Tuesday, December 03, 2024

Israel Pauses to Regroup?

Israel has accepted a ceasefire that pushes Hezbollah out of the war. Will it work or will it just allow Israel to regroup for a bigger war? 

Israel has ended the phase of its war that focused on Hezbollah (and so I won't be updating that post going forward). With only a shallow ground invasion of Israel and a long and an effective espionage and air campaign against Hezbollah's leadership and rocket arsenal--combined with apparent Hezbollah reluctance to do more than Solidarity Theater at the side of Hamas--Israel has pushed Hezbollah (and its Iranian patron) to a ceasefire in Lebanon that went into effect on November 27th:

The text published by Israeli media requires a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26, 2025. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported the deal in a message to his ministers and noted that Israel needs to focus on Iran, the need to rest its forces, and further isolating Hamas. The ceasefire calls for a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to dismantle all non-state military infrastructure, prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament, and deploy to southern Lebanon to play a predominant security role there. The ceasefire agreement also contains a self-defense clause that would allow Israel to act against Hezbollah if needed. US President Joe Biden said that the deal is designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. Only Lebanon and Israel are parties to the agreement, and it is the Lebanese state’s responsibility to ensure Hezbollah’s compliance. An independent committee advised by the United States and France, in addition to the current UN observer force in southern Lebanon, will monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement. The exact structure of the monitoring committee is not codified in the ceasefire text. The deal includes a US letter affirming support for any future Israel operations needed to combat Hezbollah violations of the deal.

Hezbollah is defeated. But it is not destroyed. But why die to support crushed Hamas? And Iran sure isn't coming to the rescue.

Hamas is feeling alone now, and announced it is ready for a ceasefire deal with Israel. That could be good as long as the ceasefire is actually a Hamas surrender with the term "ceasefire" is just a fig leaf to let Hamas pretend it didn't surrender. 

What does Israel do now? 

Is this peace for our time? Can the Lebanese army really keep Hezbollah and other jihadis out of southern Lebanon? Can UNIFAIL reform into UNIFIL as it was supposed to be after the 2006 war? Will America back Israel's efforts to maintain the Hezbollah-free zone?

Does Israel anticipate Hezbollah trying to re-infiltrate southern Lebanon? And with two or three months to prepare, Israel can resume the war to really tear up Hezbollah? This deal runs counter to my expectations for a deep ground raid lasting months

To be fair, my expectation was formed by the inability of Israel's Iron Dome to stop a hail of Hezbollah rockets and missiles. But Hezbollah--perhaps unwilling to do more than carry out Solidarity Theater for Hamas--never really surged a barrage to do that. Instead, Israel was able to destroy a large fraction (80% by memory) of Hezbollah's rockets from the air over the last year--and especially over the last couple months. Israel also smashed up Hezbollah's command structure.

So the foundation of my expectation did not take place. Is this good enough? And if so, is it lasting? And if Hezbollah returns and rearms, will it fire at maximum rate from day one to avoid their rocket arsenal's destruction in this war?

Is it time for quiet intelligence and police work to find Hamas in the West Bank?

Could Iran's assets in Syria be the target? This takes advantage of the surprise opposition offensive. Although some portion of the opposition is made up of jihadis, so encouraging them at this point might be a problem for Israel if no jihadi alternative to Assad is likely to take over. Maybe Israel could support Assad in order to defeat the jihadis and eject Iran.

Of course, if this is the next phase of the war it may not be Israel's choice:

The assault comes as Assad faces growing domestic and external pressures in a country shattered by a civil war that erupted after a 2011 popular uprising. He was able to quash the original rebellion with military backing from Russia, Iran and Iranian-backed groups, including Hizbollah, the Lebanese militant movement.

The fighting in Syria’s civil war had largely diminished in recent years, with the remnants of the armed opposition pushed to northern and northwestern areas of the country close to the Turkish border.

But over the past year, Israel has stepped up its air strikes on Iranian-affiliated targets in Syria as it has launched an offensive against Hizbollah in Lebanon, weakening the groups that had played a crucial role in supporting the Assad regime. The Israeli military said it struck “military infrastructure” linked to Hizbollah in Syria near the Lebanese border on Saturday.

HTS’s ability to fight inside Aleppo is a devastating blow to Assad and underscores the regime’s weakness.

“This is very serious for Assad,” said Malik al-Abdeh, a Syrian analyst. “Israel’s attacks against Iran and Hizbollah created the window of opportunity for this to happen. The long attritional war between Israel and Iran has clearly taken its toll on Iran’s capacity to deploy and fight in Syria.”

There is some irony in this given that I believed that Hezbollah's losses propping up Assad in Syria provided an opportunity for Israel to attack a weakened Hezbollah while Syria was recovering.

I could see Israel feeling compelled to bomb jihadis to prop up the Assad regime as the lesser of two evils. Assad at least had kept the Golan Heights front quiet. Israel would be happy to kill two birds with one stone if Hezbollah and Syrian jihadis chew each other up. And maybe Iran will be able to convince Hezbollah to once again enter the breach of Syria's multi-war (it's too complicated to call it a mere civil war) now that it doesn't have to worry about Israel. Or maybe Iran expended too much of its power (both its own and its proxies) attacking Israel to prop up Assad now. Especially with Turkey assisting the jihadi-led offensive.

Or maybe Israel turns to smash up the Houthi and re-open Red Sea shipping. That scores points with Egypt, which gets significant revenue from Suez Canal tolls.

Maybe Israel exploits Hezbollah's defeat to really put the screws to Hamas while Hezbollah has stood down to lick its wounds. Israel now has explicit approval to pound Hezbollah if it tries to react to such an effort. Could Israel be radical in a long-term plan to help Gazans choose leaders who will build up Gaza rather than kill Israelis?

Maybe Israel expands the war to Iran's proxies in Iraq--which should have been America's fight to eliminate Iran's power inside Iraq. Iraq doesn't want to get involved but hasn't been able to suppress the largely unpopular Iranian influence. Although I strongly object to the idea that Iranian and American forces "exacerbate" the threat of violence. Iran exacerbates violence and America is a force balancing that malign influence.

Or--and I'm reaching--does Israel think it can go to the source of Israel's lethal ring of enemies to cut the Gordian Knot

I just don't believe for a moment that we have peace for our time or that Israel thinks it achieved that with this ceasefire. 

Still, it is also possible that Israelis are at their limit of sacrifice after crushing Hamas and Hezbollah.

And one last thing. Perhaps Hezbollah's defeat will temporarily tamp down the perennial claim that killing jihadis isn't effective and likely counter-productive. Because I don't see Hezbollah really fired up about their jihad against Israel right now.

UPDATE: At what point would Iranian troops provoke Israel to strike them?

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran is open to the possibility of sending troops to Syria to help President Bashar al-Assad's forces after a major offensive by rebels.

Assad would have to be desperate to make that request, knowing Iranians would be hard to expel once inside Syria. 

UPDATE: Two more audition for the lead role in the next act:

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels said they have targeted Israel with drones three times in the past 48 hours in cooperation with their allies in Iraq.

UPDATE: ISW looks at Israel's victory over Hezbollah that drove it out of the war Hamas started.

But can Israel keep Hezbollah from rebuilding the threat it recently posed to Israel? Much depends on the Lebanese government and UNIFIL not being intimidated by or sympathetic to Hezbollah.

UPDATE: I'm hearing that what I thought were jihadis have evolved into "Islamism in one state" rebels focused on Syria. Even if true, I'm skeptical that Islamists can restrain their ambitions for long if they get their state.

UPDATE: As I read debates about how the frozen conflict in northwestern Syria thawed out right now, I'd rather know who equipped and supported the rebels to the extent they could launch an offensive. I guess Turkey has a hand in this. But did it really want or even just anticipate an offensive?

NOTE: I will update this post for developments in the wider war Hamas sparked on October 7, 2023 with its rape, murder, and kidnap invasion of Israel.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

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