China is looking at logistics lessons from Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
China is looking at Russia's logistics:
In this Chinese analysis three different stages of the war are identified pertaining to logistics. These are, in chronological order, the pre-war buildup and initial attack; a second phase that essentially corresponds to the period after the abandonment of the northern front; and the current situation as it has evolved in 2023.
Nothing is that earth-shaking--if China learns the lessons.
What this Chinese exercise makes me wonder is whether China is refraining from sending ammunition to Russia to avoid getting sanctioned. What if China isn't supplying Russia because China has looked at what it has and decided it needs everything it has and more to invade Taiwan in the next several years.
Yes, the article writes, China will likely try to seize airports and ports quickly to sustain their offensive. I agree, with an emphasis on the ports for logistics and the airports for getting troops on the ground to help take the ports; and also goes right for Taipei to seize or disrupt the Taiwanese government. That's been my assumption for a long time.
If China is worried about logistics perhaps we should be more interested in disrupting Chinese logistics. The Chinese did note that Ukrainian irregulars managed to hit Russia's inadequate supply effort hard. But the Chinese supply line is going to mostly be a sea one with a supplemental air resupply with helicopters flying from China and aircraft at captured airfields. This is a different kind of effort than Russia's.
Naval historian Julian S. Corbett a century ago wrote of naval power (in Principles of Maritime Strategy):
Naval warfare does not begin and end with the destruction of the enemy's battle-fleet, nor even with breaking his cruiser power. Beyond all this there is the actual work of preventing his passing an army across the sea and of protecting the passage of our own military expeditions.
The war will be decided on land. My basic template for invasion assumed China would sacrifice a lot of older ships (now in their coast guard)--including a carrier--to get an army ashore.
So perhaps rather than only thinking about sinking Chinese warships as the metric of success, Taiwan and America should be looking at ultimately sinking the supply ships and damaging the Chinese ports and airports that would sustain an invasion force (despite my doubts America could sustain that effort, assuming China accepts losses of lots of ships).
Of course, a Chinese army that is flung ashore even with reduced supplies could hang on defending with air support from China until Peking can engineer a ceasefire if Taiwan lacks the weapons, troop training, and morale to engage in an offensive to drive the invaders into the sea.
So America will have to protect the passage of our own expedition (pay attention to our logistics!) to help Taiwan and--if necessary with American forces--a ground offensive that drives the PLA into the sea (in Military Review).
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
