Israel just prepped the battlefield. The next time aircraft are spotted coming toward Gaza, Hamas leaders will scatter from their headquarters to avoid the missiles. They wish they'd done that this time.
But the next time planes come at them, an Israeli ground offensive will roll in too. And regardless of whether Israel hits all those security installations, by scattering to avoid the air attacks, the Hamas rulers will lose their command and control capabilities for many hours. Hamas fighters and terrorists will then be headless and easier to kill by a coordinated Israeli ground offensive.
The Israelis have continued the aerial attacks a second day:
Israeli warplanes pressing one of Israel's deadliest assaults ever on Palestinian militants dropped bombs and missiles on a top security installation and dozens of other targets across Hamas-ruled Gaza on Sunday.
Infantry and armored units headed to the Gaza border for a possible ground invasion, as the Israeli Cabinet authorized a callup of thousands of reserve soldiers. Some 280 Palestinians died in the first 24 hours of the campaign against Gaza rocket squads — most of them Hamas police.
Unbowed by 250 Israeli airstrikes, militants fired dozens of rockets and mortars at border communities Sunday. Two rockets struck close to the largest city in southern Israel, Ashdod, some 38 kilometers (23 miles) from Gaza, reaching deeper into Israel than ever before. The targeting of Ashdod confirmed Israel's concern that militants are capable of putting major cities within rocket range. No serious injuries were reported in any of the attacks Sunday.
Hamas is not prepared to halt their long campaign of firing rockets at Israeli civilians despite the aerial punishment. This should be no shock. Hezbollah kept firing rockets in large numbers at Israel in 2006 despite far heavier aerial bombardment.
The article also notes this effect which I figured was part of the plan:
Senior Hamas leaders went into hiding before the offensive began, shutting off their phones.
It is unclear if this means prior to yesterday's attacks or today's. Ares thinks that this campaign is attempting to take advantage of the fact that Hamas is a government with aspirations to conventional-type military force that means Hamas has assets that can now be destroyed from the air (tip to Strategypage emails):
It now seems that such objectives have been laid down. The realistic goal of any military operation should not be to oust Hamas, which would take too long and cost too much, but rather, to undermine its military capabilities and weakeni its regime. Such an operation must end with a clear bilateral truce based on terms Israel can live with.
The IDF is delivering powerful surgical blows, simultaneously, from the air, the ground and the sea, against selected prime targets in the Gaza Strip in a manner that would jeopardize the Hamas regime in Gaza.
For months, military analysts have seen that Hamas was creating a full-scale army in the Gaza strip. This may create substantial difficulties for a massive Israeli ground operation, if it is conducted according to expected military procedures, using access routes already known by the enemy and prepared with IEDs.
However, if reliable, accurate and (as far as possible) real-time intelligence is available, it's possible to achieve strategic success against an enemy who has known and identified military installations. Targets such as training camps, supply depots, weapon construction facilities, command and control centers are legitimate high-value targets, which once destroyed weaken the former guerilla organization considerably.
Moreover, a military-style organization can be robbed of its cohesive operation if its senior leaders are targeted and its communications network is disrupted or effectively jammed. One should not forget the immense effect of the 2004 assassination of Sheikh Yassin and his replacement Rantissi on Hamas’ activities, which virtually ceased for nearly six months.
This is not an unreasonable conclusion. I made much the same comment when the Palestinians elected Hamas.
However, what has changed is the 2006 Hezbollah War. Hamas in the past had little ability to project military power past its border. Israel could punish Hamas in Gaza and Hamas would have a choice of enduring without being able to strike back or halting until they could sneak suicide bombers into Israel. Now, with lots of rockets, Hamas can continue to fight. And the 2006 war showed that air power can't shut off the rocket barrage.
As for casualties among Gazans? Sadly, more martyrs, but oh well. You can't make a Jew-free Middle East without breaking a few Palestinian families. Why would the Hamas true believers care more about the lives of fellow Moslems than any other group of jihadi thugs who've eagerly slaughtered Moslems in Iraq or elsewhere? That's also a common attitude in the Middle East, as demonstrated by eager Moslem protesters who aren't fighting Israelis--they'll fight Israel to the last Palestinian.
Why would Hamas easily agree to a formal ceasefire? Why not endure, keep fighting, and hope that European and Arab countries can put pressure on Israel to stop "picking on those poor Palestinians"? Heck, might not Hamas believe the United States will join that chorus by about the end of January 2009?
And we are to believe that the Israeli analysis of the Hizbollah War concluded that they relied on air power and failed--yet think air power can work in Gaza? I don't think so. Early in the year the Israeli army indicated they were ready to invade if ordered. The Ares post notes that ground forces are moving into position.
As the Ares post notes, the aerial attacks disrupt the enemy's cohesion. If the Israelis can't invade Gaza in the face of enfeebled Hamas resistance despite IEDs, occupy Gaza for the weeks it will take to really tear up the leadership of Hamas and root out/destroy their infrastructure of political control and offensive terror (and plant surveillance devices where they can), why have an army at all?
I'm still expecting a ground invasion. Israel retreated from Gaza once, so I don't expect Israel has the stomach to reoccupy the place for an indefinite amount of time. But defanging Hamas will weaken them at home in the long run despite any short-term rallying effect and will make Hamas anger at Israel less threatening without longer range rockets in the medium term until they can rearm.
Solutions in the Middle East are rarely complete. They are either temporary or just allow another problem to become the most dangerous. But you work with what you've got.
Who knows? Maybe one day the Palestinians will stop being the most self-destructive people on the planet and end their role as television and web entertainment for the Moslem world and large swathes of Europe eager to see somebody (But not themselves! So why no talk of chicken-hawks there?) fight those "damned Jews."
