Russia isn't looking like it can win more than a Pyrrhic victory. But the fate of Ukraine still hangs in the balance as Russia defines the extent and scope of its defeat.
Ukraine continues to hold the initiative across the southern front. In the east, each trades punches but the Ukrainians appear to have the edge. And in the bigger picture, are forcing Russia to react. While it feels like Ukraine is hollowing out and stressing Russia's ground forces, Russia still holds a line despite being pushed back a bit. If Russia's army can be cracked as it is leveraged out of its apparent main line of resistance, Ukraine might get big gains. But it may have to wait until the autumn or winter.
Or Ukraine won't get that victory.
Russia seems to rely not on reclaiming the initiative in battle but on outlasting Western resolve to support Ukraine. That might win the war, but the bigger picture appears bleak for Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has scored a "huge own goal" with the war in Ukraine, according to CIA Director William Burns.
He was referring to Russia's losses at the front, international sanctions, the expansion of NATO and Russia's growing dependence on China — something that has escalated in recent years and may well become one of the enduring challenges Putin's government has created for Russia.
The risks associated with this final point, the deepening dependence on China, are substantial — and breaking free from it will prove to be a formidable task.
I suspect Russia extended its appeasement of China five years in the belief that a short and glorious war against Ukraine that broke NATO would allow Putin to pivot to face China.
Now, China might pick apart the carcass of a broken Russia too weak to be a useful pretend ally. Putin is finding it sucks to be Mussolini in the drama.
And nobody wants Mussolini to be their champion.
But just because Russia is effing up, that doesn't mean it can't make short-term dangerous gains by defeating Ukraine--thus eliminating a major army in Russia's path--and absorbing Ukraine--thus adding Ukraine's territory and some of Ukraine's military power to Russia. Given many decades when NATO oddly doesn't invade Russia and instead imports its natural gas again, Russia could recover from the mistakes while retaining the asset of Ukraine.
Although I can't rule out that--like the Russia-Finland Winter War of 1939-1940--Russia won't conclude that the price Russia paid for what it gets in this war is too high a price to risk paying again given other potential threats to Russia.
Imagine what Russia could have achieved if it had moved through Belarus and hit NATO from Estonia to Poland instead of attacking Ukraine? Would NATO have been able to halt an attack that Russia clearly could sustain for a couple years? And halt it without using nuclear weapons?
At least NATO got a wake-up call on logistics.
By arming and helping Ukraine, the West has started to "take Vienna." For God's sake, take Vienna. And maybe Russia will get a hard enough whack with the clue bat to claim victory and get out of Ukraine.
UPDATE (Monday): ISW notes that Russia is expending a lot of effort counterattacking to hold their positions in the south despite having prepared positions to fall back on further south.
Russia may be doing this to buy time for .. something unclear. Waiting for reinforcements? To build fortifications? Or perhaps Putin needs to portray Ukraine's offensive as futile even if it costs Russia excessive lives and equipment. This could be for undermining Western support or undermining domestic opposition to Putin's conduct of the war.
Can Russia's ability to hold every inch of its conquests outlast Ukraine's ability to attack? ISW doesn't know:
The Ukrainian counteroffensive is in an extremely dynamic phase and ISW is not prepared to offer any confident forecast of events despite recent positive indicators.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
