Israel has accepted a ceasefire that pushes Hezbollah out of the war. Will it work or will it just allow Israel to regroup for a bigger war?
Israel has ended the phase of its war that focused on Hezbollah (and so I won't be updating that post going forward). With only a shallow ground invasion of Israel and a long and an effective espionage and air campaign against Hezbollah's leadership and rocket arsenal--combined with apparent Hezbollah reluctance to do more than Solidarity Theater at the side of Hamas--Israel has pushed Hezbollah (and its Iranian patron) to a ceasefire in Lebanon that went into effect on November 27th:
The text published by Israeli media requires a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26, 2025. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported the deal in a message to his ministers and noted that Israel needs to focus on Iran, the need to rest its forces, and further isolating Hamas. The ceasefire calls for a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to dismantle all non-state military infrastructure, prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament, and deploy to southern Lebanon to play a predominant security role there. The ceasefire agreement also contains a self-defense clause that would allow Israel to act against Hezbollah if needed. US President Joe Biden said that the deal is designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. Only Lebanon and Israel are parties to the agreement, and it is the Lebanese state’s responsibility to ensure Hezbollah’s compliance. An independent committee advised by the United States and France, in addition to the current UN observer force in southern Lebanon, will monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement. The exact structure of the monitoring committee is not codified in the ceasefire text. The deal includes a US letter affirming support for any future Israel operations needed to combat Hezbollah violations of the deal.
Hezbollah is defeated. But it is not destroyed. But why die to support crushed Hamas? And Iran sure isn't coming to the rescue.
Hamas is feeling alone now, and announced it is ready for a ceasefire deal with Israel. That could be good as long as the ceasefire is actually a Hamas surrender with the term "ceasefire" is just a fig leaf to let Hamas pretend it didn't surrender.
What does Israel do now?
Is this peace for our time? Can the Lebanese army really keep Hezbollah and other jihadis out of southern Lebanon? Can UNIFAIL reform into UNIFIL as it was supposed to be after the 2006 war? Will America back Israel's efforts to maintain the Hezbollah-free zone?
Does Israel anticipate Hezbollah trying to re-infiltrate southern Lebanon? And with two or three months to prepare, Israel can resume the war to really tear up Hezbollah? This deal runs counter to my expectations for a deep ground raid lasting months.
To be fair, my expectation was formed by the inability of Israel's Iron Dome to stop a hail of Hezbollah rockets and missiles. But Hezbollah--perhaps unwilling to do more than carry out Solidarity Theater for Hamas--never really surged a barrage to do that. Instead, Israel was able to destroy a large fraction (80% by memory) of Hezbollah's rockets from the air over the last year--and especially over the last couple months. Israel also smashed up Hezbollah's command structure.
So the foundation of my expectation did not take place. Is this good enough? And if so, is it lasting? And if Hezbollah returns and rearms, will it fire at maximum rate from day one to avoid their rocket arsenal's destruction in this war?
Is it time for quiet intelligence and police work to find Hamas in the West Bank?
Could Iran's assets in Syria be the target? This takes advantage of the surprise opposition offensive. Although some portion of the opposition is made up of jihadis, so encouraging them at this point might be a problem for Israel if no jihadi alternative to Assad is likely to take over. Maybe Israel could support Assad in order to defeat the jihadis and eject Iran.
Of course, if this is the next phase of the war it may not be Israel's choice:
The assault comes as Assad faces growing domestic and external pressures in a country shattered by a civil war that erupted after a 2011 popular uprising. He was able to quash the original rebellion with military backing from Russia, Iran and Iranian-backed groups, including Hizbollah, the Lebanese militant movement.
The fighting in Syria’s civil war had largely diminished in recent years, with the remnants of the armed opposition pushed to northern and northwestern areas of the country close to the Turkish border.
But over the past year, Israel has stepped up its air strikes on Iranian-affiliated targets in Syria as it has launched an offensive against Hizbollah in Lebanon, weakening the groups that had played a crucial role in supporting the Assad regime. The Israeli military said it struck “military infrastructure” linked to Hizbollah in Syria near the Lebanese border on Saturday.
HTS’s ability to fight inside Aleppo is a devastating blow to Assad and underscores the regime’s weakness.
“This is very serious for Assad,” said Malik al-Abdeh, a Syrian analyst. “Israel’s attacks against Iran and Hizbollah created the window of opportunity for this to happen. The long attritional war between Israel and Iran has clearly taken its toll on Iran’s capacity to deploy and fight in Syria.”
There is some irony in this given that I believed that Hezbollah's losses propping up Assad in Syria provided an opportunity for Israel to attack a weakened Hezbollah while Syria was recovering.
I could see Israel feeling compelled to bomb jihadis to prop up the Assad regime as the lesser of two evils. Assad at least had kept the Golan Heights front quiet. Israel would be happy to kill two birds with one stone if Hezbollah and Syrian jihadis chew each other up. And maybe Iran will be able to convince Hezbollah to once again enter the breach of Syria's multi-war (it's too complicated to call it a mere civil war) now that it doesn't have to worry about Israel. Or maybe Iran expended too much of its power (both its own and its proxies) attacking Israel to prop up Assad now. Especially with Turkey assisting the jihadi-led offensive.
Or maybe Israel turns to smash up the Houthi and re-open Red Sea shipping. That scores points with Egypt, which gets significant revenue from Suez Canal tolls.
Maybe Israel exploits Hezbollah's defeat to really put the screws to Hamas while Hezbollah has stood down to lick its wounds. Israel now has explicit approval to pound Hezbollah if it tries to react to such an effort. Could Israel be radical in a long-term plan to help Gazans choose leaders who will build up Gaza rather than kill Israelis?
Maybe Israel expands the war to Iran's proxies in Iraq--which should have been America's fight to eliminate Iran's power inside Iraq. Iraq doesn't want to get involved but hasn't been able to suppress the largely unpopular Iranian influence. Although I strongly object to the idea that Iranian and American forces "exacerbate" the threat of violence. Iran exacerbates violence and America is a force balancing that malign influence.
Or--and I'm reaching--does Israel think it can go to the source of Israel's lethal ring of enemies to cut the Gordian Knot?
I just don't believe for a moment that we have peace for our time or that Israel thinks it achieved that with this ceasefire.
Still, it is also possible that Israelis are at their limit of sacrifice after crushing Hamas and Hezbollah.
And one last thing. Perhaps Hezbollah's defeat will temporarily tamp down the perennial claim that killing jihadis isn't effective and likely counter-productive. Because I don't see Hezbollah really fired up about their jihad against Israel right now.
UPDATE: At what point would Iranian troops provoke Israel to strike them?
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran is open to the possibility of sending troops to Syria to help President Bashar al-Assad's forces after a major offensive by rebels.
Assad would have to be desperate to make that request, knowing Iranians would be hard to expel once inside Syria.
UPDATE: Two more audition for the lead role in the next act:
Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels said they have targeted Israel with drones three times in the past 48 hours in cooperation with their allies in Iraq.
UPDATE: ISW looks at Israel's victory over Hezbollah that drove it out of the war Hamas started.
But can Israel keep Hezbollah from rebuilding the threat it recently posed to Israel? Much depends on the Lebanese government and UNIFIL not being intimidated by or sympathetic to Hezbollah.
UPDATE: I'm hearing that what I thought were jihadis have evolved into "Islamism in one state" rebels focused on Syria. Even if true, I'm skeptical that Islamists can restrain their ambitions for long if they get their state.
UPDATE: As I read debates about how the frozen conflict in northwestern Syria thawed out right now, I'd rather know who equipped and supported the rebels to the extent they could launch an offensive. I guess Turkey has a hand in this. But did it really want or even just anticipate an offensive?
UPDATE: Hezbollah knows it got its butt kicked. That's why it agreed to a ceasefire and effectively retreated. So why is Hezbollah still shooting at Israel?
As tit-for-tat strikes strain a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah less than a week since it went into effect, Israel’s defense minister on Tuesday threatened to directly target the Lebanese state should the agreement fall apart.
Monday was the deadliest day since that agreement came into force last Wednesday, with Israeli strikes killing nine in southern Lebanon after Hezbollah fired at Israeli-occupied territory, citing Israeli truce violations.
“If we return to war, we will act with strength, go deeper,” Israel Katz said during a visit on Tuesday to the 146th Division of the Israel Defense Forces, near the Lebanese border.
Has Hezbollah had second thoughts? Does it think it can resume the old rules of limited fighting that Hezbollah can endure? Are factions who disagree with giving up for now outside of Hezbollah command and control that the beeper and walkie talkie operations disrupted? Can Hezbollah restrain such factions--assuming Hezbollah wants to?
And why is Israel's defense minister giving this message to an Israeli army division rather than an air force unit?Is the logic behind my expectation of a deep multi-division ground raid into Lebanon too strong to ignore?
I noted in the main body of this post that I was wrong about my long-held expectation. Perhaps I'm just not correct yet. The revived multi-war in Syria certainly reduces the amount of help Hezbollah can expect from Iran.
UPDATE: ISW looks at the resurgent multi-war in the northwest:
This isn't as dramatic or as big as ISIL's 2014 offensive through western and northwestern Iraq. And like the 2014 advance/uprising where I was only very slightly worried ISIL could take Shia areas including Baghdad, I'm not too worried this offensive could threaten Assad's Alawite base of power from the coast to Damascus. But Syria does need to hold Homs, as ISW notes, to keep that corridor from the sea to Damascus.
Back in 2012 when things looked darkest for Assad before Russia intervened, I thought that to survive Assad might have to focus his limited forces on clearing and holding core territory in an arc from the Turkish border along the coast to Damascus and then to the Israeli border to hold his Alawite homeland, the capital that gives him a UN seat, and the border with Israel to at least pose as a "frontline" state as a source of legitimacy. I don't think we're anywhere near that stage yet.
UPDATE: Also, I haven't followed Syria's army development, but is it still a core of technical support personnel surrounded by a shell of often foreign militias that replaced the dead Syrian combat elements? With reports of Iraqi militias controlled by Iran reinforcing Assad, I'll guess nothing has changed significantly.
UPDATE: I'm trying to catch up on Syria after not paying much attention for years. I watched a French program. It seems like Assad's base of power is teetering. The claim is the Islamist rebels have tried to look moderate and have reached out to Christians and the Druze to weaken their alliance with Assad. And the core base of Assad, the Alawites, are so bloodied by the multi-war that they don't have heart to fight. And Russia lacks the Wagner mercenaries and special forces to more accurately call in air strikes. So Russian air power is even more limited than its reduced numbers would indicate.
We'll see. Assad had portrayed himself as the only thing standing between the minorities and the bloodthirsty Sunni jihadis. Is that gone?
Further, one analyst thinks that Turkey hopes the jihadis will conquer Damascus and take over, allowing Erdogan to send refugees back to Syria. Can they? Another analyst thinks Syria could fragment. That's something I discussed in 2016.
We'll see. I still bet Assad could rally Alawites to defend their homeland from Sunni jihadis. The question will be can Assad get enough Iranian-purchased Iraqi and Afghan mercenaries to hold Damascus, too. If he can get that support, whatever Assad holds will be a rump Syria rather than just another fiefdom in a fragmented Syria with no more claim to the UN seat than any other fiefdom.
UPDATE: How will the jihadi-led rebel offensive in Syria affect Israel-Lebanon relations? Lebanon with its fragile peace that balances rival religious groups would be easily thrown into chaos if the rebels reach the Lebanon border.
Will this push Lebanon to work with Israel more closely to resist the jihadis? Or push Lebanon closer to Hezbollah as a force able--if it rebuilds--to fight the jihadis. Hezbollah would have quite the dilemma between confronting Israel which is its reason for existing on the one hand and protecting its rear area in the Bekaa Valley that will be more directly threatened by the jihadis if they advance far enough.
In addition, the article notes the decline of Russia's air power in Syria:
Moscow only has 13 fighter jets stationed there now, seven of which are operable, after having 50 there before its war of aggression against Kyiv.
UPDATE: Apparently Hama has fallen to the rebels and the rebels have pushed south nearly 16 miles. That's bad for Assad. If Homs falls, that's officially Really Bad. Tip to Instapundit.
Would Israel use its air power to keep the Devil it knows in power and gain big points with Russia?
UPDATE: ISW has more. Assad's forces seem to have collapsed at Hama. Some villages of past Assad supporters have cut deals with the rebel jihadis to basically declare themselves open cities. The jihadis are pushing south toward Homs. The jihadis are attempting to get Iraq to ban Iraqis from fighting for Assad. Hezbollah declined to intervene, saying it must rebuild inside Lebanon. And Israel hit a weapons depot near Aleppo which is now in rebel hands, answering my most recent question.
If Assad can't hold Homs, he may have to abandon Damascus and focus on surviving in the coastal enclave of Alawites. Assuming the Alawites aren't so exhausted by fighting that even they are willing to take their chances with allegedly reformed jihadis ruling them. Would Assad have to contract a core Syria by abandoning Damascus and moving the official capital into the coastal enclave to attempt to hold the UN seat?
Amazing how my old stuff is still relevant.
Can Assad loyalists make a stand? Will the jihadis culminate? Remember that the jihadis in Iraq made spectacular gains in 2014 before stalling at the figurative gates of Baghdad.
UPDATE: Russia isn't going to waste scarce assets unless Assad looks like he can win:
“Russia doesn’t have a plan to save Assad and doesn’t see one emerging as long as the Syrian president’s army continues to abandon its positions,” said the source. ...
The Kremlin told all Russian citizens to flee Syria on the next available commercial flight.
UPDATE: Hezbollah sent commanders or advisors, apparently, but not troops:
Lebanese armed group Hezbollah sent a small number of "supervising forces" from Lebanon to Syria overnight to help prevent anti-government fighters from seizing the strategic city of Homs, two senior Lebanese security sources said on Friday.
UPDATE: Assad is prioritizing the core of Syria:
The Syrian army withdrew from much of southern Syria on Saturday, leaving more areas of the country, including two provincial capitals, under the control of opposition fighters, the military and an opposition war monitor said.Those are non-jihadis in the south, I believe. ISW reports the jihadis have advanced south to the outskirts of Homs, which is critical for Assad to hold to maintain lines of communication between Damascus and the Alawite homeland in the coastal regions.
The America-backed SDF in eastern Syria has also captured territory from Assad, which cuts off an Iranian line of supply from Iraq to Damascus.
ISW also reports that Assad desperately needs reinforcements from its foreign allies. And those allies are weakened and quite busy saving themselves.
Finally, ISW reports that Turkey does not want to stop short of overthrowing Assad. Thus finally making good on its ultimatum.
UPDATE: For Israel--and the West in general--let's draw another lesson from this rebel offensive. When you start to take Vienna, take Vienna. Or in this case, Idlib province from which the jihadi-led offensive has erupted.
But Assad did not kill his weakened enemy. And in the eight years since, his weakened enemy strengthened itself while Assad and his allies weakened to allow the jihadis to unfreeze the conflict.
UPDATE: Just going to say that I don't assume Assad's regime falls. Initial shock at the enemy offensive may fade and Assad's backers may fear defeat enough to fight. The rebels can run out of momentum short of capturing decisive objectives.
Assad may have to contract the territory it defends quite a bit to survive. But he could survive. I have no way to judge the odds.
But I strongly doubt the jihadis could advance east to conquer the Kurds and its local Arab allies as long as they have American and coalition support.
The Bashar al Assad regime faces imminent collapse. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) appears to have already collapsed itself, as its units have fled repeatedly from advancing opposition forces across the country. The SAA is combat ineffective and has yet to present a meaningful defense against the advancing opposition. The opposition forces led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) have exploited the collapse of the SAA by advancing further southward and taking control of Homs City, which is the last major obstacle before Damascus.
Rebels south of Damascus are expanding their control.
The only question may be whether the Alawites can defend their home region.
UPDATE: The Assad government has fallen (via Instapundit):
The Syrian government appears to have fallen in a stunning end to the 50-year rule of the Assad family following a rapid rebel offensive.
Syrian rebels declared victory over President Bashar al-Assad’s regime early on Sunday, after fighters entered Damascus and the president reportedly fled the country.
Did rebels from the north or south enter the capital? Will various rebels fight each other? And again, will the Alawites fight on for their part of Syria?
UPDATE: Will a new Syrian government cut a deal with the Western-backed SDF--the Kurd-dominated alliance in eastern Syria?
Will this affect anti-ISIL operations by Western forces inside Syria?
Will America need its forces in eastern Syria to screen Iraq from infiltration?
Is Hezbollah cut off or will the new government allow Iranian supplies to flow through?
Will this shake Iran, too? Syria was a major part of its informal empire that it spent huge amounts of money to prop up. It collapsed quickly.
What is Israel's position? Can it negotiate with the new rulers to keep the Golan Heights front quiet?
If it is to be a coalition government, won't the more ruthless jihadis eventually come out on top regardless of the nice feelings at the moment of toppling Assad?
Is there going to be a new Syria in anything but name? Or will rebels have power in their own regions in a decentralized Syria? I've heard some hints that the Alawites have given up, too. But it isn't clear to me yet.
Are the Russians pulling a Dunkirk from their Syria bases as fast as they can? Or will there be a deal on this issue, too?
What does this mean for refugees? Will more try to escape? Will those in other countries go home?
I've got to say, I thought Assad forces would rally at Homs. And if not there that they'd fight to hold the Alawite western coastal region.
And I'll note that Assad working with Iran to funnel foreign jihadis through those "rat lines" to be suicide bombers during the Iraq War seemingly backfired on Assad with a bloody multi-war, the rise and fall of the Islamic State across eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq, and now the fall of his regime to the rebels he failed to crush when he had the advantage.
UPDATE: For those claiming the jihadis in HTS are reformed, I'll remind you that we were told the same fantasy about Taliban 2.0 when we retreated from Afghanistan.
In addition, Israel is stepping up protection on the border with Syria:
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced today that the IDF has seized control of a U.N.-patrolled buffer zone separating the Israeli-occupied portion and the Syrian-controlled area of the Golan Heights.
Netanyahu said a 1974 agreement that established the zone of separation between the two countries had "collapsed" after Syrian soldiers abandoned their positions.
UPDATE: Wow:
Opposition forces separately entered the final remaining regime strongholds of Jableh, Latakia, and Tartus on the Syrian coast on December 8.
The government forces collapse is complete, with Alawites unwilling even to defend their homeland.
And "HTS-affiliated" forces have advanced to the Euphrates River where SDF forces appear to have retreated from recently captured territory. I find it hard to believe the Kurds would roll over. But are the Sunni Arabs part of the SDF still solid components after the fall of Assad? And without the Sunni Arabs, how much territory can the Kurds contest? And if that control falls apart, American and other Western forces won't be able to hold their toe holds inside Syria.
Further, Israel is bombing former Syrian army arsenals. And the U.S. is hitting ISIL targets.
UPDATE: Obviously, if Israel has been pausing to regroup for its next target, the fall of Assad complicates Israel's dilemma quite a bit. And it may make going after Iran more appealing.
UPDATE: Amnesty to Syrian military conscripts was granted. And:
Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is establishing a transitional government and reconciling with members of the former Syrian regime and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). HTS is attempting to ensure continuity of governance to prevent widespread anarchy in Syria, which is consistent with HTS’ longstanding approach to “liberated areas.”
Most of Syria is beyond immediate HTS presence. Turks in the north, the American-led coalition in the east, and perhaps Israelis in the south have a presence to support regional allies. For the latter, would the Druze rather live under an Israeli umbrella than risk HTS rule?
And would Iran-backed Hezbollah cut deals with the Alawites to provide security--and protect the rear of Hezbollah in Lebanon--if the Alawites decide to stand their ground?
I just don't believe HTS can maintain a broad government. I don't think Islamist restraint can last. In a battle between Islamists trying to build a "caliphate in one country" and Islamists on a Mission from Allah to create a global caliphate, I'd bet on the latter who are more willing to kill for their vision. Iran after its revolution against the shah started out as a broad-based coalition. Now the mullahs are dug in inside the government, allowing no unapproved voices to rise to the top.
Will Iran's defeat in Syria weaken Iranian influence in Iraq? Tensions are apparent.
ISW wonders what I did about the SDF Kurd-Sunni Arab alliance now that a Sunni-dominated government is forming in Damascus.
Israeli operations continue in Lebanon and low-level combat continues in Gaza. The Houthi are still attacking Israel with long-range weapons.
And Israel continues to strike former Assad weapons depots to prevent HTS or other hostile actors from getting those weapons.
UPDATE: Israel is taking out assets of use to potential enemies:
Israel targeted airbases, weapons and ammunition warehouses, aircraft and signal stations in Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, a monitoring and rights group in the country.
I've heard this includes chemical weapons. I don't know if that means something more potent than lethal gas made from otherwise legal chlorine.
UPDATE: ISW notes that, as I worried, some Arab militias have defected from the Kurdish-led SDF to support the HTS-led new rulers.
The SDF has lost a big chunk of its territory on its western front along the border with Turkey to Turkish backed militias. Will some Syrian Arab militias remain with the SDF on this issue?
HTS-led forces have cut off the Syrian coastal region from Lebanon. Also note that much of the Alawite region is marked on the ISW map as uncontrolled by the HTS. Will Alawites regain their will to fight and color that region in as their own? After all, the the HTS leader has vowed "'we' will hold former regime officers 'accountable' for torturing civilians under Assad."
UPDATE: In addition to the Alawites rethinking giving up, the other minorities who had backed Assad to keep the Sunni Arab majority from targeting them (Christians and Druze) may find their deals with the HTS not worth the figurative paper they're printed on.
UPDATE: Does Israel need to change its military approach to defeating Hamas? Can it? It might be a time for a more radical next phase, eh?
UPDATE: A CRS report to Congress provides a brief overview. The map provides no clarity to me about the situation in the Alawite homeland in the coastal regions. What does that map coding mean there? The text says Alawites and other groups with ties to the former Assad regime maintain presence there. Is this a fading remnant or a coalescing force to hold the region?
UPDATE: As Israel bombs Assad's chemical warfare arsenal left to the tender mercies of jihadi conquest, let's all breathe a sigh of relief at the brilliance of Secretary of State Kerry negotiating a deal with Russia and Syria to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons arsenal in 2013. Bravo.
UPDATE: More Arab militias in the SDF have defected to HTS. Also, Syria is looking very fragmented at this point, with even the Alawite coastal region's status unclear and HTS with a presence in very little of Syrian territory:
Further thoughts on whether Turkey will dominate Syria. Erdogan may want to relive Ottoman glories. But I doubt he can really control the monsters he unleashed.
UPDATE: I can understand why Syrians are joyous at the fall of Assad's murderous government. But Syrians aren't experiencing freedom. They are experiencing a power vacuum.
UPDATE: Losing Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah as active proxies sure puts a dent in Iran's strategy of fighting its enemies to the last dead Arab.
UPDATE: Notwithstanding HTS claims it is only interested in Islam in one country (Syria), who knows what it will do when it has the one:
Islamist rebels celebrating the fall of Damascus recently posted a video “promising that it’s just the start and that they will take Jerusalem next to free all the Gazans.”
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran spent years killing Iraqi troops using the justification that it simply had to go through Iraq to get at Israel.
Also, is Iran trying to restore its proxies by courting the Sunni al-Shabaab jihadis in Somalia?
UPDATE: One thing to keep in mind about Assad is that he was not a "at least he kills jihadis" ruler. He pushed jihadis to the top of the rebel pile to scare his supporters into fighting for him. He left ISIL alone, which an American-led coalition still fights; and after finally capturing Aleppo, he left what became HTS alone in Idlib, which turned out to be a fatal mistake.
UPDATE: Interesting:
Former regime soldiers in coastal areas of Syria are reportedly giving up their arms to HTS-led authorities as part of a settlement process. HTS announced the opening of settlement offices in Latakia on December 14. Social media users posted images of men lined up outside these offices on December 15.
Does this mean Alawites in local defense forces or just random conscripts from the armed forces? I don't know if this means HTS is exerting control over the coastal region.
UPDATE: Hezbollah has more reason to hold fire and comply with the ceasefire requirements:
Hezbollah was dealt a major blow during 14 months of war with Israel. The toppling of Assad, who had strong ties to Iran, has now crippled its ability to bounce back by cutting off a vital weapons-smuggling route through Syria.
If Hezbollah believed a ceasefire buys time to rearm, it needs a lot more time.
UPDATE: Are the Houthi the default next target?
The Iranian-backed Houthis increasingly appear to be alone in the attempts to attack Israel, as Iran and its other proxy groups have been weakened. They have not suffered a major setback since they began their attacks on Israel and on shipping in the aftermath of Hamas’s October 7 massacre.
With some diplomacy, Israel might get Egyptian and Saudi help because both need freedom of navigation through the Red Sea.
UPDATE: Alawites in Syria are rightfully fearful of Sunni Arab victors seeking vengeance. I don't know if Latakia is representative or simply a Russian outpost that naturally drew HTS coalition fighters to it. I've read some in the Alawite region are surrendering to HTS. But they may be soldiers with no particular ties to the region. The real issue is whether out in the more rural areas the Alawites are organizing and arming up to hold their homeland.
UPDATE: So far it doesn't look like the new rulers of Syria want to give Russia any base rights in Syria. The Russians seem to be concentrating in the west and preparing to get out. Could Russia be assessing whether the Alawites are strong enough to cut a separate deal? This could be part of the discussions:
The Russian-backed SAA 5th Corps in Lattakia is reportedly negotiating with the interim government to “merge its forces” into the new Syrian army.
ISW also reports that HTS continues to attract former regime forces as well as enemies of the former regime to rally under their banner.
For Israel, while Hezbollah and Iran are significantly weakened, Hamas keeps resisting in Gaza. How long will Israel wage that low-level fight? How long will Gazans be willing to suffer, stuck between Israeli measures to defeat Hamas (and the other smaller groups) and Hamas practice of using Gazans as human shields in battle and the resulting dead in the propaganda war?
The IDF stated its goal for this division is to provide a “rapid response” capability to crises that erupt around Israeli borders.
Does Israel anticipate a collapse of Hamas resistance in Gaza? Is building up forces in the West Bank an effort to prevent Hamas from trying a Plan B in the West Bank?
UPDATE: The Houthi might not be the next main enemy--especially as Syria is such a short-run unknown--but the Houthi certainly deserve attention:
Israel has said its fighter jets conducted a series of strikes against military targets in Yemen belonging to the Iran-backed Houthi movement in response to missile and drone attacks.
An Israeli military spokesman said the targets included Red Sea ports and energy infrastructure in the capital Sanaa.
Although when Israeli air operations targeting Assad's former weapons assets wind down, that could change.
UPDATE: Israel's Hezbollah and Hamas problems. But Israel gutted Hezbollah and the fall of the Iran-dominated Assad government in Syria cuts Hezbollah off from its major supply lines to Iran through Syria.
The Israeli army said an attempt to intercept a projectile launched from Yemen overnight, some 2,000 kilometres away, was unsuccessful.
Several people were injured after the projectile fell in Tel Aviv, the army said on Saturday.
UPDATE: After defeats in Gaza, in Lebanon, and in Syria, will Iran's mullah oligarchy be shaken at home by this?
Government offices in Iran are closed or operating at reduced hours. Schools and colleges have moved to online only. Highways and shopping malls have descended into darkness, and industrial plants have been denied power, bringing manufacturing to a near halt.
Although Iran has one of the biggest supplies of natural gas and crude oil in the world, it is in a full-blown energy crisis that can be attributed to years of sanctions, mismanagement, aging infrastructure, wasteful consumption — and targeted attacks by Israel.
If regime power is not feared, what might set off resistance at home? Tip to Instapundit.
UPDATE: What is next isn't clear as the dust from the Syria crisis, but Israel laid the legal framework for the next phase:
The Israeli parliament has voted to extend the state of emergency in the country for another year.
UPDATE: The Houthi should be trying to avoid eye contact with the Israelis. But no:
Following another rocket attack on the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, Israeli Air Force chief General Tomer Bar has announced tougher counter-attacks on the Houthi militia in Yemen.
UPDATE: Israel apparently struck the Houthi:
Witnesses and governing Houthi rebels said an airport and military base were targeted in the capital Sanaa, while a power station in the western port city of Hudaydah was also hit, the AFP news agency reported.
America has reason to strike after two friendly fire incidents (with one F-18 shot down by an American warship while the other plane's crew managed to evade the missile fired at it), too.
UPDATE: From the "Well, Duh" files:
Surprised by Oct. 7 and fearful of another attack, Israel weakened safeguards meant to protect noncombatants, allowing officers to endanger up to 20 people in each airstrike.
Slaughtering, raping, and kidnapping a thousand or so people as Hamas and its satellite monsters did on October 7, 2023 will do that.
This does not mean Israel is now violating rules of war. Military operations are limited in killing civilians only on the issue of whether their losses are justified by the military objective while shooting at a lawful military target. Further, an enemy that hides behind civilians is fully responsible for the deaths of civilians in combat.
This change just means that sh*t got super real and excessive caution during "peace" was thrown out the window. And keep in mind this still lets Hamas get away with using human shields. Review the rules here. In an update I include a good video explaining the rules.
The bottom line is that Hamas and its ilk are monsters who seek civilian casualties--their own and Israel's--and Israel is
lawfully fighting monsters to protect its civilians and even reduce enemy civilian casualties during lawful operations. To reduce Gazan casualties, Israel would need to let Hamas get away with using human shields, which will endanger Israeli civilians in the future. Hamas could lower civilian Gazan casualties
by surrendering or even just refusing to use human shields.
Putting a number on the balancing calculation is also false precision. Predicting losses is tough. And judging whether it is worth it is tougher. Killing 20 civilians to kill an enemy clerk-typists might seem to fail the test. But if that clerk-typist is processing an order that will lead to the deaths of scores of your soldiers or civilians, that changes the calculation quite a bit.
UPDATE: The sainted international community is the Hamas logistics arm as aid is stolen by the terrorists to sell to Gazans at hefty prices. Video of Gazans desperate to get what little is sold via official channels contribute to the myth of imminent starvation. Tip to Instapundit.
UPDATE: Huh:
The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport and claimed a drone attack targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area. The US THAAD air defense system intercepted the Houthi ballistic missile outside Israeli borders.
It works.
UPDATE: Hamas and affiliated terrorists continue to use human shields (tip to Instapundit):
Amid the ongoing counter-terrorism operation in northern Gaza, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a two-day raid on a ‘hospital’ doubling as a key Hamas command center in the area. The military arrested over 240 terrorists, including 15 who took part in the October 7 massacre.
UPDATE: Unless this is a feint, it looks like the new year will see the Houthi take priority as the target:
Israel is preparing to fight along a new front against Houthi militants in Yemen, striking back at the group for its drone and missile attacks and signaling a potential lengthy campaign that would take the battle far from Israel’s borders.
Will Israel get help from regional and major powers to reopen the Red Sea shipping lanes around Yemen?
UPDATE: The original war still goes on. But this multi-wave attack by Hamas (or allies) is interesting:
The fighters conducted a multi-wave attack targeting the IDF around Jabalia refugee camp with small arms and in groups that ranged from six to 30 fighters. The IDF has been clearing the area since October 2024. The IDF engaged the attacking Palestinian fighters with drone strikes and tank fire and killed around 106 fighters. This attack is noteworthy given it was significantly larger than most other militia operations in the Gaza Strip in recent months[.]
Why the large attack? Is Hamas rebuilding? Is this a death rattle as when doomed Japanese defenders on the verge of defeat on islands in World War II would launch massed suicide charges at American troops?
UPDATE: America launched air strikes on the Houthi and Israel hopes for American-led assistance to defeat the Houthi. I heard separately that Britain participated in the strikes.
NOTE: I will update this post for developments in the wider war Hamas sparked on October 7, 2023 with its rape, murder, and kidnap invasion of Israel.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
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