What is victory in the Winter War of 2022? A number of countries have a stake in calculating what it means.
When Russia invaded its victory conditions seemed simple--conquer Ukraine in a short and glorious parade through Ukraine.
Ukraine, once it survived the initial blow, victory was ejecting the invaders and the summer 2023 counteroffensive seemed to be the salvation that would provide that victory.
China trusted Russia would get a quick victory. This would let their vassal tie up more Western attention in Europe without exposing China's economy to blowback for having an aggressive Russia as its so-called partner.
And the West? I remain convinced that America assumed Ukraine would fall fast and simply wanted to shove in enough arms to sustain a post-conquest Ukrainian insurgency. And--more importantly--avoid looking like it did nothing to stop yet another enemy victory so soon after losing the Afghanistan war in a humiliating fashion. Europeans initially seemed more eager to stop Russia, especially those closest to Russia. But I don't know that most expected to have to spend on defense at the expense of social programs for very long.
The war goes on. Russia continues to expend lives at an accelerated rate--now including North Korean cannon fodders--to push deeper into Ukraine and reclaim Russian territory lost to Ukraine's Kursk incursion. Ukraine's manpower shortage makes the moving stalemate seemingly fragile. But sufficient Ukrainian ammunition (for now?) creates a less visible fragility on the Russian side of the equation. And Russia threw in a wild card by shooting down an Azerbaijan civilian airliners inside Russian territory.
The war is nearly three years old and that milestone is often the point when a country's people begin to lose their enthusiasm for fighting on to battlefield victory if another path is possible without clear defeat.
Russia--while still seemingly dismissive of its own casualties--seems to want acreage rather than trophy urban areas to define battlefield success:
It remains unclear which effort the Russian military command will prioritize, as Russian President Vladimir Putin may have tasked the Russian military with securing territorial gains rather than seizing significant settlements.
But Russia is sustaining heavy casualties, destroying their war-making materiel, and suffering growing economic hardships. Russia must figure out what can be sold as victory to justify its heavy losses. And must figure out how long Russians can endure the heavy losses in lives and living standards.
Yet Russia hasn't changed its definition of its war objective:
Russian President Vladimir Putin enshrined his alleged policy of Ukrainian "denazification" in a new state strategy document about countering extremism, demonstrating how Putin continues to make the same demands for the removal of the Ukrainian government that he made in 2022 when launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The bravado of demanding the same victory now as when Russia entered Ukraine in February 2022 expecting a parade makes me think Russia's demand is hollow--even as an opening bid for future negotiations. It may be a means to conceal weakness. Yet the mere fact of Russia's massive casualties makes getting anything less than total victory a potential domestic problem. How Putin can define Russian victory that also includes him winning--or surviving--seems difficult. Perhaps too difficult.
Ukraine has to decide whether just stopping--a cynic will say "pausing"--Russia's invasion can be defined as a victory after three years of fighting and dying to hold off and expel the brutal invadeers. Ukraine is exhausted and increasingly knows that short of a Russian military collapse that it cannot expel Russia from occupied Ukrainian territory. And believes Russia will renew the war just as soon as it can. And no doubt wonders how long the West will sustain its war effort if it declines a ceasefire, no matter how bad that deal is.
But one problem with ratifying the view that the "end" of suffering with a ceasefire rather than ejecting the Russians is victory for Ukraine is apparent when you describe the next step in practical terms:
[The West should] enable Ukraine to adopt a “porcupine model” of defense through their security cooperation. This would entail helping Ukraine develop a force that is optimized for defending the territory that Kyiv controls when the fighting ends, instead of providing training aimed at improving the ability to retake Russian-held territory.
A West unwilling to arm Ukraine now to liberate its territory won't suddenly be willing to do that after a ceasefire. Especially if Western troops man a border tripwire. Those troops will restrain Ukraine more than Russia. Because Russia knows Ukraine won't be able to launch an effective counteroffensive, Russia will be free to renew the conflict periodically to gain more ground and then declare peace when the figurative quills hurt too much. And if Russia warns Western tripwire forces to get out of the way or else, which Western leader will order their troops to remain and die when no Article V rescue is possible because Ukraine isn't a member of NATO and nuclear-armed Russia wouldn't be attacking NATO territory?
And this has nothing to do with my skepticism of so-called "porcupine" strategies in general--and specifically for Ukraine even before Russia invaded in 2022.
The West, which is not as solidly behind Ukraine as it once was, must decide whether it can sell an end to the war as close enough to the definition of victory to avoid a backlash. Note that in America people recoiled in horror at the defeat in Afghanistan notwithstanding a prior desire to get out of that war. And will Ukrainians be relieved if they see the West pushing to a ceasefire? Or will Ukrainians feel betrayed? And if they feel betrayed, will they resist in the next war with the vigor that they have displayed in this war? How does the West navigate this political minefield?
China has to decide what victory is, too. Is distracting America from Asia and the Pacific a victory? Is supporting Russia just enough to keep the war going in order to weaken Russia and pave the way to end a major part of China's "century of humiliation" a victory? But how does awakening Western (broadly including Japan and, South Korea, as I do) awareness of the need to rebuild a threadbare defense-industrial base to sustain a great power conventional war factor into Chinese calculations? Does China want to encourage Western rearmament by keeping the war going? Or would it be better to let Russia lose and hope to soothe the West into ending this spasm of defense realism?
I don't think there is a substitute for battlefield victory over Russia. But I don't get to write the Definitions Section. I wonder who will?
UPDATE (Tuesday): I've noted my long advice that Ukraine should trade space for time. This allows Ukraine to have a better kill ratio to tire the Russians. Yet as Ukraine loses ground this year I worry that this signifies a problem with Ukrainian morale rather than being my advice in action.
Strategypage cites German practice on the strategic defense on the World War II eastern front against Russian offensives to note Ukraine's strategy that provides "when Russian troops attack, they suffer substantial casualties as the Ukrainians continually retreat before the Russians can reach them."
I noted this World War II practice back in late 2023 as an example for Ukraine. But the small size of Russia's attacks now compared to World War II mean that Ukraine's step-back approach is on a lower scale. I do hope what I am seeing is a deliberate Ukrainian strategy rather than a sign of weakness. Indeed, if Russia sees the strategy as weakness it will encourage the Russians to keep attacking and losing men in a perhaps mistaken belief that Ukrainians rather than Russians are close to the breaking point.
But I can't know. All I know is that I can see the retreat on maps and I can't see the state of Russian and Ukrainian troops. Is this the tip of the iceberg or an isolated situation?
Russian field commanders are reportedly continuing to brutally punish Russians who refuse to fight in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that a Russian assault detachment commander deliberately mined fields near Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk) to prevent elements of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Guards Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA]) from withdrawing from forward positions in September 2024. Astra reported that the commander ordered a Russian serviceman to shoot Russian personnel who that withdrew from their positions.
Hell if I know. But I do know I also struggle with not making my hopes a valid piece of evidence.
UPDATE (Wednesday): ISW reports that Russia's pace of advance has noticeably declined in December without a decline in casualty rates.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Russia isn't acting like it is willing to negotiate an end to its invasion that doesn't provide Russia with a victory through diplomacy that force of arms hasn't achieved:
The year is ending with a pair of sharp messages between top advisers to Russian leader Vladimir Putin and President-elect Trump.We'll see.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War and the related Syria events in this post.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: I made the image with Bing.
