Sunday, October 21, 2012

Defending Mother Russia

Putin has held high-visibility nuclear exercises. These weapons are Russia's only real weapon to protect their long borders given their conventional weakness. But what level of territorial loss would really trigger their use? If China declares ownership of their former territory in Russia's Far East is now a "core interest," is that territory also a core interest of Russia to risk nuclear war to hold?

Russia's conventional military has collapsed far below the level Russia needs to defend their territory. They need nukes to keep an enemy from marching on Moscow. So showing off their still-potent nuclear deterrent is necessary:

President Vladimir Putin took a leading role in the latest tests of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, the most comprehensive since the 1991 Soviet collapse, the Kremlin said on Saturday.

The exercises, held mostly on Friday, featured prominently in news reports on state television which seemed aimed to show Russians and the world that Putin is the hands-on chief of a resurgent power.

Tests involving command systems and all three components of the nuclear "triad" - land and sea-launched long-range nuclear missiles and strategic bombers - were conducted "under the personal leadership of Vladimir Putin", the Kremlin said.

But the threat of nuclear retaliation is really only credible when national survival is at stake. Would Russia really nuke China, for example, if China merely took Vladivostok and limited border regions in the Far East?

If Russia lobbed nukes at China for that, China would then nuke European Russia, possibly including Moscow. Is the threat really credible when you consider that? Remember, the threat of nuclear retaliation is to preserve your nation. But using nukes when it prompts a nuclear response that devastates your nation is rather missing the point, isn't it?

This was always our problem with our extended nuclear deterrent during the Cold War. There was always the question of whether we'd really risk New York City for West Berlin, or Tokyo, or Seoul, or wherever. That's why we didn't rely on nukes alone and wanted a robust conventional ability to win.

Of course, the very fact that you can't be sure what your foe will do under pressure regardless of what is considered rational by your side is one reason not to take that first step of inflicting a harm you believe falls short of the nuclear threshold.

In theory, you can say that a country will use nukes if national existence is threatened. And you can say with good confidence that a country won't use nukes in response to a terror attack or cyber-attack or in a border skirmish where a few hundred square yards of territory changes hand. But between those extremes, where is the dividing line?

Defining rationality when nukes are involved is a very high stakes game with terrible consequences if you get it wrong. Russia needs a better conventional defense capability in the Far East so they don't have to try to guess right on this question.