that the IDF has seized control of a U.N.-patrolled buffer zone separating the Israeli-occupied portion and the Syrian-controlled area of the Golan Heights.

Netanyahu said a 1974 agreement that established the zone of separation between the two countries had "collapsed" after Syrian soldiers abandoned their positions.

UPDATE: Wow:

Opposition forces separately entered the final remaining regime strongholds of Jableh, Latakia, and Tartus on the Syrian coast on December 8.

The government forces collapse is complete, with Alawites unwilling even to defend their homeland. 

And "HTS-affiliated" forces have advanced to the Euphrates River where SDF forces appear to have retreated from recently captured territory. I find it hard to believe the Kurds would roll over. But are the Sunni Arabs part of the SDF still solid components after the fall of Assad? And without the Sunni Arabs, how much territory can the Kurds contest? And if that control falls apart, American and other Western forces won't be able to hold their toe holds inside Syria. 

Further, Israel is bombing former Syrian army arsenals. And the U.S. is hitting ISIL targets.

UPDATE: Israel continues to fight Hamas in Gaza and is clearing territory against apparent light opposition in southern Lebanon.

UPDATE: Obviously, if Israel has been pausing to regroup for its next target, the fall of Assad complicates Israel's dilemma quite a bit. And it may make going after Iran more appealing.

UPDATE: Amnesty to Syrian military conscripts was granted. And:

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is establishing a transitional government and reconciling with members of the former Syrian regime and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). HTS is attempting to ensure continuity of governance to prevent widespread anarchy in Syria, which is consistent with HTS’ longstanding approach to “liberated areas.”

Most of Syria is beyond immediate HTS presence. Turks in the north, the American-led coalition in the east, and perhaps Israelis in the south have a presence to support regional allies. For the latter, would the Druze rather live under an Israeli umbrella than risk HTS rule?

And would Iran-backed Hezbollah cut deals with the Alawites to provide security--and protect the rear of Hezbollah in Lebanon--if the Alawites decide to stand their ground?

I just don't believe HTS can maintain a broad government. I don't think Islamist restraint can last. In a battle between Islamists trying to build a "caliphate in one country" and Islamists on a Mission from Allah to create a global caliphate, I'd bet on the latter who are more willing to kill for their vision. Iran after its revolution against the shah started out as a broad-based coalition. Now the mullahs are dug in inside the government, allowing no unapproved voices to rise to the top.

Will Iran's defeat in Syria weaken Iranian influence in Iraq? Tensions are apparent.

ISW wonders what I did about the SDF Kurd-Sunni Arab alliance now that a Sunni-dominated government is forming in Damascus.

Israeli operations continue in Lebanon and low-level combat continues in Gaza. The Houthi are still attacking Israel with long-range weapons.

And Israel continues to strike former Assad weapons depots to prevent HTS or other hostile actors from getting those weapons.

UPDATE: Israel is taking out assets of use to potential enemies:

Israel targeted airbases, weapons and ammunition warehouses, aircraft and signal stations in Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, a monitoring and rights group in the country.

I've heard this includes chemical weapons. I don't know if that means something more potent than lethal gas made from otherwise legal chlorine.

UPDATE: ISW notes that, as I worried, some Arab militias have defected from the Kurdish-led SDF to support the HTS-led new rulers. 

The SDF has lost a big chunk of its territory on its western front along the border with Turkey to Turkish backed militias. Will some Syrian Arab militias remain with the SDF on this issue?

HTS-led forces have cut off the Syrian coastal region from Lebanon. Also note that much of the Alawite region is marked on the ISW map as uncontrolled by the HTS. Will Alawites regain their will to fight and color that region in as their own? After all, the the HTS leader has vowed  "'we' will hold former regime officers 'accountable' for torturing civilians under Assad."

UPDATE: In addition to the Alawites rethinking giving up, the other minorities who had backed Assad to keep the Sunni Arab majority from targeting them (Christians and Druze) may find their deals with the HTS not worth the figurative paper they're printed on.

UPDATE: Does Israel need to change its military approach to defeating Hamas? Can it? It might be a time for a more radical next phase, eh?

UPDATE: A CRS report to Congress provides a brief overview. The map provides no clarity to me about the situation in the Alawite homeland in the coastal regions. What does that map coding mean there? The text says Alawites and other groups with ties to the former Assad regime maintain presence there. Is this a fading remnant or a coalescing force to hold the region?

UPDATE: As Israel bombs Assad's chemical warfare arsenal left to the tender mercies of jihadi conquest, let's all breathe a sigh of relief at the brilliance of Secretary of State Kerry negotiating a deal with Russia and Syria to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons arsenal in 2013. Bravo.

UPDATE: More Arab militias in the SDF have defected to HTS. Also, Syria is looking very fragmented at this point, with even the Alawite coastal region's status unclear and HTS with a presence in very little of Syrian territory:


Further thoughts on whether Turkey will dominate Syria. Erdogan may want to relive Ottoman glories. But I doubt he can really control the monsters he unleashed.

UPDATE: I can understand why Syrians are joyous at the fall of Assad's murderous government. But Syrians aren't experiencing freedom. They are experiencing a power vacuum.  

UPDATE: Losing Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah as active proxies sure puts a dent in Iran's strategy of fighting its enemies to the last dead Arab.

UPDATE: Notwithstanding HTS claims it is only interested in Islam in one country (Syria), who knows what it will do when it has the one:

Islamist rebels celebrating the fall of Damascus recently posted a video “promising that it’s just the start and that they will take Jerusalem next to free all the Gazans.”

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran spent years killing Iraqi troops using the justification that it simply had to go through Iraq to get at Israel. 

Also, is Iran trying to restore its proxies by courting the Sunni al-Shabaab jihadis in Somalia?

UPDATE: One thing to keep in mind about Assad is that he was not a "at least he kills jihadis" ruler. He pushed jihadis to the top of the rebel pile to scare his supporters into fighting for him. He left ISIL alone, which an American-led coalition still fights; and after finally capturing Aleppo, he left what became HTS alone in Idlib, which turned out to be a fatal mistake.

UPDATE: Interesting:

Former regime soldiers in coastal areas of Syria are reportedly giving up their arms to HTS-led authorities as part of a settlement process. HTS announced the opening of settlement offices in Latakia on December 14. Social media users posted images of men lined up outside these offices on December 15.

Does this mean Alawites in local defense forces or just random conscripts from the armed forces? I don't know if this means HTS is exerting control over the coastal region.

UPDATE: Hezbollah has more reason to hold fire and comply with the ceasefire requirements:

Hezbollah was dealt a major blow during 14 months of war with Israel. The toppling of Assad, who had strong ties to Iran, has now crippled its ability to bounce back by cutting off a vital weapons-smuggling route through Syria. 

If Hezbollah believed a ceasefire buys time to rearm, it needs a lot more time. 

UPDATE: Are the Houthi the default next target?

The Iranian-backed Houthis increasingly appear to be alone in the attempts to attack Israel, as Iran and its other proxy groups have been weakened. They have not suffered a major setback since they began their attacks on Israel and on shipping in the aftermath of Hamas’s October 7 massacre.

With some diplomacy, Israel might get Egyptian and Saudi help because both need freedom of navigation through the Red Sea. 

UPDATE: Alawites in Syria are rightfully fearful of Sunni Arab victors seeking vengeance. I don't know if Latakia is representative or simply a Russian outpost that naturally drew HTS coalition fighters to it. I've read some in the Alawite region are surrendering to HTS. But they may be soldiers with no particular ties to the region. The real issue is whether out in the more rural areas the Alawites are organizing and arming up to hold their homeland.

UPDATE: So far it doesn't look like the new rulers of Syria want to give Russia any base rights in Syria. The Russians seem to be concentrating in the west and preparing to get out. Could Russia be assessing whether the Alawites are strong enough to cut a separate deal? This could be part of the discussions:

The Russian-backed SAA 5th Corps in Lattakia is reportedly negotiating with the interim government to “merge its forces” into the new Syrian army.

ISW also reports that HTS continues to attract former regime forces as well as enemies of the former regime to rally under their banner.

For Israel, while Hezbollah and Iran are significantly weakened, Hamas keeps resisting in Gaza. How long will Israel wage that low-level fight? How long will Gazans be willing to suffer, stuck between Israeli measures to defeat Hamas (and the other smaller groups) and Hamas practice of using Gazans as human shields in battle and the resulting dead in the propaganda war?

UPDATE: Israel is forming a new light infantry division of 5 brigades from reservists, including local reservists, for the West Bank:

The IDF stated its goal for this division is to provide a “rapid response” capability to crises that erupt around Israeli borders.

Does Israel anticipate a collapse of Hamas resistance in Gaza? Is building up forces in the West Bank an effort to prevent Hamas from trying a Plan B in the West Bank?

UPDATE: The Houthi might not be the next main enemy--especially as Syria is such a short-run unknown--but the Houthi certainly deserve attention:

Israel has said its fighter jets conducted a series of strikes against military targets in Yemen belonging to the Iran-backed Houthi movement in response to missile and drone attacks.

An Israeli military spokesman said the targets included Red Sea ports and energy infrastructure in the capital Sanaa.

Although when Israeli air operations targeting Assad's former weapons assets wind down, that could change.

UPDATE: Israel's Hezbollah and Hamas problems. But Israel gutted Hezbollah and the fall of the Iran-dominated Assad government in Syria cuts Hezbollah off from its major supply lines to Iran through Syria.

UPDATE: The Houthi seem oblivious to the fact that Iran's proxies are dropping all around Iran, leaving the Houthi with a bulls eye on them: 

The Israeli army said an attempt to intercept a projectile launched from Yemen overnight, some 2,000 kilometres away, was unsuccessful.

Several people were injured after the projectile fell in Tel Aviv, the army said on Saturday.

UPDATE: After defeats in Gaza, in Lebanon, and in Syria, will Iran's mullah oligarchy be shaken at home  by this?

Government offices in Iran are closed or operating at reduced hours. Schools and colleges have moved to online only. Highways and shopping malls have descended into darkness, and industrial plants have been denied power, bringing manufacturing to a near halt. 

Although Iran has one of the biggest supplies of natural gas and crude oil in the world, it is in a full-blown energy crisis that can be attributed to years of sanctions, mismanagement, aging infrastructure, wasteful consumption — and targeted attacks by Israel.

If regime power is not feared, what might set off resistance at home? Tip to Instapundit.

UPDATE: What is next isn't clear as the dust from the Syria crisis, but Israel laid the legal framework for the next phase:

The Israeli parliament has voted to extend the state of emergency in the country for another year.

UPDATE: The Houthi should be trying to avoid eye contact with the Israelis. But no:

Following another rocket attack on the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, Israeli Air Force chief General Tomer Bar has announced tougher counter-attacks on the Houthi militia in Yemen.

UPDATE: Israel apparently struck the Houthi:

Witnesses and governing Houthi rebels said an airport and military base were targeted in the capital Sanaa, while a power station in the western port city of Hudaydah was also hit, the AFP news agency reported.

America has reason to strike after two friendly fire incidents (with one F-18 shot down by an American warship while the other plane's crew managed to evade the missile fired at it), too. 

UPDATE: From the "Well, Duh" files:

Surprised by Oct. 7 and fearful of another attack, Israel weakened safeguards meant to protect noncombatants, allowing officers to endanger up to 20 people in each airstrike. 

Slaughtering, raping, and kidnapping a thousand or so people as Hamas and its satellite monsters did on October 7, 2023 will do that.

This does not mean Israel is now violating rules of war. Military operations are limited in killing civilians only on the issue of whether their losses are justified by the military objective while shooting at a lawful military target. Further, an enemy that hides behind civilians is fully responsible for the deaths of civilians in combat. 

This change just means that sh*t got super real and excessive caution during "peace" was thrown out the window. And keep in mind this still lets Hamas get away with using human shields. Review the rules here. In an update I include a good video explaining the rules.

The bottom line is that Hamas and its ilk are monsters who seek civilian casualties--their own and Israel's--and Israel is lawfully fighting monsters to protect its civilians and even reduce enemy civilian casualties during lawful operations. To reduce Gazan casualties, Israel would need to let Hamas get away with using human shields, which will endanger Israeli civilians in the future. Hamas could lower civilian Gazan casualties by surrendering or even just refusing to use human shields.

Putting a number on the balancing calculation is also false precision. Predicting losses is tough. And judging whether it is worth it is tougher. Killing 20 civilians to kill an enemy clerk-typists might seem to fail the test. But if that clerk-typist is processing an order that will lead to the deaths of scores of your soldiers or civilians, that changes the calculation quite a bit.

UPDATE: The sainted international community is the Hamas logistics arm as aid is stolen by the terrorists to sell to Gazans at hefty prices. Video of Gazans desperate to get what little is sold via official channels contribute to the myth of imminent starvation. Tip to Instapundit.

Being the logistics arm for terrorists is standard operating procedure for "humanitarian" non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

UPDATE: Huh:

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport and claimed a drone attack targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area. The US THAAD air defense system intercepted the Houthi ballistic missile outside Israeli borders.

It works.

UPDATE: Hamas and affiliated terrorists continue to use human shields (tip to Instapundit):

Amid the ongoing counter-terrorism operation in northern Gaza, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a two-day raid on a ‘hospital’ doubling as a key Hamas command center in the area. The military arrested over 240 terrorists, including 15 who took part in the October 7 massacre.

UPDATE: Unless this is a feint, it looks like the new year will see the Houthi take priority as the target:

Israel is preparing to fight along a new front against Houthi militants in Yemen, striking back at the group for its drone and missile attacks and signaling a potential lengthy campaign that would take the battle far from Israel’s borders.

Will Israel get help from regional and major powers to reopen the Red Sea shipping lanes around Yemen?

UPDATE: The original war still goes on. But this multi-wave attack by Hamas (or allies) is interesting:

The fighters conducted a multi-wave attack targeting the IDF around Jabalia refugee camp with small arms and in groups that ranged from six to 30 fighters. The IDF has been clearing the area since October 2024. The IDF engaged the attacking Palestinian fighters with drone strikes and tank fire and killed around 106 fighters. This attack is noteworthy given it was significantly larger than most other militia operations in the Gaza Strip in recent months[.]

Why the large attack? Is Hamas rebuilding? Is this a death rattle as when doomed Japanese defenders on the verge of defeat on islands in World War II would launch massed suicide charges at American troops?

UPDATE: America launched air strikes on the Houthi and Israel hopes for American-led assistance to defeat the Houthi. I heard separately that Britain participated in the strikes.

UPDATE: I offer expanded thoughts on the situation in Syria on Substack.

UPDATE: Via Instapundit, is Egypt preparing for war with Israel? That seems unlikely. Possible. But unlikely. Perhaps Egypt is preparing for the possibility that a desperate Hamas and associated jihadis may try to flee Gaza and escape into the Sinai Peninsula, and beyond. 

UPDATE: Just another round of failed unrest? Or will defeat in Syria on top of other proxy defeats knock over the mullah regime?

Iran’s public discontent surged in recent weeks as economic hardships, including widespread power outages and rising inflation, fueled calls for change, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) researcher Benny Sabti told Maariv on Friday.

Depends on whether the discontent gets more substantial.

UPDATE: ISW reports:

The IDF Air Force and the US-UK coalition conducted strikes targeting Houthi sites in Yemen on January 10 in response to repeated Houthi attacks on Israel and commercial ships in the Red Sea. Targets included infrastructure at Hezyaz power station near Sanaa and military infrastructure around Hudaydah and Ras Isa ports.

The Houthis conducted a drone attack targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on January 9. The IDF intercepted a drone launched from Yemen over the Mediterranean Sea.

The Houthis claimed that they conducted a cruise missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the northern Red Sea on January 9. The Houthis claimed that they targeted the carrier and its accompanying naval vessels.

UPDATE: Has a combination of a Biden diplomatic surge and the pressure of a looming Trump presidency led Hamas to agree to release surviving hostages and led Israel to agree to a ceasefire?

UPDATE: On January 15, 2025 I hear that a ceasefire in the Last Gaza War is imminent. But the purpose appears to be narrow--to allow space for Hamas to release "dozens" of hostages it took on October 7, 2023.

UPDATE: Apparently, if finalized and agreed to, this deal will be in two stages with Hamas handing over 33 civilians taken hostage while Israel releases 1,000 Palestinian terrorists and criminals, over several weeks. Israel will withdraw from populated areas of Gaza and then the remainder of the Israelis held--soldiers--will be released for another large group of Palestinians held by Israel, and followed by a "permanent" ceasefire. 

I'll note that there was a ceasefire in force on October 7, 2023 when the Hamas-led rape, murder, and kidnapping invasion of Israel was launched.

UPDATE: Is the deal good for or appeasement by Israel? Israel pounded down Hamas deeper and more thoroughly than ever before. But unless Israel can forge a new Gaza to deal with productively--no matter how many decades it takes--it just means that Hamas (or its jihadi replacement) will take even longer to rebuild and figure out how to launch another rape and murder invasion of Israel.

UPDATE: Israel approved the ceasefire deal. Whether or not it can last through the several phases to reach the "we'll focus on peace" stage is unclear.

UPDATE: Israel is beginning to withdraw to its final ceasefire positions as the deal is implemented:

If Hamas can avoid shooting at Israelis in the mistaken belief  they've won the war they started with their October 7, 2023 murder, rape, and kidnapping invasion.

UPDATE: Interesting:

The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that the IDF must be prepared for “significant operations” in the West Bank in the “coming days.”

UPDATE: This could be a sign that the Last Hamas War is over--or is on the path to being over:

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a wide-ranging counterterrorism operation in the West Bank city of Jenin on Tuesday.

Iran backs terrorists there. 

But there's still the question of what to do with Gaza. I mean, other than just letting it fester until Hamas can reconstitute to plan a bigger and more lethal October 7, 2023.

UPDATE: This is disturbing:

Hamas coordinated the distribution of aid and facilitated the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, which demonstrates that Hamas retains some degree of governing authority after 15 months of war. These tasks make Hamas the de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip, at least in certain areas. The activities listed above—distribution and protection of aid and “monitoring” returnees—do not indicate that Hamas runs a Gazan government like it did prior to October 7, however.

As is this assessment that Israel didn't and can't win the war against Hamas--if winning is defined as destroying Hamas (tip to Instapundit):

Baratz notes that the army’s rank-and-file is second to none, but the General Staff’s lack of strategy results in endless targeted raids, where the IDF goes in, kills some terrorists, retreats, then reenters the same area to cope with more terrorists—and lose more of its valiant young soldiers.

“When generals don’t have a strategy, they come up with an overarching strategy of attrition, which doctrinally, is achieved by raids,” Baratz told JNS on Jan. 15.

“They have different names for raids. In Vietnam, it was called ‘search and destroy.’ But it was the same idea. You raid a place, you kill the enemy combatants, with some collateral damage, and you pull back. You could see that in the Second Lebanon War [in 2006], and you can see that today.

I noted Israel's failure by firepower reliance in 2006, judging they'd screwed the pooch. Was I premature in thinking Israel was successful in Lebanon against Hezbollah contrary to my long criticism of Israel's firepower approach?

To be fair, I didn't appreciate that Israel was conducting a raid strategy in Gaza. Media coverage of the war didn't convey that. I didn't even get that from ISW coverage. With so many Israeli divisions reported as fighting in Gaza I assumed it was more than just raids.

It still isn't too late if Israel sets up a New Palestine in the northern part of Gaza. Otherwise, Hamas will rebuild its terror capabilities after its surviving cadre emerge from the tunnels and civilian structures shielding them. And civilians won't have the chance to turn against Hamas for letting them die and suffer all this time to keep that cadre alive.

UPDATE: Israel must establish military administration of Gaza rather than trust the international community to govern the area. This is half right. Israel should establish military rule of the northern part and create a New Palestine; and allow the international community to deal with the southern part, even if it reverts to old Gaza. Israel needs a contrast to show their way is superior.

NOTE: I will update this post for developments in the wider war Hamas sparked on October 7, 2023 with its rape, murder, and kidnap invasion of Israel. [As of January 26, 2025, I will close this post for updates. Either the war is dissipating into a more intelligence-based war in the shadows or this is a pause to take on a bigger enemy, perhaps Iran itself that was weakened since October 7, 2023 and which may face additional economic problems in 2025. If new posts are needed, I can add them here on TDR or on TDR:E.]

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.

Monday, December 02, 2024

The Winter War of 2022 Enters the "Kill Them All, Let the UNHCR Sort Them Out" Phase

Russia has decided its path to victory goes through dead and terrorized Ukrainian citizens.

The ground war continues with Russian forces grinding forward slowly at seemingly higher cost in men. As that continues, Russia kicks its war against Ukraine's existence to a higher level of cruelty:

The United Nations says the Russian military is increasingly attacking Ukraine's civilian population and energy infrastructure with drones.

Matthias Schmale, the UN's humanitarian coordinator in Ukraine, warned on Friday of a possible "tipping point" that could trigger new mass population movements.

There are people to cope with the humanitarian crisis that Russia creates. Why should Russia care, eh?

In contrast, Ukraine focuses on military targets inside Russia:

Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.

Reminding Russians that they are waging war--and not killing them--is a byproduct of Ukraine's strikes deep inside Russia.

I don't focus on Russian human rights violations, which includes mass kidnapping of Ukrainian children to add them into the next generation of submissive cannon fodder; and banned chemical warfare on Ukraine's troops. So Russian barbarity should be assumed in the context of an illegal Russian invasion of a founding and sovereign member of the United Nations that Putin claims is necessary to defeat NATO, Nazis, and even Satan.

Totally normal.

Should this brutality be a surprise when Russian leaders see their own men as mere disposable cogs to be destroyed for Putin's glory?

And now Russia shows that it wants the territory above all else, and driving the Ukrainians out is an acceptable price to have a buffer against NATO. A wholly theoretical threat that Putin is actually creating by his brutal invasion of Ukraine starting in 2014 that has slowly awakened a slumbering West that had been eager to disband its military power after the Cold War.

#WhyRussiaCan'tHaveNiceThings

UPDATE (Monday): The beatings will continue until pro-Russian sentiment improves:

Russia conducted a “massive” attack against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure on Thursday, firing nearly 200 missiles and drones and leaving more than a million households without power, Ukrainian officials said.

UPDATE (Wednesday): As I focus on Ukraine's suffering and wonder how long they can endure. Don't forget that Russians are enduring massive death and economic hardship, too. We just don't see that. I'll note something I read about in a Mark Moyar book about the Vietnam War:

I'm nearly done with the second and it is heartbreaking to read how badly we hurt North Vietnam and how our intelligence saw virtually none of that. Only Allah knows, eh?

Is our intelligence any better today? And this came to mind when I heard a podcast with a former British general saying America's body count fixation didn't prevent America from losing that war. We surely walked away thinking the objective was not worth sacrificing more troops or money. Could we do the same for just money because we can't see through Russia's facade of indifference to casualties?

UPDATE (Thursday): Hmmm:

Russia is increasing its efforts on the Dnipro to draw Ukrainian troops from other regions, the spokesman suggested.

“They have the goal of capturing a certain bridgehead, holding it, and bringing them there as much of our strength and means as possible,” Voloshin said. 

Is it an attempt to divert Ukrainian strength? Or could a river crossing on the Kherson front to gain a bridgehead signal that Russia intends to accept a ceasefire proposal? A bridgehead would be a last-minute addition to Russian territory it will be allowed to keep. And it would provide a jumping off point to renew the war to capture Odessa and the rest of Ukraine's Black Sea coast.

Ukraine should not accept a ceasefire until it drives the Russians across the river, if that is Russia's intent.

UPDATE (Sunday): How will the collapse of Russia-backed Assad affect Putin's standing back in Russia? How will Russia's other allies see the value of Russia after it couldn't prop up Assad and as it continues to lose huge amounts of men and materiel clawing forward in the western Donbas?

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: The image is a picture of the aftermath of a Russian missile strike in Dnipro, Ukraine, on November 21. Ukrinform/Cover Images/AP

Sunday, December 01, 2024

Weekend Data Dump

I post at The Dignified Rant: Evolved on Substack. Help me out by subscribing and by liking and sharing posts. I continue posting here on TDR seven days a week, including Weekend Data Dump and Winter War of 2022. I occasionally post short data dump items on my Substack "Notes" section. 

How precise is this description of the fatwa? "Iranian hardliners are continuing to lobby Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons to restore deterrence against Iran’s 'enemies.'" Does the fatwa ban purchasing nukes, too? Asking for a friend.

The Russian Orthodox Church seeks recruits in Africa for Putin's war.

The rise of Cossacks in the Winter War of 2022. Add them to the fuel for a Time of Troubles 2.0 in Russia.

Agents or special forces with small suicide drones could be a means to avoid sophisticated air defenses, no? "A number of drones were spotted over and near RAF Lakenheath in England on Nov. 20, the Air Force told The War Zone in response to our query about the incident." Scatter them like mines, eh?

We didn't end the war on terror by retreating from Afghanistan: "U.S. troops who have taken part in operations to counter Houthi rebels in Yemen have been authorized to receive the Global War on Terrorism Service and Expeditionary Medals[.]" Iran has just armed the terrorists better. Stay in Iraq!

This is almost infinitely more likely than Russia initiating nuclear war with the U.S.: "U.S. authorities say American defense industrial sites in Europe should step up their security over concerns that Russian saboteurs could target them."

The former president of Taiwan knows that an American reputation for lack of resolve to help Ukraine would pivot to the defense of Taiwan: "'[Americans] should do whatever they can to help the Ukrainians. We [Taiwan] still have time,' she said, as reported by Politico."

U.S.-Japanese anti-access/area denial: "Under the plan expected to be complied next month, the U.S. would deploy missile units to the Nansei Islands of Japan's southwestern Kagoshima and Okinawa prefectures, and to the Philippines, the report said, citing unnamed U.S. and Japanese sources."

That's what I have figured: "China is increasingly concerned about the alliance between Kim Jong Un's North Korea and Vladimir Putin's Russia, according to Kurt Campbell, the US deputy secretary of state." Especially on this issue.

INDOPACOM Navy commander: "'I expect Russia to provide submarine technology to the PRC that has the potential of closing American undersea dominance,' he said, using the acronym for the People's Republic of China." Well, sure. That's nothing new. Although I was wrong about China's deadline ...

Sure: "By leveraging NATO, particularly the Arctic expertise of British, Canadian, and Nordic allies, the United States can ensure a stable Arctic presence, enabling a robust military posture in the Indo-Pacific." Canada should get moving, eh?

I assume Russia is pushing this, too: "U.S. forces are fighting Iranian-backed proxies in Syria frequently as they come under militant attacks that analysts say have been aided by the Syrian government." That's today's reality of life along the Deconfliction Line (DCL).

It's taking time but the Army is building up momentum: "Drones are changing the nature of modern warfare, and as small unmanned aerial systems proliferate above battlefields, the Army is focusing on developing and procuring new technology to counter them." Counter-measures will reduce the threat.

So far, I'm guessing Marine Corps EABO is not worrying the Chinese at all. So what do the Marines do? The anti-ship capability could be useful. But that should be a mission for the NECC.

If only the tsar knew? "Russia has removed a senior commander from his post for making false claims about the progress of the war in parts of eastern Ukraine, according to military bloggers and Russian media." Tip to Instapundit.

Using a board to thin out our flag and general officer ranks was done before World War II. Cries that Trump will use politics to shape the officer corps forgets that politics shaped the officer corps we have now. If the officer corps is shaped to remove politics and push warfighting? Pluck them good and hard.

Knowing what China is doing is step one: "The United States is arming the Philippines with advanced sea drones as part of an effort to bolster an ally threatened by China’s territorial claims and growing maritime power."

Micro-carriers: "U.S. Naval Forces Central Command is steaming ahead with experimental efforts to launch unmanned aerial vehicles from uncrewed surface vessels." Good! Keep the super ones out of the Persian Gulf!

Is energy stockpiling in China a strategic indicator? Interesting. Can we measure it? How much time does China buy with stockpiling? What about other stockpiles? How vulnerable are those stockpiles to attack? And does the strategic indicator mean China plans aggression or that it believes it will be attacked? 

That's worrisome: "China's disproportionate control over fiber-optic cable repair networks reveals potential vectors for intelligence dominance, coercive leverage, and disruption of digital sovereignty." Beats attacking it. Remember when most of the Internet physically went through America? Good times.

Good: The Army is celebrating the one-year anniversary of the Future Soldier Preparatory Course .. , a pilot program intended to help America’s youth overcome academic and physical fitness barriers to service and meet or exceed the Army’s accession standards." I had a civil defense-oriented suggestion.

Civil rights group or agents of foreign influence? Tip to Instapundit.

This analyst says Ukraine's Kursk incursion has been a success, contrary to the consensus of failure. I never said it is a failure. I viewed it as a successful raid. But if Ukraine persists in holding it too long and Russia manages to destroy the force holding the salient, Ukraine will lose.

Russia's massive attacks that burn through men and equipment at an unsustainable rate to overwhelm Ukraine before Russia's military, economy, or civilian support collapses proves that Russia's claim that NATO is ready to pounce on Russia is a lie. If not, Russia would be falling into NATO's trap, no?

Westerners don't see this, but Russians do: "Russia is running out of soldiers for its war in Ukraine. Now in its third year, the war has cost Russia at least 600,000 dead and wounded soldiers. The economy went from rebuilding in 2021 to contraction and substantial reorganization by 2024." 

If America lets Russian threats of using nuclear weapons to enable their conquest of Ukraine, how will those who advocate abandoning Europe to focus on China think we could possibly deter China from threatening to use nukes to conquer Taiwan?

Failure: "The Suez canal blockade by Yemen’s Iran-backed Shia Houthi militia and shipping continues. Ships traveling north in the Red Sea towards the Suez Canal have been under attack by the Houthis since late 2023." Why are we failing?

Russia isn't bluffing and it could conduct a test of a tactical nuclear warhead? So what? Why raise this to the level of dangerous escalation? It would be a test--not an atttack. Which may push America and China to test their nukes, too, in the real world rather than in simulations. Does Russia really want that outcome?

As long as we have an incoming administration seemingly committed to a FAFO military posture, may I revive my plea for the Indo-Pacific regional unified command to be called Pacific-Indian (Oceans) Command. Or PAINCOM. I ask for so little ...

Roscosmos says if you smelt it you dealt it: "Astronauts on the International Space Station this weekend noticed a rancid stink when they popped the hatch on Russia's Progress cargo ship that had just docked with it — and NASA says that anyone who wants to know more will have to speak to mother Russia."

Oh, great: "The Kremlin signaled that it would remove the Taliban from its list of prohibited organizations amid intensified Russia-Taliban rapprochement. " I'm sure Russia wouldn't encourage and support Taliban terror-related options to hurt the West.

Sh*t rolls downhill: "The Navy will sideline 17 ships to contend with a shortage of civilian mariners, the Military Sealift commander said last week, prompting concerns from the Marine Corps about how it will support and transport its own forces." I'll wish the Marines good luck even harder now.

Iran wages war on America in order to extend its informal Persian Empire through Iraq and into Syria and Lebanon: "U.S. forces in the Middle East conducted a strike Tuesday against an Iran-backed militant weapons storage facility in Syria, according to U.S. Central Command."

Is this multi-service German modular weapon--a blend of a cruise missile and a drone--just marketing to exploit drone mania? Or does it create capabilities superior to drones or cruise missiles--or the rockets that are usually carried in those rocket launcher boxes? It certainly has a longer range than ATACMS.

Strategypage says small drones are revolutionary. I have my doubts about that as counter-measures are developed. Yet Strategypage also laments the lack of fighter drones to shoot down small drones--which I advocated six years ago. And SP notes that stockpiling small drones may lock in obsolete designs.

That's bad: "Ukraine is recalling a batch of 120mm mortar shells that soldiers said are defective." Apparently 100,000 mortar bombs are in question. Other batches have been fine. If this problem is from corruption, heads should roll. Ukraine desperately needs that to be a Russian problem only.

ISW reports Russia has no interest in negotiating anything but total victory, continues to kill POWs, allegedly can't coordinate artillery fires with maneuver units, is bombing Ukraine's cities at a higher rate, and is still advancing. But Ukraine can carry out local counter-attacks.

Whenever I hear a Russian official speak, I just want to nuke them. They're that annoying. I mean, I wouldn't. That would be insane. But Russia as a nation has had a complete mental breakdown.

Listening to representatives of the sainted international community express outrage that Ukraine will use anti-personnel mines to defend themselves against Russia's brutal invasion makes me want to nuke the UN. But first move its headquarters to Chad. Okay, I'm not really in favor of using nukes.

Germany has done this to themselves by making energy too expensive: "VW’s troubles are a parable for German industry more broadly, with manufacturers across the country hemorrhaging jobs." The ghost of Henry Morgenthau Jr. smiles.

I'd think that just one--the lack of a margin of error in case you calculate wrong--is enough: "10 Reasons Why Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Is A Bad Idea" But sure, bounce the rubble.

Is a whole-of-government and mutinational blockade of China the best way for America to defeat China in war? I should ponder this question a little more. I'm skeptical of it as a silver bullet solution and worry about the effects on our allies close to China during such a long struggle. But this deserves more attention.

A five-part plan for Trump to defeat Russia in Ukraine seems reasonable except for the fourth. What does this mean? "[At] the strategic level Trump and his team must make clear to those in Moscow who wish to invoke or even deploy the nuclear threat that if they do so it will be the last thing they ever do."

At this rate, North Korea will one day take over South Korea by sending in 100,000 Visiting Angels. Tip to Instapundit.

The other ISIS: "The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a report ... stating that Iran continues to develop capabilities to produce and deliver pharmaceutical-based chemical agents (PBAs) for offensive purposes. [Iran] focuses on research on fentanyl and medetomidine[.]"

Russia's new Belgorod submarine and its Poseidon doomsday torpedoes. Apparently it's designed in part to punish an attacker that defeats Russia in a nuclear war. Doesn't this weapon imply that most of Russia's nuclear arsenal doesn't work? Is this a final defense for Russia's Far East? Or yada yada yada, you die?

I don't really see this: "Russian military operations in Ukraine are at a standstill. ... Russian officers are ordered to keep their men from getting too close to Ukrainian forces because of the growing incidents of Russian soldiers surrendering." Russia is advancing. How could this be true? Am I missing something?

We already have four older Los Angeles boats there: "Naval Base Guam received the USS Minnesota (SSN-783) on Tuesday, marking the first forward deployment of a Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine to the strategically positioned American territory in the Indo-Pacific."

Sh*t got real: "Germany is taking significant steps to bolster its civil defense capabilities by identifying public and private buildings that can be repurposed as bunkers if needed." 

Huh: "It’s recently become visible, via satellite photos, that the Russian railroads are at a standstill in many parts of the country and thousands of locomotives and rail cars are going out of service because of a shortage of ball bearings." Is Russia coping? Is Russia teetering and bluffing that all is well?

Also, this is the first I've heard that "in late November, the Kerch Strait bridge suffered a partial collapse, apparently brought on by years of Ukrainian attacks followed by hasty Russian repairs."

An interesting post on Russian military districts, military reform efforts, and a refusal to believe inconvenient information from below. 

Did China blink at its conquered Scarborough Shoal? To me it sounds like two Chinese steps forward against the Philippines and international law--and one step back. This is no victory.

Given Russia's continued advances despite a ravaged Russian army, America will need to arm Ukraine to the teeth to sufficiently "arm Ukraine to the extent it can defend itself and stop any further Russian advances before and after any peace deal." Also, American aid would be in forms of loans.

Aim ludicrously high: "The 5-year-old U.S. Space Force is moving quickly to confront what is becoming its priority challenge: the threat of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) from foreign adversaries, including Russia and China." Control the high "ground". 

Hmmm: "Investigators believe that the Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-registered bulk carrier, deliberately severed the two key cables last week by dragging its anchor along the Baltic seabed for more than 100 miles."

Germany buys Arrow 3: "Germany is expected to receive a top Israeli missile-defense system that helped protect the Middle Eastern country from two massive Iranian attacks earlier this year."

So Ukraine should strike Moscow first if it gets them because Russia doesn't believe in nuclear deterrence: "President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday that Russia would use all weapons at its disposal against Ukraine if Kyiv were to acquire nuclear arms." Perhaps it makes more sense in the original Russian.

Counter-measures: "Ukraine has learnt how to hack the Iranian-designed kamikaze drones that are flooding its airspace and send them back to Russia and Belarus, according to reports." Where they explode?

I think I mentioned this--or maybe something similar--but Ukraine hopes that suicide drones can shoot down Russia's suicide ground attack drones.

Syria: "[Syrian] opposition forces have continued expanding their offensive eastward since launching the surprise offensive on November 27." This is led by Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: "HTS’s ability to fight inside Aleppo is a devastating blow to Assad and underscores the regime’s weakness."

From the "Well, Duh" files: "NATO analysts believe that Russia will continue to be a threat even after the Ukraine War is over. The invasion of Ukraine proved that the post-World War II creators of NATO were correct."

"Hybrid" or "frozen" conflicts are what you do when you can't smash and grab: "Faced with certain defeat in Ukraine, Russia turned to Asymmetric Warfare[, ...] less visible weapons including Electronic Warfare, sabotage and hacking NATO electronic networks to steal information and disrupt NATO operations."

A fighter drone! "Two American technology firms have deployed their 'revolutionary' Hitchhiker interceptor drone on the Ukrainian frontline to test its effectiveness in real combat situations." As the prophecy foretold.

I am always an optimist. And I had hope that the Michigan-Ohio State game could go the way it did. But you never really expect it. Just wow. Best 7-5 season, ever. Ohio State has a great team but college ball is flukey. The post-game kerfuffle was unfortunate. The Lions scraped by, too, on Thanksgiving.

Interesting if old news: 'Rumors suggest the new islands’ concrete is crumbling and their foundations turning to sponge in a hostile climate. And that is before considering what a direct hit from a super-typhoon might do." I wondered about that when the reclamation was completed.

Aiming high: "Anti-satellite technology, or ASAT, has been the goal of the United States, Russia and China for decades. No one has ever been able to get ASAT to work, but efforts continued anyway." And toss in communications and photo recon.

China needs to seize ports to successfully invade Taiwan, but "Taiwan may have the weapons and obstacles to turn its ports into fortresses." That hypothetical defense applies to everyone. Would Taiwan react in time? Still, I'm on board the port route.

Decapitating Hezbollah and Hamas.  

Is China spearheading technology to make the seas transparent? "The extremely low-frequency (ELF) electromagnetic waves, capable of penetrating seawater, enable the detection of submarines hidden hundreds of meters below the surface." 

Russia gets a distraction: "Russia, an ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, has launched a series of airstrikes on several areas of Syria where opposition forces have recently made territorial gains, a war monitor reported on Sunday." 

Huh: "China is keen to expand energy cooperation with Turkmenistan, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Saturday." China sees opportunity at Russia's expense. Also, I love it when a plan comes together.