As we process how to fight and achieve surprise on a battlefield with lots of surveillance assets searching for units, one thing we can do is not make it easier on the enemy's surveillance missions.
A lesson for both Ukraine and its international partners is that operational security was inadequate, such that Russia knew precisely where and approximately when the offensive was to take place. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that with only a couple of brigades properly equipped for offensive operations, Russia only had to track a small number of units to determine Ukrainian intent.
I anticipated that problem, as I wrote in the month before the operation kicked off:
I keep saying that the heavy lifting for Ukraine's counteroffensive will be the old Soviet equipment rather than the new Western equipment still flowing in. And I think that Soviet stuff will be the first wave. I'd rather save the Western stuff for the exploitation of a breakthrough. And also, I wouldn't want to telegraph the counteroffensive with Western-equipped brigades hitting the line. Unless that's how the Russians will be diverted from the main effort, of course.
Obviously, sending in the Western-equipped brigades as the spearhead wasn't a deep deceit to conceal the real threat.
UPDATE: Ukraine's counter-attack into Russia's Kursk province this week certainly avoided telegraphing the operation to the Russians.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.NOTE: I'm now on Substack, with The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
