Trying to create a stable unified Afghanistan is folly given the history of the region. I've never had high goals for the place and I've worried that our surge planned for Afghanistan is wrongly seeking to carry out the same strategy as in Iraq.
If we are to surge forces to Afghanistan, I hope that it truly is a temporary surge to accomplish a specific mission and not simply an escalation that increases our risk should Pakistan decide that defending our supply lines are not a priority. So far, even Pakistani jihadi attacks that destroy 160 military vehicles bound for Afghanistan are no more than nuisance attacks that won't affect our operations in Afghanistan. We can adapt to these disruptions until replacements arrive. But a total cut off would be a disaster.
We seem to be on the right track in Afghansitan if this reflects our goals:
General McKiernan said in a recent address to the Atlantic Council that he was trying to develop a “bottom up” approach in which tribal elders, religious figures and other community leaders would form local councils that would be given the authority and resources to help with security. American officials have been trying to win Mr. Karzai’s support for the effort, which would establish community national guard units in local districts to supplement the efforts of the Afghan Army and the police.
This is exactly what I've been looking for:
We need to deal with the Afghan tribes to subcontract much of the security task in a feudal version of federalism, and we need to control the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan until the Pakistan sanctuary for the Taliban and al Qaeda can be destroyed.
Afghanistan is not Vermont waiting to happen and we need to conform our objectives to what is possible:
Arguments over how much of the country the Taliban, or the government, controls, misses the point. No one controls the country, and no one ever has. Afghanistan has always been a patchwork of tribal and warlord fiefdoms, with lots of no-man's land in between. You can look it up. Efforts to recruit and train an effective national police force, and competent government officials is hampered by low literacy and education levels, and general preference for corrupt practices. There's also a long tradition of using violence to settle disputes. It's going to take decades to change the Afghan fundamentals.
It's all about the nuance, people. And our objective, of course.
