Is Russia really mobilizing new manpower to wage war on Ukraine?
Russia continues to grind forward. Nothing is individually significant. But accumulating enough insignificant gains might become significant:
The war is really not stalemated. The Russians continue to advance in Ukraine. This is causing some concern.Yes. I've repeatedly noted that Russia is grinding forward. Maybe Russia's ground forces break. But Ukrainian units could break. And Russia might be able to exploit that to dramatically change the course of the war. Breaking on defense is tougher to recover from. Russia certainly thinks it can keep grinding away ... forever.
Ukraine's top general has highlighted Russia's plans to commit troops to the war:
Syrskyi told UK outlet The Guardian in an interview published on July 24 that Russian forces currently have 520,000 personnel committed to the war in Ukraine and that the Russian military aims to have 690,000 personnel committed to the war by the end of 2024.
That's more than the 100,000 or so that crossed the border in February 2022. But what does this mean? After the war had been raging for some time, Russia announced grand plans to expand their ground forces. But their military before the war didn't match their paper strength.
And other than a one-time mobilization of 300,000, Russia has relied on normal twice-per-year intake of troops, inducements at home and abroad, and prison recruitment.
I haven't seen anything suggesting Russian troops are in for the duration. Indeed, I've read about worries that veterans returning home won't easily resume being civilians. So troops will leave service, too--and not just by dying, deserting, being too severely wounded to fight, or being captured.
This year, reports come out that Russia is only barely replacing heavy losses with new troops.
Yet I also read about how Russia has stripped troops from the rest of Russia to send them to Ukraine.
Before the war Russia had their army, navy troops, airborne forces, and the national guard as the primary ground forces. Looking at my 2018 The Military Balance (hey, even old ones are now ridiculously expensive!), Russia had 280,000 in the army plus 45,000 airborne, 35,000 naval infantry, and 554,000 paramilitary forces; plus special forces and other forces like air defense forces or non-service support troops that could be counted as "committed to" the war in Ukraine. On paper.
So that could be a pool of over 900,000 troops that could be counted as "committed to" the war. Without any expansion in reality as opposed to grand announcements of paper strength increases that somehow overcome heavy losses in troops, materiel, and leaders.
Russia is clearly committing more troops to the war. But I don't assume that reported numbers are accurate. Russian disinformation may be inflating those numbers.
Unless Russia truly has accumulated a massive reserve in secret as some writers speculate. But they've been speculating about that since shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine. But who knows? One would think our intelligence can't possibly miss that ...
But I digress.
Russia wants to look like a steamroller that is unstoppable in its relentless quest for victory. Portraying an ever-expanding horde immune to casualties would support that image. Reports of high payments for volunteers casts doubts on Russia's plan to overwhelm with numbers, no? Expensive cannon fodder is an oxymoron.
There are ways to exaggerate troop numbers apart from lying, just as you can low-ball them for political reasons.
Want to make your strength look higher? Count everyone when you are rotating troops. That way you can count troops coming and going. Even though boots on the ground fighting are far fewer.
Want to hide troop strength? Don't count some for operational security. Don't count contractors. Narrowly define the theater of war and put troops supporting the fight across that line. Or extend the "overlaps" of troop rotations so that multiple units are fighting despite not officially being part of the fight.
I don't buy the image that Russia is portraying. Invading Ukraine isn't the Great Patriotic War and Putin is no Stalin. So Putin faces more limits on killing Russians than Stalin did:
Putin’s illusions and imperial dreams are a major obstacle to peace in Ukraine as well as a threat to continued peace and prosperity in Russia. The Ukraine war has caused the average Russian increased economic suffering and killed hundreds of thousands sent to fight in Ukraine. Putin may say he has not lost patience in Ukraine but Ukrainians, NATO nations and a growing number of Russians disagree.
If the Russian horde in Ukraine is being created by concentrating what Russia has already, that's different than expanding their ground forces. In the short run it doesn't make a difference to Ukraine. But in the long run, Russia can't match their claims.
And in the meantime Russia takes risks on the sections of the border--or internal areas--stripped of troops. NATO may not wish to exploit that. But China might with their lingering losses from the Century of Humiliation temptingly close across a Far East border with nothing but a paper friendship standing in the way.
UPDATE (Monday): There is more discussion out there about how Russia is hitting weaker Ukrainian brigades to move the front rather than battering themselves against the good brigades. As I observed nearly two years ago, that's an advantage of holding the initiative. As inferior man-for-man that the Russian ground forces appear to be, they have the initiative.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Is Ukraine trying to return the favor and stretch Russian resources?
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed on August 6 that Russian border troops and FSB personnel repelled several raids by Ukrainian forces equipped with roughly a battalion's worth of tanks and armored vehicles against Russian positions near Nikolayevo-Darino and Oleshnya, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City and along the Russia-Ukraine international border).
UPDATE (Thursday): Huh:
Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7. Geolocated footage published on August 6 and 7 shows that Ukrainian armored vehicles have advanced to positions along the 38K-030 route about 10 kilometers from the international border.
The Ukrainians penetrated both defensive lines. I can't imagine this is more than a raid. A ground Doolittle Raid. I don't have a real feel for the size. I've heard very different estimates.
Ukrainians don't think they can march through Russia like the Wagner Revolt, do they?
Interesting.
UPDATE (Thursday): Is that hub the objective?
Russia said on Wednesday it was fighting intense battles against Ukrainian forces that had penetrated its southern border near a major natural gas transmission hub, in one of the largest incursions into Russian territory since the war began.
Does Ukraine think it can seriously wreck it on the ground better than from the air?
Also:
Russian President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday accused Ukraine of a "large-scale provocation" amid reports of an incursion on the Kursk region.
That from the man who has invaded Ukraine, bombed its cities, tortured POWs, kidnapped Ukrainian children, and makes routine threats to use nuclear weapons.
UPDATE (Thursday): If this is a land Doolittle Raid, recall that the original operation was more than just a morale boost to Americans. The air raids on Japan pushed the Japanese to react to prevent future attacks on the homeland by conducting an operation to take Midway Island. The U.S. Navy ambushed the Japanese and destroyed four precious carriers and their trained pilots.
What might Putin order in response? And will it provide Ukraine with an opportunity to counter-attack and inflict a serious defeat on Russia's ground forces?
UPDATE (Thursday): At another level, this operation may be a test of whether Ukrainian troops can conduct combined arms operations. This seems like a battalion task force in size. But it has burst through Russian defensive lines and apparently captured a number of Russian troops.
Without trying to judge an operation this small and this early, we should probably give the Russian defenders in the Surovikin Line in the summer of 2023 a little more respect. Ukraine is doing now what I had hoped it could do in 2023. Although by summer of 2023 I feared we'd given Russia enough time to cope.
UPDATE (Thursday): Ukrainian troops are pushing deeper into the Kursk region:
Ukraine's attack appeared to be a large-scale offensive operation, involving at least two Ukrainian brigades, rather than a less significant cross-border raid.
I don't know what to make of this, if the size of the force is accurate. The story says Ukraine fed reserves into the operation. Could still be a big raid. Even if Ukraine has a number of brigades in reserve, that still isn't a major force for a new front that would simply culminate at some point and leave Ukraine defending more terrain.
I still think this is a raid. Until I see information that makes me see something I don't now.
UPDATE (Friday): It still seems like a raid. A growing raid. But still a raid:
Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however.
Still, there are reports that Ukraine is digging in just across the border. Call it a Thunder Run, with benefits, if you wish.
UPDATE (Friday): There is discussion that this operation proves surprise is not dead due to persistent drone surveillance. This is true. It never died. Real surprise is in the minds of the enemy to make their commanders think that what they see supports their incorrect belief--not reality.
But tactical surprise is still more difficult to achieve. Remember that this started as a battalion operation. That might have been designed to look like a troop rotation. Or Russian information flowed too slowly to react. But massing forces for a major operation is still harder to hide.
And if the Russian troops holding the fortifications had been competent, they still could have stopped or contained the small attack.
Unless we see Russian troops panicking and running--or surrendering in large numbers--I can't imagine this being a major offensive. Where does it go? Unless it rolls up the border to shorten Ukraine's line by taking a shortcut through Russian territory?
But again, it might push Putin to do something stupid that Ukraine can pounce on.
UPDATE (Friday): Really, this post's theme of a Russian facade is bolstered by the weak Russian resistance to the Ukrainian operation. And it bolsters my numerous comments on the advantages of having the initiative.
UPDATE (Friday): This article on the counter-attack includes the speculation that this may have been a "spoiling" attack to disrupt Russian forces preparing for their own attack. So a form of a raid.
That's a reasonable take. But nobody observing really knows.
UPDATE (Friday): Is this a multi-brigade operation now? So far I'm trying not to trust any information.
At some level I had hoped Russia's slow grind this year was due to Ukraine building up a reserve force rather than putting everyone on the line to calm people down by stabilizing the line no matter how unimportant any particular stretch of the front is.
But I'd hoped for a strong counter-attack on one of Russia's salients inside Ukraine. If this is a big operation, what is its objective? Russia is big. Even multiple brigades will get swallowed up in an advance that pushes into Russia too far.
Tip to Instapundit.
UPDATE (Friday): Is this operation really about bolstering Ukrainian troop morale? I looked at that option back in April:
God help them, but Ukraine doesn't mostly need a Saratoga to encourage Western governments or a Doolittle Raid to sustain Ukrainian civilian morale. Ukraine's troops really need a small, decisive Trenton and Princeton counter-attack to give them hope after the body blows they have endured.
Plausible? If so, it's a raid regardless of the size.
UPDATE (Saturday): Ukraine's spearheads in the Kursk incursion in several directions seem to have pulled back. Have we reached Peak Incursion?
UPDATE (Saturday): There is oddly little attention in live television media. I'd think if something big was really going on it would leak by now. The possibility that we have really good operational security this long for something major just hasn't entered my mind.
UPDATE (Saturday): I heard that Ukraine is using a brigade supporting by elements of three other brigades. If people have just looked at brigades participating that could lead to misleading conclusion that it's a division-sized operation.
UPDATE (Sunday): It seems as if the Ukrainians are still pushing forward, if more slowly. I hope this is part of the plan--or a rational exploitation of success for a reasonable objective--and not over-eager attacks that will over-extend Ukrainian troops.
Still, this incursion demonstrates how Russia has stripped troops from the rest of Russia to shovel cannon fodder into Ukraine. If the border at Kursk was this bad, how bad is the border with China? China can deploy more than a couple brigades.
UPDATE (Sunday): I'm assuming Belarus will just make threats to pin Ukrainians along the Belarus border rather than join the war:
The Belarusian Foreign Ministry on August 10 summoned the Ukrainian charge d'affaires over alleged airspace violations after authoritarian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka claimed Ukrainian drones had flown over the country's border with Ukraine.
But who knows? Maybe Belarus joins Russia's war. Maybe Belarus officially goes neutral. Or maybe Belarus flips to Ukraine's side and requests membership in the EU or NATO. As the war goes on, alternate paths proliferate.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
NOTE: I'm now on Substack, with The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
