Ukraine's valor allowed them to survive Russia's initial invasion without being defeated and conquered. But we're past the valor stage and going into the production stage of war.
Strategypage paints a picture better than the visible results:
Russian use of poorly trained troops and shortages of supplies and modern weapons means the Ukrainian forces are more effective. This has helped the Ukrainians succeed during their current counteroffensive in southern Ukraine. That means Russian forces are facing better trained, equipped and led Ukrainian units which advance against even prepared Russian defenses because the Russian troops defending these fortified zones are equipped with less capable artillery and shortages of ammunition.
Ground isn't being taken in significant amounts. But yes, Russia is
losing troops and equipment. And some of the terrain gained is potentially
significant. There are stories of a Russian unit being destroyed, of retreating Russians being fired on by Russian artillery when mistaken for Ukrainians advancing, and of Russia thinning out its front to bolster the units facing the southern Ukrainian counteroffensive.
I admit that it feels like Ukraine has finally ground down and hollowed out the Russians enough to begin to significantly push Russia's ground forces back. At some point, Russia's army problems could cascade and lead to a break in Russia's line. If Ukraine can exploit that, Russian morale could collapse on a significant part of the front.
"Could" and "if" are doing a lot of work in that scenario, of course. But unless Russia can run the clock out by buying time with their fortifications and troops' lives, I suspect Ukraine could achieve that. I'm more uncertain of how much Ukraine could exploit any break because of lack of time and possible lack of reserve units.
Early in the war I hoped Ukraine could pounce on Russia's huge mistakes of the initial invasion:
The result has been a demoralized Russian army suffering huge casualties that lacks replacements or reinforcements; and an energized Ukrainian population. There is an opening for Ukraine to counter-attack and inflict a major battlefield defeat on the Russians while they reel from the failures. If Ukraine has the units, weapons, and supplies to exploit this moment.
But all that could change if Ukraine can't exploit their edge by ending the war, either after a major victorious counter-attack or simply at the negotiating table before Russia can fix their failures.
Yes, Ukraine did exploit that for local counteroffensives that liberated significant territory. But it took until June 2023 before Ukraine began its long-heralded big push. Yet despite giving Russia time to regroup, Russia's military could still collapse under pressure; but in the long run has the size advantage. Especially in a long war of attrition that looks nothing like magical future war--as I discussed weeks before the war. So as a general rule it's hard to argue against Russia's size advantage. But does that advantage necessarily lie with Russia in this war?
As I addressed in this post about Russia's population and GDP advantage leading to victory,
On people, you'd think so. But the Iran-Iraq War suggests otherwise. Iran had three times the population while Iraq had the money to build material superiority. Iran had far higher willingness to fight and die. But after years of relentless Iranian offensives, during which Iran lost twice as many troops as Iraq, Iran's morale broke. It was not so simple to say Iran could suffer 3 times the casualties. Indeed, one would have thought superior Iranian fanaticism would make the casualty endurance higher than 3:1. But that did not happen.
And the West's vastly superior GDP is arming and supporting Ukraine. Maybe Russia has the long-term advantage. Perhaps even probably when you factor in doubts about NATO willingness to support Ukraine for the long run. But I don't assume so.
I worry Russia may run out the clock on the time Ukraine has to break some defenders and fully exploit it before Russia's army can recover. I don't know how long Ukraine's troops and people will be willing to start over from scratch in new offensives. I had hoped Russia's ground forces were ripe for collapse last autumn. But Ukraine lacked the ability to launch a big strike after the small but successful Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives. Pity.
UPDATE (Wednesday): The length of time it took Ukraine to build a strategic reserve to launch a sustained counteroffensive surprised me, as I expected early in the war:
Let us hope that we don't have a replay of this tragic conversation in 1940:
Churchill asked General Gamelin, "Where is the strategic reserve?" which had saved Paris in the First World War. "There is none", Gamelin replied.The Ukrainians have been smart this war. I cannot believe that Ukraine has not built a strategic reserve. Even at the price of asking outmanned and outgunned Ukrainian troops to desperately hold the line in the Donbas.
So far the repercussions aren't fatal. But it certainly has a tragic element given the failure to be able to exploit Russia's failure.
UPDATE (Thursday): Ukraine's recent attacks on Russian forces in the Crimean Peninsula feel like shaping operations designed to push Russian naval and air defenses east. Could Ukraine be preparing a Kherson front offensive?
That would exploit Russia's thinning of troops, fewer fortifications, and longer Russian lines of supply. This offensive would require underwater bridges in place supplemented by pontoon bridges built after the attack begins. The river crossing would be supplemented by airmobile and amphibious forces. And we'd see a surge of special forces, partisan, and air attacks.
That's what I'd want to do. Does Ukraine have the capabilities?
UPDATE (Saturday): This article notes the recent increase in Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets in occupied Crimea. Why?
Military experts say it is essential for Ukraine to keep up its attacks on targets in Crimea to degrade Russian morale and weaken its military.
Hmmm. If the purpose was only to degrade morale and weaken Russia's military, I think targets closer to the front would be more productive.
I have to believe Ukraine's attacks are considered essential for something more specific.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
