Indeed, since jihadis moved into northern Mali in the wake of the Tuareg secession, I've expected US logistical and special forces help. Since the Benghazi attack, I've expected a US strike on al Qaeda in Mali regardless of what the French do.
But France will push West Africans and Mali forces to do the job:
France's defense minister says an international military operation to help oust Islamic militants from northern Mali will get under way in a matter of weeks.
Jean-Yves Le Drian spoke to France 2 television on Tuesday, days after the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution clearing the way for the deployment of foreign troops to Mali.
He said France will not send any troops, but will provide logistical support.
Three thousand troops from numerous ECOWAS troops won't cut it. Note what the ECOWAS troops are expected to do:
ECOWAS has offered to send about 3,000 soldiers to stabilize Mali, rebuild the country's army and help oust the militants in the north.
In addition to moving north, those 3,000 will help train the Mali army to fight (it disintegrated in a coup attempt that paved the way for Tuareg secession) and stabilize the south so that the civil war amongst Malian factions doesn't reignite. Just how many ECOWAS forces will be available to move north?
Three thousand French Foreign Legion troops could spearhead the counter-attack.
We'll see how long France lets the local counter-offensive flail before committing troops.
UPDATE: The problem with leading from behind is that the only thing in front is the enemy. Our chosen tools to lead aren't up to the task:
The UN has authorized a military operation in northern Mali (now held by al Qaeda and other Islamic radical groups) but only if the African troops assigned to the task are made ready. The United States and EU (European Union) are planning to support the ECOWAS intervention force with cash, weapons, transportation and technical services (like mine clearing). The U.S. and EU will not commit their own combat troops to the operation. ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) has offered an intervention force (mostly Nigerians) but the UN points out that these troops are not ready for a campaign in the northern Mali desert.
I've long argued that neither the Mali nor the ECOWAS forces can do the job. Northern Mali is huge, so it may seem odd that I think a single French Foreign Legion regiment could defeat the northern forces. But Strategypage also notes that such a campaign would be "mainly about capturing half a dozen cities and large towns, where the Islamic radicals are the strongest[.]" Mali and ECOWAS forces would be capable of garrisoning what the trained French regiments captures, freeing the French to keep moving north.
The main hope at this point is that the Tuaregs are ready to turn on the jihadis if they can get more autonomy within Mali rather than demanding independence with jihadis wrecking their lives. If the Tuaregs rise up and mobilize their men knowing southern forces are coming, that might work. Otheerwise, the jihadis are too strong (and brutal) in the urban areas for the Tuaregs to handle.
But if there is a countdown, a lot must be done to get the ECOWAS and Mali forces ready to move and not just be defeated and sent running south.
Remember, different actors have different objectives.
Jihadis want a safe haven where they can tell people how to live and plan attacks on the West.
Tuaregs want autonomy--although they might revert to wanting independence once the jihadis are defeated.
Mali wants their north back; with a major distraction the state of who governs Mali.
France wants to retain influence in their former colonial area and must be seen as a reliable partner to African states there. But could France continue their small role in Afghanistan, prepare for action in Syria, and intervene decisively in Mali?
ECOWAS doesn't like the example of secession or military coup to stand; and they don't want jihadis near them.
The African Union doesn't like the example of secession or military coup; but the jihadis are far enough away for most African states to figure they have their own problems to deal with.
Europe doesn't want a jihadi safe haven that might threaten Europe.
America doesn't want a jihadi safe haven that might threaten us worldwide; and we want to strike back for al Qaeda in Mali's role in the Benghazi attack. The administration would probably like some action to take place in the next couple weeks before our election.
How all these actors will act in accordance with what they want will be interesting. Everyone but the jihadis want to lead from behind because of their own weakness or lack of interest to justify a major commitment of force.
