For months, Congress has been asking how soon the military could roll out "some sort of Awakening movement"—a reference to the Iraq program—in Afghanistan, according to U.S. officials. After initially being rejected by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the plan was developed this fall and approved just over two weeks ago.
But some senior U.S. officials worry privately about launching a program modeled on the U.S.-financed militias of Iraq, given the considerable differences in the wars.
I hope we understand the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan enough to avoid the mistake of trying to make Iraqi solutions fit in the very different Afghanistan.
Victory in Afghanistan won't look like victory in Iraq. I'm just not as ambitious about Afghanistan.
We have different objectives and a different environment. And so simplistically moving the surge strategy of Iraq to Afghanistan as if it is a recipe for success won't work. We need to first figure out our objective and accept that victory will look different than in Iraq.
Strategypage makes me feel better about our efforts:
The "Taliban" (religiously conservative, and violent, factions) are on a mission from God to impose strict lifestyle rules, and turn the country into a religious dictatorship. The Taliban were unable to do that by the end of 2001, and are less likely to do it in the future. But fueled by a share of the drug profits and the proceeds of other criminal enterprises (especially extortion and kidnapping) they can still entice poor, but adventurous, country boys to come along and raise some hell. And usually get killed by smart bombs the star struck kids cannot comprehend. Meanwhile, more and more of the tribes are getting a clue and making peace with the central government. While the national rulers tend to be thieves, they are also willing to share the loot. That's another ancient Afghan custom, and U.S. and NATO commanders are willing to play along in order to prevent the country from slipping back into anarchy (real anarchy, not the Taliban terrorism that passes for it these days) and once more becomes a terrorist haven. The foreign generals believe it will take another year or two of smart bomb magic to kill enough thrill seeking tribesmen, to get all the tribes on board. The math is simple; the foreign troops can kill Afghans much better than the other way around. Even the most pro-Taliban tribes eventually come to realize that, and live with it. The country will not be peaceful at that point. There will still be the drug gangs and bandits (groups of armed tribesmen out of steal or settle some feud). But that's been going on for thousands of years, and won't change until the national police get themselves pulled together. That will take another generation or two. For most Afghans, "police" is an alien concept, and the corruption of most of the cops in service has been really bad public relations.
So our military clearly does understand the differences. We will bolster local defense forces rather than count on trying to make the central government in Kabul an effective force throughout the country. And we will help these militias with a surge of forces while we pound the difficult tribes until they come to terms with the central government. Still, does Congressional leadership understand the differences or will they try to insist on a rigid recipe in Afghanistan?
If true, our surge of forces really will be limited in time (a couple years) and not just an open-ended escalation that puts more of our troops at risk should we lose our Pakistan supply line.
And the end result will be a friendly "mayor" of Kabul, mostly friendly tribes, and an Afghanistan that is not a haven for al Qaeda. That will be good enough for me.
And when the war is over and violence is down to normal levels and restricted to normal non-jihadi reasons, we will need to remain engaged in Afghanistan not just at the nominal national level but down to the tribes and clans out in the hinterland. It will be a good place to start post-Westphalian foreign policy.
