[There] are strong reasons to believe such an Alawite state would not be welcomed by ordinary Alawites, and would not succeed in any event.
His main objections are that not all Alawites share in the regime's preferential financial benefits; that as a result most Alawites will side with a Sunni Syria that does not seek revenge; that the Sunni-dominated enlisted personnel would not fight for a rump Syria; that a coastal enclave in Alawite areas isn't enough of a state to survive; and that a coastal enclave would look like a Crusader state hearkening back to colonialism.
The last is just silly. If anything, the Crusades were about liberating the Holy Land from Moslem conquerors.
Of the rest, the first is surely true as far as the premise. Yet in Iraq, Sunnis fought against the Shia majority despite the fact that the Baathists had the wealth and not all Sunni Arabs. Alawites--even poor ones--were at the top of the pyramid in rank. And unless that second objection is rooted in rock solid promises of no retribution--in the Middle East, no less--and believed by the Alawites, forget that happy surrender and let's not argue over who killed who.
The army question is already answered since the Assad regime only trusts a fraction of the army and intelligence and police formations loyal to Assad. The Sunni conscripts are already confined to base. So Assad has the army he'll have in Core Syria.
The most meaningful objection is that the coast where the Alawites are a majority are not viable as a state. I think this is right. Which is why I've suggested that Assad needs Syria running in an arc from the Alawite coastal areas to Damascus and south to the Israeli and Jordanian borders. Such a state--with Alawites and other loyal minorities pulled into the new borders and some Sunnis expelled--could have a population only half Sunni. Remember, Assad doesn't need a pure Alawite state. He just needs to not be outnumbered so much that weapons and brutality aren't pointless.
Retreating to a Core Syria may fail in the end. But trying to hold all of Syria will fail sooner. With chemical weapons to deter enemy intervention and Russian support on the ground, Assad at least has a chance to live to fight another day.
UPDATE: The idea that Assad might want to retreat to a Core Syria is going mainstream.
But this seems right in that Core Syria doesn't mean Pure Alawite Syria:
But if Sunni rebels take Damascus, resistance in an Alawite enclave could not hold out, wrote University of Oklahoma professor Joshua Landis, who runs a popular blog on Syria.
"Assad has done nothing to lay the groundwork for an Alawite state," he said. "There is no national infrastructure in the coastal region to sustain a state: no international airport, no electric power plans, no industry of importance, and nothing on which to build a national economy."
"Whoever owns Damascus and the central state will own the rest of Syria in short order."
Again, Assad doesn't need a pure Alawite state to survive. He just needs better odds against the Sunnis.
Core Syria doesn't mean abandoning Damascus--and it really can't mean that.
