The fact is, we had post-war plans for Iraq. But some assumptions didn't work out, including the failure to foresee the decision by Iran and al Qaeda to wage war there after we overthrew the Saddam regime. Amazingly, we never made Syria or Iran pay for that decision to wage war on us to stop them. We won anyway, but it was harder than it had to be.
But not as hard as it would have been if we'd rewarded Iran and Syria by making them part of the solution, as Senator Obama wanted in 2006.
And we went to war against Libya's Khadaffi without much of a plan for the war or the post-war.
Worse, President Obama ordered a surge in Afghanistan with a military plan that cannot be followed because the administration ended the last surge too soon.
Remember, the president didn't give the military as many troops as they wanted. In response, our military planned a staged offensive focusing on the south in 2010 and then moving to the east. After knocking down the enemy in those areas, we could draw down surge troops and hand over security duties in an easier environment to Afghan forces.
But we began the second Obama surge drawdown a year ago and finished it this summer. We did that before we could go on offense in Regional Command East. All year I looked for signs we'd go on offense there with our troops. There were mixed signs. But we never did make a main effort with our troops. In the end our main effort in the east consisted of pushing Afghan forces into the lead role while our forces are still there to help.
I'm not saying we can't win this way. I still think we can. But it isn't the plan we made for the surge. The "plan" is sacred, I thought. Yet we tossed it aside.
And we make it harder on the Afghans by failing to hammer the jihadis before drawing down:
A diminished but resilient al-Qaida, whose 9/11 attacks drew America into its longest war, is attempting a comeback in Afghanistan's mountainous east even as U.S. and allied forces wind down their combat mission and concede a small but steady toehold to the terrorist group.
That concerns U.S. commanders, who have intensified strikes against al-Qaida cells in recent months. It also undercuts an Obama administration narrative portraying al-Qaida as battered to the point of being a nonissue in Afghanistan as Western troops start leaving.
The Taliban, obviously, have the same opportunity in the east with their Pakistan sanctuary behind them.
We have two years to develop a security force in Afghanistan that Afghans can afford. Remember, they don't have to be as good as our troops. Just better than the enemy. Only a fraction have to even approach our standards. Many can be lower quality local defense forces. As long as better quality forces are nearby to reinforce the lesser quality defenders, they'll do fine. As long as the Taliban don't operate in forces larger than platoon strength very often, that is. Our continued presence with trained troops and air power will be critical in keeping the enemy atomized.
Have no doubt, we need those two years:
Top Pentagon leaders, White House advisers and members of Congress from both parties have long regarded the rapid expansion of Afghanistan’s army and police as a crucial element of the U.S. exit strategy. For years, they reasoned that generating a force of 352,000 soldiers and policemen would enable the Afghan government to keep fighting Taliban insurgents after U.S. and NATO troops end their combat mission.
The U.S. military has nearly met its growth target for the Afghan forces, but they are nowhere near ready to assume control of the country.
The Afghans have a way to go, but in Iraq there were complaints that Iraqi security forces wouldn't be good enough. There were the same complaints about how many Iraqi battalions could operate without US support. In general, Iraqi troops have been good enough. Although our continued military presence would have been a force multiplier and a deterrent to corruption that weakens the Iraqi security forces.
Right now, we plan to train Afghans and remain in Afghanistan even after 2014 when we hand off primary duties to Afghan forces. That will be an improvement over Iraq.
But one plan was discarded. Afghans can be forgiven if they wonder if our new plan will be followed.
