This report examines Iraq without the American military presence that I (and many others) wanted to secure Iraq's move toward democracy and rule of law. Deterring Iran from attacking Iraq would have been a secondary goal to giving Iraqis confidence that Iran would not invade and so make their development of democracy and rule of law more secure.
Even without American troops on the ground in a visible safety net, Iraq can succeed:
There is no one scenario for Iraq’s future, and civil war and ethnic and sectarian division is only one possibility, The more likely scenario still seems to be one of lower levels of continued sectarian and ethnic rivalry struggle without going back to the civil war of 2005-2008. This could either force Iraq into a real national government or to turn back to the US. It is also possible that sheer popular “war fatigue” and several years of adjustment will create a political climate and mix of Iraqi security forces that will become steadily more competent on their own.
What is probable in virtually all near term scenarios is that the US and Iran will continue to compete for influence in Iraq, especially in aid, political development, military sales, and security training. This competition will not only have a major impact on Iraq, but the far broader range of US and Iranian competition in the Arab world – especially the Southern Gulf, in Turkey, and in dealing with Iran’s efforts to create an area of influence that includes Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon and which poses a major challenge to Israel.
I hope we are open to returning troops to Iraq if the Iraqi government can agree that they need us on the ground. Iraq proved we will go when asked. Perhaps in the new year, after our election, there will be more fruitful discussions.
In the meantime, our ground presence in Kuwait with our ability to rapidly reinforce those troops could be useful if we strike Iran's nuclear facilities and Iran tries to unleash pro-Iran Shia gangs and death squads inside Iraq. US troops might again be needed on the ground to reassure Iraqis that a major Iraqi campaign against Sadrists and their Iranian backers isn't an excuse for a general crack down on their still-fragile liberty.
For now, we need to push every avenue we have available to bolster Iraq's chances for success by encouraging rule of law and resistance to Iranian influence; hope it is enough; and prepare plans for the worst, ready to defend the First Arab Spring with more direct assistance.