Thursday, July 05, 2012

That's Gonna Leave a Mark

The son of the long-time Syrian defense minister (who was a Sunni) under Assad the Elder, who commands a brigade in the Republican Guard, defected to Turkey:

In what would be the most high-profile defection from the inner circle of the Syrian leadership, Manaf Tlas, a friend of President Bashar al-Assad and a brigadier in his Republican Guard, was reported on Wednesday to have fled to Turkey.

That seems significant to me.

As does this:

Syrian troops pushed into the rebel-held northern town of Khan Sheikhoun on Thursday, activists said. They said the security forces killed at least 11 people in an armored assault from the south at dawn after a fierce bombardment.

"They are burning houses and farms," local activist Abu al-Ghaith al-Khani said, adding that 80 percent of residents had fled.

In a defiant interview with a Turkish newspaper, Assad blamed the revolt on Islamist militants from hostile Arab states and a Western plot to break up Syria or stoke civil war.

"The big game targeting Syria is much bigger than we expected," he told Cumhuriyet daily. "The fight against terrorism will continue decisively in the face of this.

Efforts in the north could possibly mean an effort to nail down a rump Syria for Assad to rule. Claiming that sinister Western plots to split up Syria might give Assad an excuse to retreat to a core area and claim he is countering such a plot to deny the conspiracy the sign of victory--Assad's overthrow.

Could Assad portray his survival in a rump Syria as a victory over that conspiracy?

Would Russia be happy with and support a rump Syria that allows Russia to maintain a naval base at Tartus? A bunch of Russian troops there would be a clear sign of support for the future of whatever Syria under Assad survives this uprising.

And Russia has a sudden interest in potentially massive Israeli energy resources that would make a Russian naval presence nearby important indeed (tip to Instapundit):

The new Israeli-Russian agreement is part of a conscious strategy by the Israeli government to use its nascent energy wealth to improve its embattled political position.

Israel has long preferred the Devil they know in Assad, who kept the common border quiet despite Syria's support for terrorists who attack Israel. Could Israel actually get to keep the Devil they know in a truncated Syria, weakened and reliant on Russia who has even more interest in keeping the Syria-Israel border quiet?