Ukraine is finally getting F-16s from Western countries. They aren't enough to be decisive across Ukraine. But they could be decisive even in relatively small numbers on the Kherson front.
Ukraine has received F-16s in a process that was agonizingly slow:
Ukrainian officials have previously discussed their intention to use F-16 and other fixed-wing aircraft as part of Ukraine's broader air defense umbrella in coordination with Ukraine's existing air defense systems but have repeatedly stressed that Ukraine will need to receive a substantial number of jets in order to implement this vision.
As of late July, Ukraine has received 85 F-16s contributed by the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. France has sent over a dozen Mirage 2000 fighters. Most of the required Ukrainian F-16 pilots have completed their training and most of these F-16s will be operational before the end of the year. Ukraine will use these fighters to seize control of the air near the Russian border.
Does Ukraine have those planes in Ukraine? Or are those planes merely committed?
Nearly two years ago I thought there was a way to jump start that process. But we didn't go that way. So here we are. Although perhaps that path isn't too late for expanding what Ukraine is fielding.
After undeserved hype about the plane's impact we hear more voices urging people not to get too worked up over the small number of 4th generation fighters that Ukraine is getting. They're nice planes. They aren't silver bullets.
But they could have a disproportionate impact on the long-quiet Kherson front. I've kept my eye on this front since the beginning of the war as a potential site of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.
First, I hoped Ukraine could pull a Remagen Bridge operation to bounce Russian-held bridges across the wide Dnipro River:
I expressed my surprise that Ukrainian counter-attacks around Kharkiv have expanded to the breadth of a counter-offensive. I've expected a counter-offensive on the western edge of the Kherson front to aim for the destruction of Russian army units and subsequent recapture of territory to the Crimea isthmus and then northeast.
Is my map-based analysis ignoring internal Ukrainian politics? Must the Ukrainians demonstrate a roll-back of Russian forces in the east before going on offense elsewhere?
Or is my map analysis wrong? I think securing Odessa from a land threat, threatening Sevastopol, and exploiting Russia's longer lines of supply to the Kherson front (with a shorter Ukrainian line of supply to Western sources) argue for the Kherson front. Am I missing something or just wrong on timing?
Russia's well-conducted withdrawal in 2022--despite Ukraine's counteroffensive that did finally take place there--and subsequent destruction of the river crossings ended that hope.
I worried about giving Russia time in September 2022 after Ukraine's Kharkiv front success:
Does Ukraine have more reserves to commit? And if so, are they earmarked for the Kherson front or the Kharkov front?
Planning for the long run is prudent for Russia, under the circumstances. As long as Russia doesn't lose in the short run. What can Ukraine do before winter arrives to win and what more can the Russian army endure in that time? ISW doesn't think Ukraine can win before 2023 arrives. At this rate, no. But present trends continue--until they don't.
If Ukraine can't score another big win soon, could the West equip Ukraine for a winter offensive in the south that denies Putin the time to rebuild his army for a spring campaign?
I raised the issue again late in 2022:
In the short run, Ukraine has the edge--if it can carry out a major offensive. In the long run, Russia may regain the edge if its ground forces don't crack under the pressure of casualties, poor morale, and battlefield defeats. I don't know how long the short run lasts.
I had hoped for a winter offensive despite the difficulties in the belief that Russia was getting stronger.
I then put my hopes on a southern offensive in Zaporozhye province against greatly weakened Russian forces. But my fears of giving Russia time to prepare were realized as the belated counteroffensive ground to a halt after making meager tactical gains in the summer of 2023. There are surely many reasons put forward for the failure. And this RUSI report is a good stab at it. But I think the fundamental reason was granting Russia time--the most precious commodity in war.
After the 2023 counteroffensive failed, I hoped that Ukraine's small bridgeheads across the river and a campaign against Russian air defenses in western Crimea could create a protected bubble to prepare for a river crossing campaign:
Ukraine's recent attacks on Russian forces in the Crimean Peninsula feel like shaping operations designed to push Russian naval and air defenses east. Could Ukraine be preparing a Kherson front offensive?
That would exploit Russia's thinning of troops, fewer fortifications, and longer Russian lines of supply. This offensive would require underwater bridges in place supplemented by pontoon bridges built after the attack begins. The river crossing would be supplemented by airmobile and amphibious forces. And we'd see a surge of special forces, partisan, and air attacks.
That's what I'd want to do. Does Ukraine have the capabilities?
Russia has been exploiting its air power this year to strike Ukraine's ground units, but it still has a theory of warfighting that doesn't rely on air power the way Western countries do. I imagine Ukraine still has the old Soviet philosophy--from habit and lack of alternatives, eh?
Mind you, I'm not saying air power isn't valuable. Our system of warfare puts more emphasis on air attack at the expense of artillery so it is very important. I'm just saying it isn't the only solution to providing ground forces with timely fire support or for striking targets behind the lines.
The Kherson front would also exploit Russian troops holding at the end of Russian supply lines that won't be better until a railroad along the Sea of Azov through Russian-occupied Ukraine territory bolsters them.
Dropping the Kerch Strait bridge would really strain Russian supply lines that far west.
Indeed, unless Russia's ground forces simply collapse from battering against Ukrainian defenders, this front seems like the only axis of advance with the potential to generate decisive movement.
Yes, Ukraine got the Russians running on the Kursk front. But it still seems like a raid. A well-executed raid that achieved surprise. But still a raid. Even if multiple brigades are committed to roll north or south along the border to tear up Russian border forces and infrastructure, I don't see opportunities for holding more than tactically significant or symbolic ground along the border inside Russia that would benefit Ukraine.
But maybe the effect sought for the Kursk incursion is a distraction. The odds may be low, but my eyes keep getting dragged back to the Kherson front.
And perhaps the inability of Russia to deal with the incursion demonstrates that Russia lacks reserves to cope with unexpected battlefield problems. Before the Ukrainian incursion, I did write that Russia seems to have erected a facade of growing military strength to convince Ukraine and the West that resistance is futile.
Russia seems slow to react with sufficient force to the Ukrainian attack.Whether the Kursk assault is a raid or intended to capture and hold at least some ground, it appears that Ukraine doesn't have to make a quick decision to pull back. Does that expose the scale of Russia's facade of strength?
ISW writes that neither side is currently capable of making a big effort:
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are not in themselves decisive military operations that will win the war. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability to conduct individual decisive war-winning operations and must instead conduct multiple successive operations with limited operational objectives that are far short of victory, but that in aggregate can achieve strategic objectives.
ISW notes that Russia's broad offensive in the east will culminate at some point, giving Ukraine the opportunity to seize the initiative somewhere. It seems to me that as hard is it seems to carry out, the Kherson front may be the only place Ukraine can break out of the prospect of a long slog back to its borders.
Ukraine says it needs about 130 F-16s to have a broad impact across the front--if reports I've heard are accurate. But how many F-16s would be needed to be able to gain air superiority over the Kherson River? That number might be enough to be decisive.
Perhaps Zelensky will say of his outnumbered pilots, "Never have so many owed so much to so few."
UPDATE (Tuesday): Just going to say my advice of July 2014 holds up pretty well:
If Putin does escalate to openly waged warfare against Ukraine to take eastern Ukraine, Ukraine needs to do three things: preserve the Ukrainian army; wage irregular warfare in eastern Ukraine to stress Russia's still-inadequate ground forces; and strike Sevastopol.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Ukraine is seemingly attempting to get Russian forces west of their salient to withdraw, potentially leaving Ukraine with a chunk of Russian territory behind a river:
Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing efforts to strike Russian pontoon bridges and pontoon engineering equipment west of the current Kursk Oblast salient over the Seim River in Glushkovo Raion—geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian drones striking Russian equipment bringing pontoons to a staging area near the Seim River about 3km north of Glushkovo.
It is interesting that Russia hasn't seriously reacted to the incursion. Is this from lack of troops or lack of concern that Ukraine's advance could capture any significant geographic objective?
Russia certainly has enough troops to advance in the Donbas:
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Ask and I shall receive:
Russian government sources told Meduza that that the Kremlin was initially shocked and worried about Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast but calmed down with a week because Ukrainian forces’ advances were far from more densely populated regional centers such as Kursk City.
The Russians don't see a Ukrainian threat to anything of particular importance. So intend to continue offensive operations inside Ukraine.
UPDATE (Thursday): This is why Ukraine needs to establish control of the air over the Dnipro River to make the Kherson front viable:
Ukraine says it is destroying Russian pontoon bridges in Kursk before they can even be constructed.
On Wednesday, Ukrainian special forces released a video compilation that appeared to show attacks on several Russian efforts to build pontoons, or temporary floating bridges.
Ukraine would be on the receiving end of such strikes if it doesn't put up air defenses to cover its own bridge building. And it needs to push a lot of Russian artillery back out of range of the river, too.
UPDATE (Thursday): Russia continues to grind forward in the Donbas. Has Ukraine diverted too much to the Kursk front? Or is Russia gambling too much in Kursk?
UPDATE (Thursday): In the short run I hope that Ukraine plans a counter-attack against a Russian salient in the Donbas that exploits Russian reactions to coping with the Kursk incursion to inflict a serious if localized defeat of the Russian ground forces. We'll see.
UPDATE (Thursday): Ukraine's strategic warfare against Russia's rear continues.
UPDATE (Saturday): Ukraine's Kursk incursion has always seemed like a raid to me. But our government says Ukraine wants a buffer zone.
Maybe. But plenty of Ukrainians inside Ukraine could use buffer zones as Russia grinds forward in the Donbas. I can see wanting better defensive positions that may exist on the Russian side of the border. I can see wanting Russian territory to trade. I'm not sure I buy the buffer explanation.
I certainly expect Ukraine to pull back from forward positions when Russia finally reacts. So maybe just a partial raid. And I'd like to know how Russia's lack of reaction has changed Ukraine's objective since Ukraine crossed the border.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
NOTE: I'm now on Substack, with The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
