The Major Causes of Iraq's Insurgency and Civil War?

The Army study of the Iraq War (volumes one and two) blames American mistakes for the gradual descent into full insurgency and civil war. Really?

The Army study writes that "deep" de-Baathification of the state apparatus and military formations was a mistake. And that combined with "abortive reconstruction efforts" and "unmet popular expectations" were "major contributors to gradual descent into full insurgency and civil war." [my emphasis]

I don't think the history of the war through its phases justifies the conclusion that those failures were major contributors of subsequent violence.

And I'll avoid debating whether the sectarian killing that developed over time should be called a "civil war" or not. I don't feel on firm ground for that, perhaps overly influenced by the form of America's civil war in this issue, but still resist elevating it to civil war (in 2014 it was arguably more of a civil war as ISIL built a state on their territory).

So the study description of the issues bothers me. Define "major contributors" and what of helpful effects of de-Baathification?

I find it hard to believe that the Sunni Arab Baathists, who mostly believed they deserved to run Iraq despite its Shia majority--and had done so for centuries whether under independent Iraq or past imperial control--and even believed they were a majority of the population rather than 20%, would have accepted their smaller role in Iraq if reconstruction was done better.

How fast could reconstruction go when Saddam's regime was responsible for the sad state of the infrastructure rather than American-led coalition actions. As I understand it, our efforts to avoid harming the infrastructure as we advanced into Iraq in 2003 to preclude the need to rebuild foundered on the fact that the infrastructure was in bad shape because little was done since 1991 to keep it in repair. Surely that was known in Iraq, giving expectations a healthy dose of reality. And if it did not, how is failure to apply magical solutions our fault?

And insurgents destroyed as we rebuilt. Where do we draw the line between failure to rebuild and the ability of enemies to destroy or prevent rebuilding?

Further, what level of rebuilding to meet expectations would have prevented al Qaeda from invading Iraq?

And what level of rebuilding would have prevented Iran from undermining Iraq by supporting Shia fanatics?

Remember that the Army speaks of a gradual descent into full insurgency and civil war. My memory of the situation is that the fight against Baathist resistance lasting from May 2003 to February 2004 was largely successful, including the capture of Saddam and killing of his psycho lads. Lack of reconstruction progress/perceptions of unmet expectations and de-Baathification didn't prevent that.

But in March 2004 a new problem of al Qaeda and the Iran-backed Shia gunmen arose. In that dual uprising, half of the Iraqi security forces collapsed. Am I to believe that shallow de-Baathification would have prevented that collapse? Or would Baathist leadership in the army and government taken their units and government entities over to the enemies to become enemy assets rather than simply being ineffective?

Would Baathist domination of the state and military even after the destruction of the Saddam regime just made Iran's job of gaining the allegiance of the Shia majority easier?

The study seems to forget that there were worse options than weak Iraqi government and security institutions working with us.

We met that challenge in 2004. By 2005 it seemed like elections and holding the line against enemies really would allow us to withdraw a lot of troops by the end of the year. I thought it possible. Again, the problems the study indicates contributed to insurgency and civil war didn't seem to stop this progress.

It was only in 2006 after  the February bombing of the Samarra Shia Golden Mosque that Shia-Sunni Arab killings really took off as the Shias began to respond in kind to the Sunni Arab attacks on Shias. Even that was gradual, not really taking off until the summer.

So the gradual rise in sectarian violence didn't fully take off until 2006, three years after the invasion. Was that really the fault of initial reconstruction errors, unmet expectations, and deep de-Baathification?

Of course, the surge offensive (and Awakening don't forget, plus the contribution of more Iraqi forces trained to fight) beginning in 2007 finally broke al Qaeda and by spring 2008 the Shia gunmen were knocked back. Was reconstruction really better by then? Were Iraqi expectations of reconstruction being met?

Maybe I'm being picky about word choice.

Yes, de-Baathification harmed the ability to staff government and security institutions. But what problems would we have had with the majorities if the tormentors of the majority had been retained to run the government and security forces?

Yes, poor infrastructure harmed people but Saddam let it rot and enemies attacked what we rebuilt, even if our efforts failed to appreciate the scale of requirements when we invaded.

But how are unrealistic expectations something we could have dealt with?

And wasn't the decision of Iran to support Shia death squads more of a problem?

Wasn't Syria's decision to funnel Sunni terrorists into Iraq more of a problem?

Wasn't al Qaeda's decision to make Iraq the major battlefield in their war on America (and al Qaeda's hatred of democracy as un-Islamic that we worked to build) rather than remaining in Afghanistan more of a problem?

Wasn't the Baathist/Sunni Arab decision to resist losing their sweet gig as a minority exploiting the majority more of a problem?

And recall that all those factors the Army cited as causing insurgency didn't stop the Sunni Arabs in Anbar province from flipping against al Qaeda in the Awakening finally engineered at the end of 2006.

I don't dispute that the 3 factors the study cites played a role--perhaps even "major" depending on how you define that--in extending the fighting. But other factors seem to swamp them in importance.

Our military usefully notes that the enemy gets a vote, too. Sometimes the enemy "votes" outweigh anything we could do to "vote" on the outcome. And many enemies voted to fight the new Iraqi government and the coalition forces defending that government.

Mind you, I'm glad the Army is willing to take a critical look at its practices to improve on performance. But so far the lengthy Army study seems overly critical, missing the important point that we won the war. Is the basic problem that any war studied in enough detail is indistinguishable from defeat?

I am suspending final judgments on this study until I make it through the lengthy two volumes. I'm kind of taking notes by commenting on portions as I read it that jump out at me. And so far some of the takes run counter to my impression from watching the war unfold. Yet I don't want to be incapable of changing my views on new information.

But online reading sucks and I'm going slowly.